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FOREWORD 
This issue of  the Economic Survey of  Latin America and the Caribbean once 
again differs  in important respects from  earlier years. Like the issue 
published in 1995, it covers some aspects of  economic performance  during 
the first  half  of  the current year, the aim being to provide continuity by 
following  economic developments up to the time of  writing insofar  as 
information  is available. 
As in 1995, the Survey is in a single volume containing both a regional 
analysis and reports on individual countries. For the first  time, however, the 
regional analysis includes a chapter on employment and wages and another 
on saving and investment, subjects treated the year before  in the chapter on 
level of  activity, inflation  and employment. Other new elements are chapters 
on structural reforms  and on the fragility  of  the Latin American banking 
system. Some statistical tables are presented in the volume, but most of  the 
tables are contained in an annex on diskette, last year distributed separately 
but this year included with the printed Survey. 
The most important new features  concern the statistical data. First, 1980 
is no longer used as the base year for  the series of  national accounts statistics 
at constant prices; beginning with this issue they are calculated taking 1990 
as the base year. Second, a new methodology, based on the fifth  rather than 
the fourth  edition of  the Balance of  Payments  Manual  of  the International 
Monetary Fund, has been used to analyse the external sector. The change 
in methodology affects  series trends and composition in the following  ways: 
The region's trade surplus (goods and services) at current prices and 
the loss due to terms-of-trade  effects  both appear smaller, because in 
1980 the prices for  the region's exports were higher than in subsequent 
years. 
The ratio of  gross fixed  investment to gross domestic product appears 
significantly  higher (more than three percentage points), especially in 
the case of  Brazil, Colombia and Peru. 
Output growth rates are somewhat different  than when calculated on 
the old basis, the differences  being due largely to the reduced 
importance of  some primary sectors, such as agriculture in El Salvador 
and mining in Peru. 
The figures  for  exports and imports and hence their weight relative to 
services are increased considerably by the inclusion of  transactions of 
the maquila  industry, which in the previous issue were reported in the 
non-factor  services account and only to the extent of  their value added; 
by the same token, the figure  for  services is lower under the new 
method. 
Transfers  are no longer classified  as private and official,  but instead 
are divided into current and capital; the effect  is to reduce the current 
account deficit  significantly,  since a considerable proportion of  the 
official  transfers  that used to be reported on the capital account as 
official  are now reported on the current account. 
The capital account, which has undergone major changes, is now 
referred  to as the "capital and financial  account"; investment in the 
reporting economy and investment abroad by residents are reported 
separately, whereas before  only the net figure  was given. Portfolio 
investment is no longer broken down into long- and short-term, a 
distinction that is made only for  "other investment", which refers 
chiefly  to loans by banks and by multilateral and governmental 
entities. Investment in bonds is now reported under portfolio 
investment, which is broken down into equity securities (stocks) and 
debt securities (bonds). The change is not trivial, because it means that 
portfolio  investment can no longer be characterized as uniformly 
highly volatile. 
With respect to the financing  of  the overall balance (the items below 
the line), a new category has been added, that of  "exceptional 
financing,"  comprising regular International Monetary Fund loans and 
funds  from  emergency aid packages like those granted to Argentina 
and Mexico in 1995, which involved very large sums. The category 
also covers interest payment arrears, which used to be sizeable for 
most countries, but are now large only for  Nicaragua and Peru, 




I. MAIN TRENDS 
In  1995 the economies of  Latin  America 
and the Caribbean  were deflected  from 
the course they had been following  since 
the start  of  the decade  and suffered 
stagnation  in regional  output,  a decline  in 
investment  and a rise in unemployment; 
on the other hand,  inflation  continued  to 
decline  in nearly  all  countries  and 
external  accounts improved.  All  these 
trends  continued  in the first  half  of1996, 
although  as the half  ended  there were 
signs of  a recovery in level  of  activity. 
The financial  crisis that arose in Mexico at the 
end of  1994 was one of  the factors  that triggered 
the difficult  situation that has since prevailed in 
the region. The crisis not only interrupted capital 
flows  to Mexico, but also had major ripple effects 
in other countries, especially in Argentina, which 
experienced a similar withdrawal of  financial 
resources. As a result, both economies suffered 
dramatic contractions. 
The crisis did not have such extensive or 
lasting repercussions in the rest of  the region as 
had at first  been feared.  As early as the second 
quarter of  1995 there were indications of  a 
resumption of  capital flows,  a trend that was 
confirmed  in 1996. However, new problems 
arose, particularly in Brazil and Peru, which were 
forced  to adopt severe adj ustment policies as they 
tried to consolidate stabilization gains. The 
Venezuelan economy became mired in even 
greater difficulties  and also required drastic 
remedies. 
In contrast, the performance  of  many of  the 
other economies was similar to that of  the period 
1991-1994; they continued to grow, some at an 
even faster  pace. These economies maintained 
and appeared to be consolidating an economic 
pattern characterized by good growth rates, 
moderate and decreasing inflation  and a current 
account deficit  financed  by external capital. 
Although inadequate in job creation, the pattern 
nonetheless constituted a significant 
improvement over the stagnation and instability 
that afflicted  the region during the 1980s. 
Most of  the economies continued growing in 
a climate of  macroeconomic stability, but 
showed areas of  vulnerability. In many cases 
growth was insufficient  to compensate for  the 
social deficits  accumulated over previous years. 
Other causes of  concern in 1995 were limited 
growth in export volume in some countries 
(notably Brazil), the persistence of  clearly 
inadequate rates of  saving, some setbacks in 
attempts to achieve fiscal  balance and signs of 
weakness in the banking system. Moreover, the 
crisis alerted the countries to the dangers of  a 
growing trade deficit,  excessive dependence on 
inflows  of  short-term foreign  capital and a low 
national saving rate and to the need for  greater 
coordination in economic policy. 
As in the past few  years, the performance  of 
most of  the region's economies in 1995 depended 
on external capital flows.  Although the crisis 
interrupted flows  to Mexico and Argentina, they 
remained at their previous year's level in most of 
the other countries and rose considerably in 
Brazil. In Argentina and even more in Mexico, 
the net outflow  of  private capital was mitigated 
by a heavy influx  of  compensatory financing 
from  the International Monetary Fund, the 
United States Government and official 
multilateral sources. Dependence on external 
capital was also reduced because the value of 
exports grew by some 21% in 1995, owing to an 
improvement in international prices for  the 
second consecutive year and the strong increase 
in volumes exported by Argentina and Mexico. 
In 1995 the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries were forced  to adjust their economic 
policies to new external and domestic conditions. 
The impact of  the Mexican crisis of  late 1994 on 
international financial  markets and the 
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turbulence experienced in domestic financial 
markets elicited a variety of  responses in 
economic policy. Most countries of  the region 
persisted in their efforts  to stabilize domestic 
prices and expand international trade linkages. 
Stabilization programmes were widespread and 
set the tone of  foreign  exchange, fiscal  and 
monetary policies, which were, with few 
exceptions, moderate or restrictive. The external 
liberalization strategy adopted entailed, in some 
cases, reinforcing  the mechanisms of  subregional 
integration, and this was particularly the case in 
the MERCOSUR countries. 
Balanced fiscal  budgets continued to be one 
of  the chief  goals of  stabilization programmes. 
Five countries achieved a public-sector surplus: 
Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama 
and Paraguay. Another nine managed a deficit 
equal to 2% or less of  GDP: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay. Only Brazil, 
Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela posted a deficit 
greater than 4% of  output; the surprise in this 
group was Brazil, which swung from  an 
operating surplus of  1% of  GDP in 1994 to a 
deficit  of  5% in 1995. The approaches taken to 
reduce the fiscal  gap largely aimed at increasing 
revenues, although there were also efforts  to 
reduce expenditure. In most cases revenues were 
increased through indirect taxes, but some 
countries also raised real charges for 
State-provided goods and services. 
In some countries monetary policy was made 
easier by better fiscal  management and by greater 
demand for  money in the light of  expectations of 
low inflation,  while in others monetary 
management was made more difficult  by 
growing fiscal  problems. Moreover, some 
economies continued to receive heavy external 
capital flows,  and this complicated efforts  to 
reconcile monetary expansion with growth and 
inflation  targets. Domestic interest rates were 
used as a tool to mediate between the conflicting 
needs to develop competitiveness, meet 
monetary targets and finance  the external current 
account deficit. 
Foreign exchange policy underwent changes 
in Mexico, which adopted a floating  exchange 
rate at the end of  1994; in Brazil and Ecuador, 
which introduced flotation  bands; and in 
Honduras, which adopted an auction system with 
Central Bank intervention. Venezuela devalued 
its currency sharply in mid-December 1995 and 
again in April 1996 and finally  resorted to a 
currency band system. The remaining countries 
adhered to the same foreign  exchange systems 
they had applied in 1994. 
Trends in real exchange rates varied. In some 
countries, the currency continued to appreciate, 
a tendency that helped to keep inflation  down but 
undermined the ability of  domestic products to 
compete with imports. In the three countries that 
suffered  an interruption of  external capital 
inflows,  on the other hand, the local currency 
depreciated. 
The process of  structural reform  in the region 
intensified,  although there were major 
differences  between countries in the pace of 
implementation and consolidation of  changes. 
Progress was made in privatization, in improving 
regulatory systems in sectors where public 
services had been privatized and in establishing 
new regulatory mechanisms to ensure better 
functioning  of  the financial  system. In the area of 
social security reform,  a number of  countries 
moved ahead in developing schemes based on 
capitalization of  employee contributions. In the 
area of  foreign  trade, however, there were some 
reversals of  the liberalization process, as 
non-tariff  barriers were reintroduced or 
reinforced  and some import duties were raised. 
In general, an increase in international prices 
of  commodities contributed substantially 
towards narrowing the external gap. In the 
countries hardest hit by financial  turbulence, a 
decline in domestic demand combined with 
improved external competitiveness helped to 
boost export volumes and at the same time to 
restrain or reduce imports. On the other hand, in 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru, where domestic 
demand expanded, the current account deficit 
widened. 
The solvency of  the financial  system was 
threatened in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela, in 
the latter due to delayed effects  of  the previous 
year's crisis. In some countries, internal factors 
created the problem, and the illiquidity of  some 
large financial  institutions triggered the crisis; in 
these cases, the monetary authorities took steps 
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to reinforce  security mechanisms and provided 
financial  support to restructure the system. In 
other countries, massive withdrawals of  short-
term bank deposits at the time of  the Mexican 
crisis caused a severe shortage of  liquidity. 
Growth in gross domestic product was only 
0.3%, compared with 5.2% in 1994, and resulted 
in a decline of  1.5% in per capital GDP, following 
an increase of  3.3% in 1994 (see table 1-1). This 
poor performance  was due largely to the setbacks 
suffered  by Mexico and Argentina. On the other 
hand, the regional output of  the other countries 
averaged a little over 4%, just one point less than 
the rate in 1994, which had been the highest in 
the last 15 years. During the first  half  of  1996, 
growth remained slow; although the economies 
of  Argentina and Mexico stopped contracting, 
signs of  recovery were still modest. Meanwhile, 
the economies of  Brazil and Peru stagnated while 
Venezuela suffered  a downturn due to the 
implementation of  its adjustment plan. 
The factors  behind the unequal performance 
of  the economies also varied significantly  from 
one group of  countries to the next. In Mexico and 
Argentina, domestic demand, in terms ofgap  both 
consumption and investment, dropped off 
sharply; only the strong performance  of  the 
external sectors of  the two countries prevented 
even more drastic reductions in output. The 
volume of  exports grew strongly (18% for 
Argentina, 28% for  Mexico), while the volume 
of  imports declined (13% and 16%, 
respectively). In the other countries, this situation 
was reversed; domestic demand expanded far 
more strongly than GDP, so that much of  the 
demand was filled  by imports. The volume of 
imports increased by 30% in Brazil and by 15% 
on average in the other countries, while export 
volume grew by barely 1% in Brazil and around 
7% in the other countries (see table 1-2). 
Considered individually, the countries 
exhibited significant  differences  in 1995. In 
terms of  economic growth, the range was wide, 
although narrowing. Five countries grew by more 
than 5%: Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guyana 
and Peru. In 12 other countries, output increased 
by between 2% and 5%. Apart from  Argentina 
and Mexico, only Uruguayexperienced a decline 
in GDP, while in Jamaica output was virtually 
stagnant. 
Investment declined in Latin America (-5.2%) 
in a reversal of  the upward trend prevailing since 
the start of  the decade. Among the contributing 
factors  were the moderate decline in national and 
domestic savings and the drastic contraction in 
external savings. The reduction was not 
universal, however, but reflected  the downward 
trend in a few  large countries, chiefly  Argentina 
and Mexico. The investment rate in 1995 in Latin 
America as a whole was 21%, a point lower than 
the year before,  and a very low rate both from  a 
historical perspective and by comparison with 
other regions. 
The regional inflation  rate once again dropped 
sharply in 1995, down to 25% from  890% in 1993 
and 340% in 1994, due largely to Brazil's 
stabilization programme, the effects  of  which 
more than offset  the rise in prices in Mexico 
resulting from  depreciation of  the peso. The 
favourable  trend persisted through the first  half 
of  1996; only in Venezuela was there a 
significant  increase in inflation. 
In the other countries declining inflation  was 
widespread. In 17 of  22 countries the consumer 
price index fell  or held steady. It rose in only four, 
including Mexico, where inflation  increased 
significantly,  but did not reach the high levels 
recorded in some earlier years. Venezuela had the 
highest rate of  inflation  in the region in 1995 
(57%), although the pace slowed in the course of 
the year; however, in December it began to 
climb once again and picked up speed in 1996, 
so that by July the 12-month inflation  rate was 
112%. 
Inflation  was minimal -less than 2% for  the 
year- in three countries (Argentina, Barbados 
and Panama), and four  others had single-digit 
inflation  (Chile, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago). Quite a 
few  countries (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru) had 
inflation  rates of  between 10% and 20%, while 
another five  (Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti 
and Honduras) experienced price increases of 
between 20% and 30%. Uruguay's inflation  rate 
was high (35%), but lower than in 1994, 
continuing the downward trend of  the four 
preceding years, a trend that persisted into 1996 
with a rate of  29% for  the 12 months ending June 
1996. Brazil, which for  many years had suffered 
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Table 1-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS a 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995b 
Indices (1990=100) 
Gross domestic product 90.9 100.0 103.3 106.0 109.9 115.7 116.0 
Per capita gross domestic 
product 111.6 100.0 101.3 102.1 104.0 107.4 105.9 
Annual rates of  variation 
Gross domestic product -0.3 3.2 2.6 3.6 5.2 0.4 
Per capita gross domestic 
product -2.2 1.3 0.8 1.8 3.3 -1.4 
Consumer prices0 56.0 1 209.7 200.8 420.8 892.7 339.9 25.9 
Terms of  trade (goods f.o.b.) 10.1 1.4 -1.4 0.6 -1.6 2.9 2.5 
Percentages 
Urban unemployment rate d 6.2 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.3 7.1 
Billions of  dollars 
External sector 
Exports (goods) 91.6 136.3 137.1 146.2 157.7 183.0 222.1 
Imports (goods) 92.5 105.2 123.9 151.4 166.1 197.3 220.5 
Merchandise trade balance -0.9 31.1 13.2 -5.2 -8.4 -14.3 1.6 
Balance on current account -30.1 -1.8 -16.5 -35.3 -43.9 -49.2 -32.4 
Balance on capital and 
financial  account e 28.8 -6.8 22.5 49.6 56.9 40.2 26.8 
Balance-of-payments  position -1.3 -8.6 6.0 14.3 13.0 -9.0 -5.6 
Total disbursed external debt 220.4 443.1 446.5 462.7 501.9 532.5 587.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a The figures  given for  gross domestic product and population correspond to the countries appearing in table V-l (except Cuba), 
while those for  consumer prices refer  to the countries listed in table V-5. The data on the external sector (except for  external 
debt figures)  correspond to the countries shown in table VIII-17. The external debt figures  correspond to the countries shown 
in table VIII-13. b Preliminary figures.  c Decembe to December variation. Weighted annual rate for  the population 
of  17 Latin American countries. Includes errors and omissions. 
some of  the highest inflation  in the region, up into 
the four-digit  range, in 1995 recorded a price rise 
of  only 20%, compared with 930% in 1994 and 
2,500% in 1993. In 1996 inflation  continued to 
slow; the 12-month rate to June 1996 was 16%. 
The employment situation worsened in 1995. 
Because of  a steep rise in unemployment in some 
countries, the overall regional open 
unemployment rate weighted by country 
population rose from  6.3% to 7.1%, a 
proportional increase not seen since the 
beginning of  the 1980s. In some of  the region's 
largest countries (Argentina, Mexico, 
Venezuela), poor economic performance 
translated into a jump in open unemployment. In 
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Costa Rica and Uruguay, low or negative growth 
also reduced employment, but to a lesser extent. 
In some countries, notably Argentina and 
Mexico, the crisis hit labour markets that were 
already going through a difficult  period due to 
restructuring of  the productive system or of  the 
public sector. On the other hand, in countries 
with higher rates of  growth (Brazil, Chile, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru), the 
unemployment rates dropped, although only 
slightly in most cases, since for  the most part the 
growth was based on productivity increases 
rather than greater absorption of  labour. During 
the first  half  of  1996, the regional unemployment 
rate remained at the same level as in 1995. 
Figure 1-1 
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Table 1-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS (BASE YEAR 1990) 
Rates of  variation Contribution to variation 
1994 1995 1994 1995 
Gross domestic product 
Region 5.2 0.3 5.2 0.3 
Argentina 7.4 -4.4 7.4 -4.4 
Brazil 5.7 3.8 5.7 3.8 
Mexico 3.6 -6.6 3.6 -6.6 
Other countries 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.8 
Imports 
Region 12.6 4.6 2.4 0.9 
Argentina 19.1 -13.3 2.3 -1.7 
Brazil 21.6 31.9 2.0 3.5 
Mexico 14.3 -15.8 4.0 -4.9 
Other countries 4.8 14.9 1.5 4.7 
Aggregate supply and demand 
Region 6.4 1.0 7.6 1.2 
Argentina 8.7 -5.4 9.7 -6.1 
Brazil 7.1 6.6 7.7 7.3 
Mexico 5.9 -8.7 7.6 -11.4 
Other countries 4.6 7.2 6.1 9.5 
Domestic demand 
Region 6.0 -1.0 6.1 -1.0 
Argentina 8.1 -7.4 8.4 -7.7 
Brazil 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.2 
Mexico 5.0 -16.5 5.3 -17.8 
Other countries 3.8 7.2 3.8 7.3 
Total consumption plus 
changes in stocks 
Region 4.7 1.1 3.7 0.9 
Argentina 5.4 -5.0 4.5 -4.1 
Brazil 5.5 7.9 4.3 6.1 
Mexico 4.2 -8.6 3.4 -7.1 
Other countries 3.2 5.2 2.5 4.0 
Gross domestic investment 
Region 10.8 -8.2 2.4 -1.9 
Argentina 18.9 -15.9 3.9 -3.6 
Brazil 12.9 4.9 2.7 1.1 
Mexico 7.8 -42.1 1.9 -10.7 
Other countries 5.7 .14.0 1.3 3.3 
Gross fixed  investment 
Region 10.9 -5.2 2.3 -1.1 
Argentina 18.9 -15.9 3.9 -3.6 
Brazil 12.9 4.9 2.7 1.1 
Mexico 8.1 -29.1 1.7 -6.2 
Other countries 5.0 9.7 1.1 2.1 
Exports 
Region 8.8 12.5 1.5 2.3 
Argentina 16.1 18.3 1.3 1.6 
Brazil 6.5 0.9 0.8 0.1 
Mexico 10.5 27.6 2.3 6.3 
Other countries 7.5 7.1 2.2 2.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
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Figure 1-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OUTPUT AND INFLATION IN 1995 
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There was also a break in the steady increase 
in wages that had accompanied a strong rise in 
productivity in the region as a whole in the early 
years of  the decade. Whereas in 1994 there had 
been a general increase in real average wages in 
the forma]  sector, in 1995 wages rose 
significantly  only in a few  countries. 
Because the largest economies so heavily 
influenced  regional aggregates, the overall 
figures  for  the external sector chiefly  reflected 
the offset  of  trends in Mexico and Argentina 
against those in Brazil. As capital flows  suddenly 
dried up, Argentina and Mexico were forced  to 
make a major effort  to reduce the large current 
account deficits  they had accumulated since the 
beginning of  the decade; their approach was to 
cut spending and increase exports. In Brazil, on 
the other hand, the stabilization plan released a 
surge in demand that fed  a strong increase in 
imports, resulting in a deterioration in the current 
account balance that was covered by a heavy net 
influx  of  capital. 
Intraregional trade continued to be a dynamic 
element. This was particularly true of 
MERCOSUR. Despite the external account 
problems of  its two largest economies, 
transactions between group members accounted 
for  22% of  their total trade, as compared with 
19% in 1994. 
The regional terms of  trade deteriorated 
slightly, reflecting  primarily declines in Brazil 
and Mexico, even while the ratio improved for 
most of  the other countries, thanks to higher 
commodity prices. The countries most benefited 
by higher prices were Chile, Colombia and Peru, 
and to a lesser extent El Salvador, Honduras and 
the Dominican Republic. The terms-of-trade 
deterioration in Brazil and Mexico was due to the 
fact  that both countries are primarily exporters of 
manufactures,  although in Mexico the fall  in 
service prices as a result of  depreciation was also 
a factor. 
The value of  merchandise exports rose by 
21%, the biggest increase since 1980; the 
region's external sales reached US$ 222 billion 
in 1995. Some 60% of  the increase was 
attributable to Mexico and Argentina, which 
were forced  to undertake the most drastic 
recessive adjustments. Apart from  those 
countries, good export performance  was largely 
due to a strong international economy; in most 
cases the increase in value reflected  higher prices 
for  exports. 
The value of  the region's imports rose by 
12%, a smaller increase than the previous year's, 
to a record level of  over US$ 220 billion. The 
percentage increase was much higher (33%) 
excluding Argentina and Mexico, where crisis 
resulted in a substantial contraction in imports, 
although most of  that increase was 
concentrated in just one country, Brazil. The 
indicator varied widely from  country to 
country because of  the multiple factors 
affecting  import volume; unit prices changed 
very little, the slight rise being largely due to 
price increases in manufactures. 
In addition to the improvement in the 
merchandise trade balance, there was a marked 
reduction in the region's deficit  in trade in 
services, reflecting  chiefly  the improvement in 
Argentina's and Mexico's service balances 
resulting from  their reduced external purchases. 
The trade deficit  in goods and services narrowed 
substantially from  nearly US$ 26 billion in 1994 
to around US$ 9 billion in 1995. 
The current account deficit  also narrowed 
significantly  in 1995, shrinking to US$ 32 billion 
after  reaching US$ 49 billion in 1994. The same 
pattern of  changes observable in the trade 
balance in goods and services was repeated in the 
current account; Mexico's large deficit 
disappeared, Argentina's declined and Brazil's 
ballooned. Over half  of  Venezuela's considerable 
surplus the previous year melted away. 
Net capital flows  to the region totalled US$ 26.5 
billion in 1995, a much smaller amount than in 
1994 and even smaller compared to the figures 
for  1992 and 1993. This balance resulted from 
an influx  of  US$ 21 billion in direct investment 
and US$ 15 billion in other types of  long-term 
capital, less outflows  of  short-term capital and 
portfolio  investment of  some US$ 10 billion. It 
should be borne in mind that the region's capital 
flow  figures  were heavily influenced  by net 
outflows  from  Mexico and Venezuela. 
Excluding those figures,  the capital account 
balance for  the remaining countries was 
US$ 44.5 billion. During the first  few  months of 
1995 there was an exodus of  short-term capital 
from  a number of  Latin American countries, and 
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Figure 1-3 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
private financing  virtually dried up. The 
Internationa] Monetary Fund and other 
multilateral organizations stepped into the breach 
by providing compensatory financing  that 
enabled Mexico to meet its heavy short-term 
obligations and, along with Argentina, to regain 
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access to international financial  markets. It 
should be noted that the compensatory financing 
is reported, not under the capital account, but 
under reserves. 
The external debt of  the Latin American 
countries totalled some US$ 587 billion, a 
nominal increase of  10% over 1994. The ratio of 
externa] debt to exports of  goods and services for 
the region as a whole again declined, from  250% 
to 220%, the lowest percentage since 1980, 
thanks to a vigourous expansion of  exports 
combined with a moderate increase in debt. The 
ratio of  interest payments to exports of  goods and 
services also declined slightly. 
In 1995 the majority of  the most heavily 
indebted countries of  the region made substantial 
progress in renegotiating their external debt. 
Panama signed an agreement to restructure its 
commercial debt; Peru announced that it had also 
reached such an agreement; and Nicaragua 
arranged to buy back its debt to commercial 
banks at around 7% of  face  value. In addition, 
debt-restructuring agreements were signed with 
Paris Club countries. 
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n. ECONOMIC POLICY 
The  internationalization  of  the effects  of 
the financial  crisis  that  broke out in 
Mexico  at the close of  1994 prompted 
differing  responses by economic 
policy-makers  in the various countries  of 
the region.  Specifically,  the net volume of 
external  financial  inflows  and the 
varying degrees  of  uncertainty  prevailing 
in the different  countries'  markets  as a 
consequence of  external  or domestic 
factors  played  an important  role  in 
determining  which types of  policy 
approaches were adopted. 
Broadly speaking, the countries' responses 
fell  into one of  two categories. Argentina and 
Mexico, for  their part, were obliged to pursue 
their economic policies within an environment 
marked by a sharp reduction in external finance 
and a steep downturn in domestic demand which 
hurt both production and fiscal  revenues. In 
contrast, once the crisis' initial impact had 
dissipated, other countries were able to deflect 
the financial  turbulence it had generated and to 
continue growing at a satisfactory  pace, albeit 
under altered circumstances in terms of  their 
control over the main macroeconomic 
variables. 
Despite the differences  in their economic 
climates, domestic price stability remained a high 
priority for  all the countries of  the region, and 
only Mexico and Venezuela experienced 
particularly high rates or steep increases in 
inflation.  Against this backdrop, fiscal 
equilibrium continued to be a major objective, 
even though the management of  public affairs 
was clearly hampered by unbudgeted military 
expenses, in some cases, and, in others, 
unplanned disbursements to prop up the financial 
system, along with higher interest payments and 
dwindling tax receipts as a result of  flagging 
economic activity. 
The authorities' persistent stabilization 
efforts  led them to adopt monetary policies that 
wavered between prudence and outright 
restrictiveness. Real interest rates were 
positive, for  the most part, and in those cases 
where real returns climbed significantly,  the 
monetary authorities were once again faced 
with the dilemma of  whether to allow capital 
inflows  to drive down the real exchange rate or 
to sterilize the monetary impact of  such flows  at 
the risk of  setting up a vicious circle whereby 
even greater capital inflows  would be attracted to 
the country. 
Exchange policy was modified  only in Brazil, 
Ecuador and, late in the year, Venezuela; all the 
other countries held to their existing systems, 
although Mexico, of  course, had made an abrupt 
change at the close of  1994. Trends in the real 
effective  exchange rate varied. Some countries' 
currencies continued to appreciate as they 
continued to receive an ample supply of  external 
resources; this helped to dampen inflation,  but it 
also limited their external competitiveness. In 
others, depreciations (in some cases quite sharp, 
in others less so) of  the local currency were 
observed due to the use of  exchange policy as a 
means of  buoying up the export sector or to 
various sorts of  economic or political events that 
heightened the level of  uncertainty among the 
relevant economic agents. 
The countries' financial  systems showed 
signs of  weakness, and the relevant monetary 
authorities were therefore  obliged to set up a 
safety  net for  these systems and help fund 
their restructuring efforts,  all of  which cost 
their Governments a great deal and hindered 
the management of  monetary policy (see 
chapter IV). 
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1. Fiscal policy 
Striking  a fiscal  balance continued  to be 
a highly  important  component of  the 
countries'  stabilization  programmes 
and,  as a result,  14 of  the 19 countries 
for  which information  is available 
managed  to narrow their  public  deficits 
or widen  their  surpluses.  Only five 
countries  saw their  deficits  grow and, 
even in these cases, three of  the five  had 
deficits  amounting  to less than one point 
of  GDP. 
Five countries' public sectors posted 
surpluses (Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
Panama and Paraguay). Another nine had deficits 
of  around 2% of  GDP or less (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay). A deficit  of  more 
than 4% of  GDP was recorded only in Brazil, 
Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela. 
Efforts  to reduce the fiscal  deficit  focused 
primarily on boosting income, although steps 
were also taken to cut spending. In order to attain 
the first  objective, most of  the countries set up 
mechanisms to improve the workings of  the tax 
system and curb tax evasion. Most of  the 
measures taken to boost receipts focused  on 
indirect taxes, but some countries also resorted 
to real increases in the prices and rates charged 
for  goods and services furnished  by the public 
sector. 
a) Fiscal balances 
At the close of  1994, there were three 
countries -Chile, Colombia and Paraguay-
whose fiscal  accounts had been fairly  well 
balanced for  a number of  years, but only Chile 
was successful  in preserving its record in this 
area in 1995 (so much so, in fact,  that it actually 
increased its surplus further).  Colombia's fiscal 
position made an about-turn, although the 
resulting public-sector financial  deficit  did not 
even amount to one full  point of  GDP; for  its part, 
Paraguay did manage to maintain its 
public-sector surplus, but the central government 
witnessed a deterioration in its accounts, as well 
as sustaining quasi-fiscal  losses as a consequence 
public finance 
of  the assistance it provided to the banking 
system. 
Three countries which had stepped up their 
fiscal  adjustment efforts  the year before  turned in 
weaker performances  in 1995. Peru had marked 
upa surplus of  approximately 3% of  GDP in 1994 
as economic activity proceeded at a brisk pace, 
but in 1995 expenditure and income more or less 
evened out on the basis of  a somewhat slower 
-yet still high- growth rate. The large sums spent 
by Ecuador in response to specific  situations 
which arose (armed border clashes and the 
energy crisis) added considerably to its 
public-sector deficit,  which thus climbed to 
nearly 2% of  GDP. For its part, Brazil lost a great 
deal of  ground, as its 1994 operating surplus (1% 
of  GDP) gave way to a deficit  amounting to 5% 
of  GDP in 1995. 
Almost all the countries whose fiscal 
adjustment programmes suffered  setbacks in 
1994 managed to improve their public-sector 
accounts in 1995. Mexico balanced its fiscal 
accounts with the help of  a very strict domestic 
adjustment plan, but it also paid out large sums 
in the form  of  financial  assistance to various 
banking institutions that were experiencing 
problems in terms of  their liquidity positions or 
financial  stability. After  seeing its deficit  grow 
over the preceding two years, the Dominican 
Republic managed to post a surplus in 1995. The 
harsh adjustment programme launched by 
Uruguay midway through the first  half  of  the year 
enabled it to put a stop to the tendency to run up 
increasingly large deficits  which the 
non-financial  public sector had been exhibiting 
since the year before.  Argentina was the 
exception to the rule, in that the slump in its level 
of  economic activity had a direct effect  on tax 
receipts, thereby adding to the deficit.  While it is 
true that this financial  imbalance amounted to a 
scant one-half  point of  GDP, it should be noted 
that towards the end of  the year the gap was 
beginning to widen. 
No substantive change was seen in the 
position of  high-deficit  countries whose 
shortfalls  were covered with concessionary 
funding  (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, among others). 
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Table II-l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DEFICIT(-) OR SURPLUS OF 
THE NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR AT CURRENT PRICES a 
(Percentages  of  GDP) 
Country 1980 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995b 
Argentina -4.8 -4.6 -6.2 -3.2 -3.8 -1.6 -0.1 1.4 -0.1 -0.5 
Bolivia -5.4 -6.8 -5.8 -4.8 -3.9 -2.6 -2.8 -6.5 -3.3 -1.9 
Brazil -2.0 -7.0 -7.4 -6.6 1.5 -0.2 -1.8 -0.8 1.1 -5.1 
Chile c 6.5 1.9 1.0 1.4 0.8 1.5 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.6 
Colombia -2.6 -1.9 -2.2 -1.9 -0.5 0 -0.1 0.3 2.6 -0.3 
Costa Rica -0.2 0.1 -2.5 -2.5 -0.1 0.7 0.6 -6.6 -1.9 
Ecuador -7.4 -9.6 -5.3 -1.4 0.1 -1.0 -1.7 -0.4 -0.2 -1.9 
El Salvador -5.8 -2.8 -4.9 -6.5 -3.6 -2.0 -0.9 
Guatemala c -4.7 -2.4 -2.4 -3.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.5 -1.5 -1.5 -0.5 
Haiti c -1.3 -0.5 -2.8 -3.8 -4.3 -4.5 
Honduras c -8.7 -8.1 -6.9 -7.4 -6.4 -3.3 -4.9 -9.3 -5.2 -2.9 
Mexico -15.5 -12.5 -5.6 -3.9 -0.4 1.6 0.7 -0.1 0.1 
Nicaragua -17.2 -7.9 -8.3 -8.6 -12.1 -9.7 
Panama 0 -9.3 -4.5 -5.3 -7.0 -0.7 -2.7 -1.4 -0.4 -0.8 0.8 
Paraguay 5.2 2.9 0.1 1.2 2.4 2.8 
Peru -0.9 -1.5 -1.2 3.1 -0.1 
Dominican Republic c -2.8 -2.2 -1.6 -0.1 0.3 2.8 2.9 -0.4 -1.2 0.5 
Uruguay -2.5 -3.4 0.3 1.3 1.5 -0.8 -2.5 -1.5 
Venezuela -4.4 -8.5 -1.2 0.1 -2.2 -5.9 -1.3 -13.8 -5.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Calculated on the basis of  figures  in the local currency at current prices. Preliminary estimates. c Refers  to the central 
government. 
Nonetheless, in every case their deficits 
diminished, and much the same thing occurred in 
the three countries that had found  themselves in 
serious fiscal  difficulties  in 1994 (Costa Rica, 
Haiti and Venezuela). All three managed to 
narrow their financial  gap, although, even so, 
their deficits  were still quite sizeable. 
b) Fiscal income 
i) Tax  receipts 
In the great majority of  the countries (15 out 
of  the 19 for  which information  is available), the 
non-financial  public sector's current revenues 
rose in real terms, which indicates that their 
strategies for  reducing the fiscal  deficit  were 
largely based on efforts  to increase their 
income. 
The tax burden -defined  as the ratio between 
tax revenues and the gross domestic product-
was in the 15%-20% range in more than half  the 
countries of  the region. The tax burden was under 
10% of  GDP in only three countries (Haiti, 
Guatemala and Venezuela). 
Procedural improvements in the 
administration of  the tax system were one of  the 
main reasons for  the increase in revenues in a 
number of  countries, particularly Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru. 
Some countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras) added to the 
tax load by introducing new taxes and raising 
existing ones. In these cases, policy-makers 
focused  their efforts  on raising the rates of 
indirect taxes on domestic transactions, such as 
the value added tax and excise taxes. Costa 
Rica also temporarily increased its customs 
duties. Despite advances in the management of 
the tax system, however, tax evasion and 
avoidance are still rampant in virtually the entire 
region. 
Pronounced slumps in economic activity 
drove down real revenues in Argentina, Mexico 
and Uruguay. Escalating inflation  also eroded 
real receipts in Mexico due to the effect  of 
collection lags. In Brazil, on the other hand, 
lower inflation  helped to boost real income for 
the second year running. 
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Figure II-l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BALANCE AND EXPENDITURES OF THE 
NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR, 1995 
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Note: Data on the deficits and expenditures of Chile, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras and Panama refer  to the central government. 
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Table II-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INCOME OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
Country Category 
Percentage of  GDP Percentage variation3 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 b 1994 1995 
Argentina Current income 16.1 13.2 15.0 17.4 19.9 17.9 17.4 -3.4 -7.1 
Tax revenue 15.0 12.4 14.2 16.6 17.4 17.0 16.5 4.9 -7.2 
Capital income 0.4 0.2 1.2 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 7.4 59.3 
Total income 16.5 13.5 16.3 18.8 20.2 18.2 17.9 -3.2 -6.0 
Bolivia Current income 33.1 25.7 26.2 26.1 31.5 33.7 34.2 12.4 5.1 
Tax revenue 5.0 6.2 6.9 8.6 1 1 . 0 11.3 12.4 7.8 14.3 
Capital income 0.4 0.2 1.5 2.3 1.6 2.7 1.9 71.1 -26.7 
Total income 33.5 25.9 27.7 28.4 33.2 36.4 36.1 15.3 2.7 
Brazil Gen. govt, income 20.6 30.2 26.2 25.4 27.0 29.0 31.2 13.7 11.8 
Operating income 3.8 1.5 4.1 3.8 2.5 3.2 2.4 35.2 -20.1 
Total income 24.4 31.7 30.3 29.2 29.4 32.2 33.7 15.5 8.6 
Chile c Current income 32.8 20.5 22.3 22.4 22.6 21.9 22.3 0.9 10.1 
Tax revenue 18.7 14.5 16.7 16.9 17.6 17.1 17.1 1.2 8.2 
Capital income 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 4.1 8.2 
Total income 34.5 21.7 23.4 23.4 23.4 22.7 23.1 1.0 10.1 
Colombia Current income 19.7 23.6 25.1 25.7 27.2 29.3 28.9 14.5 4.3 
Tax revenue 13.5 14.9 16.2 16.9 19.1 19.4 19.6 7.9 6.8 
Capital income 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.7 3.6 1.4 125.1 -58.9 
Total income 20.4 23.7 25.1 26.0 28.8 32.9 30.3 21.4 -2.6 
Costa Rica Current income 26.1 27.6 28.2 28.2 26.0 28.3 -3.8 11.6 
Capital income 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Total income 26.1 27.7 28.3 28.3 26.0 28.4 -4.0 12.0 
Ecuador Current income 27.0 27.1 25.4 25.8 26.6 24.4 25.7 -3.7 8.1 
Oil revenue 7.3 11.6 8.8 9.6 8.7 7.2 7.6 -12.9 8.4 
Non-oil revenue 19.7 15.5 16.6 16.2 17.9 17.2 18.1 0.7 8.0 
El Salvador Current income 12.5 13.0 13.6 13.7 15.2 16.1 17.2 12.5 
Tax revenue 9.1 9.5 9.6 10.3 10.8 11.8 11.4 15.4 
Guatemala c Current income 9.5 7.9 9.0 10.1 9.0 7.6 8.4 -11.8 15.5 
Tax revenue 8.6 6.8 7.3 8.2 7.8 6.7 7.6 -10.6 19.1 
Haiti 0 Current income 7.7 7.8 5.8 5.7 3.4 5.7 -42.8 74.1 
Tax revenue 7.3 7.6 5.5 5.5 3.4 4.0 -41.7 24.0 
Honduras c Current income 16.5 16.4 17.4 17.4 16.8 16.8 18.1 -1.1 11.1 
Tax revenue 15.2 14.8 15.5 16.0 15.7 15.6 16.3 -1.7 7.5 
Capital income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1 -32.3 -76.4 
Total income 16.5 16.4 17.4 18.0 17.4 17.3 18.1 -2.3 8.3 
Mexico c Current income 16.5 17.1 17.0 17.7 17.3 17.3 17.7 3.6 -4.4 
Current income 
excluding PEMEX 
earnings 13.3 13.4 14.3 14.2 14.8 13.1 8.0 -17.3 
PEMEX earnings 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.1 2.5 4.6 -16.8 72.6 
Capital income 3.7 3.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Total income 16.5 17.1 20.7 20.9 17.7 17.3 17.7 1.3 -4.4 
Nicaragua Current income 24.3 27.7 28.4 28.7 30.8 5.2 12.0 
Capital income 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 -37.5 74.0 
Total income 193 24.5 27.9 29.0 29.0 31.3 4.1 12.7 
Panama c Current income 19.1 18.5 19.6 21.0 20.1 19.7 19.6 1.6 1.7 
Tax revenue 13.9 12.5 13.3 13.8 13.1 13.1 13.2 3.9 2.5 
Paraguay Current income 16.1 16.0 16.2 16.4 18.2 21.1 14.7 20.2 
Capital income 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 120.5 -68.8 
Total income 16.6 16.2 16.4 16.5 18.5 21.1 15.6 18.8 
Table II-(concl.) 
Country Category 
Percentage of  GDP Percentage variation" 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 b 1994 1995 
Peru c Current income 17.0 7.8 9.2 11.0 10.8 13.0 13.8 37.1 14.3 
Tax revenue 15.8 7.5 8.6 9.5 9.3 11.1 11.6 35.9 12.6 
Capital income 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 4.7 1.6 1 238.1 -63.3 
Total income 17.0 7.8 9.3 11.2 11.2 17.7 15.3 80.0 -6.9 
Dominican Current income 13.5 10.3 13.1 15.4 16.1 15.0 15.0 -2.9 4.7 
Republic c Tax revenue 10.8 9.8 11.4 13.9 15.0 14.0 13.9 -2.3 3.9 
Uruguay Current income 28.9 31.1 31.8 31.7 31.9 32.1 7.5 -2.2 
Tax revenue 17.8 18.3 19.2 19.5 20.4 20.4 11.8 -2.8 
Total income 28.9 31.1 31.8 31.7 32.0 32.2 7.9 -2.2 
Venezuela Current income 32.7 29.4 24.0 25.6 27.3 25.2 3.8 -5.5 
PDVSA earnings 25.8 21.2 15.8 15.4 15.8 14.0 0.4 -9.5 
Non-oil revenue 6.9 8.2 8.3 10.2 11.4 11.2 9.0 0.0 
Capital income 0.2 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 203.4 -47.0 
Total income 32.9 31.1 24.3 25.8 27.8 25.5 5.2 -6.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
Key: PEMEX = Petróleos de México, PDVSA = Petróleos de Venezuela. 
" Calculated on the basis of  figures  in the local currency at current prices, 
government. 
Preliminary figures. Refers  to the central 
ii) Other public-sector  income 
Increases in the prices and rates charged by 
State enterprises were used as an expedient for 
achieving rapid gains in government income in 
some cases. State-run firms'  net contributions to 
the public sector's financial  balance sheet were 
significant  in Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. A decrease in the number of 
government-owned companies in Bolivia as a 
consequence of  that country's privatization 
programme reduced the financial  input obtained 
from  such enterprises. 
High copper prices on the international 
market represented a major source of  non-tax 
income for  Chile; as in earlier years, a large 
portion of  these increased profits  were paid 
into a reserve fund.  Panama's earnings from 
the operation of  the Canal also continued to 
make an important contribution to its public 
finances.  Oil revenues were down in Ecuador 
and Venezuela, but Mexico's decision to raise 
the fees  charged for  drilling rights averted a 
major downturn in the funds  received by the 
federal  government. 
Income from  the sale of  government assets 
was lower than in the past, although it still 
amounted to nearly half  a point of  GDP in 
Argentina and to 1.6% of  GDP in Peru. 
c) Public expenditure 
The management of  government expenditure 
varied from  country to country, in line with the 
differences  in their fiscal  and macroeconomic 
situations. Nine countries chose to cut total 
spending in order to strike a better financial 
balance. In Bolivia, Costa Rica and Honduras, 
reductions in expenditure were coupled with 
upswings in income; the Dominican Republic, 
Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela based their 
adjustments on a decrease in expenditure, while 
Argentina and Mexico geared their spending 
patterns to their lower levels of  income. On the 
other hand, five  countries (Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru) increased 
expenditure, thereby adding to their fiscal 
shortfalls.  In Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti and Paraguay, expenditure also rose, but 
less sharply than income, and these countries' 
fiscal  positions therefore  improved. 
Eight of  the nine countries that reduced total 
expenditure did so by holding down current 
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Figure II-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT INCOME OF 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1995 
(As  a percentage  of  GDP) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official  figures. 
Table II-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPENDITURE OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
_ „ Percentage of  GDPa Percentage 
Country Category 6 variation6 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1994 1995 c 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table II-3 (concl.) 
Percentage of  GDPa Percentage 
Country Category T v a n a t l o n 























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
' Calculated on the basis of  figures  in the local currency at current prices. Calculated on the basis of  figures  in constant 1980 
dollars. c Preliminary figures.  d Refers  to the central government. 
outlays. Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Mexico and Uruguay also decreased investment, 
whereas Panama and Venezuela made their 
adjustments at the expense of  current 
disbursements, since their capital expenditure 
actually increased. In contrast, the improvement 
in the Dominican Republic's fiscal  balance sheet 
was achieved entirely through cuts in public 
investment. 
These nine countries' fiscal  policy 
environments varied in terms of  the constraints 
they imposed. In Uruguay, an adjustment was 
unavoidable, since the downswing in economic 
activity and high inflation  eroded income, thus 
making it essential to curb public spending. 
Fiscal policy had to be implemented under very 
difficult  conditions in Venezuela -after  the 
Government's bailout of  distressed banks in 
1994 had caused expenditure to swell by nearly 
13% of  GDP- as well as in Costa Rica, where the 
Government's adjustment programme only 
managed to bring down the fiscal  deficit  from  7% 
of  GDP in 1994 to 4.4% in 1995. The recessions 
affecting  Argentina and Mexico had a direct 
impact on their levels of  real income, which 
declined. Both of  these countries pared down 
their spending levels, but chose different 
methods of  doing so, with Argentina cutting back 
on capital expenditure while Mexico made the 
bulk of  its reductions in current expenditure. 
Unlike the above-mentioned countries, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Haiti and 
Paraguay adopted expansionary fiscal  policies. 
In the first  four  of  these cases the upturn in 
spending had an adverse effect  on the public 
sector's balance sheet; in the last two, the 
increases in expenditure were more than offset 
by gains in income. 
Fiscal policy-makers adopted a frankly 
expansionary approach in Brazil, with spending 
climbing by over 7% of  GDP. This was primarily 
attributable to a substantial increase in current 
outlays (particularly under the headings of 
consumption expenditure and interest 
payments), although capital expenditure also 
rose. The higher level of  transfers  in Colombia 
played an important part in the fact  that, far  from 
repeating its performance  of  the year before, 
when it had posted a surplus, the non-financial 
public sector actually ran up a small deficit  in 
1995. In Ecuador, the expenses associated with 
the country's armed conflict  with Peru, the fuel 
subsidies provided in order to alleviate the 
energy crisis and interest payments were the 
main causes of  the increase in expenditure. 
Current spending also mounted in Peru. Total 
expenditure was up in Chile, El Salvador and 
Guatemala as well, but in these cases, the 
increase was moderate in size, since it was 
substantially less than GDP growth. 
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Figure II-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC-SECTOR 
EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA, 1995 
1 1 9 9 0 H 1 9 9 5 
Argentina 
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 
Dollars at 1990 prices 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official  figures, 
a/ Refers to central government expenditure. 
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2. Foreign exchange policy 
In  1995, foreign  exchange policy  played 
a pivotal  role  in the economic strategy 
employed  by policy-makers  in four  of 
the region's  largest  countries.  The 
currency crisis  in Mexico  at the close of 
1994, the turnaround  in Brazil's  trade 
balance,  the steep drop  in the real 
exchange rate in Venezuela  and the 
adverse  implications  which the alteration 
of  the system of  convertibility  in 
Argentina  was likely  to have for  its 
stabilization  process leant  added 
importance  to the ongoing debate 
regarding  the role  of  the exchange rate in 
price stabilization  or in strengthening 
external  competitiveness.  In  some cases, 
priority  was given to its  function  as an 
anchor for  domestic  prices and,  in others, 
to its  ability  to enhance external 
competitiveness. 
This debate was not of  such crucial 
importance in the other countries of  the region, 
although it did command a great deal of  interest 
in countries that were receiving a large volume 
of  externa] (and chiefly  short-term) resources, in 
view of  such inflows,  repercussions on the real 
exchange rate. 
The practice of  placing restrictions on the 
entry of  short-term capital in an effort  to reduce 
the volatility of  such inflows  was confined  to 
those countries which had employed this 
instrument the year before  (i.e., Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia). For the region as a whole, the 
composition of  external capital inflows  has 
changed since the early 1990s in that the 
proportion of  private short-term capital has been 
declining while that of  long-term capital has been 
growing. Direct investment has continued to be 
an important source of  funds. 
An analysis of  trends in the real effective 
exchange rate (calculated on the basis of  a basket 
made up of  the currencies of  major trading 
partners) indicates that the currencies of  9 out of 
the 18 countries for  which information  is 
available appreciated during 1995. The annual 
average real exchange rate fell  considerably in 
Brazil, as the country moved to consolidate its 
new stabilization programme, and in Venezuela, 
where the decrease was due to the adoption of  a 
fixed  exchange rate against the dollar which was 
then abandoned as the year drew to a close. 
Haiti's currency also rose in value, since political 
and economic conditions in the country were less 
turbulent than in years past. A slight appreciation 
was also registered in the currencies of  Chile, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
In contrast, even though Argentina and Mexico 
used very different  strategies, both countries' 
currencies depreciated in real terms against a 
basket of  currencies representing their main trading 
partners. The currencies of  Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay also lost ground, 
although in the cases of  Paraguay and Uruguay, 
as well as Argentina, the decline was largely due 
to the appreciation of  the Brazilian real (Brazil is 
the most important trading partner of  all three). 
The 1995 averages for  Colombia's and Ecuador's 
real effective  exchange rates were much the same as 
the year before,  but the value of  their currencies 
gradually weakened as the year progressed. 
The two countries which changed their foreign 
exchange regimes during 1995 -Brazil and 
Ecuador- both chose to use a system of  currency 
bands, as did Venezuela midway through 1996. 
Hence, by mid-1996, seven countries (Haiti, 
Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru 
and the Dominican Republic) were allowing their 
currencies to float,  although in most cases the 
Centra] Bank was also exerting some control 
over the exchange rate. Another six (Brazil, 
Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Uruguay and 
Venezuela) were using exchange rate bands that 
could be switched over to a managed parity 
system if  the exchange rate neared the floor  or 
ceiling of  the band. Three countries (Bolivia, 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua) were using crawling 
pegs, while El Salvador joined the very small 
group of  countries (Argentina and Panama) which 
were maintaining a fixed  parity against the dollar. 
a) Countries registering a real appreciation 
In many cases, the exchange rate continued to 
be used as a tool for  achieving the priority 
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Table II-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL 
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS a 
(Based  on consumer price indexes) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995b 
Argentina 58.7 94.7 100.0 83.3 77.5 74.0 78.4 87.0 
Bolivia 72.8 50.4 100.0 108.3 116.3 117.6 125.1 126.6 
Brazil 141.7 149.9 100.0 118.5 127.7 117.1 92.9 70.6 
Chile 50.5 71.2 100.0 98.9 95.3 96.6 96.5 92.4 
Colombia 52.2 59.6 100.0 101.0 90.0 87.0 74.8 74.9 
Costa Rica 64.7 89.9 100.0 108.3 103.0 100.7 101.0 98.6 
Ecuador 48.4 62.3 100.0 95.2 94.7 84.0 78.2 78.8 
El Salvador 139.0 75.8 100.0 98.4 98.2 87.4 83.9 81.9 
Guatemala 57.0 47.2 100.0 87.9 87.0 88.2 85.1 82.6 
Haiti c 82.4 64.6 100.0 94.0 95.2 112.0 91.5 80.5 
Honduras 66.4 53.4 100.0 107.9 102.2 112.6 125.3 112.3 
Mexico d 76.2 95.2 100.0 91.1 84.1 79.8 81.9 121.1 
Nicaragua 243.4 70.1 100.0 104.6 104.9 108.3 113.3 118.9 
Paraguay e 50.4 80.8 100.0 86.9 90.6 92.2 97.4 106.8 
Peru 220.2 232.6 100.0 82.1 80.9 83.3 84.6 85.6 
Dominican Republic 86.0 112.4 100.0 100.6 101.3 96.8 95.4 93.5 
Uruguay 59.5 77.9 100.0 88.1 84.1 74.2 76.6 79.4 
Venezuela 45.9 52.2 100.0 93.9 88.5 88.9 92.5 70.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
a Corresponds to the average of  the indexes of  the (main official)  real exchange rates between each country's currency and 
the currencies of  its main trading partners, weighted by the share of  that country's total exports represented by exports to 
each of  the trading partners. The weightings are averages for  the period 1989-1992. For further  information  on the 
methodology and sources used, see ECLAC, 'Economic  Survey of  Latin  America, 1981 (E/CEPAL/G. 1248), Santiago, Chile, 
1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. b Preliminary figures.  c From 1987 on, the commercial exchange 
rate was used. d TTie exchange rates used were the following:  To July 1982, the mean of  the average buying and selling rates 
as reported to the Bank of  Mexico by major commercial banks; August to November 1982, the preferential  rate for  essential 
imports; after  November 1982, the mean of  the buying and selling rates on the regulated market. e The unregulated or parallel 
exchange rate was used. 
objective of  reducing inflation.  This policy 
yielded positive results in Brazil and Venezuela, 
whose currencies appreciated the most, in real 
terms, during 1995. 
Brazil's foreign  exchange regime was 
modified  under the Real Plan. The prior system's 
aim had been to maintain a stable real exchange 
rate; the new system -which was adopted during 
a period of  very heavy inflows  of  external capital, 
import liberalization and mounting domestic 
demand- gave rise to a sharp appreciation of 
Brazil's currency and a large trade deficit,  thus 
making a change in the country's foreign 
exchange policy necessary. Accordingly, in 
March 1995 the Government announced the 
adoption of  a system of  currency bands. These 
bands were to be subject to ongoing adjustments 
in line with the differential  between domestic and 
external prices and with productivity gains. The 
upper and lower limits of  the band were modified 
a number of  times with a view to enhancing the 
country's external competitiveness and 
preventing any further  widening of  the trade 
deficit.  Despite these efforts,  however, the 
authorities were unable to neutralize the initial 
appreciation of  the real, and, in consequence, the 
annual average real effective  exchange rate 
proved to be 25% lower in 1995 than it had been 
in 1994 and was just over 50% of  its 1992 level. 
In response to quite a different  set of 
circumstances, throughout the year Venezuela 
maintained the capital controls it had introduced 
in June 1994 along with the official  exchange rate 
of  170 bolívares to the dollar, with the result that 
the steep upturn in domestic prices led to a sharp 
appreciation of  the currency in real terms. The 
outcome was that the annual average real 
effective  exchange rate for  1995 was 25% lower 
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than it had been the year before.  Midway through 
the year, the country's securities exchanges were 
authorized to begin trading dollar-denominated 
Brady bonds in bolívares, thereby setting up what 
was for  all intents and purposes a de facto  parallel 
exchange market. The implicit exchange rate for 
these transactions continued to rise until it was 
twice as a high as the official  rate. In October, the 
parallel exchange rate began to be used for  some 
service transactions, such as payments for  airline 
tickets and overseas credit-card purchases by 
Venezuela residents. At year's end, the market 
was consolidated once again with the 
introduction of  a single exchange rate of  290 
bolívares to the dollar. Since demand pressure in 
the currency market failed  to subside, however, 
in April 1996 the currency was allowed to float, 
whereupon the exchange rate climbed to around 
470 bolívares to the dollar. Finally, in mid-1996 
a currency band system was instituted. 
The other countries whose currencies gained 
in value enjoyed a favourable  external 
environment, either because the international 
prices of  their raw material exports had risen 
sharply or because they received large inflows  of 
externa] funds  in the form  of  private transfers, 
tourism receipts and short-term capital. 
Among this group of  countries, the case of 
Chile is particularly striking. Chile exhibited 
very strong export growth while also witnessing 
a substantia] increase in the international prices 
for  its main export products and sustained 
inflows  of  external capital, which continued to 
play a part in the downward movement of  the real 
exchange rate. The currency appreciated 
considerably during the first  half  of  the year as 
the nominal value of  the dollar fell  sharply. In 
July, the combination of  a number of  steps taken 
by the Central Bank (particularly new measures 
regarding reserve requirements aimed at curbing 
the entry of  short-term capital via the banking 
system), a stronger dollar on international 
markets and burgeoning imports contributed to 
an upsurge in the nominal rate. Near the end of 
the year, the Centra] Bank introduced a 2% 
annual discount into the corrections made in 
determining the value of  the currency basket used 
as a point of  reference,  which is adjusted daily on 
the basis of  the differentia]  between external and 
domestic inflation;  in so doing, the authorities 
have, in light of  the country's changed external 
circumstances, incorporated a structural 
tendency towards a revaluation of  the Chilean 
peso. As a result, the annual average real 
effective  exchange rate slipped by 4% in 1995. 
El Salvador set the rate for  its currency against 
the dollar at the start of  the year based on such 
factors  as its abundant inflows  of  external 
resources in the form  of  remittances by 
non-residents and tourism receipts, the higher 
prices brought by its commodity exports on the 
international market, and the inflow  of  short-term 
capita] that was attracted by the difference 
between domestic and external interest rates. As 
domestic prices continued to climb, the colón 
increased in value. 
The Dominican Republic was in much the 
same sort of  position; the supply of  finance  on 
the country's currency market was quite ample 
(owing, among other factors,  to remittances from 
abroad and incoming short-term capital), while 
tourism and maquila  sales flourished.  All of  this 
contributed to an appreciation of  the dollar within 
a context of  greater external openness. The 
increased value of  the peso in real terms has given 
rise to an entire structure of  subsidies and implicit 
taxes applying to specific  export and import 
activities. One particularly noteworthy factor  is 
that official  trading operations put such 
traditional exports as sugar at a disadvantage 
while subsidizing the use of  petroleum and 
petroleum products. 
The currencies of  Costa Rica, Guatemala and 
Honduras also appreciated as these countries, 
too, enjoyed favourable  external conditions. The 
appreciation was slight in Costa Rica, where the 
real exchange rate has been quite stable over the 
past four  years. In Guatemala, this situation 
coincided with a loss of  international reserves, 
while in Honduras -following  a year marked by 
a great deal of  uncertainty that had put heavy 
pressure on the foreign  exchange market- the 
real exchange rate rebounded to the level it had 
reached two years earlier. 
The cases of  Cuba and Haiti merit special 
mention. The downward trend in the real 
exchange rate seen in both of  these countries 
reflected  the fact  that their currency markets were 
in a more balanced position than they had been 
in past years thanks to a more flexible  supply of 
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foreign  exchange and the improved operation of 
their financial  and product markets. 
b) Countries registering a real depreciation 
These countries can be divided into two 
different  groups. The first  is made up of  countries 
that trade heavily with Brazil, where the 
appreciation of  the real pushed up its effective 
exchange rate against the currencies of  its most 
active trading partners. The second group is 
made up of  economies whose currencies were 
allowed to depreciate for  balance-of-payments 
purposes or whose value was driven down by a 
strong demand for  foreign  exchange in the 
presence of  economic or social conditions that 
heightened the level of  uncertainty among 
economic agents. 
Mexico was the country whose currency 
depreciated the most in 1995. Early in the year, 
uncertainty about the viability of  the emergency 
programme and about the Government's 
compliance with the stated terms for  its 
redemption of  tesobonos triggered a steep 
downturn in the peso, which bottomed out in 
early March. Subsequent modifications  in the 
emergency programme and the revision of  the 
country's macroeconomic targets contributed to 
the recovery and stabilization of  the peso, but the 
continuation of  the recession and a number of 
events of  a non-economic nature (chiefly  in the 
political arena) destabilized the currency again in 
September. This state of  affairs  persisted until 
near the end of  the year, when the dollar reached 
7.7 pesos -a 120% increase in its price in nominal 
terms over its level just prior to the end-1994 
devaluation of  the peso. 
The other cases of  real depreciations within 
the region were limited in scope. In Bolivia, the 
monetary authority continued to intervene in the 
foreign  exchange market with a view to 
achieving a gradual improvement in the 
country's external competitiveness, thereby 
carrying forward  a policy it has pursued since 
1989. In Peru, whose inflows  of  external capital 
thinned out somewhat in 1995, the real exchange 
rate climbed for  the second year in a row 
following  a number of  years of  steady declines. 
Nicaragua, which received a considerable flow 
of  foreign  aid and saw an improvement in its 
terms of  trade, maintained its system of  sliding 
parities for  the gold córdoba and corrected the 
exchange rate for  the dollar at a pace that 
outstripped the movement in domestic prices. 
The MERCOSUR countries were in a quite 
different  position. With the rapid increase in 
trade that has taken place within this subregional 
grouping in recent years, Brazil has become the 
main buyer of  its trading partners' exports. 
Consequently, the steep appreciation of  the 
Brazilian currency in real terms boosted the 
purchasing power of  its MERCOSUR partners in 
that country and their real effective  exchange 
rates therefore  improved, even though the 
currencies of  Paraguay and Uruguay 
strengthened against the dollar and the parity of 
the Argentine peso held steady. 
The free  convertibility of  Argentina's 
currency, which has been maintained since 1991, 
came under heavy pressure as capital flows 
retreated in the wake of  the events that overtook 
Mexico in late 1994. Nonetheless, the 
Government continued to uphold the system and 
placed top priority on the country's stabilization 
programme; as a result, productivity gains and 
the reduction of  local-currency costs came to 
play a key role in the expansion of 
competitiveness. Stronger demand from  Brazil, 
higher international prices for  major export 
products and the incoming stream of  long-term 
external capital contributed to the equilibrium of 
the balance of  payments and thereby shored up 
the currency's parity with the dollar. Given these 
conditions, the annual average real effective 
exchange rate for  1995 climbed to a five-year 
high that put it 11% above where it had been the 
year before. 
Paraguay continued to float  its currency, 
subject to Central Bank intervention. In a 
departure from  the situation during the preceding 
four  years, in 1995 the Central Bank sold more 
foreign  exchange than it bought, and the increase 
in the dollar exchange rate was therefore  a scant 
3%, which represented a 5% appreciation of  the 
local currency in real terms. This factor  was more 
than offset,  however, by the guarani's 
depreciation against the Brazilian real, and the 
real effective  exchange rate consequently 
reached the highest level to be recorded in many 
years. 
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In Uruguay, the Central Bank continued to 
make monthly devaluations in the floor  rate of  its 
7%-wide currency band. Although some degree 
of  convergence was observed between domestic 
prices, on the one hand, and the price of  the dollar 
together with the portion of  external inflation 
relevant to the country, on the other, the annual 
average real exchange rate was higher in 1995 
than it had been the year before  owing to the 
sharp appreciation of  the Brazilian real during the 
second half  of  1994. 
Two countries whose currencies had risen in 
value in past years saw their exchange rates 
change direction in 1995. Thus, even though the 
real average exchange rate for  1995 was similar 
to the preceding year's rate, at year's end it was 
much higher than it had been in late 1994. 
In Colombia, the exchange rate went through 
two very different  stages. Up to August, the 
currency stayed close to the central band rate, but 
for  the rest of  the year-partly as a result of  greater 
political uncertainty- the dollar clung to the 
ceiling of  the band, prompting the Bank of  the 
Republic to offer  hard currencies for  sale on the 
open market on a number of  occasions. This 
brought about a reversal in the trend of  the real 
effective  exchange rate, which thus climbed by 
around 6% during the year. Nevertheless, in 
terms of  annual averages, the 1995 rate was 
virtually the same as the year before.  In view of 
this situation, during the first  few  months of  1996 
the Bank of  the Republic relaxed the regulations 
governing short-term overseas borrowing which 
it had established previously in an effort  to 
mitigate the effects  of  ongoing capital inflows  on 
the real exchange rate. 
In order to quell the steady appreciation of  the 
sucre, Ecuador adopted a currency band which 
was adjusted in accordance with the projected 
inflation  rate. The series of  corrections made over 
the course of  the year represented a real 
devaluation of  the sucre on the order of  2%. 
3. Monetary policy 
The  priority  given to foreign  exchange 
policy  in a number of  countries' 
stabilization  programmes relegated 
monetary policy  to a subordinate  role. 
Other countries  allowed  their 
currencies to float  and sought  to check 
inflation  through  the use of  moderate  or 
tight  monetary policies.  In  both cases, 
fiscal  adjustment  measures buttressed 
monetary policy  by reducing  the 
pressure for  money creation.  As a 
consequence of  the difficulties 
experienced  by some financial  systems 
and the considerable  volume of  inbound 
external  resources, however, a sizeable 
expansion was seen in the primary 
money supply in various countries. 
Faced  with  an undesired  increase in 
liquidity,  their  central  banks 
strengthened  their  sterilization 
mechanisms (chiefly  open-market 
operations  and higher  reserve 
requirements).  In  response to these 
circumstances,  real  domestic  interest 
rates tended  to move upward,  thereby 
dampening  domestic  demand  and 
slowing  the economy's growth. 
The monetary policies pursued in the region 
can be grouped into two main categories: 
i) essentially passive policies, implemented 
under a system of  managed exchange rates; and 
ii) policies of  a more discretionary nature. 
a) Passive monetary policies 
In those countries that employed the exchange 
rate for  the dollar as the main variable in domestic 
price formation,  money creation was primarily 
endogenous. The situation was much the same in 
countries that devalued their currencies 
periodically (generally on the basis of  changes in 
the spread between domestic and external prices) 
and in those whose currencies tended to hover 
near the outer limits of  their currency bands. In 
the latter type of  country, however, monetary 
policy provided some scope for  action, since it 
was used to align the level of  liquidity with 
policy-makers' objectives in respect of  domestic 
prices. 
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As mentioned earlier, Argentina, El Salvador 
and Venezuela adopted a fixed  exchange rate in 
1995. Bolivia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
corrected their exchange rates through a regular 
series of  small devaluations, while in Uruguay 
the exchange rate clung to the floor  of  the band. 
In almost all of  these cases, the money creation 
generated by foreign-exchange  transactions was 
not the only factor  influencing  the growth of  the 
money supply. The increase in the money stock 
caused by the provision of  central bank credit to 
help out troubled financial  institutions, 
open-market operations aimed at sopping up 
what was regarded as excess liquidity, and the 
monetary effects  of  the public-sector's financial 
balance all helped either to create or absorb 
money and thus altered -in some cases, 
strikingly- the growth of  the primary money 
supply caused by variations in international 
reserves. 
The case of  Argentina provides a good 
example of  a passive monetary policy, given its 
system of  free  convertibility. After  several years 
of  remonetization, in 1995 the increase in the 
money supply was quite limited. The steep drop 
in demand for  domestic assets -due to a smaller 
volume of  transactions and greater uncertainty as 
to the soundness of  the financial  system- drove 
down the demand for  money during the first  half 
of  the year, and particularly for  interest-bearing 
deposits. In late February the authorities 
modified  the Central Bank's charter and 
expanded the scope of  its authority to assist the 
financial  system through rediscounting 
operations, which had been extremely limited 
until that time. The laws governing financial 
institutions were also amended so as to empower 
the Central Bank to authorize the reorganization 
of  such institutions prior to suspending their 
operations. The announcement of  a package of 
foreign  assistance tied to the IMF agreement 
signed by Argentina, in conjunction with the 
fiscal  and financial  measures unveiled in March, 
eased the tension in credit markets. Although this 
did not start off  a swift  recovery, the prospect of 
a run on deposits and of  a credit squeeze 
gradually receded. 
Conditions in financial  markets began to 
return to normal, and the downward trend 
exhibited by the money supply in previous 
months was consequently reversed during the 
second half  of  the year. Late in the year, 
peso-denominated rates on term deposits and on 
loans to top-rated corporate clients were lower 
than they had been in mid-December 1994, while 
the dollar rates on the same instruments were 
only slightly higher. 
Even though Costa Rica adopted a system of 
small, frequent  devaluations, it implemented a 
tight monetary policy in order to lower both the 
fiscal  deficit  and inflation.  The tools used by 
policy-makers to control money creation were 
reserve requirements (which they had raised in 
late 1994) and open-market operations. Sales of 
"stabilization bonds" were 65% higher than the 
year before  and, in conjunction with increased 
placements of  Treasury bonds, therefore  exerted 
upward pressure on real interest rates. As a result, 
Ml shrank nearly 18% in real terms while 
local-currency liquidity contracted even more. 
This outcome was not entirely attributable to the 
country's monetary policy, however, but was 
instead also a reflection  of  the genera] public's 
preference  for  converting their savings from  the 
local currency into foreign  exchange. 
In Bolivia, which also used a system based on 
numerous small devaluations, the main events 
affecting  monetary policy were the banking crisis 
that broke out during the first  half  of  1995, which 
triggered a sizeable increase in the money supply 
due to the credit assistance provided to the 
system, and the Government's commitment to 
push ahead with its stabilization programme. In 
order to reconcile these two objectives, sales of 
certificates  of  deposit on the open market were 
stepped up (the volume of  such transactions more 
than doubled the 1994 figure).  The higher level 
of  external financing  which it received and the 
smaller size of  the fiscal  deficit  enabled the 
public sector to build up its deposits with the 
Central Bank, thereby driving down the net level 
of  domestic credit extended to that sector. Given 
these circumstances, domestic interest rates 
gradually rose as the year progressed, although 
their average level for  the year was much the 
same as it had been in 1994. 
El Salvador switched to a system of  fixed 
exchange rates at the start of  1995. In response 
to a copious inflow  of  external resources, the 
authorities began to implement a sterilization 
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policy aimed at keeping the level of  liquidity in 
line with the growth of  the economy and with the 
targets they had set for  inflation  and net 
international reserves. The Central Bank's 
decision to raise interbank interest rates and 
reserve requirements held the expansion of 
monetary aggregates to much more moderate 
levels than the year before.  Despite the 
downswing in credit to the public sector and in 
the financial  system's net international reserves, 
liquidity expanded due to a significant  increase 
in private-sector borrowing (30%), which was 
financed  with the external resources that were 
flowing  into the country. 
Under its managed exchange-rate regime, 
Nicaragua's monetary policy, which had already 
been quite restrictive in previous years, was 
tightened even further.  The net amount of  credit 
extended by the Central Bank to the country's 
financial  system continued to decline in 1995, 
which helped to curb the growth of  liquidity. In 
April, the legal reserve requirement was raised, 
but this did not affect  domestic interest rates. The 
Central Bank's move to float  negotiable 
investment certificates  marked the first  time it 
had ever engaged in córdoba-denominated 
operations on the open market. Despite 
widespread indexation to the dollar, the public 
continued to perceive a certain measure of  risk, 
and this was reflected  in an increasing degree of 
dollarization; in fact,  the ratio between deposits 
in dollars and in córdobas climbed to nearly 60%. 
What is more, the high default  rate made the 
financial  system reluctant to lend out the funds 
that it attracted. 
In Venezuela, the strong increase in domestic 
credit conflicted  with the Government's foreign 
exchange policy, under which a fixed  exchange 
rate was maintained for  almost the entire year. 
Indeed, the credit extended by the Central Bank 
to the public sector virtually doubled in 1995. 
The liquidity that this injected into the economy 
continued to fuel  the demand for  foreign 
exchange and helped to draw down international 
reserves. Uncertainty as to whether or not the 
authorities would maintain the fixed  exchange 
rate against the dollar in the face  of  a hefty  fiscal 
deficit,  which was being covered through 
domestic borrowing, seriously weakened money 
demand. Thus, although inflation  amounted to 
52%, the money supply only expanded by 34% 
and the broadly defined  money supply (M2) by 
37%. 
In Uruguay, where the dollar crept along or 
very near the floor  of  the currency band for  most 
of  the year, 70% of  the growth in the monetary 
base corresponded to the acquisition of  foreign 
currency within the banking system, while about 
one third was generated by the Central Bank's 
para-fiscal  expenditures. In contrast, the 
financial  system's deposits with the Central Bank 
had a contractionary effect.  Public-sector 
borrowing, which showed an increase, was easily 
financed  by issues of  six-month, dollar-
denominated "monetary regulation notes". 
Against this backdrop, trends in money creation 
and in nominal transactions were in step with one 
another. 
b) Active monetary policies 
The remaining countries in the region allowed 
their currencies to float  and relied on monetary 
policy as the main tool for  achieving their 
objectives. In the vast majority of  cases, these 
countries' monetary policy-makers took a 
restrictive line in an effort  to forestall  any 
excessive increase in liquidity that could 
destabilize their product or currency markets. 
Brazil's adoption of  a currency band system 
reinforced  the active control over domestic 
demand that it had begun to exercise in late 1994. 
In an effort  to relieve the pressure that a high level 
of  domestic expenditure might exert on the 
balance of  payments, in October 1994 the Central 
Bank had established reserve requirements for 
deposits and even lending operations within the 
financial  system. This policy was buttressed by 
the decision to float  the real, and interest rates 
rose considerably; as a result, business 
enterprises that had access to the international 
market turned to borrowing overseas, while high 
rates of  return within the country made financial 
investments in the Brazilian market highly 
attractive. Both of  these factors  contributed to the 
steep upturn in capital inflows  observed during 
the second half  of  1995. 
In order to limit the monetary expansion 
caused by the increase in international reserves, 
the Central Bank of  Brazil lowered reserve 
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Table II-5 
LATIN AMERICA: REAL INTEREST RATES a 
(Annualized  percentages) 
1994 1995 
I II III IV I II III IV 
Argentina 
Deposits 6.0 3.9 1.2 6.1 11.4 15.0 7.4 8.7 
Loans 19.9 16.6 12.6 19.9 22.0 31.3 26.3 14.5 
Bolivia 
Deposits 14.1 13.0 5.3 4.5 7.0 6.2 12.8 -3.8 
Loans 52.6 44.2 38.1 39.1 34.3 35.3 51.3 26.0 
Brazil 
Deposits 35.5 43.0 7.8 17.8 33.0 24.7 25.8 15.7 
Loans 630.8 399.1 73.0 101.3 114.5 89.8 59.9 63.1 
Chile 
Deposits 3.1 7.6 5.9 6.0 4.3 4.6 4.5 7.0 
Loans 8.1 12.2 10.7 10.8 8.6 8.4 8.2 11.6 
Colombia 
Deposits -12.3 5.4 15.7 17.5 -2.6 9.0 18.1 17.2 
Loans -4.8 14.7 25.5 24.8 4.9 17.2 28.1 26.6 
Costa Rica 
Deposits 3.4 0.6 -3.7 -7.1 -4.9 -0.8 6.0 3.4 
Loans 16.0 13.6 9.5 5.2 6.2 9.7 15.3 13.4 
Ecuador 
Deposits -5.1 3.3 15.2 14.2 18.8 9.8 17.4 20.9 
Loans 3.9 11.6 23.4 21.5 24.4 22.9 28.5 31.2 
El Salvador 
Deposits 0.5 6.3 4.6 5.8 0.5 4.4 -4.4 10.9 
Loans 4.7 10.9 9.9 11.8 5.9 8.4 -0.8 14.8 
Guatemala 
Deposits -2.2 1.5 -1.8 -4.3 6.0 -6.8 2.0 -4.4 
Loans 8.5 13.4 11.5 7.5 19.2 5.2 14.9 7.1 
Honduras 
Deposits -9.8 -20.8 -9.4 -12.7 -22.3 -9.6 -7.3 -6.5 
Loans -0.5 -12.3 1.1 -0.5 -12.1 2.4 5.5 6.0 
Mexico 
Deposits, 1 month 1.1 8.6 7.6 5.9 -21.2 -18.4 5.4 3.3 
Deposits, 3 months 1.3 8.7 7.3 5.6 -22.1 -19.1 5.2 3.0 
Panama b 
Deposits 6.2 7.8 
Loans 9.6 10.0 
Paraguay 
Deposits -8.1 14.9 8.0 6.4 5.8 12.1 17.1 11.1 
Loans 0.4 25.8 18.3 16.4 12.8 21.4 28.1 22.1 
Peru 
Deposits 3.8 9.2 5.1 5.9 2.7 4.1 7.9 6.2 
Loans 36.0 38.1 28.5 28.8 21.2 23.8 27.0 23.9 
Uruguay 
Deposits 1.6 -5.6 -6.8 -8.6 0.7 -2.0 1.2 8.7 
Loans 45.9 35.3 31.5 29.4 43.7 43.5 47.8 53.1 
Venezuela 
Deposits 17.3 -19.0 -19.0 -23.3 -12.3 -21.4 -8.8 -28.5 
Loans 32.8 -6.4 -7.8 -8.1 3.9 -10.4 4.6 -19.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Nominal rates deflated  by the change in the consumer price index over the relevant period. b Average value for  the year. 
40 
requirements on deposits considerably and did 
away with the ones applying to bank lending 
activity altogether. In addition, early in October 
new mechanisms were created to lengthen the 
terms of  incoming external resources; 
nevertheless, real domestic interest rates 
remained high, thereby encouraging further 
inflows  of  external capital and dampening the 
demand for  credit. The country's strict monetary 
policy and its recently achieved price stability 
had a positive impact on public and private 
financial  institutions, a number of  which had 
been experiencing solvency and liquidity 
problems. 
The interplay of  foreign  exchange and 
monetary policies was a crucial factor  in Chile 
during 1995. On a number of  occasions the 
monetary authorities tried to check the net inflow 
of  short-term external capital by introducing 
regulations designed to increase the cost of 
accepting foreign  capital and to diversify  local 
institutional investors' portfolios  on an 
international scale. In addition, within the 
framework  created by the nominal revaluation of 
the dollar during the second quarter, in May the 
authorities took steps to give the market a broader 
role in determining the level and structure of 
domestic interest rates. In September, however, 
they adopted a more restrictive monetary policy 
stance as the Central Bank moved to hike 
interbank rates; later, in December, it increased 
its rediscount rates along with the rates offered 
on the securities it floated  as a means of 
regulating liquidity, thereby reversing the 
downward trend in these rates which had been in 
evidence since May. This policy was tightened 
up even further  in early 1996 in response to the 
sharp upswing in aggregate demand. 
Colombia applied a tight monetary policy 
throughout the year in an effort  to rein in the rapid 
growth of  domestic demand. Ever since 
mid-1994 the country's monetary authorities had 
been striving to reduce the growth rate of  private 
consumption while also implementing an 
expansionary fiscal  policy. This policy remained 
in place during the first  half  of  1995, but 
policy-makers then decided to cut public 
spending and, at the same time, to lower interest 
rates. Interest rates started to bounce back 
towards the end of  the year, however, as the level 
of  uncertainty mounted in response to political 
events in the country. 
In Honduras, the goal of  reducing inflation, 
which had surged during 1994, was the linchpin 
of  the country's monetary policy. In order to keep 
money creation within the limits called for  by the 
targeted rate of  price increases, the Government 
floated  bonds on the open market and maintained 
high legal reserve requirements. Thanks to these 
measures, the increase in Ml was only half  of 
what it had been in 1994. 
Monetary policy was particularly strict in 
Mexico, in view of  what had occurred in 1994, 
and Ml therefore  shrank by nearly one third in 
real terms. The attraction of  deposits by 
multi-purpose banks slipped 14%, while the 
private sector's credit balance dropped 17%, as 
compared to an increase of  36% in 1994. The 
pivotal elements of  the country's adjustment 
programme -which from  the very outset enjoyed 
the backing of  the international community, as 
evidenced by the loan packages granted by the 
United States and the IMF- were harsh fiscal 
restrictions and a highly contractionary monetary 
policy. The recession and the high level of 
interest rates hurt the financial  position of 
business firms  and households alike, making it 
difficult  for  them to pay off  their debts. This, in 
turn, undermined the banking system's financial 
standing, since the default  rate on banks' loan 
portfolios  skyrocketed. The Government set up 
various mechanisms to safeguard  the savings of 
private citizens, help debtors to restructure their 
financial  obligations and assist the commercial 
banks to put themselves back on a sound 
financial  footing,  all of  which had an impact on 
the level of  public expenditure. This machinery 
contributed to an improvement in the banks' 
capitalization indexes, but failed  to check the 
increase in the default  rate on bank loans. 
The slowdown in the formerly  swift  growth 
rate of  domestic demand in Peru was also based 
on a tight monetary policy, to which the decrease 
in the inflow  of  external resources (far  below the 
preceding year's level) contributed as well. The 
policy tools used by the authorities to soak up 
excess money included the sale of  securities by 
the Centra] Reserve Bank of  Peru and deposits 
by the public sector and the Banco de la Nación 
in the Central Bank; these measures succeeded in 
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lowering the annual growth rate for  primary 
money creation from  57% as of  the end of  March 
to 37% in December. The confidence  inspired by 
the Government's policies continued to fuel 
money demand, and the share of  total bank 
liabilities represented by foreign-currency 
deposits therefore  diminished once again. Under 
these circumstances, local-currency interest rates 
on both deposits and loans sank in real terms. 
In contrast to the above-mentioned cases, the 
Dominican Republic pursued a much looser 
monetary policy in 1995. The build-up of 
international reserves played a major role in 
boosting the money supply. At the same time, 
very attractive domestic interest rates (which 
stood, when measured in annual averages, more 
than 9% above international rates) contributed to 
the increase in deposits by the general public in 
the financial  system and, hence, to the upturn in 
bank lending. Although public-sector borrowing 
climbed by a rather modest amount, given the 
policies being implemented in an effort  to 
improve the outturn of  the public sector's 
accounts, both of  these increases generated a 
much higher level of  money creation than had 
originally been anticipated. 
In Guatemala, monetary policy continued to 
be expansionary during the first  few  months of 
1995, but in the second quarter policy-makers 
took steps to siphon off  excess liquidity and bring 
net international reserves, which had dropped 
sharply, back up to their former  level. To this end, 
the Bank of  Guatemala resumed its operations on 
the open market and kept bank reserve 
requirements at high levels. Nonetheless, its 
sterilization efforts  were seriously hampered by 
the commercial banking system's use of 
deposit-attraction mechanisms that were not 
subject to reserve requirements, and secondary 
credit thus swelled by more than 24%, which 
injected more liquidity into the economy. In 
response to this situation, the Central Bank 
stepped up its open-market operations, offering 
hefty  returns that translated into operating losses 
on the order of  1% of  GDP. Meanwhile, the 
process of  amending the laws governing 
financial  activity moved forward  in 1995, and, as 
part of  that approach, legislation designed to 
strengthen the Superintendency of  Banks and to 
increase the capitalization of  banking institutions 
was passed during the year. Interest rates were 
also entirely decontrolled by legislative decree. 
The monetary policies of  Ecuador, Haiti and 
Paraguay had some distinctive features.  In some 
instances, circumstances in these countries were 
such that the authorities enjoyed greater 
manoeuvering room and were able to take steps 
which led to the remonetization of  the economy. 
In other cases, liquidity rose above the limits that 
had been set for  it based on the targeted inflation 
rate, and the authorities therefore  implemented 
sterilization measures which succeeded in 
bringing the rate of  monetary expansion back 
down to moderate levels. 
In Ecuador, the credit extended to the public 
sector, which found  itself  in a more difficult 
fiscal  position than before,  and the emergency 
assistance furnished  to a number of  banks and 
other financial  institutions to help them cope with 
liquidity problems were major factors  in the 
expansion of  the money stock. Uncertainty in the 
financial  market and political events in the 
country also drove down the demand for  money 
and thereby led to a decrease in international 
reserves and a contraction of  the money supply. 
As a result, in 1995 Ml increased by just 13%, 
which was only one third as much as the year 
before  and far  below annual inflation.  High 
interest rates, in conjunction with the energy 
crisis and sluggish domestic demand, led to a 
build-up in loan arrears after  they had already 
jumped to nearly twice their former  level in 1994. 
In late 1995 and early 1996, a number of  financial 
institutions were overtaken by a severe liquidity 
crisis, and some of  them lapsed into bankruptcy. 
In a bid to stabilize the financial  system, the 
Central Bank extended emergency financing, 
imposed a freeze  on the chartering of  new banks, 
created incentives for  mergers among financial 
institutions, raised the minimum level of  reserves 
required of  such institutions and upgraded the 
supervisory machinery for  the sector. 
The gradual normalization of  the political 
situation in Haiti opened the way for  an influx  of 
external financial  aid. Under the agreement that 
the country signed with the IMF, the increase in 
its international reserves turned out to be the 
main factor  in the expansion of  the money stock. 
Public-sector borrowing -which had been the 
main cause of  the growth of  liquidity in 1994-
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had just the opposite effect  in 1995. Private-
sector borrowing rose considerably and, when 
signs of  excess liquidity began to appear, the 
authorities reacted by boosting reserve 
requirements sharply and removing the cap on 
interest rates. Monetary authorities also pledged 
to hold back one fifth  of  external inflows.  In 
August, the Central Bank began to sell foreign 
exchange (thus helping to absorb monetary 
resources) and, as a result of  all this, local-
currency liquidity grew by only 15%, which was 
well within the limits set in the agreement with 
the IMF. 
In Paraguay, price stabilization was the 
primary focus  of  the monetary programme which 
was launched in early 1995, as had also been the 
case in 1994. The crisis that broke out in 
numerous financial  institutions in late April 
severely hindered this programme's 
implementation, however. The financial  crisis hit 
major banking institutions accounting about for 
one sixth of  the system's total deposits. In order 
to prevent this crisis from  spreading to the rest of 
the system, the Central Bank took over the loans 
of  distressed companies, a step which boosted 
monetary expansion sharply (by an amount 
equivalent to three fourths  of  money creation as 
of  the end of  1994). The monetary authority then 
sopped up the excess money in circulation 
through the sale of  Treasury bills. The slump in 
public-sector borrowing also helped to absorb 
surplus liquidity, thereby enabling the Central 
Bank to hold back the expansion of  primary 
money to levels in line with the Government's 
price stabilization objectives against a backdrop 
of  steadfast  nominal exchange rates. The very 
appealing interest rates offered  by the Central 
Bank in order to soak up excess liquidity pushed 
real interest rates far  above the levels they had 
reached in the past. 
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III. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
During 1995, the structural  reform 
process continued  to gain ground  in the 
region,  although  the pace of  progress and 
the degree  of  consolidation  in each 
country remained  quite  uneven. 
One of  the most important developments in 
1995 was the fact  that the privatization process 
at the national level not only was continued but 
was also embraced by a number of  countries that 
had not previously divested themselves of 
public-sector enterprises. Equally important 
were the efforts  made to improve existing 
regulatory systems in sectors where public 
utilities were being privatized and to introduce 
new regulatory mechanisms to tighten up the 
operation of  the financial  system. In the area of 
social security reform,  a number of  countries 
took steps during 1995 to set up social insurance 
systems funded  by employee's contributions. In 
the area of  foreign  trade, on the other hand, the 
liberalization process suffered  some setbacks as 
non-tariff  barriers were reintroduced or 
strengthened and tariffs  were raised in countries 
which had made substantial progress in 
liberalizing their trade regimes in the past. 
Special mention should be made of  the reform 
process that is taking place in Cuba. Different  in 
many ways from  the rest of  Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Cuba is in effect  making structural 
changes of  varying scope under its existing 
socialist system. During 1995, for  example, it 
continued opening up its economy to foreign 
capital and decentralizing its foreign  trade, which 
will eventually lead to a separation between 
Central Bank operations and those to be carried 
out by the commercial banks that will be 
established in the future,  thus paving the way for 
the reform  of  the financial  system. The 
privatization of  the agricultural sector also 
continued as the proportion of  cooperatives and 
individual producers increased and the amount of 
land worked by the State sector was reduced to 
30% of  the country's total farmland. 
1. Public-sector reforms 
A major feature  of  public-sector reform  in 1995 
was the ongoing progress of  the privatization 
process, particularly in the case of  public utilities; 
this has, in turn made it necessary to move ahead 
with the restructuring of  their regulatory systems. 
Some advances were also made in the reform  of 
the region's social security systems. 
a) Privatizations 
Since the early 1990s, the privatization 
process has gradually taken hold in the region, 
thereby consolidating the State's new role, in 
which greater emphasis is placed on its function 
as a regulatory body and direct State participation 
in the production of  goods and services is being 
sharply curtailed to make room for  greater 
involvement in financing,  policy design and the 
regulation of  economic activities. From a more 
short-term perspective, there has been a tendency 
-reflected  to some extent in developments in 
1995- to gear the sale of  public-sector firms  and, 
more specifically,  the whole pace of  the 
privatization process, to budget requirements. 
Divestment of  such assets is, thus, still 
considered an important source of  funds  for 
narrowing fiscal  deficits  and helping to finance 
shortfalls  in the balance of  payments. 
Before  1988, Chile alone had made significant 
progress with sales of  publicly-owned 
companies, but in 1989 both the sums involved 
and the number of  countries engaged in the 
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process began to escalate. Then, after  peaking in 
1991, the sell-off  rate slackened; this trend 
became more pronounced in 1995, when 
divestment of  public assets in 14 countries of  the 
region brought in some US$ 3.7 billion 
-considerably less than the US$ 8.5 billion 
realized in 1994- and the number of  companies 
privatized fell  from  120 to 63. Much of  the 
explanation for  this marked decline lies in the 
fact  that certain stages of  the process have now 
been completed in a number of  countries, such as 
Argentina and Mexico, where in previous years 
revenue from  privatizations had equalled some 
8% of  GDP. Nevertheless, the process also slowed 
in Brazil and Peru, while in Chile it has generated 
only modest revenues in recent years, after 
having produced spectacular gains during the 
second half  of  the 1980s. 
An analysis of  the sectoral distribution of 
privatizations reveals that, in those countries 
where this process is the farthest  along, the 
companies sold have primarily been in 
subsectors such as electricity and 
telecommunications; this circumstance is 
accounted for  by the large amount of  capital such 
activities require and the extremely high returns 
on investment in these services due to the wide 
gap that exists between supply and demand. 
There have also been substantial divestments in 
Argentina's oil sector (30%) and in Mexico's 
financial  sector (51%). In Bolivia, it is hoped that 
the capitalization of  Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) will increase the share 
of  the hydrocarbons sector. 
The decline in privatizations observed in 1995 
has led some experts to conclude that the process 
may be entering a new phase which is 
characterized by a more gradual approach, by 
more thorough preparations for  such sales, and 
by attempts to find  strategically better partners. 
Despite the slowdown, however, prospects for 
1996 and the following  years are encouraging, 
since countries where the privatization process 
has only recently taken off  -such as Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and 
Venezuela- are making strenuous efforts  to shift 
the process into high gear. Moreover, 1995 saw 
the removal of  obstacles to greater domestic and 
foreign  private-sector participation in the 
production of  a number of  goods and services 
that had formerly  been the exclusive preserve of 
the public sector. There is evidence of  this in 
Brazil, for  example, where Constitutional 
reforms  have put an end to State monopolies in 
telecommunications, natural gas distribution, 
shipping services and hydrocarbons. In Mexico, 
too, the Constitution has been amended to allow 
both Mexican and foreign  private investors to 
enter the telecommunications, transport, natural 
gas and infrastructure  sectors. In addition, there 
is an increasing tendency to use 
concession-based mechanisms to finance 
activities in areas where the State has 
traditionally held sway, such as infrastructure 
projects in Chile and natural resource (oil) 
development in Peru and Ecuador. 
Private-sector participation in infrastructure 
projects is still only in the preparatory or initial 
stages, but there are high hopes as regards this 
sector's future  role in the areas of  road and rail 
systems, ports and airports, and it is thought 
likely that concession-based mechanisms will 
play a very important part in the process. 
Operations of  this nature will, however, 
necessarily take longer to carry out because of 
their great technical complexity and their very 
high capital requirements. 
Although privatization per se makes no 
contribution to capital formation,  it has 
galvanized the process of  accumulation. The 
reasons for  this include the existence of  unmet 
demand in areas of  activity where the State used 
to exercise sole responsibility and of 
considerable technological backwardness, since 
both of  these circumstances have obliged the new 
operators to expand their production capacity 
rapidly. Other processes have also been at work, 
however, including an increasing openness to 
market competition and the emergence of  new 
opportunities for  the private sector, such as those 
provided by the concession-based schemes 
currently being applied in the area of 
infrastructure. 
In Peru, for  example, the sales agreements for 
a number of  public-sector enterprises 
(particularly the largest such companies and 
public utilities), have included clauses calling for 
around US$ 3.5 billion in investment over the 
next few  years -a sum which almost matches the 
US$ 3.9 billion realized from  the sales 
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Table III-l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VALUE OF PRIVATIZATIONS a 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1985-
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total 2 446 5 875 16 702 14 886 10 179 8 529 3 774 
Argentina b _ 2139 1 896 5 312 4 589 1 441 793 
Bolivia - - - 7 14 - 887 
Brazil - - 1564 2 451 2 621 1 972 910 
Chile 1 146 29 117 21 - 203 3 
Colombia 52 117 105 27 4 681 138 
Costa Rica 15 - 3 - - 27 -
Ecuador - - - - - 74 73 
Mexico 1 233 3 580 10 716 6 799 2 507 771 -
Nicaragua d e - 0.4 20 14 74 7 




3 208 317 
22 
2 578 946 
Venezuela - 10 2 276 30 32 15 21 
Other countries - - - - - 638 2 
Source: R. Cominetti, "La privatización y el marco regulatorio en Bolivia y Nicaragua: un análisis comparativo", Reformas  de 
Políticas Públicas series No. 43 (LC/L.973and Add. 1), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1996. 
a Cash income plus income in the form  of  external and domestic debt instruments, calculated on the basis of  their secondary-market 
value; in the case of  Brazil, domestic debt securities were computed at their face  value. b Includes concessions. c Includes 
US$ 51 million from  privatizations and US$ 836 million from  the capitalization of  four  companies, including the State railway 
company (ENFE), which was capitalized at the beginning of  1996. Includes assumption of  liabilities; does not include capital 
contributions to illegally confiscated  companies which were later returned to their owners. e Only US$ 33 million correspond 
to cash payments, a considerable portion of  which were made in the form  of  bonds. 
themselves. Bolivia has adopted a method of 
privatization -referred  to as capitalization1-
whose specific  features  make it possible to obtain 
financial  inputs from  strategic international 
partners equal to the net worth of  the companies 
that are privatized (US$ 900 million in 1995). 
These resources may be used only for  investment 
in the companies themselves and the deadline for 
their disbursement varies between six and seven 
years. 
Another interesting example is the Chilean 
programme to privatize energy generation and 
distribution and telecommunications; despite the 
absence, as a rule, of  specific  capitalization 
clauses, investment in these areas has surged 
thanks, on the one hand, to the very 
characteristics of  these two subsectors and, on the 
other, to Chile's anti-trust regulations and 
legislation (see box IH-1). 
b) The regulatory system 
Since the late 1980s, the countries of  the 
region have implemented major reforms  in order 
to regulate and reinforce  institutional and 
microeconomic aspects of  various sectors of  the 
economy. These reforms  have sought to reduce 
risk in the banking system and capital market and 
to establish rules for  competition and supervisory 
functions  relating to the privatized public 
utilities. 
i) Regulation  of  financial  activity 
The majority of  the countries of  the region 
seem neither to have quite completed their 
1 Privatization in Bolivia takes the form  of  capitalization, whereby the State's share in a company diminishes as the capital 
inputs from  a strategic private partner increases. 
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Box III-l 
CHILE: THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON INVESTMENT IN THE 
ELECTRICITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SUBSECTORS 
Chile's electricity and telecommunications companies 
were privatized between 1986 and 1989. Before  theit sale, 
the Government had reorganized the companies by 
restructuring their internal management and setting up 
affiliates  and subsidiaries which were later to be 
coordinated through holding companies. In addition, the tax 
system was modified  to bring public and private corporate 
taxes into line with each other. 
Opportunities for  public-sector enterprises to invest and 
borrow had previously been very limited, since the need to 
improve public finances  and balance the budget had obliged 
such companies to generate higher profits  for  transfer  to the 
central government. 
The privatization of  the electricity subsector began with 
the sale of  small blocks of  shares in the holding company 
for  the electricity distributor CHILECTRA Metropolitana, 
S.A. and concluded in 1989 with the privatization of  the 
national electricity company, ENDESA. Substantial private 
investments were made in the subscctor between 1985 and 
1993, with a cumulative total approachingUS$ 3.6 billion. 
This has allowed the supply of  electrical power to expand 
at a rate similar to that of  GDP during the last 10 years; 
installed capacity has increased by 68% in the case of 
ENDESA and by 31% in the case of  its rival generating 
company, CHILOENERI 
Between 1994 and 1995; ENDESA, which holds a 61% 
share of  the country's installed power generation capacity, 
invested US$ 450 million; with part of  this sum being spent 
on the new Pangue power plant; the company also plans to 
invest over US$ 1.5 billion between 1996 and 2000 in the 
installation of  new power lines, substations and 
transformers. 
Investment in the private electricity subsector 











1985-1993 3 560 
Source: Jaime Tohá (consultant); Estudio sobre la reforma 
del sector energético en Chile (LC/R.1493), 
Santiago, Chile, ECI.AC, January 1995. 
In 1982, Congress passed an omnibus act which opened 
the telecommunications sector up to competition by 
allowing private investment and defining  the relevant 
regulatory agency's role. In 1987, a new schedule of  local 
and long-distance rates was introduced, along with an 
arbitration procedure for  settling disputes between 
companies and the Tegulatory authority. These Teforms 
facilitated  the privatization of  the Compañía de Teléfonos 
de Chile (CTQ, which operates the local telephone system, 
and the Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL), 
which furnishes  national and international long-distance 
services. The process was completed i n 1988. 
Once privatized, these companies embarked upon a 
swift  development process (particularly crc) and their rate 
of  capital accumulation -which had in the past been 
constrained by the obligation to distribute all their profits-
was impressive. Investment jumped from  a 
pre-privatization rate of  less than US$ 150 million per year 
to an average of  US$ 500 million per year between 1990 
and 1995. This enabled CTC to expand the number of  lines 
it has in service from  592,000 in 1988 to nearly 1.8 million 
in 1995 (the projected number for  the year2000is 3 million) 
as well as to digitize all its lines and double its volume of 
telephone traffic.  Meanwhile, ENTEL has expanded the 
switching network, transmission capacity and digitization 
of  the international telephone system; in addition, it has 
financed  a national and international fibre-optic  grid, an 
undersea interoceanic cable network and an international 
satellite system. 
The inauguration in October 1994 of  the multi-carrier 
system for  longdistance calls that was made possible by 
reccnt legislation created a highly competitive situation 
which induced other telephone companies to enter the 
subsector and spurred existing companies to invest more. 
In 1995, local services were contracted out to existing and 
new operators, leading ENTEL to draw up plans to invest 
US$ 800 million in such projects as local networks and the 
mobile telephone system between 1997 and 2000, while 
CTC plans to invest at least US$ 2 billion in 1996-2000 in 
order to stand up to the new competition. 
Investment in the telecommunications subsector 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Year CTC /-ÍÉNTEIÍ 
1988 110 36 
1989 347 35 
1990 468 39 
1991 357 43 
1992 432 60 
1993 549 82 
1994 387 102 
1995 560 
1988-1995 3 210 
Source: Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 
(ENTEI.), Memoria  anual y estado  financieros, 
Santiago, Chile, various issues; Compañía de 
Teléfonos  de Chile (CTC), Memoria  anual, 
Santiago, Chile, various issues. 
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reforms  of  the regulatory system for  the financial 
sector nor to have laid sufficiently  solid 
foundations  for  those reforms  -a situation which, 
in combination with the adverse macroeconomic 
climate, would account for  the latest wave of 
banking crises (see chapter IV). The few 
exceptions include Chile, which made the 
necessary adjustments during the first  half  of  the 
1980s, Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Bolivia, 
Peru and El Salvador. 
Despite the limited progress of  such reforms, 
however, there have been a number of  positive 
developments during the 1990s, notably in 
Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Mexico and, belatedly, Venezuela. Of 
particular interest is the design of  new banking 
legislation which incorporates competition-
promoting principles such as multipurpose 
banking facilities;  capital ratios more closely 
geared to the Basle Agreement's capital 
adequacy standards; risk-diversification 
standards based on regulations regarding 
portfolio  composition; restrictions on 
associated-party loans; and stricter accuracy 
standards with regard both to accounting 
principles and to market information.  This new 
legislation also seeks to invest supervisory 
bodies with greater authority and powers and to 
furnish  more precise definitions  of  the coverage 
of  such mechanisms as government deposit 
insurance and Central Bank financial  aid to 
institutions in difficulties;  the aim of  all these 
measures is to contain and correct the current 
problems of  distortion of  incentives and moral 
hazard. In addition, most regulatory agencies are 
making a determined effort  to improve their 
computing capacity and steps are being taken 
virtually throughout the region -Brazil may well 
be the sole exception- to establish inspection 
procedures based on assessment of  the quality of 
risk asset portfolios. 
ii) Regulation  of  public  services 
The privatization of  public utilities -which in 
most cases have monopolistic market structures 
but nonetheless contain potentially competitive 
segments- has led many countries to revamp 
their regulatory frameworks.  Approaches to 
market reorganization vary depending on 
whether the goods in question are tradable or 
non-tradable and what entry and exit barriers 
may exist. In the telecommunications field,  Chile 
became the first  country to lift  market entry 
barriers when it introduced a multi-carrier 
long-distance telephone system, which entered 
into operation in 1994; in 1995, the system was 
extended to include local services, with the result 
that any one area may be served by more than one 
operator. The regulation of  inter-carrier 
connections is one of  the most important aspects 
of  the new system, as every operator must be 
allowed unrestricted access to the lines in order 
to guarantee free  competition in this field. 
As regards electrical energy and natural gas, 
attempts have been made to step up competition 
at the production stage while regulating 
transmission and distribution, both of  which are 
natural monopolies. In the petroleum sector, 
there is an observable trend towards encouraging 
competition in the domestic hydrocarbons 
market by promoting private participation and 
eliminating State monopolies. The aim is to 
stimulate competition at the exploration and 
production stages by ceasing to set up reserves 
on behalf  of  State companies and encouraging 
private companies to assume most of  the risk. 
The reform  of  regulatory mechanisms has not 
progressed at the same speed as privatization. 
Bolivia alone has made regulation a central 
element of  its capitalization programme. The 
new integrated regulatory system established in 
Bolivia under the Sectoral Regulatory System 
(SIRESE) Act in late 1994 is administered by a 
group of  autonomous, politically independent 
agencies made up of  a General Superintendency 
and a number of  sectoral superintendencies. 
What is noteworthy about this new regulatory 
framework  is its integrated nature, which makes 
it possible not only to guarantee uniform 
standards for  all the various sectoral regulatory 
bodies but also to achieve economies of  scale, as 
each sector can benefit  from  the lessons learned 
by all the others. 
Another interesting initiative in the field  of 
regulation in 1995 was the reform  of  Brazil's 
Telecommunications Act, which had been in 
force  since 1962. The new regulatory framework 
will make it possible to generate competition in 
the telecommunications subsector -hitherto a 
State monopoly- map out the structure of  the 
industry for  the future  and regulate such services 
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Box III-2 
THE REGULATORY SYSTEM IN BOLIVIA 
The regulatory system currently in operation in Bolivia is 
based on an omnibus act known as the SIRESE (Sectoral 
Regulation System) Act and on a series of  sectoral laws, not 
all of  which have yet been passed. 
The SIRESE Act stipulates that the purposeof  the system 
is to regulate, control and supervise activities in the 
telecommunications, electricity, transport; water and 
hydrocarbons sectors and any other sectors that may 
subsequently be incorporated into the system by law. 
SIRESE is part of  the executive branch and is under the 
authority of  the Ministry of  Finance and Economic 
Development. It is run by the General Superintendency and 
the sectoral superintendences, which; are self-governing 
bodies with technical, administrative and financial 
autonomy. 
The superintendents are appointed by the President of 
the Republic from  a shortlist submitted after  approval by 
two thirds of  the members present in the Senate. 
The appointment system has been designed to be 
independent of  the political process^  Accordingly, a 
seven-year term of  office  has been set for  the 
Superintendent-General and a five-year  term for  the 
sectoral superintendents, and persons who have held these 
posts in the past cannot subsequently be appointed until a 
period of  time equal to the length of  that term has elapsed. 
In addition, there are a series of  provisions intended to 
prevent candidates for  these positions from  facing  a conflict 
of  interest. 
The Superintendent-General's responsibilities include 
overseeing the management of  the sectoral 
superintendencies and settling any jurisdictional disputes 
arising among them. 
The sectoral superintendents' responsibilities are: 
- To promote competition and efficiency  in the 
subsectors regulated by SIRESE. 
- To award, amend, renew and cancel concessions, 
licences, authorizations and registrations. 
- To ensure that services are provided in the agreed 
manner and that contractual obligations are 
fulfilled,  including the investment planto which the 
regulated enterprises have committed themselves. 
- To approve and publish prices and rates. 
- To examine and process complaints and grievances 
brought by users, regulated enterprises and the 
relevant State agencies. 
Source: R. Cominetti, "La privatización y el marco rcgulatorio en Bolivia y Nicaragua: un análisis comparativo"; Reformas 
de política pública series, No. 43 (LC/L.973 and Add.l), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1996. 
as the ce l lu lar t e l ephone sys tem, data 
transmission and satellite services; it will also 
pave the way for  the reorganization of  the 
ho ld ing company for  the State te le-
communications enterprise (TELEBRAS) and its 
subsequent sale to the private sector. 
The privatization of  road, port, railway and 
airport infrastructure  has aroused a debate 
regarding the legal and contractual structures for 
public works concessions, the auction process, 
the construction and production phases and the 
relevant tax regime, and all of  these issues figure 
on the Governments' agendas for  1996. 
c) Social security reforms 
During 1995 a number of  countries moved 
towards the establishment of  social insurance 
systems funded  by individual wage-earners' 
contributions. Until recently, this kind of  system 
existed only in Chile, but Argentina, Colombia 
and Peru introduced similar schemes a short time 
ago and have now been joined by Mexico and 
Uruguayas well. 
Towards the end of  1995, the Mexican 
Congress passed a law modifying  the pension 
system to allow workers to open individual 
retirement accounts. These accounts are to be 
administered by pension-fund  management 
boards (AFORES), in which domestic and foreign 
financial  institutions, as well as the Mexican 
Social Security Institute, will be able to 
participate. 
In Uruguay, the pay-as-you-go system has 
been replaced by a mixed system composed of 
one component based on the pre-existing 
redistributive scheme and another in which 
pensions are funded  by contributors' payments 
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into individual accounts. The new system divides 
pensionable remunerations into three brackets. 
For wages of  up to around US$ 800, 
both employer and employee make compulsory 
contributions to the pay-as-you-go system. 
Between US$ 800 and approximately US$ 1,600, 
both contributions are still compulsory, but the 
employer pays into the public redistributive 
system while the employee pays into the 
privately-managed individually funded  system. 
Above US$ 1,600, contributions are optional and 
are channelled entirely into the funded  system. 
Participation in the new scheme is compulsory 
for  workers under the age of  40 and optional for 
those over 40. 
In July 1995, Peru amended its legislation to 
equalize the cost of  public and private insurance 
(the latter was previously more expensive) as a 
way of  encouraging contributors to join the 
private pension system. Under the new 
regulations, the contribution to be deposited in 
the individual's account was temporarily reduced 
from  10% to 8% and the 1% contribution to the 
redistributive system was discontinued, as was 
the value-added tax (VAT) previously levied on 
pension-fund  management boards' (AFPs) 
commissions and insurance coverage. In 
addition, as of  November, contributors were 
allowed to switch freely  between AFPs. 
In Chile, where an individually funded  system 
has been in operation since 1982, accumulated 
funds  up to the end of  1995 totalled nearly 
US$ 26.7 billion: 40% of  this sum was invested 
in government securities, 32.5% in private-sector 
stocks and bonds, 16.3% in mortgage bonds and 
around 6% in time deposits (the last two being 
financial-system  instruments). In view of  the 
large amounts involved, and in order to increase 
the range and rate of  return of  the instruments 
held, in 1995 the limit set on investment in 
corporate stock was raised from  30% to 37% 
while the ceiling on foreign  investments was 
raised from  6% to 9%; the allowable number 
of  such instruments was also increased, as was 
the number of  destination countries. 
Floating-rate investments are now also 
permitted, as is investment in convertible 
securities; this opens up the possibility of 
financing  greenfield  projects, including 
investments in infrastructure. 
2. Trade reform 
In  1995, the foreign  trade  liberalization 
process took a step backwards  as tariffs 
rose and new non-tariff  barriers  were 
erected.  This  was particularly  the case in 
countries  which had made significant 
progress in trade  reform  during  the 
1990s. 
Although the general set of  conditions created 
by trade liberalization remained in place in nearly 
all the economies of  Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the need to protect some sectors that 
were highly vulnerable to international 
competition -from  Asian countries especially-
led a number of  countries to raise tariffs  and erect 
new non-tariff  barriers. The authorities in these 
countries asserted, however, that these measures 
did not represent a reversal of  the liberalization 
process because they were of  a purely temporary 
nature and were primarily designed to combat 
unfair  competition. 
The Government of  Argentina, for  example, 
raised tariffs  during the first  quarter of  1995. It 
also took a number of  other steps, such as 
imposing import quotas, requiring advance 
authorization for  automotive products, banning 
imports of  clothing and spare parts for  used motor 
vehicles; issuing new local-content regulations 
applying to finished  goods produced by the 
automotive industry; and reducing drawbacks on 
exports. Some of  these measures were intended 
to improve the Government's fiscal  position, but 
others were of  a more protectionist nature. 
Brazil, too, interrupted the import 
liberalization process, which had made great 
strides in 1994, in response to the need for  greater 
competitiveness in the domestic market to 
underpin the stabilization drive. A significant 
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Box III-3 
MAIN INSTRUMEN T OF TRADE REFORM 
1. ELIMINATION OF BANS, QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS. 
2. REDUCTION OF TARIFFS AND TARIFF-RATE SPREADS. 
3. REPLACEMENT OF GENERALIZED EXPORT-PROMOTION SCHEMES (SUBSIDIES) AND WITH SELECTIVE 
INSTRUMENTS. 
4. STREAMLINING OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPORT PROCEDURES. 
reversal in the country's external accounts -the 
result of  a more open economy and a sharp real 
appreciation of  its currency- led Brazil, in its 
turn, to raise import tariffs  on automotive 
products (to 32% in February and to 70% in 
April); import quotas and licence requirements 
followed  later. These new barriers were 
removed towards the end of  the year, however, 
in anticipation of  an adverse ruling by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO); what is 
more, by that time the drop in imports had 
rendered them unnecessary in any case. Tariffs 
on household appliances were hiked as well, 
and import barriers were later extended to 
include other areas such as textiles, clothing 
and toys. 
Argentina and Brazil adopted these restrictive 
measures in line with their commitments under 
MERCOSUR based on the safeguard  clauses 
contained in that agreement. A certain amount of 
friction  nevertheless arose owing to the effect 
these measures had on trade flows,  even though 
the items concerned, such as automotive 
products, textiles and clothing, were as yet not 
covered by the automatic tariff  rollback 
scheme. 
Mexico also decided to increase its tariffs  on 
65 products to between 25% and 260% in the 
case of  imports from  non-NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement) countries. In 
Costa Rica, meanwhile, a surtax of  8% was added 
to existing tariffs  at the end of  March with the 
aim of  giving an immediate boost to fiscal 
income while awaiting passage of  the reform  bill 
being considered at that time by the Legislative 
Assembly. After  the law was passed in 
September, the surtax was dropped. 
Panama, by contrast, made a certain amount 
of  progress in trade liberalization. Once 
negotiations on entry to WTO had begun, Panama 
agreed to cut its maximum tariff  level from  40% 
to 30% over a period of  five  years and to set a 
minimum tariff  of  5% for  all but agricultural 
products; the rates for  these products would start 
out at a higher level but would then gradually be 
reduced. 
Table m-2 compares the tariff  rates in effect 
when trade reforms  were begun with those in 
force  at this writing, omitting temporary changes. 
As can be seen, average rates were in general still 
low -between 10% and 20%- and the number of 
steps remained quite limited. 
3. Financial and capital-market reform 
During 1995 a number of  countries 
embarked  upon financial  liberalization 
programmes designed  along  much the 
same lines  as other initiatives  already 
under  way in the region. 
The law establishing a new charter for  the 
Central Bank which was recently passed in Costa 
Rica laid the foundations  for  profound,  though 
gradual, changes in the country's banking sector. 
This legislation gives the Central Bank greater 
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Table II-
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: SUMMARY OF THE TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION PROCESS 
Start Latest Maximum tariff  Number of  steps Average tariff 
of  year of 
programme evaluation Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 
Argentina a 1989 1995 65 33 _ l l b 39 13.4 
Bolivia 1986 1995 150 10 - 2 12 9.7 
Brazil 1987 1995 105 20 b 29 l l b 51 12.0C 
Chile d 1984 1995 35 11 - - 35 11 
Colombia 1990 1995 100 20 14 4 44 13.4 
Costa Rica 1986 1995 100 20 e - 4 e 27 14.0e 
Jamaica 1989 1991 - - - - 50 20.3 
Mexico 1985 1995 100 20 f 10 7 f 24 12.0s 
Peru 1990 1995 108 25 56 3 66 16.3 
Venezuela 1989 1995 135 20 41 4 35 13.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Tariffs  include a 3% surtax. No account is taken of  the temporary increase (to 70%) of  the tariffs  on 109 items under the 
headings "passengervehicles" and "electrical household appliances" which was instituted in March 1995. '"If  the temporary 
increase (see note b ) is taken into account, then the average tariff  was 12.7%. d Under Chile's first  trade liberalization 
programme, which was completed in 1979, a uniform  tariff  of  10% came into effect  and remained in place until 1982. In 1984, 
the tariff  was raised to 35% and was then reduced to 20% in 1995 and to 15% in 1988 before  being lowered to its current level 
of  11% in 1991. e Information  relates to the Central American Common Market (CACM) tariff.  95% of  all traded goods are 
duty free;  on the remaining 5%, countries may apply higher or lower tariffs  than those agreed upon. The highest tariffs  tend to 
be applied to textiles, woven fabrics,  clothing and footwear,  while lower tariffs  —as low as 1%— may be applied to essential 
items. In the case of  Costa Rica, the reader should note that since March 1995 the country has been applying a temporary 8% 
surtax for  fiscal  purposes. This surcharge has not been figured  into the maximum and average tariff  rates shown in this table; if 
it were, each of  those rates would be 8% higher than the figure  given here. f  No account is taken of  the temporary increase, 
to between 25% and 260%, of  the tariffs  on 65 items which was implemented at the beginning of  1995. 8 If  the temporary 
increase (see note f )  were to be taken into account, the average tariff  would be 13.5%. 
autonomy and puts an end to State banks' 
monopoly on current accounts; in addition, it 
gives all financial  institutions access to the 
Central Bank's discount window (see box III-4). 
The State-run commercial banks are to keep their 
monopoly on certain services, however, although 
steps have been taken to encourage them to 
compete with one another. An agreement was 
also signed by the Government, the Central Bank 
and State-run commercial banks with the aim of 
strengthening the competitiveness of  the State's 
commercial banking system. The agreement 
stipulates, inter  alia,  that the Central Bank will 
help backstop this system by reducing reserve 
requirements and covering any losses such banks 
may incur on foreign-currency  operations. The 
State's commercial banks, for  their part, are to 
improve the range of  services they offer  on a 
competitive basis, cut their administrative and 
operating costs and reduce interest-rate spreads. 
In 1995 Costa Rica also established the 
Superintendency for  Financial Institutions 
(SURGEF), which is to draw up and implement 
prudential regulations. 
The modernization of  El Salvador's financial 
system moved forward  with the drafting  of  a 
number of  bills that aim to increase financial 
institutions' solvency, expand their overseas 
operations and improve their information 
gathering and reporting procedures. 
Modernization of  the system's legal framework 
will permit new banks and related institutions to 
be established and will allow foreign  banks to 
participate in the domestic market. 
Cuba has continued to promote a policy of 
openness to foreign  capital as part of  its ongoing 
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Box III-4 
MAIN FEATURES OF FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL-
MARKET REFORMS 
1. LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT OR REDUCTION OF RESTRICTIONS THEREON. 
2. ELIMINATION OF BARRIERS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND EQUAL TAX TREAT FOR FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC CAPITAL. 
3. DEREGULATION OF INTEREST RATES AND BANK CREDIT; LIBERALIZATION OF CURRENCY MARKET. 
4. DEVELOPMENT OF MULTI-PURPOSE BANKING FACILITIES. 
5. SUPERVISION AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION. 
6. CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY. 
process of  structural transformation.  In 
September 1995, for  example, a foreign 
investment act was passed which sets time-
limits to ensure speedy processing of 
investment proposals and provides for  the 
establishment of  wholly foreign-owned 
companies. It also makes provision for  the 
creation of  free  trade zones and industrial parks, 
andtherelevantdecree-lawwasdrawnupduring 
1995 and was passed at the end of  the first  half 
of  1996. 
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IV. THE FRAGILITY OF LATIN AMERICA'S 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Loss of  confidence  in Mexico's  economic 
stability  led  to a withdrawal  of  foreign 
capital  in 1994, and the capital  outflow 
was exacerbated  by the devaluation  of 
the peso in December of  that  year. The 
situation  did  considerable  harm to 
Mexico's  banking system and sent 
shock waves throughout  the region, 
damaging  financial  institutions  in a 
number of  countries,  especially 
Argentina,  through  effects  on liquidity 
due  to deposit  volatility  and through 
the high real  interest  rates 
characteristic  of  severe macroeconomic 
adjustment.  To  these factors  were 
added  the internal  problems,  dating 
from  late  1993, plaguing  Venezuela's 
economy andfinancial  markets.  The  most 
severe banking crises occurred  in 
Argentina,  Mexico,  Paraguay  and 
Venezuela.  To  a lesser  extent,  Bolivia, 
Brazil,  Costa  Rica and Ecuador  also ran 
into  difficulties. 
Since 1970 the world has witnessed a number 
of  banking crises, particularly in the developing 
countries, and Latin America has not been 
immune. The events of  the last two years bring 
to mind the severe difficulties  experienced in the 
early 1980s, though the climate today is more 
favourable.  The crises were not totally 
unexpected in Latin America, since in several 
countries weaknesses in the banking system 
-particularly in some microeconomic aspects-
had not been fully  corrected. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
financial  impact of  the Mexican crisis on the 
economies and banking systems of  the various 
countries differed  widely. Some experienced an 
extraordinary boom, such as Chile, whose 
banking sector in 1995 recorded its eleventh 
consecutive year of  growth, with deposits on the 
order of  60% of  GDP, real returns on capital close 
to 20% per annum and an overdue loan ratio of 
under 0.7%. Others, such as Colombia, Peru, 
Uruguay and some Central American countries 
including El Salvador, did not suffer  major 
turbulence, but merely natural, temporary 
declines in their stock exchanges. 
1. Factors contributing to recent banking crises 
The banking crises that have occurred since the 
late 1970s can be attributed primarily to the 
process of  financial  deregulation undertaken in 
the region, in a context of  strong macroeconomic 
imbalances and insufficient  domestic saving; 
however, other factors  have also played a part, 
including inconsistencies between policies and 
reforms,  microeconomic and institutional 
deficiencies  and the critical situation of 
public-sector banks in several countries. The 
interaction between macroeconomic conditions 
and the state of  Latin America's banking system 
has demonstrated that the risks of  a banking 
crisis are great if  macroeconomic equilibria are 
not fully  achieved. Experience has also shown 
that when countries introduce a sweeping 
programme of  liberalization and deregulation 
without first  consolidating the necessary 
institutional reforms,  such as more effective 
supervision mechanisms, the vulnerability of 
the financial  system tends to increase. Moreover, 
political uncertainty and turmoil have also 
been a major cause of  banking crises in the 
region. 
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The instability in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, though partly attributable to 
microeconomic factors,  was precipitated by 
severe macroeconomic adjustments. In contrast, 
in Ecuador and Venezuela -although both were 
beset by political crises, confidence  problems 
and macroeconomic imbalances- the troubles of 
the banking system were due chiefly  to poor 
standards of  disclosure and, in Venezuela 
especially, to an inadequate regulatory and 
supervisory framework.  The economies of 
Bolivia and Paraguay have enjoyed stability, but 
their banking systems -especially Paraguay's-
have nevertheless faced  crises, which in essence 
are attributable, notwithstanding the progress 
made in Bolivia since the late 1980s, to 
microeconomic and institutional factors. 
There is general recognition of  the widespread 
absence, until recently, of  regulatory frameworks 
suited to dealing with the risks of  a rapidly 
expanding banking market less subject to 
government control. Reforms  would include 
stringent capitalization ratios, hedging 
mechanisms, reliable accounting rules and 
demanding standards of  disclosure. Other 
problems, such as equipment obsolescence, 
insufficient  human resources training and 
inadequate auditing methods, that have plagued 
watchdog agencies in the region for  many 
decades have made prudential supervision in an 
environment of  greater freedom  in banking 
management simply unfeasible. 
There has also been confusion  concerning the 
scope of  public deposit insurance, which must 
necessarily be limited, and specifically  the 
inadvisability of  having the State or centra] bank 
assume full  responsibility for  losses resulting 
from  the liquidation of  insolvent banks, a 
common practice in quite a few  countries in the 
1980s and in some during the 1990s. 
Another problem is that Governments have 
tended to rely too much on the banking system 
to finance  public-sector deficits,  by setting high 
reserve requirements or mandating investments, 
thereby constraining lending in the market and 
consequently limiting the experience built up by 
the banks prior to expansion. 
A striking feature  is the low financial  intensity 
of  the region, whose banking sector manages 
assets that do not usually exceed 25% of  GDP (see 
figure  IV.l). Nonetheless, the stability of  this 
market is crucial to the real sector of  the 
economy, since banks handle more than 80% of 
formal  financing  to firms  and individuals. It is 
therefore  not surprising that instability in the 
banking sector represents a severe handicap for 
economies and that bank bailouts have in general 
carried a high price in fiscal  terms or contributed 
to a rapid acceleration of  the inflation  rate. 
The countries of  the region have implemented 
a series of  reforms,  particularly during the current 
decade, designed to strengthen institutional 
and microeconomic aspects of  the banking 
system and capital markets in general. However, 
except in the case of  Chile, Colombia, and 
to a lesser extent, Bolivia, El Salvador and 
Peru, these reforms  appear to have been 
neither comprehensive nor sufficiently 
developed in most of  the region; this situation, 
added to the macroeconomic factors,  explains 
the resurgence of  banking crises in the 
mid-1990s. 
2. Measures taken to cope with the banking crisis 
The Governments of  the region responded in a 
variety of  ways to the recent crises in the 
financial  sector. Initially, all attempted to 
alleviate the problem by providing troubled 
institutions with financial  assistance. Follow-up 
measures varied. Some Governments, for 
instance, encouraged bank mergers and 
takeovers and the participation of  new 
shareholders, including foreign  investors. As part 
of  their economic reforms  and efforts  to resolve 
recent crises, some countries made it easier for 
foreign  banks to set up operations or eliminated 
some of  the obstacles foreign  investors must 
overcome in order to acquire complete or partial 
ownership of  local banks. 
Despite these measures, a number of 
institutions had to be shut down or placed under 
control of  the central bank, though some were 
able to resume operations, once former  owners 
were removed from  management. All the 
countries beset by banking crises took steps to 
deal with the situation, to avoid depositor losses 
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Figure IV-1 
DEPOSITS IN THE BANKING SYSTEM 
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Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
or to shore up the asset position of  ailing 
institutions; measures ranged from  the granting 
of  financial  assistance under certain conditions to 
tax incentives to promote restructuring of  the 
banking industry. 
The financial  assistance accorded banks and 
depositors, plus the tax incentives, represented a 
high cost to central banks and Governments. The 
cost was highest in Venezuela, where it was 
equivalent to 13% of  GDP, but was also 
significant  -between 4% and 5%- in Bolivia, 
Brazil, Mexico and Paraguay. These percentages 
were comparable to those recorded during 
banking crises in some of  the developed 
countries in the current decade (see table IV.l). 
The banking crises were handled with varying 
success. In some countries, such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico, the measures taken 
helped strengthen the banking system, while in 
others, such as Ecuador, Paraguay and 
Venezuela, no progress was made; indeed, such 
measures as were taken served only to exacerbate 
distortions. There have, however, been 
achievements in the region in recent years, in the 
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form  of  new banking legislation incorporating 
principles of  greater competition through 
multi-purpose banking regimes, improved 
solvency rules more in keeping with the Basle 
accord on capital adequacy requirements, risk 
diversification  standards, and more 
comprehensive disclosure rules. Efforts  are 
being stepped up to confer  greater status and 
powers on supervisory agencies and to set clear 
limits on the scope of  public deposit insurance 
and on the financial  assistance central banks will 
accord to troubled institutions. Initiatives are also 
focusing  on upgrading the capabilities of 
regulatory agencies and developing inspection 
procedures that measure the quality of  risk asset 
portfolios. 
The most successful  case of  recovery is 
Argentina, where the non-inflationary  rescue 
mechanisms employed have apparently proven 
far  more effective  than in the past in restoring 
confidence  and ensuring that the correct 
incentives remain in place. Improvements have 
been noted in the microeconomic and 
institutional spheres, including greater emphasis 
on bank supervision, the disclosure of  more 
information  on the financial  health of  banks and 
improvements in almost all important aspects of 
prudential standards; these reforms  are all very 
recent, however, and have yet to be fully 
consolidated. 
The measures adopted by the Mexican 
Government to reinforce  the capitalization and 
ownership structure of  banks had the merit of 
avoiding distorted incentives and moral hazard. 
A government programme was created to 
provide short-term loans to service international 
obligations and temporarily capitalize banks, 
while another scheme sought to promote capital 
increases using shareholder resources. In 
addition, it was made easier for  foreign  investors 
to acquire equity in local banks, and assistance 
was provided in rescheduling some US$ 2 billion 
in bank debt. 
Brazil introduced a series of  confidence-
boosting measures. Since August 1995, the 
Central Bank has had the power to permit foreign 
investors who buy into local banks to acquire a 
majority shareholding. In November 1995, a 
fund  was created to increase the insurance on 
bank deposits, and a programme was launched to 
support bank restructuring and mergers. 
Bolivia also took constructive steps to 
strengthen the banking system. A fund  was 
established to improve liquidity and increase the 
capita] base of  the banking system. The fund 
mechanism was designed to enhance 
transparency in the banking system and reinforce 
market incentives. 
In Venezuela, on the other hand, the policies 
adopted since 1994 to resolve the crisis have 
lacked focus  and consistency, and apparently 
have not helped resolve the problems. Moreover, 
the restructuring of  some banks, the winding-up 
of  others and the introduction of  deposit 
insurance have all posed substantial operational 
difficulties. 
Paraguay passed a financial  stabilization and 
recovery act in an attempt to refloat  the banks 
under government supervision, though to little 
practical effect.  Deposit insurance was increased, 
but at the same time accounting standards were 
relaxed, and this only served to aggravate the 
predicament of  the banking system. 
Ecuador, despite a number of  measures 
introduced in 1993-1994 in an effort  to improve 
the standard of  supervision and put its financial 
system in order, was also faced  with financial 
crises: the first  involved a medium-sized 
institution, while more recently, in 1996, several 
brokerage firms  closed down and the 
Government was forced  to intervene in the 
country's third largest bank, an event that 
revealed the weakness of  bank supervision. The 
Central Bank ultimately had to step in and 
assume full  ownership of  the failing  bank. 
3. The situation in Mexico 
Mexico's banking sector has been under strong 
macroeconomic pressure during the 1990s as a 
result of  stabilization plans that brought inflation 
down from  159% in 1987 to 8% in 1994. Against 
that backdrop, interest rates since 1990 have 
remained relatively high, and the Government 
has worked to reduce its budget deficit.  At the 
same time, it has adopted reforms  aimed at 
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Table I -
FINANCIAL CRISES: COST OF BANK BAILOUT, SIZE OF OVERDUE 












Argentina 1995 28.00 47 
Bolivia 1994-1995 4.20 3 
Brazil 1995 5.00 17 
Ecuador 1996 1.10 2 
Mexico 1995 5.70 20.00 10 
Paraguay 1995 4.11 8 
Venezuela 1993-1994 13.00 9.30 19 
Other countries 
Finland 1991-1993 8.20 9.30 
Norway 1988-1992 4.50 
Sweden 1991-1993 4.50 
United States 1991 5.10 4.80 
Source: Latin America: G. Ramírez Vilardell (cons.), "Vulnerabilidaddel  Sistema  Financiero  de  América  Latina",  Santiago, 
Chile, ECLAC, 1996. 
Other countries: L. Rojas Suárez and S. Weisbrod, "Banking  crises in Latin  America: experience and issues", document 
presented at the Conference  on Banking Crises in Latin America, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, 
D.C., 6-7 October 1995. 
deregulating the major markets and privatizing 
enterprises. These developments for  a time 
generated expectations of  economic growth, 
enabling Mexico to attract sizeable flows  of 
short-term foreign  capital, on the order of  US$ 
25-30 billion a year, during 1992 and 1993. The 
prolonged overvaluation of  the peso, stemming 
from  the use of  the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor, led to a large balance-of-payments 
current account deficit,  equivalent to 7-8% of 
GDP between 1992 and 1994, while consumption 
grew at a brisk pace and saving remained 
sluggish, representing no more than about 14% 
of  GDP. These factors  combined to create a highly 
vulnerable macroeconomic situation, 
particularly with regard to capital flows.  The 
situation was aggravated by political 
developments from  early 1994 onwards and 
resulted in a progressive slackening in capital 
flows  to under US$ 10 billion in 1994 and the 
devaluation of  the peso in December of  that year. 
Over the course of  1995, inflation  picked up 
sharply the level of  economic activity dropped, 
and interest rates fluctuated  between 50-80%; 
this had a severe impact on both borrowers and 
banks, especially because consumer and business 
debt were high, as reflected  in the fact  that bank 
lending had expanded by an average of  24% in 
real terms between 1991 and 1994. 
A number of  Mexican banks were at risk of 
insolvency in 1995, owing to an adjustment 
process that caused the proportion of  overdue 
loans to climb to around 20% of  total loans for 
the banking system as a whole. Another reason 
for  the banks' troubles, apart from  the difficult 
macroeconomic circumstances mentioned above 
and relatively poor supervision, was imprudent 
business management, combined with a lack of 
technical expertise in handling commercial risks 
in an expansionary economic climate, since prior 
to privatization, the Mexican banking sector had 
concentrated on public-sector financing.  A 
further  contributing factor  would appear to be the 
financial  conglomerates' desire for  a quick return 
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Table I -
DEPOSITS IN COMMERCIAL BANKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
IN COUNTRIES IN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
1994 1995 
Argentina 4.66 4.37 
Bolivia 0.47 0.72 
Ecuador 13.45 14.80 
Mexico 22.79 25.66 
Paraguay 5.97 7.53 
Venezuela 29.14 26.13 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
on their big investments in bank acquisition. In 
1991 and 1992, the Government sold 65% of  the 
equity in 18 banks it controlled for  approximately 
US$ 12 billion, with prices for  the various banks 
averaging 3.65 times the book value of  the stock 
and in some cases more than 5 times the book 
value. 
The Government responded quickly to the 
banking crisis by instituting a series of  measures, 
some designed to strengthen the capitalization 
and ownership structure of  banks, which had the 
merit of  avoiding distorted incentives and moral 
hazard. First, the Government enlisted the 
support of  international financial  agencies to set 
up a temporary capitalization programme 
(PROCAPTE), administered by the Bank Savings 
Protection Fund (FOBAPROA), an agency of  the 
Bank of  Mexico, for  the purposes of  granting 
short-term loans to service international 
obligations and temporarily capitalize banks that 
did not fulfil  the normal capital adequacy 
requirements. To that end, PROCAPTE purchased 
subordinated bonds (with five-year  maturities) 
considered as capital for  accounting purposes 
and redeemable as stock in the event of 
non-payment. Five banks availed themselves 
temporarily of  capitalization resources 
amounting to some US$ 900 million, while 
short-term loans worth US$ 3.8 billion were 
disbursed and were paid off  when circumstances 
improved. 
In addition, FOBAPROA introduced a scheme 
to promote capitalization with shareholder 
resources. For this purpose, FOBAPROA acquired 
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the banks' high-risk loan portfolios  in return for 
bond issues, on condition that for  every peso of 
portfolio  transferred  shareholders must increase 
the bank's capital by half  a peso. Although the 
mechanism has made financial  statements less 
transparent, nevertheless, since it is designed so 
that the risk associated with the bond is equal to 
the risk of  the ceded portfolio,  it at least ensures 
that the stockholders still bear the burden of 
losses and has furthermore  served to increase 
bank capital. The portfolios  purchased from  10 
banks account for  roughly 10% of  total loans in 
the banking system, and capital has increased by 
about US$ 4.8 billion, 80% of  net worth at 31 
December 1994. Undoubtedly, one factor 
contributing to this success was the 
Government's decision to make it easier for 
foreign  investors, particularly financial 
institutions, to acquire equity in local banks. As a 
result of  this decision, at the beginning of  1996 
there were five  banks in which foreign  investors 
had acquired a portion of  the share capital ranging 
from  16% to 70%. In addition, as happened in 
Chile during the 1980s, the Government has had 
to step in to help various sectors and consumers 
reschedule roughly US$ 2 billion in bank debt. 
It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness  and 
cost of  the measures undertaken to revitalize the 
Mexican banking sector (some calculations put 
the cost in 1995 at 6% of  GDP). Nevertheless, the 
steps taken appear to address fundamental 
problems and show a commitment to improving 
long-term microeconomic and institutional 
conditions. 
4. The situation in Argentina 
The devaluation of  the Mexican peso in late 1994 
raised serious doubts that the convertibility 
regime could be maintained and led to an 
interruption and reversal of  capital flows.  It also 
caused a crisis of  confidence  in the banking 
system, especially in the cooperative and 
provincial public-sector banks, many of  which 
were known to be facing  solvency problems. It is 
estimated that dollar deposits slumped by about 
15%, or some US$ 3.5 billion, between 
December 1994 and March 1995, while deposits 
in pesos fell  by some 13%, or about US$ 3.3 
billion, between December 1994 and April 1995, 
triggering a serious liquidity crisis. The situation 
started to return to normal in the fourth  quarter 
of  1995, but although the exchange rate held firm 
and prices remained stable, very high interest 
rates (exceeding 20% in real terms for  deposits 
made in the second quarter of  1995) and the fierce 
liquidity squeeze inevitably provoked a sharp 
recessionary adjustment, GDP declined by some 
4.3% in 1995 and the banking sector showed 
increasing signs of  weakness. 
Total losses by banks in 1995 are calculated 
at about US$ 700 million; these poor results 
extended into the first  six months of  19%. On 
average, non-performing  and underperforming 
loans hovered around 28% of  the total in the 
second quarter of  1995, ranging from  35% and 
50% for  cooperative and provincial public-sector 
banks to 18% and 12% for  private and 
foreign-owned  banks, respectively. These latter 
two categories proved to have far  more solid 
assets than the rest and to be much better at 
weathering the liquidity squeeze, which would 
indicate that the country has started to overcome 
traditional problems of  lack of  disclosure and that 
market discipline has to some extent been at 
work. By mid-1996, 43 banks out of  a total of 
177 disappeared, in most cases by merger with 
stronger banks with the aid of  government rescue 
programmes; the tally included 29 cooperative 
banks, four  provincial public-sector banks, nine 
locally-owned private banks and one foreign 
bank. In addition, nine non-bank financial 
institutions also closed their doors. 
Although it is still too soon to know how much 
bank debtors will be able to repay, the position 
of  Argentina's financial  sector does appear to 
have improved since mid-1996, while domestic 
interest rates have dropped substantially and 
deposits have flowed  back into banks. Of 
particular note in this process are the measures 
taken by the Government to alleviate the crisis; 
for  example, the Government injected liquidity 
by releasing reserve funds  held with the Central 
Bank (BCRA) and operating a "security network" 
headed by the Banco de la Nación -the Central 
Bank is subject to strict legal limitations as a 
lender of  last resort- with the aim of  shoring up 
interbank lending. The Government also set up a 
deposit insurance scheme, financed  by the banks, 
with a premium of  up to 0.06% per month on the 
daily average of  deposits, which aims to 
accumulate a fund  equal to 5% of  the total 
insured. In order to avoid moral hazard, insured 
liabilities will be subject to the stipulation that 
interest rates offered  may not exceed a reference 
rate. 
Meanwhile, using resources collected by the 
Government and loans from  international 
financial  agencies, a fund  has been set up to 
privatize provincial public-sector banks, and 
another created to capitalize private banks with 
insufficient  equity. This second fund,  similar in 
design to Mexico's programme, has US$ 2 
billion with which to acquire subordinated bonds 
with a 3-year maturity that can be counted as 
capital and are convertible to share capital in the 
event of  default. 
5. The situation in Venezuela 
Venezuela's financial  system has achieved a 
certain depth, at least by Latin American 
standards, as shown by the fact  that in 1993 
deposits were equivalent to about 30% of  GDP. 
Nonetheless, the loan portfolio  has typically 
represented a small proportion of  total bank 
assets. Moreover, just before  the country's 
banking crisis erupted in January 1994, 
macroeconomic conditions were not altogether 
unfavourable,  even though 1991 and 1992 were 
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marked by the reappearance of  fiscal  deficits  and 
a slowly deteriorating political climate, which 
stalled the reform  process. In any event, in late 
1993, for  reasons that are not altogether clear, the 
second-largest private bank in Venezuela was 
faced  with a big run on deposits, so that the 
Government had to intervene in January 1994; 
the panic spread, causing major instability in 
financial  markets and severe macroeconomic 
problems throughout the period 1994-19%, 
encompassing fiscal  deficits,  inflation,  recession 
and currency depreciation. 
Between January 1994 and August 1995, 19 
banks -responsible for  55% of  total deposits as 
ofDecember  1993-came under government control; 
four  of  these banks were nationalized, and the 
others were liquidated, and their assets placed 
under control of  the Deposit Insurance and Bank 
Protection Fund (FOGADE). This situation led to 
great turmoil in the capital markets and in many 
firms,  because of  the operation in Venezuela of 
de facto  financial  conglomerates with strong 
interlinkages between companies. By mid-1995, 
the Government had committed resources on the 
order of  US$ 8 billion, just for  financial 
assistance, injections of  capital into nationalized 
banks and assumption of  liabilities of  other banks 
taken over by nationalized institutions, without 
counting the cost of  deposit insurance. 
Macroeconomic fluctuations  and political 
conflicts  were obviously important factors  in 
Venezuela's financial  crisis, but serious 
microeconomic and institutional deficiencies 
weighed far  more heavily than in other countries. 
Although prudential regulations were 
overhauled and a new general banking act came 
into effect  in January 1994, there are strong 
technical reasons for  concluding that these steps 
were too little and too late. The crisis revealed 
that the Superintendency of  Banks and Financial 
Institutions was ineffective  and obsolete in its 
methods, and it also showed that the banking 
system was out of  control and marked by 
business abuses, an absence of  self-regulation 
and market discipline, undercapitalization and a 
nearly total lack of  disclosure. There were 
revelations of  a large volume of  loans to owning 
conglomerates, along with significant  unreported 
bank liabilities from  trusts, brokerage of 
commercial paper and offshore  transactions. A 
problem of  moral hazard may also have arisen 
with respect to deposit insurance and the 
financial  assistance FOGADE provided 
unconditionally to banks. 
6. The situation in Brazil 
Brazil's financial  system is quite complex in 
terms of  the number and diversity of  institutions, 
which total about 3,500, including 250 
commercial and multi-purpose banks. However, 
at the national level, private banking in particular 
is underdeveloped; this appears to be a reflection 
of  the difficult  macroeconomic conditions 
prevailing over the last decade and the 
dominance of  federal-  and state-government 
banks. In 1995, loans to the private sector totalled 
no more than 30% of  GDP, and over 50% of 
financial  activity was handled by the many 
public-sector institutions. As might be expected 
under those circumstances, public banks were 
severely weakened, because they continued to 
lend in times of  extremely high real interest rates 
-in genera] well in excess of  100% per annum 
during the period 1991-1995- and because they 
were heavily involved in financing  state 
governments and enterprises. Moreover, banks 
owned by the state governments in particular 
were very inefficient  and greatly overstaffed. 
Private banks, meanwhile, earned their profits 
chiefly  from  the intermediation of  public paper 
with buyback agreements, foreign  exchange 
transactions and inflation  gains on demand 
deposits. 
Even though macroeconomic conditions 
improved during 1995 and 1996, since inflation 
was reduced to below 20% per annum, while GDP 
grew on average by 4.7% over the period 
1993-1995, the banking system as a whole had 
to deal with strong pressures and a crisis of 
confidence,  although there was no massive 
withdrawal of  deposits. A number of  factors,  in 
addition to those already mentioned, appear to 
have contributed to this situation. First, the sharp 
drop in inflation  in 1995-1996, to less than one 
hundredth of  the levels recorded in the two 
previous years, heavily stressed the entire 
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commercial and multi-purpose banking system. 
Second, the stabilization initiatives contained in 
the Real  Plan, combined with the uncertainty 
generated by the Mexican crisis, caused serious 
liquidity problems for  a number of  private and 
public banks -despite the high level of 
international reserves and a manageable current 
account deficit.  In particular, the Central Bank of 
Brazil (BCB) strictly enforced  reserve 
requirements, for  state banks as a means of 
supporting the stabilization programme and 
putting the states' finances  on a sounder footing. 
Those requirements revealed the serious lack of 
liquidity in the banks' loan portfolios,  and this 
prompted the Central Bank to implement 
assistance plans, primarily through swaps of  state-
government paper for  federal  securities, and by 
virtually taking over the management of  the 
banks. Third, real interest rates remained very 
high, which hurt loan portfolios  and limited the 
growth of  this activity as a replacement for 
inflation-related  income. 
Since late 1994, the Central Bank has 
liquidated or intervened in a total of  17 public 
and private banks. Most were small in size, but 
the Central Bank was compelled to intervene on 
an extraordinary basis in both the Banco do 
Estado de São Paulo (BANESPA), Brazil's second 
largest bank, and the Banco do Estado de Rio de 
Janeiro (BANERJ). It also conducted routine 
interventions in the second half  of  1995 in two 
major private banks, the Banco Económico and 
the Banco Nacional, which apparently had been 
rife  with irregularities for  many years. This 
panorama was further  compounded in 1996 by 
the discovery of  serious problems in the 
management and supervision of  the Banco do 
Brasil, which forced  the Government to 
acknowledge the bank's losses and undertake to 
recapitalize it for  US$ 5 billion. 
The situation of  the banking system led the 
Government to adopt a series of  confidence-
building measures. Since August 1995, the 
Central Bank has been empowered to allow 
foreign  investors to acquire a majority 
shareholding in Brazilian banks. In November 
1995, a loan guarantee fund  was set up for  the 
purpose of  increasing insurance on deposits with 
public and private banks from  2,000 to 20,000 
reais, to be financed  by a premium of  0.3% per 
annum on deposits. Lastly, at the end of  1995 as 
an outgrowth of  efforts  to bolster the merger 
between the failed  Banco Nacional and 
Unibanco, a Programme was launched to 
promote the restructuring and strengthening of 
the national financial  system (PROER), as a 
vehicle for  the Central Bank to support the 
numerous restructurings and mergers taking 
place in Brazil. The mechanisms include tax 
exemptions for  mergers undertaken before  31 
December 1996, lines of  credit linked to various 
losses and costs associated with downsizing, 
release of  reserve funds,  relaxation of  operating 
limits and authorization to defer  expenses. 
Lastly, it would be incorrect to speak of  a 
widespread crisis among private banks, as on the 
contrary they appear to have minimized their 
exposure. Improvements have also been noted in 
prudential regulatory standards and especially in 
capital requirements. Moreover, in late 1995 the 
Central Bank was demonstrating good analytical 
and supervisory capacity, although its on-site inspec-
tions were deficient  in some areas, particularly 
with respect to portfolios  rating audits, an issue 
that will be particularly pertinent if  Brazil's 
private banks expand lending in the future. 
7. The situation in Paraguay 
Paraguay's financial  system had serious 
problems in 1995-1996, despite the fact  that the 
economy continued to enjoy a high degree of 
stability. It should be pointed out that the 
development of  the financial  system has been out 
of  proportion to the size of  the economy; in 1995 
Paraguay had 35 banks and 64 financial 
institutions for  a total volume of  deposits barely 
greater than US$ 1.8 billion. Prudential standards 
and supervision by the Central Bank of  Paraguay 
(BCP) have not been sufficient  to ensure effective 
monitoring of  the financial  system, which in 
addition operates within an inadequate legal 
framework.  Financial institutions are 
undercapitalized and handicapped by poor 
management and above all by a serious lack of 
reliable information.  A significant  portion of 
transactions are not recorded on the banks' 
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books, and it is strongly suspected that a high 
percentage of  loans have been made to 
associates. 
Beginning in mid-1995, when the 
irregularities of  some institutions became 
evident, the Central Bank was obliged to 
intervene in four  banks, which were 
subsequently liquidated, and four  other financial 
institutions. The deposits in the banks under 
centra] bank supervision represented about 15% 
of  total deposits in the domestic banking system. 
There was a major loss of  confidence  in the local 
financial  system, and this situation continued to 
worsen as the crisis developed; by mid-1995, 
54% of  bank deposits were held in 
foreign-owned  institutions. Again in 1996, the 
Central Bank had to step in to shore up a number 
of  institutions, accounting for  a further  15% of 
deposits in domestic banks, and there were 
concerns for  their solvency. By mid-1996, the 
Centra] Bank had committed some US$ 400 
million to help troubled banks, quite a large 
figure  in relation to deposits and one which 
generated considerable political controversy. 
During the second half  of  1995, the Government 
approved -to little practical effect-  a temporary 
financial  stabilization and recovery act (Act No. 
797), in order to refloat  banks under government 
control, increase deposit insurance to 
approximately US$ 20,000 and streamline 
accounting procedures for  banks that submitted 
restructuring plans. The third initiative, also 
ineffective,  came in for  severe criticism, 
complicating still further  the banking system's 
predicament. 
Thereafter,  the Paraguayan authorities sought 
more effective  means of  strengthening the 
banking system and imposing greater market 
discipline. In mid-1996, a project was announced 
to set up a bank capitalization fund,  modelled on 
similar programmes in Mexico, Argentina and 
Bolivia. During the second quarter of  1996, 
Congress passed a new general banking and 
lending institutions act (Act No. 861), which 
contains all the elements of  modern prudential 
supervision. 
8. The situation in Bolivia 
Macroeconomic stability has characterized 
Bolivia's economy for  nearly a decade, since 
hyperinflation  was tamed. As a result, deposits 
have staged an impressive recovery, climbing 
from  some US$ 600 million in late 1989 to some 
US$ 2.5 billion in late 1995. However, the entire 
post-inflationary  period has been marked by high 
interest rates and a high degree of  dollarization 
of  deposits, suggesting that it has been hard to 
win back confidence. 
Beginning in 1988, the Superintendency of 
Banks set about devising better prudential 
regulations, including portfolio  rating 
mechanisms, establishment of  risk provisions, 
controls on loans to associates, and proper 
disclosure by banking institutions. Lastly, in 
April 1993, a new banks and financial 
institutions act (Act No. 1488) was passed, 
containing all the provisions required to ensure 
adequate bank regulation and supervision. 
Notwithstanding these developments, several 
financial  institutions started running into 
liquidity and solvency problems in the fourth 
quarter of  1994. Banco de Cochabamba and 
Banco del Sur were both shut down, and by virtue 
of  Executive Order No. 23,881, the Government 
assumed responsibility for  payment of  those 
banks' deposits. The situation deteriorated in 
1995, leading to major public controversy aimed 
largely at Banco Boliviano Americano (BBA), 
Bolivia's sixth largest bank, but also involving 
the Central Bank's support and efforts  to secure 
foreign  investors. Available information 
indicates that a substantial proportion of  the 
Bolivian banking system suffers  from 
undercapitalization and imprudent management, 
despite the provisions of  the 1993 law and the 
regulations promoted by the Superintendency of 
Banks. 
As part of  its efforts  to strengthen the banking 
system, in September 1995 the Government 
issued Executive Order No. 24,410, establishing 
a fund  for  the development of  the financial  system 
and assistance to the productive sector; one of  the 
purposes of  the fund  is to channel resources into 
shoring up liquidity and raising the capital base 
of  the banking system, using the US$ 265 
million contributed mainly by international 
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agencies. The fund  boasts considerable 
resources, equivalent to more than the capital of 
all local banks combined. The fund  is designed 
to increase transparency in the banking system 
and reinforce  market incentives; a pre-condition 
for  its use is that financial  statements be 
immediately adjusted to meet strict accounting 
standards; contributions take the form  of 
subordinated loans granted to banks and 
considered as capital for  accounting purposes, 
but convertible into shares, with a resulting 
change of  ownership, in the event of  default  (as 
in Mexico and Argentina). 
9. The situation in Ecuador 
Ecuador's banking system remained somewhat 
chaotic until early 1994, because the monetary 
authorities had authorized a large number and 
variety of  institutions to take deposits from  the 
public, including banks, finance  companies, 
brokers of  commercial paper, mutual 
associations, cooperatives, leasing firms  and 
credit card companies. Furthermore, since the 
1980s a number of  banks had engaged in 
irregular practices; in order to avoid taxes and 
attract funds  in foreign  currencies, they would 
record many of  their domestic loan and deposit 
transactions on the books of  offshore  subsidiaries 
and associated foreign  firms.  These practices, 
combined with very lax legislation, inadequate 
disclosure and an inefficient  Superintendency of 
Banks, created a situation in which there was 
very little real control of  the banking system. 
In 1993 and 1994, the Government, with the 
support of  the Inter-American Development 
Bank, took steps to improve bank supervision 
and restructure the financial  system. To that end, 
a new general financial  institutions act was 
passed in May 1994, embodying the principles of 
multi-purpose banking, the Basle capital 
standards, stringent accounting and disclosure 
rules and in general a more suitable legal 
framework  in which to exercise prudential 
supervision. The Superintendency of  Banks 
attempted to introduce some key rules, such as 
portfolio  rating mechanisms. More recently, 
however, particularly in 1995, Ecuador's 
banking system has suffered  from  severe 
uncertainty, as a result of  the deteriorating 
macroeconomic situation, a drop in capital 
inflows,  the effects  of  armed conflict  with Peru 
and domestic political tensions. 
In August 1994, the authorities had to deal 
with rumours and liquidity problems involving 
Banco de los Andes, a medium-sized bank which 
accounted for  4% of  deposits. Though the 
problem was resolved when the ailing institution 
merged with another bank, the episode 
nevertheless highlighted the difficulties  alluded 
to, such as loans to associates and offshore 
transactions. 
Over the last year and a half,  liquidity 
shortages and high interest rates have been the 
order of  the day. In spite of  its intention to 
maintain the exchange rate, the Central Bank of 
Ecuador (BCE) has had to take steps to stem the 
liquidity crisis facing  banks. In late 1995, new 
officials  at the Superintendency of  Banks, backed 
by legal amendments, decreed a three-year 
moratorium on the establishment of  new banks 
and sharply increased minimum capital 
requirements, bringing to a halt the conversion of 
institutions to multi-purpose banks under the 
1994 act. The Superintendency has also sought 
to bring about the merger of  a number of  financial 
institutions, and, in 1996, the National Financial 
Corporation (CFN), with international funding, 
has been working to restructure the obligations 
of  bank debtors. 
In 1996, as a result of  the liquidity crisis, the 
Government had to deal with the closure of 
several stockbrokers and to intervene in the failed 
Banco Continental, the country's third largest 
bank, which held some 10% of  assets in the 
financial  system. The bank's image was badly 
hurt by the discovery of  a capital pyramiding 
scheme involving associated firms,  which 
apparently gave them access to tax benefits.  The 
case also underlined the laxity of  bank 
supervision, for  the bank had been expanding 
strongly prior to the scandal. The Central Bank 
ultimately became de facto  owner of  the bank, 
when it granted the institution a subordinated 
loan counted as capital in the amount of  some 
US$ 200 million. 
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V. LEVEL OF ACTIVITY AND INFLATION 
1. GDP Growth 
The  gross domestic  product  (GDP)  of  Latin 
America and the Caribbean  grew by 0.3% 
in 1995, thereby interrupting  the recovery 
which had begun in 1991. Per capita  GDP 
thus declined  1.5%, in contrast  with  the 
3.3% increase noted  in the preceding 
year. As a result,  the region's  GDP for 
1995 was 16% higher than in 1990, but 
only 30% higher than in 1980, before  the 
debt  crisis  struck,  while  per capita  GDP 
was still  5% lower  than the 1980 figure. 
The picture is even gloomier if  one looks at 
how the level of  economic activity changed in the 
course of  the year. The strong expansion 
observed in the latter half  of  1994 continued into 
the first  few  months of  1995, but from  the second 
quarter on, there was a dramatic turnabout which 
led to a contraction in regional output. In the 
fourth  quarter, the recession bottomed out, but 
signs of  an upturn were unconvincing. The 
recessionary situation persisted into the first  half 
of  1996, although an improvement was expected 
in the second half.  Thus, GDP growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean should be between 
2% and 3%. 
This negative trend is attributable mainly to 
the sharp downturn in production in Mexico and 
Argentina (see table V-l). Excluding these two 
countries, regional output exhibited a very 
different  trend, recording an increase of  slightly 
over 4%, or just one percentage point less than in 
1994, when it had reached its highest point of  the 
past 15 years. The financial  crisis that broke out 
in Mexico in December 1994, when capital 
inflows  to that country had fallen  off  drastically, 
spread to the rest of  the region, but Argentina was 
the most seriously affected;  total demand 
contracted in these two countries, causing 
declines in consumption and investment, 
although this slump was partly offset,  in both 
cases, by a surge in exports. 
The repercussions of  this decrease in external 
capital inflows  had already been felt  in the first 
quarter of  1995, but the situation worsened 
significantly  from  the second quarter on, leading 
to a contraction in GDP in both economies that 
dragged down the regional figure,  which was also 
affected  by the loss of  momentum in other 
economies, in particular Brazil and Peru. 
As a result of  the crisis in Argentina, Uruguay 
-which has strong economic ties with that 
country- also suffered  a decline in its GDP for 
1995. In Jamaica, for  its part, economic growth 
was again minimal owing to problems of 
economic instability and setbacks in the 
manufacturing  and mining sectors. 
In contrast with these poor performances,  the 
rest of  the countries in the region recorded 
positive trends, although substantial variations 
were to be seen among these economies in terms 
of  both their actual growth rates and the duration 
of  the upswing to date. In 10 countries of  this 
group, indicators of  economic activity in 1995 
were either better or practically the same as in 
1994; in 10 others, the increase was slightly 
lower. In both situations, growth in 1995 was due 
to the expansion of  domestic and external 
demand. The reduction in financial  inflows  from 
abroad was noticeable only in the first  quarter; 
later, there was an improvement in these inflows 
which played an important role in the growth of 
the economies concerned. 
Five countries (Chile, Colombia, Guyana, El 
Salvador and Peru) recorded GDP growth rates of 
over 5%, thus maintaining the positive 
performance  of  preceding years. For Chile, 
which registered an increase of  just over 8% -a 
substantially higher rate than the previous 
year's- 1995 was the twelfth  year of 
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Table V-l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual  growth  rates) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 1981-1990 
1991-
1995a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean -0.3 3.2 2.6 3.6 5.2 0.4b 0.9 3.& 
Argentina 0.0 8.8 8.6 6.1 7.4 -4.4 -0.9 5.2 
Bolivia 4.6 5.3 1.6 4.2 5.1 3.6 0.2 4.0 
Brazil -4.7 0.1 -1.1 4.4 5.7 3.8 1.3 2.6 
Chile 3.3 7.1 10.5 6.0 4.1 8.2 3.0 7.2 
Colombia 3.8 1.6 4.0 5.1 6.3 5.7 3.7 4.5 
Costa Rica 3.5 2.1 7.3 6.0 4.4 2.5 2.2 4.5 
Ecuador 3.2 5.4 3.7 2.5 4.8 2.7 1.7 3.8 
El Salvador 4.8 3.6 7.5 7.4 6.0 6.1 -0.4 6.1 
Guatemala 3.0 3.7 4.9 4.0 4.1 5.0 0.9 4.3 
Haiti -0.1 0.8 -8.4 -1.3 -4.4 4.8 -0.5 -1.8 
Honduras -0.8 2.0 6.3 7.0 -1.3 3.2 2.4 3.4 
Mexico 4.5 3.7 3.0 0.8 3.6 -6.6 1.7 0.8 
Nicaragua -0.1 -0.1 0.8 -0.4 4.1 4.4 -1.8 1.8 
Panama 8.0 8.1 7.5 3.8 3.8 1.9 1.6 5.0 
Paraguay 3.0 2.4 1.6 4.1 2.9 4.1 3.0 3.0 
Peru -5.4 2.8 -0.9 5.8 13.9 7.7 -1.2 5.7 
Dominican Republic -4.9 0.8 6.7 2.2 4.3 4.7 2.4 3.7 
Uruguay 0.6 3.2 7.8 3.3 6.9 -2.8 0.0 3.6 
Venezuela 7.0 9.7 6.1 0.7 -2.5 2.3 -0.7 3.2 
Other Caribbean 
countries 
Antigua and Barbuda c 3.5 4.3 1.7 3.4 5.5 -3.8 6.4 2.1 
Barbados -3.2 -4.0 -6.2 1.5 3.8 2.7 0.9 -0.5 
Belize 10.3 3.1 9.5 4.3 1.5 3.8 4.5 4.4 
Dominica 6.3 2.2 2.7 1.9 2.1 1.8 4.4 2.1 
Grenada 5.2 3.6 1.1 -1.3 2.3 2.3 4.9 1.6 
Guyana -3.0 6.0 7.8 8.2 8.5 5.1 -2.7 7.1 
Jamaica 5.5 0.7 1.5 1.4 0.8 0.5 2.5 1.0 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.0 3.8 3.6 4.0 3.2 2.0 5.8 3.3 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 7.0 3.1 6.5 1.3 0.4 3.0 6.5 2.9 
Saint Lucia 4.4 2.3 7.1 2.3 2.8 3.8 6.8 3.6 
Suriname 0.1 3.5 5.8 -4.5 -0.8 0.5 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.5 2.7 -1.7 -1.6 4.2 3.5 -2.4 1.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Does not include Suriname. c Based on figures  at factor  cost. 
uninterrupted growth. Colombia showed an 
upturn of  around 6% and El Salvador continued 
the dynamic recovery (6%) which had begun at 
the start of  the decade when the civil war came 
to an end. Guyana recorded an increase (5%) for 
the fifth  consecutive year -for  a cumulative rise 
of  40%- but its growth rate was somewhat lower 
than the figure  for  the preceding year. Peru 
experienced 7% growth, although this was down 
from  the previous year's level of  14%, thus 
completing three years of  vigorous expansion; 
nevertheless, its performance  changed 
considerably in the course of  the year, with a 
marked slowdown in the second half.  In the first 
few  months of  1996, there were even signs of  a 
recessionary situation, although this later started 
to correct itself. 
In 10 other countries, GDP continued to grow 
at a moderate pace of  between 3% and 5%, while 
in five  others, the rise was between 1.5% and 3%. 
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The Brazilian economy grew by approximately 
4% in 1995, almost two percentage points lower 
than the rate for  1994. As with Peru, there was 
an uneven pattern during the course of  the year; 
in the first  quarter, the economy continued to 
display the same remarkable vitality as in 1994, 
which, in itself,  was sufficient  to ensure a 
satisfactory  performance  for  the entire year. 
There followed  a marked decline in the second 
and third quarters, but in the fourth,  it stabilized 
at a low level which carried over into the first  half 
of  1996. The reasons for  this sudden break in the 
trend are different  from  those noted for  Argentina 
and Mexico, however. Although, initially, the 
consequences of  the fall-off  in foreign  inflows 
were noticeable, the slowdown was actually due 
to the measures put into effect  to stop the 
economy from  overheating and to maintain the 
degree of  stability already achieved. 
Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala 
and Paraguay, displayed more dynamism than in 
the preceding year. On the other hand, in addition 
to Brazil, as already discussed, another six 
countries -Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago-
suffered  a slowdown. 
Four other countries (Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela) showed signs of  an 
upturn, after  the paltry results of  the preceding 
years. In Venezuela, GDP was up by just over 2%, 
but this was on the strength of  the oil sector's 
performance  since the rest of  the economy was 
sluggish. The exacerbation of  the recession and 
the introduction of  an adjustment plan also had 
an adverse effect  on the growth of  the economy, 
and a fall  in the level of  activity may therefore  be 
expected in 1996, thus making a stronger 
recovery in regional output unlikely. Honduras, 
where the impact of  the main obstacles to 
economic growth encountered in the preceding 
year started to subside, achieved an expansion of 
slightly over 3%. Nicaragua recorded 
satisfactory  growth for  the second consecutive 
year, but it was insufficient  to compensate for  a 
protracted period -over a decade- of  severe 
economic recession. Haiti also showed signs of 
recovery, following  the lifting  of  the 
international embargo, although this could 
scarcely make up for  the huge losses incurred in 
the preceding years (see table V-l). 
Economic activity in Cuba increased, but the 
country remained mired in the severe recession 
that has prevailed since the collapse of  its 
relationship with what was formerly  the socialist 
bloc; thus, GDP amounted to only slightly more 
than half  of  the level recorded in 1989. At the 
same time, the intensification  of  the economic 
embargo by the United States is making recovery 
difficult,  especially by keeping away new 
investors. 
The small countries of  the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) showed a 
modest increase (1.9%) that was somewhat lower 
than the previous year; nevertheless, there were 
wide disparities between the different  member 
countries: Antigua and Barbuda recorded a 
decline of  almost 4%, while Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines had a growth rate of  over 7%. 
Although many countries of  the region still 
had relatively high population growth rates, GDP 
per capita growth rates were mostly positive in 
1995. In five  countries -Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guyana and Peru- this indicator of 
well-being climbed by over 3%, and in eight 
others -Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and 
Paraguay- the rates were between 1% and 3%. 
In another three economies -Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and Trinidad and Tobago- they were up slightly 
while in Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama and 
Venezuela, there was no variation. In the four 
remaining countries (Argentina, Jamaica, 
Mexico and Uruguay), per capita GDP decreased. 
In the OECS countries, a 1% rise was recorded, 
although with very pronounced differences 
within the group. 
During the current decade, per capita GDP 
increased in most countries of  the region; only in 
five  were there decreases (Barbados, Haiti, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago). 
The strongest gains were made in Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guyana, Panama, 
Peru and Uruguay. However, in view of  the poor 
performance  of  the region's economies in the 
preceding decade, only a few  countries recorded 
a significantly  higher per capita GDP in 1995 than 
in 1980, namely Chile (49%), Jamaica (41%), 
Belize (36%), Colombia (36%) and the 
Dominican Republic, Panama and Uruguay, 
where it increased by about 10%. At the opposite 
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Table -
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual  growth  rates) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 1981-1990 
1991-
1995a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean -2.2 1.3 0.8 1.8 3.3 -1.4b -1.1 l . l b 
Argentina -1.3 7.4 7.3 4.8 6.2 -5.5 -2.3 3.9 
Bolivia 2.3 2.8 -0.8 1.7 2.6 1.1 -1.9 1.5 
Brazil -6.4 -1.7 -2.8 2.7 3.9 2.1 -0.7 0.8 
Chile 1.6 5.4 8.7 4.2 2.5 6.5 1.3 5.4 
Colombia 2.0 -0.2 2.2 3.3 4.6 4.1 1.7 2.8 
Costa Rica 0.8 -0.4 4.7 3.5 1.9 0.2 -0.6 2.0 
Ecuador 0.8 3.0 1.4 0.3 2.5 0.5 -0.9 1.5 
El Salvador 2.8 1.5 5.2 5.0 3.7 3.7 -1.7 3.8 
Guatemala 0.1 0.8 1.9 1.1 1.1 2.0 -2.0 1.4 
Haiti -2.2 -1.2 -10.3 -3.3 -6.3 2.7 -2.4 -3.8 
Honduras -3.7 -1.0 3.2 3.9 -4.1 0.3 -0.8 0.4 
Mexico 2.5 1.8 1.1 -1.1 1.8 -8.2 -0.4 -1.0 
Nicaragua -3.1 -3.6 -3.0 -4.2 0.2 0.7 -4.4 -2.0 
Panama 5.9 6.0 5.5 1.9 1.9 0.1 -0.5 3.1 
Paraguay 0.0 -0.5 -1.3 1.2 0.2 1.3 -0.2 0.2 
Peru -7.1 0.9 -2.6 4.0 12.0 5.9 -3.3 3.9 
Dominican Republic -6.9 -1.2 4.6 0.3 2.3 2.9 0.2 1.7 
Uruguay 0.1 2.6 7.2 2.7 6.3 -3.3 -0.6 3.0 
Venezuela 4.4 7.1 3.6 -1.6 -4.6 0.1 -3.2 0.8 
Other Caribbean 
countries 
Antigua and Barbuda 0 2.8 3.6 1.0 2.8 4.9 -7.2 5.9 0.9 
Barbados -3.2 -4.4 -6.6 1.1 3.4 2.3 0.6 -0.9 
Belize 7.3 0.5 6.7 1.7 -1.1 1.2 1.9 1.8 
Dominica 7.8 2.2 2.7 1.9 2.1 1.8 4.8 2.1 
Grenada 5.7 3.4 0.9 -1.5 2.1 2.1 4.7 1.4 
Guyana -3.1 5.0 6.6 7.2 7.3 4.1 -3.2 6.0 
Jamaica 5.0 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.1 -0.2 1.4 0.3 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.5 3.8 3.6 6.5 3.2 2.0 7.0 3.8 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 5.9 2.2 5.6 0.4 -0.5 2.1 5.5 1.9 
Saint Lucia 2.9 1.0 5.7 0.9 1.5 2.4 5.3 2.3 
Suriname -1.2 2.3 4.6 -5.6 -1.9 -0.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2 1.6 -2.8 -2.7 3.0 2.4 -3.7 0.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Does not include Suriname. c Based on figures  at factor  cost. 
extreme, the sharpest reductions in per capita GDP 
were noted in Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela (see table V-2). 
Gross national income, like gross domestic 
product, scarcely increased since there were only 
minor variations in the terms of  trade and 
external factor  payments. There were significant 
differences  between countries, however. Thus, in 
Chile, the rise in national income was almost 1% 
higher than the rise in GDP as a result of  the 
improvement in the terms of  trade caused by the 
increases in copper and pulp prices on the 
international market. There were also 
appreciable improvements, although not on the 
same scale, in Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador and 
Guatemala. On the other hand, in Mexico, the fall 
in income was greater -by almost two percentage 
points- than the decline in GDP because of  lower 
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prices in dollars for  tourism and other services as 
a result of  the devaluation. Lastly, in the case of 
Haiti, national income grew at an extraordinarily 
high rate (25% against 5% GDP growth) owing to 
the substantial volume of  current transfers 
received from  abroad. 
2. Production sectors 
The  performance  of  the region's 
production  sectors revealed  considerable 
differences.  On the one hand, 
agriculture,  mining  and basic services 
(electricity,  gas and water,  and transport 
and communications)  expanded  in most 
countries,  regardless  of  the trend  in their 
total  GDP, since this  was accounted  for  by 
factors  unrelated  to the economic 
situation  of  the moment. On the other 
hand,  in the rest  of  the sectors 
(manufacturing,  construction,  commerce 
and financial  services), there was a 
marked  contrast:  in the countries  where 
there was an expansion in economic 
activity,  all  these other sectors recorded 
positive  results  whereas, in countries  with 
overall  declines,  these sectors posted 
significantly  lower  production  figures. 
The agricultural sector expanded in all the 
countries of  the region except Haiti, Mexico and 
Venezuela (see table V-3). Paraguay had the 
strongest increase (10%), thanks to the improved 
harvests of  its two main crops, but substantial 
increases -of  between 5% and 7%- were also 
recorded in nine other countries (Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru). 
Mining production was also up in all countries 
where this sector has a major role except in 
Mexico, where production figures  declined 
slightly. In Argentina, mining output continued 
to climb, thanks to its increased fuel  production. 
Colombia also made substantial gains based on 
an upswing in hydrocarbon production. In 
Venezuela, the petroleum industry was quite 
buoyant, in contrast to the other sectors of 
production, which recorded an overall decline. 
Utilities showed an overall expansion of  5%, 
again with the exception of  Mexico, which 
suffered  a slight decline. 
Among the countries that marked up increases 
in manufacturing  output, five  (Chile, Colombia, 
El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela) recorded rises 
of  between 4.5% and 7%, while Haiti posted a 
rise of  15%, although this represented no more 
than a partial recovery from  the debacle of  the 
preceding years. In the other countries of  this 
sub-group, modest increases were noted; in 
Brazil, for  example, where manufacturing  bore 
the brunt of  the economic slowdown, the 
expansion of  this sector amounted to less than 
2%. In Nicaragua and Peru, the construction 
industry recorded noteworthy increases on the 
order of  16%. Other services recorded gains in 
Peru (11%) and in Chile and Haiti 
(approximately 7%). In Brazil, the increase was 
below 3%, above all because of  the contraction 
in banking services prompted by the decline in 
the rate of  inflation. 
In the three countries where there was a 
slowdown in activity (Argentina, Mexico and 
Uruguay), the performance  of  the manufacturing 
sector, construction and other services (in 
particular commerce) was poor. The fall  in 
manufacturing  production in Argentina was 
especially noticeable in the case of  such items as 
motor vehicles and household appliances. In 
Mexico, the manufacturing  sector suffered  a 
significant  contraction which affected  almost all 
of  its branches. In the automotive industry, the 
structure of  demand, which shrank overall by 
19%, was drastically different;  domestic sales 
plummeted 73%, while the number of  vehicles 
exported soared 38%. In Uruguay, 
manufacturing  output intended for  the Argentine 
market suffered  the sharpest decrease, while 
construction was the most adversely affected 
activity with declines of  between 11% and 22%. 
This sector also performed  poorly in Venezuela, 
asa result of  the crisis in that country, and in costa 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
BY BRANCHES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 
(Annual  growth  rates) 
Agriculture M i m n 8 a n d Manufac-  C o n s t r u c t j o n Subtotal: Basic Other 
quarrying turing goods services services 
1994 1995a 1994 1995a 1994 1995a 1994 1995a 1994 1995a 1994 1995a 1994 1995a 
Latin America 
and the Caribbean b 5.5 2.9 5.4 4.2 5.7 -0.5 7.5 -4.6 5.9 0.1 6.2 2.9 3.9 -0.6 
Argentina 3.8 1.7 11.7 4.3 4.2 -6.5 15.7 -11.0 6.2 -5.2 7.3 -3.8 8.4 -3.6 
Bolivia 8.1 1.6 3.6 3.5 4.5 4.1 3.2 5.0 5.4 3.2 9.5 5.0 5.2 3.0 
Brazil 8.4 5.0 4.7 3.1 7.8 1.6 6.0 0.1 7.6 2.1 4.9 8.4 2.3 2.7 
Chile 8.5 5.5 2.7 7.2 2.9 6.5 2.0 7.4 3.7 6.6 7.3 10.7 3.7 7.1 
Colombia 2.3 5.2 4.5 17.8 1.4 1.0 21.5 3.8 4.4 5.4 7.5 5.3 6.6 5.7 
Costa Rica 3.2 3.3 a 3.5 3.0 6.2 -12.0 3.6 1.9 7.6 5.2 4.4 2.5 
Ecuador 3.9 3.2 7.6 0.6 6.9 6.9 5.3 -1.4 6.3 3.0 4.2 3.2 3.1 2.2 
El Salvador -2.7 5.1 12.0 7.2 7.9 7.0 10.1 6.0 4.1 6.2 5.2 5.6 6.1 6.2 
Guatemala 2.4 2.9 3.8 12.3 2.9 3.3 -4.9 8.0 2.1 3.5 5.3 6.4 5.2 5.7 
Haiti -0.8 -11.3 -14.3 50.0 -11.2 23.6 -2.1 85.1 -3.2 5.8 -23.1 12.6 -3.1 3.4 
Honduras 0.8 6.9 2.3 9.1 -1.8 2.6 -19.2 -2.2 -3.1 4.3 0.6 6.1 0.2 1.5 
Mexico 2.0 -2.5 1.6 -3.4 3.6 -4.6 6.4 -23.3 3.5 -6.3 7.8 -3.6 3.1 -7.6 
Nicaragua 10.8 5.0 -10.1 10.9 1.0 3.0 17.8 16.3 7.7 5.1 0.4 5.1 0.3 3.4 
Panama 3.1 2.4 9.6 -5.5 4.3 0.2 2.2 1.3 3.5 1.1 3.5 7.0 5.8 1.5 
Paraguay -0.6 7.2 5.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 3.6 4.0 0.6 5.2 11.4 9.2 4.1 1.9 
Peru 14.7 5.6 4.0 2.4 15.8 4.5 32.1 17.2 18.3 7.4 8.0 7.3 11.0 11.5 
Dominican 
Republic -1.8 6.0 88.2 9.4 2.9 -0.7 6.6 5.7 5.5 4.0 4.9 9.1 3.1 4.7 
Uruguay 9.2 2.7 7.1 -14.6 4.0 -2.8 5.7 -14.7 5.8 -2.7 11.4 3.1 3.9 -3.2 
Venezuela 1.9 -0.6 5.6 4.8 -3.5 7.2 -26.3 -11.4 -1.7 3.7 -2.2 3.8 -2.7 -1.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
" Preliminary figures.  Does not include Cuba. 
3. Supply and demand 
Total  supply in Latin  America and the 
Caribbean  increased  1% in 1995, owing 
mainly  to the expansion in the volume of 
imports  (4%),  since GDP growth  was flat. 
This  increase in supply was lower  than in 
the four  preceding  years, when it  had 
stood  at an annual average rate of  slightly 
over 5%. Domestic  demand  contracted 
1% due to the fact  that  exports  grew more 
than imports  in terms of  volume, which 
means that  a larger  portion  of  the 
increase in supply was transferred 
abroad,  unlike  previous years, when a 
high percentage  of  the increase in 
domestic  demand  had been met with 
goods  and services brought  in from 
abroad. 
The volume of  the region's imports increased 
less than in previous years because of  the 
substantial decline in the amount imported by 
Argentina and Mexico, although this was offset 
by strong expansions in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela 
(between 10% and 30%) and in Haiti, where 
imports quadrupled after  the trade embargo was 
lifted  (see table V-4). 
The volume of  exports expanded 12%, which 
was more than in 1994 and more than the 
historical average annual rate for  the period 
1981-1994. Significant  increases were noted in 
Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico and 
Nicaragua (between 10% and 28%); in Haiti, the 
indicator was two and a half  times higher. In 
Brazil, there was scarcely any increase and in 
Uruguay, there was a 7% decline. 
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Table -
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL SUPPLY, 
DOMESTIC DEMAND AND GROSS NATIONAL INCOME a 
(Annual  growth  rates) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995b 1981-1990 
1990-
1995" 
1. Total supply (2 + 3) 0.9 5.0 5.1 4.4 6.4 1.0 8.6 23.9 
2. Gross domestic product at 
market prices -0.4 3.3 2.7 3.7 5.2 0.3 10.1 16.0 
3. Imports of  goods and services 12.1 17.6 20.8 8.6 12.6 4.6 -1.3 81.6 
4. Exports of  goods and services 6.5 4.9 7.2 7.5 8.8 12.5 68.9 47.9 
5. Domestic availability of  goods 
and services (2 + 3 - 4) = 
domestic demand (6 + 7) 0.1 5.0 4.8 3.9 6.0 -1.0 2.6 20.0 
6. Final consumption expenditure c 1.3 5.4 4.3 3.1 4.7 0.2 12.5 18.9 
7. Gross fixed  capital formation -4.4 3.4 6.7 7.3 10.9 -5.2 -24.4 24.4 
8. Income -14.9 -5.9 2.2 6.3 -0.1 -1.6 51.6 0.5 
9. Real gross national income (2 - 8) 0.8 3.5 3.0 3.2 5.9 0.3 6.3 17.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a 19 countries. b Preliminary figures.  c Includes variation in stocks. d Includes current transfers  and terms-of-trade 
effect. 
The notable expansion in the volume of 
exports counterbalanced the adverse effects  of 
the slump in domestic demand and the increase 
in imports, thus contributing to GDP growth of 
0.3%. In some countries, a considerable portion 
of  domestic demand was diverted to imports; this 
was the case in Brazil, where over half  of  the 
increase in domestic demand was siphoned off 
by foreign-made  goods, which accounted for  the 
phenomenal increase in the country's imports. 
Exports were also affected,  since part of  the 
potential outward flow  of  goods was channelled 
into the local market to help satisfy  the sharp 
increase in domestic demand. In addition, there 
was a strong diversion of  domestic demand 
towards external sources in Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Haiti, Peru and Venezuela. Owing to 
this shift,  GDP growth was lower than the 
expansion in domestic demand in these countries. 
On the other hand, in Argentina and Mexico just 
the opposite occurred as the increase in trade 
balances averted a sharper fall  in GDP. 
While total demand showed a slight increase 
at the regional level, wide differences  existed 
from  one country to another. On the one hand, 
this aggregate expanded in a large number of 
1 Includes the variation in stocks. 
economies and did so particularly vigorously in 
seven of  them, where it rose by over 5%. On the 
other hand, in another three countries, total 
demand fell:  in Mexico by as much as 11%, in 
Argentina by 6% and in Uruguay by 4%. In 
almost all the countries where demand rose 
sharply, the increase was attributable to upturns 
both in domestic demand and in exports. In 
almost all cases where there was a significant 
contraction in total demand, it was due to a sharp 
fall  in domestic demand since exports soared. 
Domestic demand in the region as a whole 
contracted 1%, but there were considerable 
differences  between countries. On the one hand, 
Chile, El Salvador and Peru recorded substantia] 
increases (10% or more) and Haiti witnessed a 
30% rise. These upswings stemmed mainly from 
strong growth in gross capita] formation  and, to 
a lesser degree, in consumption.1 On the other 
hand, domestic demand was down in three 
countries -Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay-
with a sharper fall  being seen in investment than 
in consumption. Fixed investment continued the 
upturn begun in 1991, but the regional aggregate 
represented only 20.9% of  GDP, compared with 
28% in 1980 (for  further  details, see chapter VI). 
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In 1995, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Peru and Venezuela recorded a substantia] 
rise in per capita consumption (between 5% and 
11%), while in Ecuador, Guatemala and 
Paraguay, the increase was slimmer. In four  other 
countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, and Honduras), it remained relatively 
stable. On the other hand, in Argentina and 
Mexico, this indicator declined markedly (by 6% 
and 15%, respectively) and in the Dominican 
Republic, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay, it 
was down by between 2% and 4%. 
Per capita consumption levels in general 
remained lower than they had been at the 
beginning of  the previous decade, as the upturn 
observed between 1991 and 1995 only made up 
in part for  the setbacks recorded between 
1981 and 1990 (see figure  V-l). Only in six 
countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Paraguay and Uruguay) was per capita 
consumption higher in 1995 than in 1980. On the 
other hand, the sharpest decreases were noted in 
Bolivia, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Venezuela. 
4. Inflation 
In  1995, the regional  rate of  inflation 
again fell  dramatically,  dropping  to 26%, 
after  having reached  890% in 1993 and 
340% in 1994; it  has continued  its 
downward  movement in 1996, although 
at a slower  pace. This  sharp reduction 
was due  to a considerable  decrease  in 
Brazil  which marked  the end of  the last  of 
all  the quasi-hyperinflationary  situations 
experienced  in the region over the 
preceding  15 years. 
This decrease in 1995 was, moreover, quite 
widespread, since in 17 out of  the 22 countries 
analysed, the consumer price index declined or 
remained stable. Only four  actually experienced 
a rise in inflation  and only Mexico showed a 
marked increase, but without reaching the high 
rates recorded several years earlier; inflation 
reached 52% in 1995, after  a low of  7% in 1994. 
In 1996, the 12 month rate of  inflation  started to 
fall,  subsiding to 31% by June. In Costa Rica, 
which had experienced 20% inflation  in 1994, 
the rate went up to 23% in 1995, while in Bolivia 
and El Salvador, it also advanced by three 
percentage points, reaching 13% and 12%, 
respectively. 
Venezuela was the country with the highest 
rate of  inflation  in the region in 1995 (57%), 
although this was lower than the year before. 
However, in December the rate of  inflation  began 
to rise again, and this trend strengthened further 
in 1996; thus, by July, the 12-month increase was 
112%, an unprecedented level for  the country. 
The monthly variations spiralled upwards until 
May, but then started to abate. 
Inflation  was very low -an annual rate of  less 
than 2% per year- in three countries (Argentina, 
Barbados and Panama) and in four  others, was 
below 10% (Chile, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago). In a large 
group of  countries (Bolivia, El Salvador, 
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru), it 
varied between 11% and 16%. Six other 
countries (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Haiti and Honduras) had price 
increases of  between 20% and 30%. Uruguay 
experienced a high rate of  inflation  (35%), 
although it was lower than in 1994. Brazil, which 
for  many years had sustained the highest inflation 
in the region (up to four  digits), recorded a rate 
of  only 20% in 1995, down from  930% in 1994 
and 2,500% in 1993. In 1996, inflation  continued 
to decline, although more slowly, and the 
12-month rate was 16% as of  June (see table 
V-5). 
Price rises were also down in other countries 
in 1995 -notably Ecuador and Uruguay- which 
had previously suffered  high levels of  inflation, 
although nowhere near as high as in the cases 
referred  to above. In Ecuador, inflation  continued 
to abate, although slowly -moving from  25% in 
1994 to 22% in 1995. In Uruguay, as already 
indicated, it stood at 35%; this was the lowest 
figure  to be recorded since 1983 and confirmed 
the downward trend of  the four  preceding years. 
In 1996, this decline persisted, and the 12-month 
rate as of  June was 29%. 
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Table V-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES 
(December-to-December  variations) 
1980-1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 388.4 1 209.7 200.8 420.8 892.7 339.9 25.9 21.8 
Argentina 162.0 1343.9 84.0 17.5 7.4 3.7 1.7 0.1 
Barbados 2.0 3.4 8.1 3.4 -1.0 0.5 3.4 
Bolivia 9.6 18.0 14.5 10.5 9.4 8.5 12.6 13.1 
Brazil 740.5 1 584.6 475.8 1149.1 2489.1 929.3 22.0 14.9 
Chile 10.6 27.3 18.7 12.7 12.2 8.9 8.2 7.7 
Colombia 18.8 32.4 26.8 25.2 22.6 22.5 19.3 20.3 
Costa Rica 14.0 27.3 25.3 17.0 9.0 19.9 22.6 19.41 
Ecuador 29.1 49.5 49.0 60.2 31.0 25.4 22.8 24.0 
El Salvador 10.0 18.3 9.8 20.0 12.1 8.9 11.4 10.0 
Guatemala 14.2 59.6 10.2 14.2 11.6 11.6 8.6 11.6 
Haiti c 16.9 26.1 15.8 16.8 36.1 31.7 24.0 18.2' 
Honduras 15.3 35.2 21.4 6.5 13.1 28.8 26.8 21.3' 
Jamaica 25.8 29.7 80.2 40.2 30.1 26.9 25.5 
Mexico 15.9 29.9 18.8 11.9 8.0 7.1 52.0 31.81 
Nicaragua 1 591.5 13 490.5 775.4 3.6 19.5 12.4 11.1 11.1 
Panama 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.7 0.9 1.5 0.9 1.6' 
Paraguay 13.2 44.1 11.8 17.8 20.3 18.3 10.5 9.61 
Peru 880.3 7 649.6 139.2 56.7 39.5 15.3 10.2 11.9 
Dominican 
Republic 12.6 79.9 7.9 5.2 2.7 14.3 9.2 6.6' 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 4.8 9.5 2.3 8.5 13.4 5.5 3.8 *" i 
Uruguay 43.0 128.9 81.3 59.0 52.9 44.1 35.4 28.3 
Venezuela 42.8 36.5 31.0 31.9 45.9 70.8 56.6 112.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
" Twelve-month variations to July 1996. b Twelve-month variations to June 1996. c In earlier publications, reference 
was made to the fiscal  year, which in this country runs from  September to the following  August. d Twelve-month variations 
to May 1996. 
Colombia, which for  a number of  years had 
recorded moderate inflation,  maintained this 
pattern in 1995 and even achieved a slight 
reduction in comparison with the previous year's 
rate. In Paraguay, the inflation  rate, which had 
hovered just under 20% in 1994, recorded an 
appreciable decline in 1995, falling  to just over 
11%; in the first  months of  1996, it tended to 
accelerate somewhat, however. Jamaica, after 
recording 80% inflation  in 1991, had shown a 
downturn since 1992 and managed to maintain 
this trend in 1995 with an annual rate of  slightly 
under 16%. 
The marked reduction in the regional rate of 
inflation  and the improved performance  of  the 
vast majority of  countries are attributable to the 
stabilization programmes implemented in 
previous years and to the programme initiated in 
Brazil -the region's largest economy- in the 
middle of  1994. The devaluation in Mexico had 
the opposite type of  effect,  although its impact 
was cushioned by the fall  in the level of  economic 
activity in that country. 
The chief  objective of  the macroeconomic 
policies implemented in the region in the last 
several years has been to curb inflation,  and the 
strategies used to achieve this goal have included 
fiscal  austerity measures, prudent monetary 
policies and greater liberalization, especially 
through the conclusion of  regional agreements 
with a view to eliminating tariffs  between trading 
partners. Exchange rate variations have played 
an important role in consumer price movements 
in almost all the countries of  the region by 
providing support for  anti-inflationary  measures 
in situations characterized by an abundant supply 
of  foreign  exchange (for  further  details on 
economic policy, see chapter II). 
Notwithstanding the undeniable strides 
made over the last few  years, efforts  to lower 
inflation  to the levels seen in developed 
countries have run up against great difficulties. 
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Bringing inflation  down from  its previous 
extremely high levels, either through orthodox 
programmes involving the use of  exchange-rate 
anchors and harsh monetary policies or through 
de-indexation (as in the recent case in Brazil) has 
certainly been an impressive achievement. 
However, once rates of  the order of  10% to 20% 
have been reached, inflation  seems to put up 
some resistance to efforts  to reduce it further.  The 
only exception may be Argentina: after  the initial 
success of  its stabilization programme, it also 
had difficulties  in putting an end to the 
inflationary  process in spite of  the exchange 
policy of  strict convertibility that it applied. 
However, in 1995 and 1996, prices stabilized 
completely, if  only as a direct result of  the severe 
recession affecting  the country. The intractability 
of  inflation  is perhaps attributable to the 
persistence of  a certain element of  inertia in price 
movements, which is only overcome when the 
economy in question undergoes a severe 
recession. 
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VI. INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
1. General outlook 
The  drop  in investment  that  occurred  in 
1995 in Latin  America and the 
Caribbean  in the wake of  Mexico's 
financial  crisis  brought  the recovery 
process that  had begun in the early  1990s 
to a halt.  This  phenomenon was 
accompanied  by a modest  decline  in 
national  and domestic  saving, while 
external  saving experienced  a sharp 
downturn. 
The region's prospects for  sustained 
growth over the long term are based on the 
countries' ability to increase their savings and 
investment rates. The crisis of  the 1980s had 
precipitated a widespread slowdown in 
growth that led to a slump in domestic demand 
and, hence, to an underutilization of  installed 
capacity; this, in its turn, contributed to a 
strong contraction in investment, which was 
also dampened by the abrupt drop in capital 
flows  from  abroad. The 1990s ushered in a 
recovery that continued until 1994, but in 1995, 
the stagnation of  the region's GDP triggered a 
new downturn in investment in the wake of  the 
Mexican financial  crisis and its after-effects  in 
other countries of  the region. 
In contrast, gross domestic saving has 
proved more stable, hovering around 22% of 
GDP during the last 15 years, though it did show 
a slight decline in 1995. National saving, for 
its part, displayed a definite  downward trend in 
the 1980s, with the result that its level in the 
1990s was five  percentage points below that 
recorded in the 1980s. This trend reflected  the 
worsening of  the terms of  trade during the 1980s, 
and, to a lesser extent, higher net external 
payments for  factor  services, which were only 
partiallyoffsetbytheexpansioninnetunrequited 
private transfer  payments. In 1995, there was a 
considerabledropinexternalsavingflowinginto 
the region, especially portfolio  capital, and this 
had a negative impact on investment. 
It is important to note that the levels of 
saving and investment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean are, in general, very low in 
comparison with high-growth regions, such as 
the countries of  East Asia, which normally 
record investment and savings rates of  over 
30% of  GDP. According to recent estimates 
prepared by ECLAC, in order for  Latin America 
and the Caribbean to attain an average growth 
rate of  6%, the region would need to raise 
its fixed  investment rate to over 26% of 
its GDP. In 1995, only seven countries met that 
standard: Chile, Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Peru. This group of  countries, whose average 
investment rate was 27% of  GDP, achieved 
a growth rate of  5.3%. For the region as a 
whole, on the other hand, average fixed 
investment amounted to 21% of  GDP while the 




The  present investment  rate of  Latin 
America and the Caribbean  is very low, 
whether  viewed  from  an historical 
perspective  or in comparison with  other 
regions.  In  1995, the situation  worsened 
still  further,  given that  gross fixed 
investment  dropped  by 5.2% to the 
equivalent  of21%  of  GDP,  which was one 
point  less than in 1994. This  decline  did 
not occur across the board,  however, but 
is instead  attributable  to adverse 
circumstances  in just  a few  countries, 
particularly  Argentina  and Mexico.  The 
composition  of  investment  continued  to 
undergo  major changes, with  increases 
being noted  in private  investment  and in 
machinery and equipment.  A number of 
countries  made significant  progress as 
regards  the institutional  and legal 
framework  for  investment. 
During the early 1990s, the region's 
economies recorded moderate growth and, as 
pre-existing external constraints came to an end, 
was approaching the production frontier.  As a 
country nears that frontier,  however, it must have 
higher levels of  investment and productivity. 
One of  the legacies of  the crisis of  the 1980s was 
that the region's level of  investment in 
infrastructure,  education and job training has 
been too low to meet the demands of  economies 
undergoing significant  reforms  and major 
changes. 
The region's domestic investment rate 
declined to 21.4% of  GDP at constant 1990 prices, 
which was very close to the lowest level 
registered in the previous decade. Mexico and 
Argentina, which account for  a large share of  the 
region's aggregate investment, were especially 
hard hit. The downturn in fixed  investment was 
less marked, but inventories recorded quite a 
significant  slump, especially in Mexico (see 
table VI-1). 
There were mixed investment trends in the 
countries in question. Investment contracted in 
six and expanded in the other 13 countries for 
which information  is available. Argentina and 
Mexico were among the countries showing 
declines, after  having recorded significant  rates 
of  growth in previous years. Output dropped 
considerably in these two countries, but the 
downswing in investment -both private and 
public- was even sharper and was, moreover, 
evident in construction and in machinery and 
equipment as well. In Argentina, the upward 
trend in fixed  investment as a percentage of  GDP, 
which had been in evidence since 1990, came to 
an end. In Mexico, public investment fell  by 19% 
and private investment by 34%. The drop in 
physical investment by the Government was 
especially abrupt, notwithstanding a higher level 
of  investment by Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 
and the implementation of  emergency 
programmes to combat unemployment. The huge 
drop in investment resulted in a significant 
reduction in imports of  capital goods (35%), 
though it should be noted that export firms' 
imports of  machinery and equipment by export 
firms  recorded substantial growth. The 
investment slowdown was particularly evident in 
the construction industry. 
Gross fixed  investment also contracted in 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Investment was down sharply in Costa Rica for 
the second year in a row as a result of  the severe 
stabilization policies implemented in order to 
reduce the country's hefty  fiscal  deficit. 
Investment in Uruguay slipped by around 6% in 
1995, after  having expanded by two thirds during 
the preceding four  years. One contributing factor 
was the fiscal  adjustment programme, which 
emphasized cutbacks in central-government 
capital expenditure. In Venezuela, investment 
continued to fall,  thus reaching very low levels 
(14% of  GDP), as a consequence of  the grave 
crisis affecting  the country in recent years, which 
1 This analysis refers  mainly to fixed  investment, since in the case of  a number of  countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, this 
is the only variable for  which information  is available. In addition, the figure  given for  the variation in stocks in Colombia -10% 
of  GDP- is extremely high, probably as the result of  an underestimation of  consumption. 
2 Total investment in Mexico plunged by 42%, falling  from  25.4% to 15.8% of  GDP. Fixed investment decreased less (29.1%), 
slipping from  21.4% to 16.2% of  GDP. 
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Table VI-1 
LATES AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COEFFICIENTS OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT 
(Percentages  of  gross domestic  product) 
1980 1985 1990 
Latin  America and 
the Caribbean 28.3 20.1 19.5 
Argentina 26.1 16.0 13.9 
Bolivia 12.8 11.1 12.6 
Brazil 33.9 24.1 22.9 
Chile 21.0 17.6 23.3 
Colombia 20.5 19.1 16.6 
Costa Rica 22.8 17.6 22.4 
Ecuador 31.8 20.5 18.4 
El Salvador 12.8 11.8 13.7 
Guatemala 18.4 11.5 13.0 
Haiti 16.3 18.8 15.1 
Honduras 27.6 19.6 20.2 
Mexico 24.7 17.8 18.6 
Nicaragua 15.5 21.1 16.0 
Panama 22.5 15.2 8.4 
Paraguay 26.8 19.2 22.0 
Peru 28.9 19.6 21.2 
Dominican Republic 28.3 20.9 24.9 
Uruguay 23.4 9.6 10.6 
Venezuela 24.9 19.3 14.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into 
a Preliminary figures. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995' 
19.5 20.2 21.0 22.1 20.9 
16.0 19.3 20.7 22.9 20.1 
14.2 15.7 15.7 14.2 16.0 
21.7 20.2 20.8 22.2 22.5 
21.3 24.3 26.9 26.8 27.8 
15.4 16.6 21.5 24.0 25.2 
19.1 21.7 25.1 21.9 19.7 
19.4 20.0 19.7 19.7 20.2 
15.4 16.9 18.0 19.1 19.8 
13.0 16.1 16.5 15.3 15.6 
15.9 12.1 11.4 11.4 28.8 
19.9 23.7 30.0 29.8 25.6 
19.4 20.9 20.5 21.4 16.2 
14.8 17.0 18.1 21.7 22.8 
14.8 19.5 26.5 27.6 28.8 
22.8 21.0 20.6 21.0 21.1 
21.1 21.9 23.3 27.0 30.0 
22.0 25.7 27.1 27.6 29.4 
12.8 14.0 15.8 15.4 14.7 
17.4 20.9 19.3 14.9 14.5 
dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
has led to high inflation,  steep devaluations and 
a widespread banking crisis. Though Honduras 
showed some signs of  recovery, the persistent 
economic crisis caused a sharp decline in private 
investment. 
The countries showing the highest increases 
in investment were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Peru, with 
rises of  over 10%. Virtually all of  these 
economies have been growing for  a number of 
years now, some at quite high rates. Fixed 
investment in Chile continued to be very robust 
(12%), accelerating strongly in the second half  to 
reach levels approaching 29% of  GDP. Bolivia 
saw an upturn not only in investment as a whole 
but also in the private sector's share of  that 
aggregate; this trend went hand in hand with a 
strong increase in foreign  direct investment, 
which accounted for  a third of  gross fixed 
investment. It should be noted that the 
capitalization of  public-sector enterprises was 
only partly responsible for  this positive trend, 
since strategic partners' contributions, 
particularly in the electricity and 
telecommunications subsectors, did not 
materialize immediately, but were instead held 
outside the country in trust accounts. 
Fixed investment in Colombia grew by 11% 
and was thus the most dynamic component of 
aggregate demand in 1995. Accordingly, its 
share of  GDP rose to 25%. Unlike the previous 
year, public investment expanded more quickly 
than private investment. Investment in 
machinery and equipment also showed an 
appreciable increase due to the expansion of  the 
petroleum subsector. In Peru, the upward trend 
in investment remained on course. The private 
sector accounted for  most of  the upswing, but 
public investment also grew robustly, increasing 
its share to around a fifth  of  total investment. 
Private investment in El Salvador once again 
recorded rapid growth, unlike public investment, 
which was so low (4% of  GDP) that its 
contribution to production activity was quite 
limited. In Brazil, investment rose by about 5%, 
which was somewhat higher than GDP growth, 
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but down from  the 13% recorded the previous 
year. This meant that the investment coefficient 
remained low in comparison with the levels of 
the early 1980s. Nevertheless, there was an 
important qualitative change, which took the 
form  of  a steep rise in the share of  imported 
capital goods, which has surely produced a 
significant  rise in the productivity of  capital. A 
breakdown of  fixed  investment reveals that 
machinery and equipment represented a very 
large share of  the total. 
Investment in Guatemala developed into a 
dynamic component of  aggregate demand; 
private investment increased in the areas of 
housing, manufacturing  and commerce, while 
public investment grew at a faster  pace than in 
recent years. In Nicaragua, gross domestic 
investment expanded vigorously for  the second 
year running, bolstered by an upswing in 
construction and by more modest increases in 
spending on machinery and equipment. Public 
and private investment grew at similar rates, with 
more than half  of  the former  being channelled 
into economic infrastructure  projects. In Haiti, 
investment staged a significant  recovery, thanks 
largely to greater public spending on 
labour-intensive infrastructure  repair and 
maintenance projects for  which generous 
financial  backing was forthcoming  in the form  of 
foreign  aid. 
In Jamaica, the decline in external debt 
payments paved the way for  an increase in gross 
investment, especially in machinery and 
equipment. In Trinidad and Tobago, capital 
expenditure rose by 30% and was channelled 
primarily towards the upgrading of  physical 
infrastructure.  In Barbados, in contrast, capital 
expenditure fell  by 13%, thus putting the end to 
the upward trend observed in the two preceding 
years. The downturn in public investment was 
particularly striking. In Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
capita] expenditure jumped by 70%, chiefly  as a 
result of  infrastructure  development. 
There are two widely used criteria for 
breaking down investment; one is based on the 
sector of  origin, and thus makes a distinction 
between public investment and private 
investment, while the other disaggregates 
investment in terms of  the type of  product 
involved (investment in machinery and 
equipment, on the one hand, and investment in 
construction, on the other). Generally speaking, 
there are two theoretical approaches to the 
relationship between public and private 
investment. In the opinion of  some experts, the 
two types of  investment are complementary, 
since the productivity of  private investment rises 
as public investment (especially in 
infrastructure)  increases. However, other experts 
contend that the two types of  investment work 
against one another because public investment 
crowds out private investment, notably by 
pushing up interest rates. The empirical results 
available for  Latin America suggest that the 
productivity-related effect  is the more 
pronounced of  the two in the region. 
This point may be especially relevant in the 
light of  current circumstances in the region. From 
both historical and comparative viewpoints, 
public investment's share of  the total has 
remained fairly  high in Latin America. However, 
one of  the effects  of  the crisis of  the 1980s has 
been a downward trend in public investment, 
whether because of  external constraints or as a 
consequence of  structural reforms.  The 
privatizations implemented as part of  this reform 
process have reduced State participation in 
production and, hence, in investment. Both 
factors  also explain why the reduction has been 
particularly sharp in the case of  infrastructure, 
especially road building and maintenance, the 
energy and water subsectors and port facilities. 
During 1995, the vast majority of  countries for 
which data are available recorded an increase in 
the share of  private investment. This trend had 
already been in evidence in 1990-1994, given 
that in five  countries (Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Guatemala and Uruguay) private investment had 
grown more quickly than public investment, 
while the opposite had occurred in three others 
(Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua) (see table 
VI-2). 
It is also important to distinguish between 
investment in machinery and equipment and 
investment in construction. According to a 
number of  studies on developed countries, the 
first  of  these investment categories has a greater 
impact on economic growth than the other. 
However, the data for  Latin America for 
1990-1995 do not back up that assertion. 
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Table I-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): COMPOSITION 
OF GROSS FIXED INVESMENT, BY SECTOR 





Public Private Total 
Bolivia a 7.6 7.5 5.0 8.5 -6.5 41.5 14.0 
Colombia 6.1 8.6 10.5 16.6 15.7 9.5 11.0 
Chile a 5.9 5.8 17.4 22.0 6.0 14.5 12.1 
Ecuador 4.0 3.0 14.4 17.1 -2.9 6.9 5.3 
El Salvador 2.5 3.3 11.2 16.5 0.4 12.4 10.2 
Guatemala 2.7 2.8 10.3 12.9 4.7 8.3 7.6 
Honduras 6.6 8.9 13.6 16.7 -3.9 -14.9 -11.4 
Mexico b -34.0 -19.0 -29.1 
Nicaragua 9.3 16.7 6.7 6.0 9.3 9.7 9.4 
Peru a 2.4 5.1 18.8 24.9 14.7 20.7 19.8 
Uruguay 3.0 3.5 7.6 11.1 -29.9 2.8 -7.6 
Venezuela 9.2 10.1 4.9 4.4 -6.9 -15.1 -0.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a The percentage breakdown by sector is based on information  from  official  sources. b Official  figure. 
Moreover, when external resources are in short 
supply, the composition of  investment is directly 
affected,  in particular as regards machinery and 
equipment, since many of  these products are 
imported. 
In the case of  Latin America, empirical 
analyses also point towards some sort of 
connection between these two disaggregations. 
The increase in private investment may be 
concentrated in machinery and equipment, 
especially imports thereof.  Furthermore, the 
relative drop in investment in construction goes 
along with the downswing in public investment. 
As regards the composition of  investment, in 
1990-1995 there was a relative increase in private 
investment and in investment in machinery and 
equipment. In 1995, both these categories 
experienced similar positive trends, despite a 
slump in investment for  the region as a whole. 
During 1995, there was a markedly higher 
increase in investment in machinery and 
equipment in 10 of  the 12 countries for  which 
information  is available, while in the other two, 
construction predominated; this appears to 
consolidate the upward trend in machinery and 
equipment's share in total investment which has 
been taking shape in Latin America since 1990 
(see table VI-3). 
In a number of  Latin American countries, 
major changes were made in the institutional and 
legal framework  for  investment. As part of  this 
process, privatization programmes were 
launched or carried forward  which, while not 
generating new investments themselves, 
certainly created the conditions necessary for  an 
acceleration of  the accumulation process. In 
1995, this was especially the case in Peru and 
Brazil (see chapter III). There were also, 
however, substantive changes to the regulations 
governing the investment process, as in the case 
of  the reforms  implemented in Bolivia and Chile. 
In Bolivia, these changes were made within the 
framework  of  what is referred  to there as the 
capitalization of  public-sector enterprises, the 
most fundamental  structural reform  to be carried 
out in that country in recent memory. This 
capitalization process works in the following 
way: the public sector contributes the existing 
assets as initial share capital, while private 
investors (considered strategic partners) provide 
fresh  capital in exchange for  a 50% stake in the 
enterprise and control of  its management. In 
Chile, the main reforms  have concerned the 
financial  sector. Of  particular importance were 
legal changes designed to streamline regulations 
on institutional investment in infrastructure 
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Table I-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): COMPOSITION OF 
GROSS FIXED INVESMENT, BY DESTINATION 
Percentage of  GDP Growth rates, 1995/1994 
Construction Machinery Cons- Machinery 
and equipment truc- and Total 
1990 1995 tion equip-1990 1995 ment 
Bolivia a 7.0 7.3 5.6 8.7 7.6 20.0 14.0 
Colombia 15.3 13.4 7.6 9.1 0.0 13.2 4.9 
Chile a 8.2 9.9 8.4 15.3 4.0 16.1 11.0 
Ecuador 10.3 10.5 12.9 17.3 7.0 15.5 12.1 
El Salvador 8.7 7.8 13.7 11.8 -10.0 -6.6 -8.0 
Guatemala 7.0 8.4 6.7 11.4 5.9 13.7 10.2 
Honduras 9.3 8.1 9.3 8.1 -25.0 -32.8 -29.1 
Mexico b 6.6 8.6 9.4 14.2 18.6 4.5 9.4 
Nicaragua 3.3 16.1 5.1 12.7 3.0 10.8 6.2 
Peru a 14.1 20.0 7.1 10.0 18.4 22.8 19.8 
Uruguay 6.5 7.9 4.2 6.7 -15.1 3.1 -7.6 
Venezuela 7.8 7.3 6.3 7.1 -10.3 11.0 -0.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a The percentage breakdown by sector is based on information  from  official  sources. b Official  figure. 
projects, which is expected to amount to US$ 2.4 
billion during 1995-1997; given this situation, 
the regulations governing the pension fund 
system, insurance schemes and investment funds 
were modified  with a view to gearing the 
diversification  and attraction of  resources to the 
special characteristics of  infrastructure  projects. 
In addition, insurance companies and mutual 
funds  were authorized to make investments 
abroad and, in June, foreign  investment margins 
and alternatives open to institutional investors 
were broadened with the inclusion of  fixed-  and 
floating-rate  options, these steps were designed 




For  a number of  years now, domestic 
saving in the region has been relatively 
stable,  but in 1995 it  edged  downward  by 
just  over half  a percentage  point  of  GDP. 
This  result  reflected,  in particular,  the 
marked  decline  in domestic  saving in 
Brazil  and Paraguay,  although  this  was 
partly  offset  by an increase in external 
saving. In  contrast,  Argentina  and 
Mexico  witnessed  a drop  in external 
saving, due  to reduced  capital  inflows 
from  abroad. 
a) Domestic saving and national saving 
In 1995, gross domestic savings amounted to 
20.5% of  GDP. Net externa] payments for  factor 
services came to about 3% of  GDP, while 
unrequited private transfer  payments stood at 
1%. The terms-of-trade  effect  has remained 
relatively stable in the 1990s, although it was 
3 It is important to point out that the change in the base year from  1980 to 1990 has an impact on the figures  for  gross national 
savings. The terms-of-trade  effect  in 1990 was, according to the oldbase (1980), equal to -5% of  GDP. Consequently, the new series 
(base year = 1990) records an average increase in gross national savings of  5 percentage points of  GDP. This, in turn, is reflected 
in an increase in gross capital formation  of  about 4 points of  GDP. 
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Table I-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FINANCING 
OF GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION a 
(Expressed  as percentages  of  gross domestic  product) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 199& 
1. Gross domestic savings 24.7 24.6 22.6 21.2 20.5 20.6 21.0 20.4 
2. Factor income -2.4 -4.1 -3.4 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -2.9 
3. Current transfers 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 
4. Terms-of-trade  effect 3.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.2 
5. Gross national savings 
(1 + 2 + 3 + 4) 25.8 21.0 20.1 19.0 18.7 18.3 19.4 18.8 
6. External savings 3.9 0.3 0.2 1.6 3.2 3.9 4.0 2.7 
7. Gross capital formation  (5 + 6) 29.6 21.3 20.3 20.6 21.9 22.2 23.4 21.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
" 19 countries. b Preliminary figures. 
somewhat lower in 1992-1993 than in 1994. 
Thus, national saving was two points lower than 
domestic saving as well as showing a decrease 
with respect to the preceding year (see 
table VI-4). 
The fact  that domestic saving exceeded gross 
national saving was due primarily to the marked 
differences  between the two variables in 
Venezuela and Mexico. In Venezuela, this 
divergence was caused by the terms-of-trade 
effect,  while, in Mexico, a combination of  this 
effect  and increased external payments for  factor 
services was responsible. On the other hand, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Haiti -along with, to a lesser extent, Bolivia, 
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic- all 
recorded higher levels of  national savings than of 
domestic savings. In almost all of  these countries, 
this was attributable to the fact  that the terms of 
trade were more favourable  than in 1990 (the 
base year) and more than compensated for  net 
outflows  in the form  of  factor  payments. In El 
Salvador and Haiti, a major contributing factor 
in the stronger increase in national saving was 
the sizeable net transfers  received from  abroad, 
equivalent to 19% and 35% of  GDP, 
respectively. 
National savings was greater than 20% of  GDP 
in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Panama, Peru and Venezuela. In the region's 
"success stories", such as Chile, the main factor 
was the increase in domestic saving by business 
enterprises. Nevertheless, in 1995, the combined 
effect  of  the terms of  trade, factor  income and 
current transfers  was negative in Brazil, Ecuador, 
Panama and especially Venezuela (see table 
VI-5). 
In Brazil, there was a continuation of  the 
downward trend in domestic saving, but on this 
occasion it was offset  by a significant  rise in 
external saving. Domestic savings in Chile once 
again hovered around 29% of  GDP, with a 
public-sector savings rate of  5.1%. In addition, 
the favourable  external conditions helped pave 
the way for  an unprecedented national saving rate 
of  32% of  GDP. This feat  was partly attributable 
to the 1984 tax reform,  which encouraged firms 
to save by setting the marginal tax rate on 
undistributed profits  lower than the rate levied on 
distributed profits. 
b) External saving 
External saving fell  steeply in 1995, after 
having expanded significantly  in 1990-1994; 
portfolio  flows  showed a particularly sharp 
decrease owing to the loss of  confidence 
prompted by Mexico's financial  crisis in late 
1994. The largest drops in external savings were 
recorded in Mexico (10% of  GDP and US$ 26 
billion) and Argentina (4% and US$ 8 billion) 
(see table IV-6). 
83 
Table VI-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL SAVING 
(As  a percentage  of  gross domestic  product) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 25.8 21.0 20.1 19.0 18.7 18.3 19.4 18.8 
Argentina 22.7 15.2 17.1 15.6 15.3 16.7 18.1 18.9 
Bolivia 13.1 9.2 8.7 11.1 7.9 7.7 12.1 11.3 
Brazil 30.8 27.0 22.0 21.3 21.9 20.8 21.9 18.5 
Chile 16.7 10.3 24.5 25.3 26.4 24.3 27.6 32.5 
Colombia 22.5 14.3 19.9 23.0 25.4 22.7 26.0 26.1 
Costa Rica 11.7 12.1 16.3 19.4 21.3 20.0 20.4 21.7 
Ecuador 28.3 23.7 14.4 16.2 18.9 14.4 15.3 16.0 
El Salvador 13.4 6.5 8.4 11.2 14.9 16.7 19.1 17.0 
Guatemala 16.6 9.6 10.6 13.5 11.9 10.3 10.6 12.5 
Haiti 9.6 14.8 13.8 12.5 12.7 10.2 11.7 23.6 
Honduras 14.9 10.1 16.2 18.6 18.0 23.5 26.2 25.1 
Mexico 20.1 18.6 18.8 16.8 15.9 16.0 15.6 15.5 
Nicaragua -3.8 -7.4 0.8 17.0 -19.3 -12.0 -8.1 -3.3 
Panama 7.7 10.7 12.2 4.5 11.0 15.7 10.7 20.2 
Paraguay 20.2 14.8 19.6 18.3 11.3 7.8 1.9 4.1 
Peru 33.5 19.3 19.5 20.8 18.5 19.9 22.7 23.6 
Dominican Republic 10.5 18.9 20.8 20.2 15.5 21.3 26.0 32.5 
Uruguay 21.1 10.5 12.8 13.9 13.9 13.1 12.2 13.9 
Venezuela 33.8 24.7 27.2 20.1 15.0 14.0 16.3 16.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a Preliminary figures. 
External saving also declined in Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Uruguay. External saving was negative in Chile, 
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, 
although in Chile's case, this was due to the 
prepayments it made on its external debt, as the 
country took advantage of  its extremely 
favourable  balance-of-payments  position. In 
contrast, the share of  the total saving accounted 
for  by external sources rose markedly in Bolivia, 
Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay and Peru. 
In Brazil, external saving climbed by US$ 17 
billion, which was equivalent to almost 4% of 
GDP. The first  months of  1995 were marked by 
an outflow  of  capital, but this turned into a 
significant  inflow  in the second half.  Lines of 
credit for  external trade operations not only 
recovered, but actually expanded; in addition, 
overseas sales of  privately-issued bonds and 
securities resumed. 
Of  all the components of  externa] saving, the 
one most directly related to investment is foreign 
direct investment (FDI). In a global context, FDI 
has gradually become the primary instrument of 
international economic integration. This trend is 
also evident in Latin America, though it differs 
from  one country to another, since FDI is 
concentrated in a handful  of  countries (mainly 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico). 
This group of  countries has recently been joined 
by Bolivia and Peru (see chapter VIII). 
In 1995, in a continuation of  the dynamic 
trend initiated in 1990, direct investment topped 
the US$ 21 billion mark. As in previous years, it 
was mainly directed towards the mining and 
petroleum sectors, except in Mexico, where it 
was channelled primarily into manufacturing. 
Direct investment showed a decline in Chile, 
Peru and Mexico, but this merely represented a 
lull in a firm  upward trend which has brought it 
up to around 3% of  GDP. 
In Argentina and Brazil, FDI expanded 
markedly, though in the case of  Brazil, it still 
represents a fairly  small proportion of  GDP 
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Table I-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXTERNAL SAVING 
(As  a percentage  of  gross domestic  product) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 3.9 0.3 0.2 1.6 3.2 3.9 4.0 2.7 
Argentina 3.4 0.8 -3.2 0.4 4.0 4.0 4.8 1.2 
Bolivia 0.1 7.7 3.8 4.3 7.8 8.1 2.0 4.7 
Brazil 3.8 0.1 1.0 0.4 -1.7 0.0 0.3 4.0 
Chile 9.9 7.0 1.8 -0.3 2.0 5.8 1.7 -0.3 
Colombia 0.8 5.9 -1.3 -6.3 -2.5 5.8 7.7 8.9 
Costa Rica 13.6 6.4 8.7 1.7 6.0 9.1 6.3 1.7 
Ecuador 6.8 -0.7 3.0 5.3 1.6 4.8 4.2 4.7 
El Salvador -0.8 4.1 5.4 4.5 3.8 2.3 0.3 3.8 
Guatemala 2.7 4.0 3.0 2.6 8.0 7.7 6.7 4.9 
Haiti 7.7 6.1 1.3 3.5 -0.6 1.3 -0.3 5.2 
Honduras 12.9 9.8 6.8 7.9 10.1 9.1 9.0 5.2 
Mexico 6.9 -0.4 3.1 5.9 9.3 8.4 9.8 0.2 
Nicaragua 21.6 31.3 14.3 0.2 36.5 28.4 30.3 26.7 
Panama 17.9 4.4 4.4 12.4 10.8 8.3 16.2 7.3 
Paraguay 8.2 5.8 3.3 5.9 11.0 14.2 20.3 18.3 
Peru 0.3 -0.3 1.9 2.3 4.6 4.3 4.6 7.1 
Dominican Republic 19.2 2.4 4.3 2.6 11.0 6.5 2.3 -2.3 
Uruguay 6.5 1.2 -2.0 -0.4 0.1 2.3 3.7 2.9 
Venezuela -10.0 -8.9 -17.0 -3.3 6.8 3.6 -4.5 -2.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
a Preliminary figures. 
(0.5%). In Colombia, FDI continued to rise, 
reaching the equivalentof  2.5% of  GDP. The level 
of  FDI was extraordinarily high in Bolivia, where 
it amounted to 5.5% of  GDP; new investments and 
the privatization of  State-owned enterprises in 
the energy and telecommunications subsectors 
were two of  the factors  that helped produce this 
result. Costa Rica, too, experienced abundant 
inflows  of  FDI (4% of  GDP). 
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VII. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
1. The overall situation 
Two  major trends  were to be observed  in 
the regional  employment  situation  in 
1995: a sharp increase in open 
unemployment,  much of  which was due 
to cyclical  factors,  and a very low rate of 
productive  job creation,  which reflected  a 
problem of  a more structural  nature. 
The regional unemployment rate rose steeply, 
climbing from  6.3% of  the workforce  in 1994 to 
7.1% in 1995; this 0.8-point change translates 
into an increase of  around 16% in the number of 
unemployed persons. Not since the crisis of  the 
early 1980s has the annual unemployment rate 
climbed so fast  or so high. Real wages also 
declined in a number of  countries -quite 
significantly  in some cases- after  three years of 
more or less regionwide increases. 
Unlike the pattern observed in the early 1980s, 
the deterioration of  the employment situation in 
1995 was not an across-the-board phenomenon. 
In 1982, and again in 1983, the unemployment 
rate went up in 12 of  the 16 countries for  which 
series are available, whereas in 1995 nine 
countries reported an upswing in unemployment, 
in another three the rate remained practically 
unchanged and in five,  unemployment fell. 
Arguably, the regional unemployment rate was 
strongly affected  by events in Argentina and 
Mexico, where unemployment indexes climbed 
quite sharply: indeed, if  these two countries are 
left  out of  the calculation of  the regional rate 
(which is based on national population-
weighted rates) then the results show a slight 
drop between 1994 and 1995 (from  6.5% to 
6.2%). Thus, an improvement in the open 
unemployment rates of  these countries (as was 
in fact  observable in Argentina towards the end 
of  1995 and in Mexico at the beginning of 
1996) is likely to have a favourable  effect  on 
the regional rate. 
Be that as it may, longer-term series on 
labour-market trends indicate that, beyond the 
immediate causes of  fluctuations  in the 
unemployment rate, there are structural problems 
that are affecting  job creation and are 
diminishing its impact in the area of  social equity : 
this is exemplified,  particularly, by the fact  that 
productive employment in high-productivity 
sectors has been growing very slowly while jobs 
have increasingly been concentrated in such 
low-productivity sectors as the informal  sector, 
which includes most small-scale and 
micro-enterprises, and own-account workers. As 
a result, a high percentage of  new jobs are not 
very productive. This trend continued in 1995, 
even in many countries where open 
unemployment did not increase very much. 
2. A sharp rise in the regional unemployment rate 
The  countries'  performances  in terms of 
unemployment  were uneven, largely  due 
to differences  in growth.  In  those 
countries  where unemployment  was a 
particularly  serious problem,  an increase 
in the labour  supply could  be seen to 
coincide  with  a marked  drop  in demand 
as a consequence of  adverse  economic 
conditions.  The  fact  remains, however, 
that  the relationship  between output  and 
unemployment  appears to have 
undergone  a change in the early  1990s, 
which points  to the presence of  an 
additional  structural  problem. 
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BOX VII-1 
ECONOMIC CONTRACTION AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN 
ARGENTINA AND MEXICO 
In 1995, output in both Argentina and Mexico dropped 
drastically and open unemployment increased. Despite the 
fact  that the contraction in economic activity was more 
pronounced in Mexico, however, the increase in 
unemployment was greater in Argentina, for  a number of 
reasons. 
On the demand side, the loss of  wage-based jobs was 
actually more marked in Mexico than in Argentina, but in 
Mexico there was also an increase in the number of  jobs in 
micro-enterprises, own-account work and unpaid labour. 
Consequently; since a significant  portion of  the 
unemployed were absorbed into low-quality occupations, 
the overall level of  employment remained practically 
constant. In Argentina, on the other hand, employment fell 
in all categories, and a considerable drop was therefore 
observed in total employment. In addition, the increase in 
lhe labour supply, which in both countries was the result of 
the entry of  a larger proportion of  women into the 
workforce,  was much greater in Argentina. 
The crisis that rocked Mexico, and its fallout 
in Argentina, had very serious repercussions on 
the labour markets of  these two countries. In 
Mexico, urban unemployment reached an annual 
average of  6.3% and peaked in the third quarter 
of  the year at 7.4%, thereby exceeding the high 
recorded in the early 1980s (7.2% in the third 
quarter of  1983). Meanwhile, the annual average 
in Argentina was 17.5% -an all-time record. 
Before  these increases, the unemployment rate 
had behaved differently  in each of  these countries. 
In Mexico, prior to 1995, open unemployment 
had remained below 4%, while in Argentina, 
despite high GDP growth rates, unemployment 
had been mounting quite rapidly ever since 
1992 and had reached 11.5% in 1994 (see 
table vn-1). 
Other countries where significant  increases in 
urban unemployment were observed -in each 
case in a context of  limited or negative growth-
were Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela, while 
in Bolivia, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay, 
unemployment rates rose less (see figure  1-3). In 
Cuba, too, where economic reforms  were under 
way, open unemployment began to emerge as a 
major problem. On the other hand, in Chile, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru, where high GDP 
growth was achieved in 1995, unemployment fell 
sharply. This was also the case during the first 
half  of  the year in Brazil and Colombia, but the 
slowdown in economic activity in these countries 
pushed unemployment up during the second half, 
with the result that the annual average improved 
only moderately in Brazil and remained 
unchanged in Colombia. 
In a number of  countries (Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela), the 
factors  that drove unemployment rates up had as 
much to do with supply as with demand. Thus, 
in all of  these countries, the participation rate, 
too, went up, and did so quite sharply in some 
cases, such as Uruguay and Venezuela and, also, 
during the first  half  of  the year, in Argentina. In 
part, this is a reflection  of  the tendency of 
households to add to the labour supply when 
labour market conditions deteriorate 
-particularly when they do so very abruptly- in 
order to make up for  the loss of  income that 
occurs when the main breadwinners are thrown 
out of  work or when their earnings fall. 
At the same time, long-term trends in the 
participation rate show that the labour supply has 
been expanding. At the regional level, this 
indicator (unweighted) has risen steadily since 
1990, although in some individual countries 
-Brazil, for  instance- the reverse has happened 
(see figure  VII-1).1 The main reason for  this 
has been the long-term increase seen in 
women's participation as urbanization has 
proceeded and levels of  education have 
improved, a trend that should not be confused 
with short-term fluctuations.  The need for 
1 The regional activity rate, weighted by the working-age population, remained relatively stable owing to the drop in Brazil's 
participation rate, and as of  the end of  1995, was just slightly higher than it was in 1990. 
Table VII-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OPEN URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Average  annual rates) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Latin America 6.2 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.3 7.1 
Argentina 2.6 7.5 6.5 7.0 9.6 11.5 17.5 
Bolivia b 7.3 5.8 5.4 5.8 3.1 3.6 
Brazil c 6.3 4.3 4.8 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.6 
Chile d 11.7 6.5 7.3 4.9 4.1 6.3 5.3 
Colombia e 10.0 10.5 10.2 10.2 8.6 8.9 8.9 
Costa Rica 6.0 5.4 6.0 4.3 4.0 4.3 5.7 
Ecuador f 6.1 8.5 8.9 8.9 7.8 7.7 
El Salvador 10.0 7.9 8.2 8.1 7.0 7.0 
Guatemala 8 2.2 6.5 6.4 5.7 5.5 5.2 4.3 
Honduras 7.8 7.4 6.0 7.1 4.0 4.6 
Mexico 4.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.7 6.3 
Nicaragua h 11.1 14.2 17.8 21.8 20.7 18.2 
Panama 1 9.9 20.0 19.3 17.5 15.6 16.0 16.2 
ParaguayJ 
Peru 
4.1 6.6 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.4 5.2 
7.1 8.3 5.9 9.4 9.9 8.8 7.1 
Uruguay 1 7.4 8.5 8.9 9.0 8.3 9.2 10.3 
Venezuela 6.6 11.0 10.1 8.1 6.8 8.9 10.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  Capital cities. c Metropolitan areas of  Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto 
Alegre, Salvador and Recife.  d Santiago metropolitan area. c Seven metropolitan areas. f  Includes hidden 
unemployment. 8 Nationwide total, official  estimates. 11 Nationwide total, official  estimates: from  1993 onward, 
nationwide urban rate, based on household surveys. g Metropolitan area. Includes hidden unemployment. ' Asunción 
metropolitan area: from  1994 onward, nationwide urban rate. Lima metropolitan area. 11980, Montevideo. 
productive job creation has therefore  increased 
as well. 
On the demand side, job creation in countries 
with high unemployment rates was constrained 
by a decline in economic activity. Where the 
recession hit hardest -Argentina and Mexico-
the demand for  labour weakened, which meant 
that the number of  employed persons as a 
percentage of  the working-age population also 
dropped in those countries. It is this trend, 
together with the increase in the participation 
rate, that explains the surge in unemployment in 
both countries (although the increase was far 
greater in Argentina than in Mexico) (see table 
VII-2). Elsewhere, a portion of  the additional 
workforce  found  employment, although it was 
often  in low-productivity, low-paid jobs. It was 
for  this reason that in Costa Rica, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, both the unemployment index and 
the ratio of  employed persons to the total 
working-age population rose at the same time. In 
these countries, the rise in the unemployment rate 
can be attributed to the fact  that the rate of  job 
creation was lower than the rate of  expansion of 
the labour supply. 
An analysis of  the structure of  unemployment 
provides a means of  determining how an 
economic crisis reduces the demand for  labour in 
different  branches of  activity. In cases where a 
crisis imposes severe constraints on domestic 
demand, the production of  non-tradable goods 
and services is usually the hardest hit. Indeed in 
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, for  example, 
unemployment in the construction sector rose 
significantly,  with Greater Buenos Aires 
recording an annual average of  34.9%. Argentina 
also experienced a rapid climb in unemployment 
in commerce (the result of  lower household 
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BOX VII-2 
THE INCREPE IN UNEMPLOYMENT IN ARGENTINA 
Despite a high rate of  GDP growth, unemployment in 
Argentina increased substantially between 1992 and 1994 
as a result of  the relentless expansion of  the labour supply 
and insufficient  job creation. On the one hand, with 
increasing numbers of  women entering the labour market, 
the participation rate climbed steadily from  the mid-1980s 
until May 1993, after  which it fell  back slightly and then 
levelled out at a quite high figure  during the period between 
the second half  of  1993 and the end of  1994. On the other 
hand, structural reforms  (changes in relative prices, 
technological and organizational innovations, public-sector 
downsizing) slowed the demand for  labour. Even so, the 
powerful  economic momentum of  the early 1990s 
continued to drive the employment Tate up until 1993; thus, 
employment and unemployment climbed in tandem during 
this period. In 1994, however, the generation of  new jobs 
faltered,  the employment rate dropped and, despite a lower 
participation rate, unemployment continued to increase. 
The sharp economic contraction of  1995 caused the 
demand for  labour to decline. Simultaneously ; supply (the 
participation rate) suddenly built up. One of  the most 
important reasons for  this was that; in the face  of  growing 
unemployment among heads of  household (which rose 
from  8.9% in October 1994 to 12.9% in May 1995), the 
secondary labour force  (mainly women) stepped up its rate 
of  entry into the labour market. Accordingly, the female 
participation rate went up from  31.2% to 35.1% during the 
same period. At times when the pace of  economic activity 
is slow, the search for  work on the part of  these new or 
sporadic entrants into the labour force  often  proves 
unsuccessful,  with the result that they swell the ranks of  the 
unemployed; thus, the female  Unemployment rate in 
Greater Buenos Aires stood at 24.5% in May 1995 
(compared with 15.7% in October 1994) while total 
unemployment was 20.2%. With prospects in the labour 
market looking less than promising, some peoplcopted out 
again, however, and as of  October 1995, the rate of  female 
participation had taken back once more (to 33.2%), as had 
unemployment (to 20.1% for  women and 17.4% overall). 
The upshot of  this was an increase in the percentage of 
women in the working population as the female 
employment iate (i.e., the number of  employed women as 
a percentage of  the female  population)climbed from  26.3% 
to 26.6% between October 1994 and October 1995, whereas 
the male rate went down from  49.7% to 47.3%, 
Apart from  the drop in the participation rate, a further 
factor  which helped to push the unemployment rate down 
towards the end of  the year was the fact  that a certain 
number of  jobs were actually created, although some of 
these were mere stopgaps, as shown by the higher rate of 
underemployment. Even so, the yearly average shows that 
employment slumped again, slipping to 36.6% of  the total 
population -the lowest level since 1983. In May 1996, the 
situation deteriorated once more and; although the 
participation rate dropped again, a net loss of  jobs caused 
unemployment to climb. 
consumption), domestic service (reflecting  the 
tight economic situation of  middle-income 
groups) and government service (due to 
restructuring and policies designed to restrain 
public spending). By contrast, the rise in 
unemployment in manufacturing  was less 
pronounced and was more a reflection  of  a 
longer-term trend towards retooling than a result 
of  the immediate crisis -although the crisis did 
hit this sector, too, provoking a variety of 
responses including, apart from  lay-offs,  a 
reduction of  working hours and the suspension 
of  overtime. The increase in the amount of  jobs 
that were involuntarily converted into part-time 
positions showed up in the figures  for  visible 
underemployment, which rose from  10.3% to 
12% in Argentina, while in Mexico the number 
of  employed persons working fewer  than 35 
hours per week went up from  18.4% to 19.6% of 
the economically active population. 
The interpretation of  developments in 1995 
should not, however, be confined  to the short 
term. During the early 1990s, a change had been 
observed in the relationship between GDP growth 
and unemployment (see figure  VII-2); thus 
during the period in question, the attainment of  a 
given level of  growth did not contribute, as it had 
in the past, to a reduction in unemployment, and 
the region's unemployment rate rose during the 
first  half  of  the decade even though its economic 
growth rate was far  higher than it had been during 
the 1980s. While this does not mean that there is 
no longer a connection between output growth 
and job creation, it does indicate that this 
relationship is changing. It may be inferred  from 
the da ta on r e g i o n a l e m p l o y m e n t and 
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Figure VII-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (12 COUNTRIES): TOTAL PARTICIPATION 
RATE (TPR) AND EMPLOYMENT RATE (ER) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Unweighted TPR + Weighted TPR * Unweighted ER * Weighted ER 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official  figures. 
Table VII-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS 
(Average  annual indexes:  1990=100) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Formal industrial 
employment 
Brazil 108.9 100.0 93.4 88.4 87.7 87.8 87.7 
Colombia c 111.6 100.0 101.2 102.4 103.8 101.2 98.2 
Costa Rica d 100.0 98.6 102.0 102.7 103.5 103.2 
Ecuadore 
Guatemala f 
100.0 101.1 97.6 96.2 89.7 84.8 
81.5 100.0 114.2 125.7 130.6 138.7 
Mexico 8 93.4 100.0 99.2 97.2 93.2 91.4 88.5 
Non-maquila 
industry 105.7 100.0 98.6 95.0 88.9 85.2 79.5 
Maquila 
industry 26.0 100.0 102.8 110.5 118.7 128.1 141.5 
Peru h 122.9 100.0 94.9 85.2 78.3 77.3 75.4 
Uruguay 1 94.5 100.0 94.6 85.8 74.6 61.3 54.8 





140.9 100.0 102.7 102.6 96.4 90.8 85.3 
Bolivia ' 100.0 121.8 135.7 136.1 148.2 157.6 
Chile m 74.6 100.0 103.0 108.9 118.7 114.8 114.3 
Colombia n 100.0 106.4 113.9 113.0 113.5 116.8 
Costa Rica 93.7 100.0 103.1 107.7 107.5 111.2 105.3 
Nicaragua 100.0 99.7 90.6 87.1 82.7 87.4 
Panama ° 79.4 100.0 101.3 117.3 125.5 133.1 134.9 
Venezuela 69.6 100.0 110.8 116.2 113.7 113.3 117.1 
Source: E C L A C , on the basis of  official  figures  and figures  supplied by the Institute of  Economics, University of  Costa Rica. 
a Preliminary figures.  The indexes of  formal  industrial employment reflect  the situation in large- and medium-scale 
enterprises, while those referring  to total industrial employment include small-scale and micro-enterprises, as well as 
own-account workers. ^ Manufacturing,  excluding coffee  processing. Industrial enterprises with 20 or more 
workers. c Industrial enterprises with 10 or more workers. f  Persons paying into the social security system; includes 
mining. 8 Total formal  industrial employment. h Industrial enterprises in metropolitan Lima with 100 or more workers. 
1 The figure  shown for  1980 actually refers  to 1982. ' Industrial enterprises with five  or more workers. k Up to 1990, 
refers  to formal  employment in manufacturing;  from  1991 onward, refers  to the total number of  persons employed in 
manufacturing  in Greater Buenos Aires as of  October of  each year. 1 Capital cities. 111 Metropolitan region. " Seven 
metropolitan areas, fourth-quarter  figures.  0 The figure  shown for  1980 actually refers  to 198Z 
unemployment that will be analysed below that 
this change has to do with the economic 
restructuring processes currently under way in a 
large number of  countries in the region, which 
has proved to be of  only limited effectiveness  in 
generating productive employment. 
3. Insufficient  job creation 
Few  jobs were created  in 1995, and 
these few  were concentrated  in less 
productive  activities  and low-level 
occupational  categories.  The  shortfall 
in productive  job creation  has thus 
become the mos t serious problem 
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Source: ECLAC, on the bas i s of  official  figures. 
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Figure VII-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET VARIATION IN EMPLOYMENT BY 
BRANCH OF ACTIVITY AND OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY 
(.Percentages) 
Branch of activity 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J? 
^ y ^ 
Job category 
^ ^ ^ ^ 




ft?  ..0 ,tf  . 6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official  figures. 
Note: Variations refer  to nationwide rates weighted by the working-age population. Figures in 
brackets indicate the number of countries for which information was available. 
In 1995, the average number of  employed 
persons in 12 countries of  the region (see figure 
VII-3), weighted by their working-age 
populations, went up by 1.6%. This means that, 
in a large number of  countries, not enough jobs 
were created, since the annual growth of  the 
working-age population at the regional level is 
reckoned to be 2.1% and the expansion of  the 
economically active population is put at 2.7%. 
As in previous years, net job creation was 
concentrated in the tertiary sector. 
Industrial employment declined even in 
absolute terms. Of  particular concern was the 
disappearance of  many jobs in industry in 
Argentina and Mexico due to a contraction of 
domestic demand for  manufactures  which could 
not be offset  by increasing exports. Industrial 
employment expanded in only a few  countries, 
such as Bolivia and Colombia; in Brazil, too, it 
increased slightly in annual average terms, but 
the rate dropped substantially towards the end of 
the year. 
In all countries for  which information  is available, 
medium-sized and large industrial concerns (i.e., 
formal  activities) shed jobs (see table VII-2). In this 
sector, only the maquila  industry held its ground 
as a net job creator in Mexico and a number of 
Central American and Caribbean countries, although 
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the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) appears to be causing maquila activities 
in the subregion to lose some momentum. 
According to the information  from  countries 
such as Brazil, Chile and Colombia, technological 
and organizational innovations in other major 
branches of  industry helped boost labour 
productivity significantly,  and the immediate effect 
of  this was to inhibit job creation.2 This trend was 
observed in a number of  countries throughout the 
first  half  of  the 1990s, although it was occasionally 
reversed by favourable  economic situations that 
led to a significant  upswing in hirings. At the 
beginning of  1996, information  on manufacturing 
in Argentina and Brazil pointed to a continuing 
decline in formal  industrial employment. 
Employment in the construction sector also 
declined sharply at the regional level, largely as 
a result of  the contraction in the Argentine and 
Mexican economies; however, employment in 
this sector was also down in countries such as 
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica and Uruguay, while 
in others -such as Chile and Panama- it 
improved only slightly. 
According to the information  provided by the 
small group of  countries that maintain annual 
records on rural employment, agricultural 
employment also contracted in absolute terms, 
thus indicating that the long-term downward 
trend in this sector has not abated. Nevertheless, 
as the existence of  land disputes in countries such 
as Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico and Paraguay demonstrates, in many 
parts of  the region agricultural work continues to 
play a key role in helping a large number of  rural 
families  to survive and in acting as a bulwark 
against poverty in rural areas. 
In tertiary activities, on the other hand, 
employment rose sharply. In commerce, hotels 
and restaurants, for  example, employment was 
up by between 2% and 3%, with very high rates 
in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. It 
was service activities, however, that recorded the 
biggest increases. Employment in community, 
social and personal services -the sector that 
already employs the greatest percentage of  the 
workforce  in a large number of  countries-
expanded considerably once more, with a 4% 
increase for  the region as a whole and particularly 
sharp upturns in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Mexico and Panama. 
Given the disparate nature of  employment in 
this subsector, this increase may reflect  the 
generation of  formal  -and generally highly 
productive- employment, as well as low-paid 
jobs. In Chile, for  example, wage-earners 
accounted for  approximately 50% of  the increase 
in employment in this branch, while the 
remaining 50% comprised own-account workers 
and service staff.  In a number of  Central 
American countries and in Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic, the expansion of  tourism 
continued, as in previous years, to generate 
formal  tertiary-sector employment in commerce, 
hotels and restaurants and in social and personal 
services. In many countries, however, the growth 
of  employment in community, social and 
personal services and in commerce has mainly 
been a reflection  of  growth in informal  activities; 
this was the case in Ecuador, for  example, where 
nearly 80% of  the increase in service 
employment was the result of  the expansion of 
the informal  sector (including domestic service). 
The steep climb in employment in finance, 
real estate and business services noted in a large 
number of  countries was due partly to the brisk 
activity to be seen in these sectors as the 
modernization of  the structure of  production 
proceeded and partly to the spreading practice 
among business enterprises of  subcontracting 
services from  specialized companies. This trend 
was also, on the other hand, a factor  in the decline 
in industrial employment. 
The countries' government services were not 
caught up in the momentum of  tertiary-sector 
employment, however. According to the 
information  available from  countries where 
separate records are kept for  this subsector, 
civil-service employment levels showed 
practically no change in absolute terms. Indeed, 
a number of  countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia and Costa Rica, recorded a decline in 
employment either in the civil service itself  or in 
the government sector as a whole. 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (12 COUNTRIES): CONTRIBUTION 
TO NET JOB CREATION, 1995 
(Percentages) 
Contribution of  each branch of  activity 
to non-agricultural employment 
Contribution of  each job category 
to total employment 
Total 1.7 Total 1.6 
Manufacturing -0.2 Wage-earners (including domestic service) 0.6 
Construction -0.3 Own-account workers 0.7 
Commerce, hotels and restaurants 0.5 Unpaid workers 0.1 
Community, social and personal 
services (including finance,  real 
estate and business services) 1.6 
Other 0.2 
Government service 0.0 
Other 0.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
Clearly, the real contribution of  each branch 
of  activity to net job creation depends not only 
on its relative growth but also on its relative 
weight in the structure of  employment. As can be 
seen from  table VII-3, it was the expansion of 
services, which exhibited a high growth rate in 
the region and had a considerable share in the 
composition of  employment, that accounted for 
much of  the net employment generated in 1995. 
Since the 1980s, the indications have been that 
formal  activities have only a limited job-creation 
capacity.3 In 1995, this assessment seems to have 
been confirmed  at the regional level by a further 
increase in the share of  the informal  sector 
(micro-enterprises and own-account work) in 
total employment. Although information  on 
recent changes in the relative size of  the informal 
sector is available for  only a few  countries, data 
on the generation of  employment that are 
broken down by occupational category show that 
this trend persists in, inter  alia,  Bolivia, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Panama. In the 
region as a whole, the number of  jobs created for 
wage-earners was negligible -around 0.9%-
although this figure  was heavily influenced  by 
Mexico's enormous job losses in this category 
(see figure  VII-3). However, even a simple 
average for  12 countries of  the region shows only 
2% growth in wage-based employment, with 
rates of  2% or more being recorded by Brazil, 
Colombia, El Salvador and Panama, among 
others. By contrast, own-account work expanded 
at an average rate of  more than 3%, with highs 
of  over 5% in Bolivia, Costa Rica and Mexico; 
meanwhile, in another typical informal-sector 
category -unpaid family  labour- employment 
rose by a weighted rate of  more than 2% and an 
unweighted rate of  over 6%, which testifies  to the 
3 Between 1990 and 1994, the share of  the formal  sector (medium-sized and large enterprises, the public sector, administrative 
personnel, and own-account professional  and technical workers) in non-agricultural employment at the regional level shrank from 
47.9% to 44.3% (ILO, Panorama laboral  '95,  No. 2, Lima, ILO Regional Office  for  Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995). 
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BOX VII-3 
RELATIVE INCOMES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The incomes of  persons employed in micro-enterprises and of  own-account workers are generally far  below average. The 
average earnings of  own-account workers, who are a very diverse group, are higher than those of  wage-earners employed in 
micro-enterprises. 
AVERAGE INCOMES OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE 
POPULATION, BY JOB CATEGORY 
early 1990s (figures  given in multiples of  (be relevant per capita 












BOLIVIA, 1992 4.3 2.8 3.2 
BRAZIL, 1990 4.4 2.8 3.3 
CHILE, 1992 2.8 4.5 
COSTARICA, 1992 5.1 3.1 3.9 
HONDURAS, 1992 3.5 1.4 1.6 
MEXICO, 1992 4.7 2.4 3.3 
PANAMA, 1991 5.0 3.0 2.3 
PARAGUAY, 1992 
(Asunción) 3.6 2.1 3.1 
URUGUAY, 1992 4.6 2.8 3.3 
VENEZUELA, 1992 4.8 2.5 5.1 
Source: ECLAC, Social  Panorama of  Latin  America, 1995 (LC/G.1886-P), table 4, Santiago, Chile. 
Note: This source also provides detailed information  on other occupational categories. 
relatively rapid advance of  this sector in a 
number of  smaller countries.4 
An analysis of  the relative weight of  the 
different  occupational categories shows that the 
expansion of  own-account work contributed 
0.7% to the increase in overall employment, 
while waged-based employment (including 
domestic service) contributed 0.6%, and the 
remaining two categories together contributed 
0.3% (see table VII-3). 
In addition, in 1995 the trend in many 
countries still seemed to be for  waged-based 
employment to become more and more 
concentrated in small businesses and 
micro-enterprises as well as to become less and 
less secure. In Brazil, for  example, the number of 
wage-earners not covered by employment 
contracts, measured as a proportion of  total 
wage-earners, continued to rise, climbing from 
34.3% in 1994 to 34.7% in 1995 (five  points 
higher than it was in 1991). In Mexico, the share 
of  total employment accounted for  by 
establishments employing fewer  than five 
workers (excluding own-account and unpaid 
workers) grew from  20.5% to 20.9%. This means 
that the categories of  lower average productivity 
The rapid expansion of  the category "Other occupational categories" on the weighted scale reflects  the growth in the number 
of  employers in Brazil and Mexico, most of  whom, in all likelihood were micro-entrepreneurs. 
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-wage-earners employed in small businesses and 
micro-enterprises, and own-account and unpaid 
workers- are expanding. 
Owing to this increase in informal-sector 
employment, the employment rate continued to 
rise in many cases, as can be seen from  its 
non-weighted levels in 12 countries (see figure 
Vn-2). However, with a number of  the biggest 
countries in the region exhibiting a low 
job-creation capacity, the weighted rate has been 
falling,  with the result that in 1995 it was well 
below its 1990 level. 
4. Mixed wage trends 
After  three years ofrising  wages in nearly 
all  the countries  of  the region,  trends 
in 1995 were less favourable.  Like 
unemployment  rates,  however, real 
wage indexes  behaved in widely 
differing  ways. 
In the five  countries that recorded rather sharp 
rises in unemployment, real wages were down in 
absolute terms, which underlined the difficult 
conditions existing in their labour markets (see 
table VII-4). In Mexico, where wages in 
manufacturing  had risen steadily since the end of 
the 1980s, real wage levels dropped particularly 
steeply -by 14%- in 1995, thus slipping below 
the levels achieved in 1992 and in the early 
1980s. In Venezuela, real wages fell 
considerably for  the third year in a row. Wage 
erosion was not as great in Argentina, Costa Rica 
or Uruguay, although in many cases workers' 
real earnings fell  by more than their wages did 
owing to measures such as the suspension of 
overtime and temporary lay-offs.  Moreover, in 
Argentina's case, there was an even steeper 
reduction in pay for  many high-level employees 
in both the public and private sectors. In Peru, 
despite strong GDP growth and a fall  in 
unemployment, real wages also declined, after 
having increased significantly  increase in 1994. 
By contrast, wages moved upward in absolute 
terms in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay; 
indeed they rose so rapidly that in some cases 
they regained lost ground. In Brazil, wages in the 
less formal  categories (non-contract 
wage-earners, own-account workers) which had 
fallen  considerably at the beginning of  the 1990s, 
also rose markedly. 
The real minimum wage also fell  in a number 
of  countries, and once again the decline was most 
pronounced in some of  the countries whose 
labour markets had performed  poorly in general; 
thus, in Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, for 
example, the decrease was very steep (see table 
VII-5). In the majority of  countries for  which 
information  is available, real minimum wages 
were lower than they had been in 1980. In fact, 
only in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and 
Paraguay were they higher. In six countries, the 
minimum wage went up in real terms in 1995, 
with the highest rises occurring in Ecuador, 
Brazil and Chile; in others, wage policy was 
aimed at holding minimum wages steady at 
existing levels. 
Generally speaking, the wages of  large 
segments of  the working population in the region 
are not high enough to guarantee households an 
income above the poverty line. In addition to 
unemployment, then, low wages continue to be 
an important cause of  poverty. The situation is 
extremely serious, particularly in the rural areas 
of  many countries, and it is safe  to say that in 
1995 the combination of  higher unemployment 
rates and declining real wages that was seen in 
1995 has probably had a deleterious effect  on 
levels of  well-being in a large number of 
households in the region. By contrast, the 
recovery of  wages that took place in Brazil, 
particularly in the lowest-paid occupational 
categories, contributed to an improvement in 
income distribution, thus confirming  that, justas 
high inflation  inhibits the achievement of 
greater social equity, so quelling inflation 
encourages it. 
5 See, for  example, ECLAC, Social  panorama of  LatinAmcrica,  1995 (LC/G.1886-P), Santiago, Chile. 
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Table VIM 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL AVERAGE WAGES 
(Average  annual indexes:  1990 = 100) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995' 
Argentina b 130.0 100.0 101.3 102.7 101.0 102.0 100.8 
Bolivia 0 100.0 93.4 97.1 103.6 111.8 112.6 
Brazil d 
Rio de Janeiro 94.0 100.0 79.3 79.5 85.7 87.1 91.8 
São Paulo 88.6 100.0 88.3 85.3 94.6 98.0 102.0 
Chile e 95.4 100.0 104.9 109.6 113.5 118.8 123.6 
Colombia f 85.0 100.0 97.4 98.6 103.2 104.1 105.5 
Costa Rica 8 115.8 100.0 95.4 99.3 109.5 113.6 111.4 
Ecuador h 100.0 104.6 113.5 127.8 139.2 153.0 
Guatemala 8 142.5 100.0 93.6 107.6 115.2 122.9 
Mexico 1 128.3 100.0 106.5 114.3 124.5 129.1 111.5 
Nicaragua3 477.6 100.0 103.2 103.2 118.8 128.6 133.4 
Panama k 96.2 100.0 103.8 106.2 106.1 
Paraguay 1 102.1 100.0 104.7 103.6 104.5 106.1 114.2 
Peru m 309.3 100.0 115.2 111.1 110.2 127.4 116.7 
Uruguay 108.5 100.0 103.8 106.1 111.2 112.2 109.0 
Venezuela n 100.0 94.2 98.8 90.1 75.9 65.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  Manufacturing.  c Private sector in La Paz. Workers covered by social and labour 
legislation. e Up to April 1993, wage-earners in sectors other than agriculture. From May 1993 onward, general 
index of  hourly pay. Manual workers in manufacturing.  g Average earnings reported by persons enrolled in the 
social security system. h Enterprises with 10 workers or more in mining, manufacturing,  commerce andservices activities. 
' Manufacturing.  ' Average wages, not counting payment in kind and other benefits.  k Manufacturing  in Panama City, 
estimated figures.  ' Asunción. m Private-sector manual workers in metropolitan Lima. " Urban non-manual and 
manual workers, as of  the second half  of  each year. 
5. Employment trends in 1996 
During1996,  the regional  unemployment 
rate has tended  downwards  slightly,  but 
in a large  number of  countries,  the rate 
of  productive  job creation  is still  too low. 
Based on data from  the end of  1995 for 
Argentina and the beginning of  19% for  Mexico, 
the annual average rate of  open unemployment 
for  1996 is expected to go down in those 
countries where it rose most sharply during 1995. 
Against a background of  moderate growth and 
given the severely limited capacity of 
high-productivity sectors to generate productive 
employment, however, such improvement as 
there is will probably be due mainly to a 
contraction of  the labour supply and the creation 
of  "subsistence-level work" in the informal 
sector, although a more intensive use of  installed 
capacity may also play some role in helping to 
reduce unemployment. 
For other big countries in the region, such as 
Brazil and Colombia, initial data for  19% point 
to a continuation of  the rise in unemployment that 
overshadowed the second half  of  1995. Thus the 
regional outlook once again includes mixed 
trends in unemployment, with a high average rate 
and shortfalls  in terms of  productive job creation 
throughout much of  the region. 
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Table VII-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL URBAN MINIMUM WAGE 
(.Average  annual indexes:  1990 = 100) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Argentina 465.9 100.0 259.1 203.7 263.7 363.9 352.0 
Bolivia 100.0 165.6 164.8 181.2 199.9 196.3 
Brazil 138.4 100.0 112.8 102.5 113.0 108.0 113.9 
Chile 114.4 100.0 109.3 114.3 120.0 124.4 130.0 
Colombia 93.1 100.0 96.7 95.0 97.6 96.0 95.6 
Costa Rica 82.7 100.0 92.8 92.5 92.7 93.6 91.0 
Ecuador 288.3 100.0 87.0 87.1 100.0 115.9 137.4 
El Salvador 287.2 100.0 103.1 104.6 104.6 102.7 103.1 
Guatemala 207.5 100.0 80.7 72.5 62.8 55.5 50.7 
Haiti 136.2 100.0 84.6 74.2 60.0 43.3 81.8 
Honduras 117.6 100.0 96.6 108.7 110.2 94.8 89.6 
Mexico c 252.9 100.0 95.8 90.9 89.4 89.6 76.9 
Panama 100.8 100.0 98.9 97.4 108.8 107.3 106.6 
Paraguay 76.4 100.0 95.6 87.1 83.8 86.0 87.4 
Peru e 428.0 100.0 68.0 68.0 47.8 61.9 63.3 
Dominican 
Republic 131.7 100.0 97.0 118.0 112.1 119.1 120.2 
Uruguay 
Venezuela f 
145.0 100.0 89.6 87.4 75.8 67.3 62.0 
209.1 100.0 86.5 123.3 108.0 121.0 113.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the bas^s of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  Minimum living wage, including supplementary allowances. c Minimum wage, deflated  by the 
consumer price index for  Mexico City. Minimum wage in Asunción. e Minimum wage in the Lima metropolitan area 
for  non-agricultural activities. Nationwide minimum wage for  non-agricultural activities; from  1992 onward, includes meal 
and transport allowances. 
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Vin. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
1. Foreign trade in Latin America 
The  trade  deficit  in goods  and services in 
Latin  America and the Caribbean 
narrowed  by US$  16 billion  in 1995. The 
merchandise  trade  balance,  in particular, 
changed  direction,  moving from  a deficit 
of  nearly  US$  14 billion  to a surplus 
approaching US$  2 billion.  This  was due 
primarily  to a dramatic  expansion in 
exports  from  the region (21%)  -the 
biggest  increase since 1980, and one 
which took exports  to a total  of  US$  222 
billion-  and to a slowdown  in the rate of 
increase in the value of  imports,  which, 
had risen quite  rapidly  since the 
beginning  of  the 1990s. 
Four main factors  played a part in this result, 
although their effects  were counteracting. The 
decisive factor  was the contraction of  voluntary 
external financing  caused by the financial  crisis 
in Mexico, which, while it created problems in 
both Mexico and Argentina and triggered a 
massive cutback in imports, also made it possible 
for  both countries to expand their exports 
appreciably. Secondly, trends in international 
commodity prices, which rose more than import 
prices, also made an important contribution to the 
improvement of  the region's external accounts. 
Thirdly, intraregional trade continued to expand 
briskly, as it has done since the beginning of  the 
decade. Lastly, counteracting the other trends, 
Brazil's export volume shrank, while its level of 
imports soared in response to the explosion of 
domestic demand set off  by the successful 
implementation of  the Real  Plan. 
a) The volume of  foreign  trade 
In 1995, the volume of  the region's foreign 
trade in goods and services again grew much 
faster  than its gross domestic product (GDP), a 
sign that the regional economy is indeed opening 
up and that Latin America and the Caribbean are 
playing their part in the increasing globalization 
of  the world economy. 
In recent years, the growth of  foreign  trade has 
rested chiefly  on the dynamism of  imports, but in 
1995 imports slowed throughout the region and 
lost their leading role. The total volume of 
imports of  goods and services in the region 
increased by little more than 4%, as against 
nearly 13% in 1994. Consequently, the ratio of 
imports to regional GDP (21%) rose more slowly 
than it had since the late 1980s (in 1990 it was 
only 14%). Export performance,  on the other 
hand, improved; exports grew by 12%, further 
enhancing their steadily expanding share in GDP, 
which hitherto this decade had lagged behind the 
ratio of  imports to GDP. In 1995, exports 
accounted for  20% of  GDP, compared with 16% 
in 1990 and 10% in 1980. 
Because of  the preponderance of  merchandise 
trade within total trade, the pattern observed in 
both was similar: imports increased by 5% and 
exports by 10% (see table VIII-1). These 
aggregate results were heavily influenced  by the 
sudden drop in external capital flows  that 
affected  Mexico and Argentina and, indirectly, 
Uruguay. The extraordinary readjustment that 
these countries were forced  to make caused a 
marked rise in exports and a sharp cutback in 
imports. The situation in Argentina in turn 
adversely effected  economic activity in Uruguay, 
and imports faltered  there as well. 
Aside from  these three countries, trends in 
most of  the remainder were the same as they had 
been throughout the 1990s, that is, imports 
expanded faster  than exports. Brazil, one of  the 
two biggest economies in the region -the other 
being Mexico- provided an extreme example. 
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Table VIII-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN : VARIATION IN 
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODSa 
(Growth  rates) 
Exports Imports 
Value Volume Unit value Value Volume 
Unit 
value 
1985 -5.3 2.4 -7.5 0.9 1.6 -0.7 
1986 -14.2 0.4 -14.5 2.6 5.6 -2.9 
1987 14.9 7.1 7.2 13.5 8.5 4.6 
1988 16.1 7.6 7.9 16.3 9.6 6.2 
1989 11.0 4.5 6.1 8.6 4.9 3.4 
1990 10.1 5.1 4.8 12.9 9.4 3.3 
1991 0.6 4.7 -3.9 17.8 20.8 -2.5 
1992 6.6 6.3 0.3 22.2 22.4 -0.3 
1993 7.9 8.6 -0.7 9.7 8.8 0.9 
1994. 16.1 8.9 6.6 18.8 14.6 3.6 
1995 b 21.3 10.4 9.9 11.8 4.3 7.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Covers 17 Spanish-speaking countries plus Brazil and Haiti. b Preliminary figures. 
The success of  its Real  Plan induced an abrupt 
expansion of  domestic demand, which drove 
imports up and depressed exports, 
i) Merchandise  exports 
Differing  trends in the volume of  merchandise 
exports were observable in the countries of  the 
region. Two groups, in particular, stand out for 
their very dissimilar performances.  Argentina, 
Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti 
and Nicaragua recorded double-digit growth 
rates in exports of  goods, whereas for  Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Panama and the Dominican 
Republic, growth was negative or close to zero 
(see table VHI-2). 
These disparities can be explained by 
different  combinations of  the factors  of  domestic 
and external supply and demand for  goods in 
each country. Domestic demand was the major 
factor,  for  example, in Argentina, Mexico and 
Brazil, all of  which are large exporters of 
manufactures.  In the case of  Argentina and 
Mexico, the recession due to the abrupt drop in 
capita] inflows  pushed exports up (and in Mexico 
this expansion was further  fuelled  by the sharp 
currency depreciation); while in Brazil domestic 
demand crowded exports out as the exchange rate 
appreciated. External demand affected  the 
countries of  the region in different  ways, 
depending on where their principal markets lay. 
The countries with double-digit growth in 
export volume were those that were able to take 
advantage of  the opportunities created by the 
more dynamic economies in Latin America and 
other regions and favourable  trends in 
international commodity markets. Analysis of 
the performance  of  selected countries shows that 
Argentina, for  example, benefited  from  the 
strong demand for  manufactures  in Brazil, whose 
economic situation in some ways complemented 
Argentina's own. Meanwhile, the main boost to 
Mexico's export trade, thanks to the devaluation 
of  the peso and the new opportunities opened up 
by the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), came from  an increase in sales to the 
United States large enough to reverse its 
traditional trade deficit  with its neighbour. El 
Salvador reaped the benefit  of  the sizeable 
expansion of  intraregional trade within the 
Central American Common Market (CACM). By 
contrast, Paraguay and Uruguay were affected  by 
the contraction in demand in Argentina, while 
Panamanian exports from  the Colón Free Zone 
were hit by the drop in demand in Mexico and 
other Latin American markets. 
Generally speaking, countries with 
fast-expanding  export sectors sold in increasing 
proportions to other Latin American countries, 
and the most vigorous markets for  intraregional 
102 
Table Vm-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF GOODS FOB 
(Growth  rates) 
Value Unit value Volume 
1993 1994 1995a 1993 1994 1995a 1993 1994 1995a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 7.9 16.1 21.3 -0.7 6.6 9.9 8.6 8.9 10.4 
Argentina 7.2 20.8 32.4 1.9 1.9 10.1 5.2 18.5 20.3 
Bolivia b 11.3 38.8 5.7 6.6 15.6 0.5 4.4 20.1 5.2 
Brazil 10.7 11.3 5.5 -2.7 6.5 7.9 13.8 4.5 -2.31 
Chile -8.1 26.1 38.2 -8.9 12.6 23.9 0.9 12.0 11.5 
Colombia 2.3 17.9 18.7 -4.5 15.1 16.0 7.1 2.4 2.4 
Costa Rica 7.3 12.6 30.8 1.2 8.0 14.0 6.1 4.3 14.7 
Ecuador 1.8 25.5 13.4 -3.0 13.5 5.9 4.9 10.6 7.0 
El Salvador b 22.3 71.2 32.6 -9.2 29.7 15.1 34.7 32.0 15.3' 
Guatemala 6.2 13.7 28.3 -6.0 8.0 16.5 13.0 5.3 10.2 
Haiti 7.9 -29.7 166.6 0.3 6.0 10.0 7.6 -33.6 142.2 
Honduras b 1.6 7.6 26.6 3.6 21.6 10.1 -1.9 -11.5 15.0 
Mexico 12.3 17.3 30.6 6.2 4.9 5.0 5.8 11.8 24.4 
Nicaragua 19.7 31.5 50.6 14.9 18.1 17.0 4.2 11.4 28.7 
Panama 6.1 10.8 0.9 0.0 1.1 2.1 6.1 9.6 -1.1 
Paraguay 42.3 18.7 12.1 -6.6 8.3 7.0 52.3 9.6 4.8 
Peru -0.6 29.6 22.3 -4.0 10.1 12.7 3.6 17.7 8.6 
Dominican 
Republic -9.2 26.0 15.4 -3.0 8.0 14.5 -6.3 16.6 0.8 
Uruguay -3.9 10.5 10.6 -3.5 7.4 10.8 -0.4 2.9 -0.2 
Venezuela 4.1 7.5 16.3 -7.2 1.5 10.5 12.1 5.9 5.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Preliminary figures.  b The indexes and rates given for  unit value and volume are derived from  national accounts. 
exports were to be found  in Brazil, Peru, Chile 
and Venezuela. Chile and Venezuela also figure, 
along with Argentina and Mexico, among those 
whose own exports within the region expanded 
most. Being above all a commodity exporter, 
however, Latin America as a whole was not able 
to take full  advantage of  the substantial growth 
in imports by the Asian region, and it was 
manufactures  that made the biggest contribution 
to the surge in exports, 
ii) Merchandise  imports 
Except in Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay, 
imports expanded to a greater or lesser extent 
in almost all the countries of  the region in 
response to the growth of  domestic demand, 
which was itself  usually dependent on activity 
levels (see table VIII-3). The expansion of 
imports was particularly striking in Brazil, 
Peru, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala and 
Chile, and also Haiti, while the extraordinary 
import drive observed in Colombia in recent 
years drew to an end. Significant  in these 
developments were changes in real exchange 
rates, which appeared to exert more influence 
on import trends than on export trends. In 
nearly all the countries it was noticeable that 
imports expanded when the local currency 
appreciated and contracted when it depreciated 
(see figure  VIII-2). The former  situation was 
more common, showing how important the 
fight  against inflation  has been; countries 
where this occurred included Brazil, Chile, 
Guatemala and Venezuela . Currency 
depreciation and import contraction occurred 
in Nicaragua and Paraguay, in addition to 
Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay. 
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Table VIII-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN : IMPORTS OF GOODS FOB 
(Growth  rates) 
Value Unit value Volume 
1993 1994 1995a 1993 1994 1995a 1993 1994 1995 a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 9.7 18.8 11.8 0.9 3.6 7.2 8.8 14.6 4.3 
Argentina 13.6 29.2 -6.7 1.5 3.0 8.9 11.9 25.4 -14.4 
Bolivia b 10.8 -0.4 14.1 9.1 -1.1 0.8 1.5 0.7 13.2b 
Brazil 23.1 31.4 49.4 -3.6 3.3 13.7 27.7 27.2 31.4 
Chile 10.2 6.9 34.7 -2.2 3.5 9.4 12.7 3.2 23.1 
Colombia 50.7 21.5 17.0 -1.2 0.5 9.6 52.6 20.9 6.8 
Costa Rica 18.8 6.2 5.9 2.4 3.7 9.0 16.1 2.4 -2.8 
Ecuador 18.8 32.7 24.8 3.9 6.0 9.0 14.3 25.1 14.5 
El Salvador b 13.2 36.3 31.5 -7.7 17.2 8.1 22.7 16.3 21.6b 
Guatemala 2.4 6.8 19.1 -0.1 -1.1 7.6 2.5 8.0 10.7 
Haiti 24.5 -47.0 339.1 -0.8 2.9 6.5 25.5 -48.5 312.1 
Honduras b -4.7 12.3 12.3 -9.2 8.8 15.3 4.9 3.2 -2.6 
Mexico 5.2 21.4 -8.7 5.8 5.0 6.0 -0.6 15.7 -13.8 
Nicaragua -14.5 19.0 8.6 -0.7 2.1 7.1 -13.8 16.6 1.4 
Panama 4.8 9.7 6.8 0.6 3.4 5.6 4.2 6.0 1.1 
Paraguay 40.8 29.0 4.8 1.0 -0.4 6.0 39.4 29.6 -1.1 
Peru -1.0 37.7 37.9 -1.0 8.1 8.7 0.0 27.4 26.9 
Dominican 
Republic -2.6 7.4 4.4 -1.2 2.5 3.0 -1.4 4.8 1.3 
Uruguay 10.1 22.7 3.2 1.7 1.0 9.0 8.3 21.5 -5.3 
Venezuela -10.7 -28.7 41.9 -0.5 0.5 9.0 -10.2 -29.1 30.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Preliminary figures.  b The indexes and rates given for  unit value and volume are derived from  national accounts. 
b) Foreign trade and foreign  exchange 
earnings 
Higher growth in export volume than in 
import volume was accompanied by a 
generalized improvement in the terms of  trade, 
as export prices also rose more than import prices 
(see table VIII-5). As a result, there was a 
significant  change in the regional merchandise 
trade balance, which swung from  a deficit  in 
excess of  US$ 13.5 billion in 1994 to a modest 
surplus of  US$ 1.6 billion in 1995 (see table 
VIII-17). At the same time, the trade deficit  in 
goods and services narrowed dramatically from 
around US$ 25.7 billion to US$ 9.35 billion. 
i) International  prices 
Higher commodity prices were a decisive 
factor  in the improvement in the real terms of 
trade, for  commodities form  the bulk of  exports 
from  most Latin American countries, with the 
exception of  Mexico and Brazil. This favourable 
trend was mainly due to the steady pace of 
worldwide economic activity (which had begun 
to grow again and expanded at a rate of  2.4%, 
after  a period of  virtually no growth between 
1991 and 1993) (United Nations, 1996), and to 
the depreciation of  the United States dollar 
against a number of  the major currencies (it lost 
between 8% and 9% of  its value against the yen 
and the European ECU). 
The combination of  strong demand, more 
vigorous activity and -most notably in Japan-
appreciating exchange rates, led to an expansion 
of  world trade that far  outstripped output growth, 
and to a substantial rise in most primary 
commodity prices due to inelasticity of  demand. 
Commodity prices, which had begun to rise in 
the second half  of  1993, peaked in the first 
quarter of  1995, after  which they began to fall 
back once more as a result of  the restrictive 
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Table VIII-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRICES OF MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS 
(Annual  average prices) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Soya bean oil b 598.3 447.3 453.8 429.0 480.4 615.6 625.2 
Sugar0 28.7 12.6 9.0 9.1 10.0 12.0 13.3 
Bananas 0 17.0 23.6 25.6 21.5 20.0 19.9 19.9 
Cocoa c 118.1 57.7 54.2 49.8 50.7 63.3 65.0 
Coffee  1 c 178.8 96.5 89.9 68.2 75.8 157.3 158.3 
Coffee  2 c 208.8 82.8 72.9 56.5 66.7 143.2 145.9 
Beef0 125.9 115.4 120.8 111.4 118.7 105.8 86.5 
Bovine leather 0 104.6 108.3 65.6 63.5 81.2 106.8 111.0 
Fishmealb 504.4 412.5 477.8 481.5 364.7 376.3 495.0 
Shrimp 0 4.6 4.9 5.3 4.9 5.2 5.9 6.1 
Maize b 210.3 127.1 126.3 120.0 120.4 125.2 144.6 
Soybeans b 296.3 246.9 239.6 235.5 255.1 251.8 259.3 
Wheatb 175.9 136.8 129.0 150.5 141.9 150.9 178.8 
Cotton0 94.2 81.1 77.1 61.8 62.2 82.2 98.3 
Wool 0 194.5 167.3 119.0 123.2 115.8 144.7 172.4 
Tobacco 0 142.6 178.4 186.5 185.0 183.4 122.9 119.9 
Aluminium 0 78.4 74.4 59.1 56.9 51.7 67.0 81.9 
Copper0 
Tin 
98.6 120.7 106.1 103.5 86.7 104.6 133.1 
761.4 281.1 253.7 276.6 234.0 247.7 281.8 
Iron ore b 27.2 30.8 33.3 31.6 28.1 25.5 27.0 
Lead 0 41.1 36.8 25.3 24.6 18.5 24.8 28.6 
Zinc0 34.6 68.9 50.7 56.3 43.7 45.3 46.8 
Crude o i l d 27.6 20.0 17.1 16.6 14.7 14.6 15.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the United Nations Conference  on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Note: Soya bean oil, all sources, f.o.b.  Rotterdam. Unrefined  sugar, f.o.b.  Caribbean ports, for  export to the open market. Central 
American and Ecuadorian bananas, f.o.b.  United States ports. Cocoa beans, average of  daily prices (futures),  New York 
and London. Coffee  1, Colombia, mild arabica, ex-dock New York. Coffee  2, Brazil and other arabicas, ex-dock New York. 
Beef,  frozen  and de-boned, all sources, United States ports. Bovine leather, United Kingdom, average import prices. 
Fishmeal, all sources, 64%-65% protein, c.i.f.  Hamburg. Shrimp, price in United States. Maize, United States, No. 3, 
yellow, c.i.f.  Rotterdam. Soybeans, United States, No. 2, yellow, in bulk, c.i.f.  Rotterdam. Wheat, f.o.b.  United States, 
No. 2, Hard Red Winter. Cotton, United States M1 -3/32", c.i.f.  Northern Europe. Wool, clean, combed, 48"s quality, United 
Kingdom. Tobacco, United States, all markets. Aluminium, copper, tin, lead and zinc, spot prices on the London Metal 
Exchange. Iron ore, Brazil to Europe, C. 64.5% Fe, f.o.b.  Oil, Venezuela, Tía Juana, light. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Dollars per metric ton. 0 US cents per pound. d Dollars per barrel. 
monetary policies that developed countries were 
implementing to deal with the threat of  inflation. 
Even so, average dollar prices for  most goods 
were higher in 1995 than in 1994. The strength 
of  demand was of  most benefit  to industrial raw 
materials, such as cotton and minerals and metals, 
prices for  which improved by an average of  20%. 
Copper and nickel prices went up by around 30%, 
while , among other products of  regional 
importance, sugar prices rose by 10% and wheat 
by nearly 20%. Oil price rises were smaller (8%). 
There were a number of  important exceptions 
to the upward trend; international beef  prices 
slumped by 18%, and the annual average prices 
of  soybeans, bananas, coffee  and precious metals 
remained virtually unchanged. Coffee  prices 
tumbled in the second half  of  1995, after  having 
more than doubled the year before.  With a view 
to halting the price slide, the major Latin 
American, Asian and African  coffee-exporting 
countries reached a new agreement to hold back 
coffee  from  the market. 
Meanwhile, the fact  that developed countries 
had prioritized the control of  inflation  in their 
economic policies meant that their recovery 
during 1994 and 1995 was accompanied by the 
105 
Table VIII-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE IN GOODS FOB/FOB 
(Indexes:  1990 = 100) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 1995a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 129 100 99 99 98 100 103 
Argentina 154 100 102 109 109 108 109 
Bolivia b 134 100 98 81 79 93 93 
Brazil 120 100 105 104 105 108 102 
Chile 124 100 102 101 94 103 116 
Colombia 116 100 107 109 105 120 127 
Costa Rica 104 100 104 106 105 109 114 
Ecuador 166 100 90 88 83 88 86 
El Salvador b 108 100 99 99 97 107 114 
Guatemala 113 100 104 104 98 107 116 
Haiti 170 100 84 80 81 83 86 
Honduras b 107 100 105 99 113 126 121 
Mexico 150 100 101 106 106 106 105 
Nicaragua 145 100 93 68 79 91 99 
Panama 107 100 98 98 98 95 92 
Paraguay 91 100 99 99 91 99 100 
Peru 139 100 96 95 92 94 97 
Dominican Republic 183 100 109 102 100 106 118 
Uruguay 84 100 100 103 98 104 106 
Venezuela 165 100 83 79 74 75 76 
Source: ECLAC. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Indexes derived from  national accounts. 
lowest inflation  rates since the 1960s. This had 
the effect  of  tempering price rises in the region's 
imports from  these countries - largely 
manufactures.  Average inflation  in developed 
countries, which had fallen  during the early 
1990s and stood at 2.3% in 1994, remained low 
(2.4%) in 1995. 
The unit values in the merchandise trade of 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
reflected  international price trends in line with 
each country's specific  product mix and terms of 
sale, the two factors  that determine the 
correlation between unit values and spot-market 
prices. In export terms the country that benefited 
most was Chile, where the average unit value of 
exports went up by nearly one quarter, boosted 
primarily by the surge in copper, cellulose and 
fishmeal  prices. Elsewhere in South America, 
unit values in Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela went up by more than 10%, while 
increases in Central America varied between 
10% and 17%, since coffee  sales, in particular, 
had been contracted at prices prevailing before 
the shift  in trend. Generally speaking, the rise in 
the unit values of  imports, more similar in kind, 
was somewhere between 7% and 10%. As a 
result, the terms of  trade improved in all the 
countries with the exception of  Brazil, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Honduras, Mexico and 
Panama, where they remained unchanged or 
deteriorated slightly. 
ii) The  value of  trade 
The favourable  trend in international prices 
was thus the determining factor  in increasing the 
region's earnings from  exports of  goods. The 
most notable of  the few  exceptions to this rule 
were Argentina and Mexico, which experienced 
not only favourable  trends but also a strong 
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growth in export volumes. The value of  exports 
thus rose in all the countries, and in most cases 
the rise was substantia] (see table VIII-3). Only 
in Panama was growth less than 1%, while in 
Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay it approached 6%. 
In the majority of  the remaining countries, the 
value of  exports went up by between 10% and 
30%; and the increase was even greater in 
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico and 
Nicaragua, for  example -and indeed in Haiti, 
where trade made an exceptional recovery after 
several years of  political upheaval, a trade 
embargo and economic chaos. 
Thus in 1995 the region's overall earnings 
from  merchandise exports were US$ 222 billion, 
21% more than in 1994 (see table VIII-6). This 
outcome marked a new stage on the upward path 
that export earnings have followed  since the 
beginning of  the decade. It was the biggest 
increase since 1980 and, in terms of  recent 
decades, it was second only to the surge in 
income occasioned by soaring oil prices in the 
1970s. Justas those episodes were the product of 
events in the oil-producing countries, so the 
trigger in 1995 was the crisis that engulfed 
Mexico and Argentina, the two countries that 
were ultimately responsible for  60% of  this 
increase in earnings. 
At the same time, the only countries whose 
import spending went down despite price rises of 
nearly 10%, were Argentina and Mexico. The 
other countries' import bills grew, although in 
nearly half  the cases more of  the increase was 
spent on covering price rises than on purchasing 
larger volumes, when greater quantities were in 
fact  purchased (see table VIII-4). Apart from 
Haiti, the biggest spender was Brazil, whose 
imports increased in value by 50%. The value of 
imports to Chile, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador and 
Venezuela rose by between 25% to 40%, an 
increase shared, except in Ecuador, among all 
categories of  goods (consumer, intermediate and 
capital). A further  five  countries recorded rises in 
excess of  10%. 
iii) Foreign  trade  markets 
According to preliminary estimates by the 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), 
intraregional trade continued to grow, as it has 
since the beginning of  the 1990s. Between 1990 
and 1994, the value of  intraregional exports 
nearly tripled and their share in total Latin 
American exports increased from  11% to 17%. 
In 1995, exports to other LAIA countries grew by 
24%, further  expanding their share of  total. 
Exports between countries in the Andean Group 
increased by 26%, in MERCOSUR by 20% and in 
the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
by 25%: these rates were higher than the rate of 
growth in trade between each of  these groups and 
the rest of  the world (see table VIII-6). 
iv) The  balance of  trade  in goods  and services 
The above trends were reflected  in various 
ways in the merchandise trade balance in each of 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Those that had been hardest hit by the abrupt drop 
in voluntary external financing  showed 
improvements that were a direct result of  the 
process of  adjusting to the new shortage of 
finance.  One of  the most significant  turnabouts 
occurred in Argentina where, thanks to an 
increase of  US$ 6.5 billion, a large deficit  turned 
into a substantial surplus. Developments in 
Mexico were similar, but the amounts involved 
were even greater: the preceding year's deficit  of 
nearly US$ 18.5 billion swung to a surplus of 
more than US$ 7 billion. Equally dramatic was 
the radical improvement in Chile's merchandise 
trade balance, although in this case the reasons 
were very different. 
Argentina, Mexico and Chile were also the 
only countries in the region, apart from  two 
oil-exporting countries, Ecuador and Venezuela, 
to run up a merchandise trade surplus with the 
rest of  the world in 1995 (see table vm-6). The 
other countries not only posted a deficit,  but in 
most a wider deficit  than before.  In no case was 
the change as great as in Brazil, however, there 
the traditional surplus, which in 1994 had been 
well above US$ 10 billion, shifted  to a deficit  of 
more than US$ 3 billion. 
It was basically the merchandise trade balance 
that shaped the regional balance of  trade in 
goods and services, for  trade in services 
accounted for  no more than a small fraction  of 
total trade (15% of  exports and 18% of 
imports). Only in a few  countries do services 
have a large share in foreign  trade, but in a 
number of  those, such as the Dominican 
Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Uruguay 
and Paraguay, the sector is a major source of 
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Table VIII-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: R E O N A L AN 
(illions  of  dollars) 
1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Mercosur 
Intrasubregional 7.2 10 12 14.4 
World 50.5 54.2 62.1 70.3 
Mercosur/World (in %) 14.3 18.5 19.3 20.5 
Andean Group 
Intrasubregional 2.2 2.9 3.8 4.8 
World 28.3 29.8 35.2 40.2 
Andean Group/World (in %) 7.8 9.7 10.8 11.9 
LAIA 
Intrazonal 19.4 23.7 28.6 35.5 
World 134.9 145.2 169.3 206.3 
LAIA/World (in %) 14.4 16.3 16.9 17.2 
CACM 
Intrazonal 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.5 
World 4.7 4.9 6.2 7.8 
CACM/World (in %) 19.1 22.4 19.4 19.2 
CARICOM b 
Intrazonal 0.2 0.3 0.4 
World 3.7 3.7 3.8 
CARICOM/World (in %) 5.4 8.1 10.5 
Region c 
Intraregional 24.5 29.3 34.7 
World 146.1 156.4 180.6 
Region/World (in %) 16.8 18.7 19.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary estimates. b Includes only Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. c Includes LAIA, CACM, 
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, Belize, Haiti, Panama, Dominican Republic and Suriname. 
foreign  exchange; the same is true of  Panama, 
whoseearningscome from  bankingand transport 
services. These countries and, exceptionally, 
Mexico, were the only ones to record a surplus 
in their trade in services. 
Taken as a whole, regional revenue from 
exports of  services rose from  over US$ 34 billion 
to around US$ 38 billion, of  which Mexico 
accounted for  over one fourth.  Payments for 
services also increased, albeit by somewhat less 
(US$ 2 billion), to nearly US$ 47.6 billion, half 
of  that spent by Brazil and Mexico. As a result, 
the regional deficit  narrowed to less than US$ 11 
billion (see table VIII-6). 
2. Economic integration in the region 
During 1995, progress continued  to be 
made with  the integration  process in 
Latin  America and the Caribbean.  Trade 
policy  in nearly  all  the countries  of  the 
region is now tied  to subregional 
integration  agreements.  All  four  of  the 
existing  agreements  of  this  type 
-MERCOSUR, the Andean Group, the 
Central  American Common Market 
(CACM)  and the Caribbean  Community 
(CARICOM)-  have recently  become 
customs unions with  varying levels  of 
integration. 
MERCOSUR became a customs union on 1 
January 1995, and the Andean Group followed 
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suit barely a month later, each group putting into 
effect  a common external tariff  (CET) to 
supplement the free  trade regime that its 
members had agreed on. At the beginning of 
1995 the MERCOSUR CET had 11 tariff  brackets 
ranging from  0% to 20% with a simple average 
of  11%. The Andean Group's CET varied from 
5% to 20% over just four  brackets, with an 
average of  14%. Both Bolivia and Peru continued 
to apply their own national tariffs,  however, and 
Peru did not join the Group's free  trade regime 
but continued to trade with the other member 
countries under bilateral agreements. 
In mid-1993, CACM members agreed on a 
common external tariff  with a minimum of  5% 
and a maximum of  20%. Since then, they have 
been moving to perfect  their customs union, 
although there are still major exceptions to the 
intraregional free  trade regime and to application 
of  the common external tariff  under the new 
Central American Tariff  System. Honduras 
having resumed its place as a full  member of 
CACM, the free  trade regime was further 
strengthened in 1995 by Costa Rica's agreement 
to reduce its surcharges on the other four 
members and by Nicaragua's approval of  a 
reduction in its temporary import tariffs.  The 
tariff  system has three components. The first 
covers roughly 95% of  all dutiable items and is 
common to all the parties (except for  the 
safeguards  and temporary surcharges each party 
is permitted); the second comprises the 3% of 
tariffs  that are to progressively converge by 
1999; and the third consists of  the other 2%, 
which will remain unchanged. 
By mid-1995, CARICOM countries had made 
significant  progress in pursuit of  their goal of 
reciprocal free  trade, and work continued on the 
implementation of  the agreed common external 
tariff.  As regards free  trade, 10 out of  the 13 
member countries1 dropped their requirement for 
prior import licences. The CET structure is now 
set as far  as 1998, and a gradual reduction of  the 
common tariffs  on non-agricultural goods is 
planned, to bring them down to between 5% and 
20%. 
Of  the four  integration schemes, it is without 
doubt MERCOSUR that has made the most 
progress, as can be seen from  the high degree of 
trade liberalization among all its members; it is 
also moving forward  with its CET according to a 
schedule to be completed by 2006. 
There are four  basic reasons for  the remaining 
limitations of  these customs unions. In the first 
place, the free  trade regimes still permit lists of 
exceptions, and these will only gradually be 
phased out. Secondly, the common external 
tariffs  do not yet apply to the whole range of 
dutiable goods, and countries have drawn up lists 
of  products for  which the tariffs  are only 
gradually to be brought into line with CETs. 
Thirdly, some countries have not yet applied their 
own group's CET. Lastly, a number of  countries 
of  the region have recently adopted unilateral 
trade policy measures in order to cope with 
adverse economic situations. In some groups 
such measures have created great internal 
tensions, although so far  it has been possible to 
resolve these tensions through direct negotiations 
between the parties involved. 
It is important to bear in mind the fact  that 
since 1 January 1994, Mexico has also been a 
member of  the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), along with Canada and the 
United States. A year after  Mexico joined NAFTA, 
the treaty of  the Group of  Three came into force, 
creating a free  trade area between Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela. An additional element of 
the integration picture is the proliferation  of 
bilateral agreements that, despite their obvious 
similarities, nevertheless differ  so significantly  in 
their specific  details that it would be difficult  to 
harmonize them by simply making them 
multilateral. 
A variety of  efforts  have been made to devise 
a broader framework  encompassing all the 
different  integration processes, but as yet no 
definitive  approach appears to have been 
adopted. The possibility of  the countries of  the 
region joining NAFTA in the near future  seemed 
to offer  good prospects, but these evaporated 
when the United States suspended the fast  track 
authority provisions. After  the Summit of  the 
Americas in Miami in December 1994, a new 
path towards integration at the hemisphere level 
began to emerge with the Free Trade Area of  the 
1 In February 1996, Suriname was admitted as the fourteenth  member of  CARICOM. 
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Americas (FTAA) initiative. The ministers of 
foreign  trade of  the 34 countries participating in 
the FTAA project have since met on two occasions 
(in Denver, Colorado, in July 1995 and in 
Cartagena, Colombia, in March 1996) and 11 
working groups have been set up; these groups 
are currently compiling comprehensive information 
on the national and subregional levels that may 
be relevant to future  negotiations. According to 
the Declaration of  Principles of  the Summit, the 
process of  covergence should take account of  all 
the integration agreements that are already in 
place in the region. This position was subsequently 
reaffirmed  at the two later meetings, where it was 
also acknowledged that there was a range of 
possible approaches to such harmonization. 
The formation  of  a customs union by the 
MERCOSUR countries also appears to have created 
a new focus  of  convergence in the south of  the 
continent. In June 1996, MERCOSUR and Chile 
completed negotiations on the establishment of  a 
free  trade zone within the next 18 years. Also in 
June, Bolivia signed a framework  agreement on 
negotiations to create a free  trade zone with 
MERCOSUR, and it is expected that the other 
Andean countries will reach similar agreements 
with the group. If  these initiatives, and the 
economic complementarity agreements between 
Chile and the Andean countries, bear fruit,  they 
will bring about a South American free  trade area 
of  a sort, although significant  gaps and 
limitations will still exist. 
3. The current account balance and the income balance 
The  balance-of-payments  current 
account deficit  in Latin  America and the 
Caribbean  was just  over US$  32 billion  in 
1995, marking  a halt  in the upward  trend 
that  began in 1991. From  1992 to 1994 
the region's  deficit  had averaged  US$  43 
billion.  This  narrowing  of  the deficit  was 
mainly  a reflection  of  the improvement  in 
the external  accounts of  Mexico, 
Argentina  and Chile,  somewhat tempered 
by a deterioration  in those of  Brazil,  Peru 
and Colombia. 
The most important contribution to the 
improvement in the regional current account was 
made by Mexico, where the huge deficit  posted 
in 1994 -the equivalent of  7.5% of  GDP- has 
brought close to a balance in 1995. Argentina's 
deficit  also shrank considerably, narrowing to the 
equivalent of  2.5% of  output. The trade balance 
was the decisive factor  in both these cases. Other 
countries of  the region where trends in the 
balance-of-payments  current account took a 
positive turn included Chile, the Dominican 
Republic and Costa Rica. 
By contrast, the poor showing of  the external 
accounts of  Brazil, Peru and Colombia had an 
adverse effect  on the region's overall current 
account (see table VIII-17). Brazil's deficit  was 
US$ 18 billion, chiefly  owing to the first  large 
trade deficit  the country had run up in many 
years; even so, as a percentage of  output the 
current account deficit  was moderate (2.2%). In 
Peru, too, the deterioration in the current account 
was attributable to the trade deficit,  which 
doubled owing to the strong expansion of 
imports. Colombia's wider deficit,  however, was 
due both to a further  deterioration in the balance 
of  trade and to the increase in factor  service 
payments. 
The region's income balance, which basically 
reflects  net payments of  profits  and interest, 
showed a modest increase on the 1994 figure  and 
amounted to US$ 37.6 billion; this means that it 
was not a significant  factor  in the variation in the 
current account balance (see table VIII-17). Net 
profit  remittances for  the region (US$ 11.5 
billion) continued to be concentrated in five 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico 
and Chile. Net interest payments totalled US$ 25 
billion. In 1995, as in 1994, there was a 
regionwide increase in gross interest payments. 
One of  the contributory factors  was the rise in 
interest rates (LIBOR); although these gradually 
declined during the course of  the year, the annual 
average was one percentage point higher than in 
1994. A further  reason for  the rise in interest 
payments was the increase in external debt, 
chiefly  in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and 
Colombia. 
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4. Capital flows  and international reserves 
In  1995, the balance on the region's 
capital  and financial  account was nearly 
US$  27 billion,  a much lower  figure  than 
the annual average of  US$  49 billion 
recorded  in 1992, 1993 and 1994? This 
figure  included  US$  21 billion  in direct 
investment,  US$  14 billion  in net portfolio 
investment  in bonds  and US$  7  billion  in 
other long-term  capital;  these inflows 
were offset,  however, by outflows  of 
US$  15 billion  in short-term  capital  and 
portfolio  investment  (see  table  VUI-7). 
The  region's  international  reserves 
shrank by US$  5.6 billion,  as it  increased 
its  reserve assets (foreign  exchange) by 
US$24.4  billion,  while  drawing  on 
US$  30 billion  in exceptional  financing. 
a) General trends 
In the wake of  the events in Mexico in 1994, 
two distinct phases could be observed in the flow 
of  capital to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The first  phase, which lasted from  January to 
April 1995, was characterized by financial 
turbulence that affected  the region's major 
economies in varying degrees. Its chief 
manifestations  were a flight  of  short-term capital 
from  a number of  Latin American countries and 
a virtual cut-off  of  flows  of  private financing  to 
the region. Multilateral agencies filled  the gap in 
this situation by providing compensatory 
financing  that enabled Mexico to meet its huge 
short-term commitments and Mexico and 
Argentina to regain access to international 
financial  markets. In the second phase, which 
began in May 1995, Latin America once more 
became fully  active in the international financial 
markets, particularly the bond market. It is also 
important to note that direct investment flows  to 
the majority of  countries in the region had a 
momentum of  their own and remained unaffected 
by the Mexican financial  crisis during 1995. 
Capital flows  to Latin America and the 
Caribbean over the course of  the year largely 
reflected  the pattern of  private capital flows  to 
developing countries in general. The main 
features  of  such flows  were: i) a continuation of 
the upward trend in direct investment that began 
in 1991, partly as a consequence of  the active 
privatization programmes being pursued in 
emerging economies; ii) a sharp drop in portfolio 
investment in stocks -chiefly  as a result of  the 
heightened volatility of  the financial  markets in 
the wake of  the Mexican crisis (especially in the 
first  few  months of  1995), combined with the 
strong performance  of  the United States stock 
market in 1995; and iii) a recovery in portfolio 
investment in bonds, although not yet to the level 
recorded in 1993 (see figure  VIII-1). 
The region's financial  account balance3 was 
the outcome of  opposite trends (see table 
VIII-17). On the one hand, capital in Brazil 
expanded by US$ 31 billion, an extraordinarily 
high proportion of  which consisted of  short-term 
capital and portfolio  investment (see box VIII-1). 
Colombia's net inflows  of  US$ 4.4 billion, half 
of  which represented direct investment, set a new 
record for  the country. Capital flows  to Peru 
totalled US$ 3.85 billion, an amount which 
despite its size did not match the preceding year's 
exceptional figure;  the chief  components were 
direct and portfolio  investment and short-term 
capital. 
Meanwhile, other Latin American countries 
recorded net outflows  of  capital. Mexico 
experienced net outflows  of  US$ 14.6 billion in 
voluntary capital, owing mainly to the fact 
that, the year's total net outflows  of  portfolio 
investment and other capital amounted to 
2 Changes in the methodology used for  the capital and financial  account in the fifth  edition of  the IMF Balance of  Payments 
Manual  include the following:  i) the financial  account does not include official  transfers;  ii) the scope of  portfolio  investment has 
been widened to include money-market debt instruments and negotiable financial  instruments (chiefly  bonds), which under the 
fourth  edition were reported as other capital; and iii) direct investment and portfolio  investment are no longer broken down into 
long- and short-term, although "other investment" is. For full  details see International Monetary Fund, Balance of  Payments 
Manual,  fifth  edition, Washington, D.C., 1993. 
3 Capital inflows  figured  as the balance on the capital and financial  account plus errors and omissions in the balance of 
payments. 
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Table VIII-7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOME SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
A. Debt 
Bonds b 2 760 7 242 12 577 28 794 18 241 23 395 
Banks0 8 559 6 800 10 942 1 581 5 027 5 117 
Commercial paper - 1 212 840 315 400 
Certificates  of  deposit - 670 1 100 65 
B. Investment 
Directd 6 599 11 101 13 676 13 734 21 887 21 288 
ADR/GDR e 98 3 891 3 964 6 022 4 704 962 
External funds f  575 727 293 10 565 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  and data from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for  International 
Settlements (Bis). 
' Preliminary figures.  b Gross value. 1 Net short- and medium-term borrowing. d Net figures.  Includes reinvestment of 
profits.  e ADRs = American Depository Receipts; GDRs = Global Depository Receipts. f  Close-ended funds  only; 
initial capital. 
US$ 21.6 billion. On the other hand, reserve 
assets increased, boosted by the compensatory 
capital provided by the multilateral agencies and 
the extraordinary loans granted by the United 
States Treasury Department, which together 
totalled US$ 26 billion. 
Venezuela continued to experience net capital 
outflows  in 1995, as in 1994, although these 
shrank to US$ 3.4 billion. Inflows  of 
non-compensatory capital to Argentina 
amounted to only US$ 400 million, a sum that 
did not stand comparison with the US$ 10 billion 
in external financing  received annually in the 
three-year period 1992-1994. 
In Chile, which took steps to discourage the 
influx  of  short-term capital and in October made 
an exceptional prepayment of  US$ 1.8 billion to 
multilateral agencies, net inflows  diminished 
from  US$ 3.8 billion in 1994 to US$ 900 million 
in 1995. Among the remaining South American 
countries, capital inflows  to Bolivia totalled 
US$ 260 million, a sum which exceeded the 
preceding year's total, while the balance on 
Uruguay'scapital account was positive, although 
lower than it had been in 1994. 
Inflows  of  capita] to Central America and the 
Caribbean totalled only US$ 1.7 billion in 19954, 
and the largest sums went to El Salvador and 
Panama. 
b) The composition of  capital flows 
In 1995, the upward trend in direct investment 
that began in 1990 continued. As in previous 
years, such investment was concentrated 
primarily in the mining and oil sectors and was 
associated with high-yield projects. The 
exception was Mexico, where an appreciable 
share of  direct investment went, into 
manufacturing.  The financial  crisis in Mexico 
and the political upheavals in other countries of 
the region during 1995 did not detract from  the 
strength of  these flows. 
With the benefit  of  a regulatory framework 
much more favourable  than in previous years, 
direct investment continued to increase in 
1995, rising to more than US$ 21 billion (see 
4 Under the new methodology used for  the balance of  payments, some official  transfers  that used to be reflected  in the capital 
account balance, are now reported on the current account, mainly as current transfers.  Since the majority of  Central American 
countries receive sizeable sums in financing  of  this kind, their financial  account balance appears rather small when figured 
according to the new version of  the balance of  payments. 
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Figure VIII-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
O Direct investment O Bonds a E 3 A D R b ED Commerc ia l b a n k s 
Billions of dol lars 
1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official  figures. 
* Gross values. b Primary issues. 
table Vin-8). For the first  time since 1990, such 
investment was not mobilized primarily by 
privatization programmes. In 1995, the value of 
companies sold off  was only US$ 4.3 billion, as 
compared with an annual average of  US$ 11 
billion between 1991 and 1994. 
Although direct investment declined in Chile, 
Peru and Mexico, these dips were mere 
interruptions in a clear upward progression, and 
the ratio of  direct investment to output remained 
at around 3%. Flows into Colombia continued to 
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Box VIII-1 
BRAZIL: INFLOWS OF CAPITAL 
Ifl  1995, net capital inflows  to Brazil totalled US$ 31 
billion, an unprecedented figure  equal to half  the value of 
the year's exports of  goods and services. 
During the early months of  the year, the Mexican crisis 
caused a shrinkage in capital inflows  to Brazil. As a result, 
the amount of  new Brazilian securities issued (bonds, 
euronotes and certificates  of  deposi t) dropped from  US$3.2 
billion in the last quarter of  1994 to a mere US$ 500 million 
in the first  quarter of  1995. During the same period, the 
stock market recorded net outflows  of  US$ 3.6 billion, in 
contrast to 1994, when a total of  US$ 7.3 billion was 
accumulated. In view of  this unstable situation, the Central 
Bank announced in March the introduction of  a currency 
band-initially set at between 0.84 and0.93 reais perdollar-
thus formalizing  a mechanism which had already been 
operating de facto  for  some months. 
External events and domestic adjustment policies 
prompted speculative activity and caused a reduction of 
US$ 6.5 billion in international reserves between 
December 1994 and April 1995. This situation forced  a new 
adjustment of  the exchange rate band, whose floor  was 
raised to 0.88 reais, an effective  devaluation of  5%. 
However, from  midway through the second quarter there 
was a gradual but steady increase in participation in 
international private financial  markets. The exchange rate 
band was adjusted once more in June, this time without 
turbulence in the foreign  exchangemarket, and the value of 
the dollar gradually rose to slightly over 0.96 reais per dollar 
by mid-Deccmber. 
The recovery of  capital flows,  which accelerated in the 
second half  of  1995, was evident from  the following:  i) sales 
of  private bonds and securities, whichhad amounted to US$ 
4,3 billion during the first  quarter, rose to US$ 7.5 billion 
in the second quarter; ii) the Brazilian Government once 
again floated  international bond issues, in Germany and 
Japan, to the value of  USS 1.8 billion; iii) net direct 
investment reached US$ 3.5 billion, nearly double the 
amount for  the same period in 1994; iv) commercial lines 
of  credit to finance  foreign  trade increased a4 a result of  the 
substantial expansion (50%) of  imports of  goods and 
services; and v) inflows  of  equity and financial  capital 
expanded greatly. 
BRAZIL: BALANCE ON THE CAPITAL AND 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT* 
(.Billions  of  dallaré) 
1994 1995 
Total 7.7 31.1 
Long-term capital 3.0 10.3 
Direct investment 2.0 3.5 
Other long-term 
capital 1.0 6.8 
Portfolio  investment 
and short-term capital 4.4 19.4 
Errors and omissions 0.3 1.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
1 Preliminary figures. 
The increase in long-term capital and, in particular, the 
growing percentage of  direct investment are significant 
The changes in legislation on foreign  investment and the 
end of  the State monopoly in petroleum and 
communications, together with the privatizations 
announced in the electricity sector, should stimulate such 
flows  still further  in 1996. Short-term capital and portfolio 
investment, however, soared to an extraordinary US$ 19 
billion; despite the measures adopted in October 1994 by 
the Central Bank to discourage speculative flows  of  very 
short-term capital. Although some of  these measures were 
relaxed during the first  quarter of  1995, the Central Bank 
raised the tax rates once again with a view to reducing the 
influx  of  short-term capital. 
expand, reaching a total of  US$ 2 billion, or the 
equivalent of  2.5% of  GDP. 
Direct investment flows  to Argentina and 
Brazil were nearly US$ 4 billion, substantially 
more than in previous years, although in Brazil's 
case the level was still low as a proportion of  GDP 
(0.5%). Of  particular note was direct investment 
in Bolivia, which equalled 5.5% of  output, partly 
as a result of  new investments and partly owing 
to the privatization of  companies in the energy 
and telecommunications subsectors under the 
capitalization programme. Direct investment 
flows  into Costa Rica were also significant  (4% 
of  GDP). 
The level of  direct investment abroad by the 
countries of  the region were again appreciable, 
notably in Brazil (US$ 1.4 billion), Chile 
(US$ 900 million), Colombia (US$ 300 million) 
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Table VIII-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: E ORE E T I N N 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995° 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 5 538 6 599 11101 13 676 13 734 21 887 21288 
Argentina 678 1 836 2 439 4179 6 305 1 200 d 3 900d 
Bolivia 47 10 94 120 122 128 372 
Brazil 1 544 324 89 1 924 801 2 035 3 475 
Chile 213 582 400 321 410 796 1 008 
Colombia 51 484 433 740 710 1 515 1 977e 
Costa Rica 48 160 173 222 244 298 e 350e 
Ecuador 70 126 160 178 469 531 470 
El Salvador 6 2 25 15 16 -
Guatemala 111 48 91 94 143 65 75 
Haiti 13 8 14 - - - -
Honduras 6 44 52 48 35 35 50 
Jamaica 28 138 133 142 78 117 
Mexico 2 090 2 549 4 742 4 393 4 389 10 973 6 963 
Nicaragua - - - 15 39 40 70 
Panama -47 -147 138 173 -658 549 
Paraguay 32 76 84 137 111 180 207 
Peru 27 41 -7 145 371 2 326 1 691 
Dominican Republic 93 133 145 180 183 190 199 
Trinidad and Tobago 185 109 169 178 379 516 
Uruguay 290 0 0 0 102 155 124 
Venezuela 55 76 1728 473 -514 239 357 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
' Refers  to direct investment in the reporting economy minus direct investment abroad by residents. Includes reinvested 
earnings. b In accordance with the fifth  edition of  the IMF Balance ofPayments  Manual,  all transactions between non-financial 
direct-investment enterprises and their parent companies and affiliates  are included in direct investment. c Preliminary 
figures.  d Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1995-1996. c Official  figures. 
and Venezuela (US$ 200 million); the majority 
of  such investment was in neighbouring 
countries. 
Gross portfolio  investment in bonds, which in 
1995 reached US$ 23.4 billion, was 30% higher 
than in 1994, although it was still lower than 
1993's record figure  of  US$ 29 billion (see table 
Vm-9). Net debt in the form  of  bonds, however, 
increased by only US$ 15 billion, since around 
US$ 8.5 billion of  debt principal was paid off. 
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were responsible 
for  90% of  total bond sales. 
In the wake of  the Mexican devaluation at the 
end of  1994, bond issues declined sharply in the 
countries of  the region in the early part of  1995; 
in the first  four  months of  the year issues 
amounted to barely US$ 1 billion, and the great 
majority of  these were private issues. In the 
following  months, however, foreign  investors 
showed more interest in providing financing  to 
Latin American countries and were further 
encouraged by declining international interest 
rates as the year wore on. 
Terms for  bond issues deteriorated: average 
maturities shortened from  four  and a half  years 
in 1993 to four  years in 1994 to only three and a 
half  years in the first  nine months of  1995, 
although the trend reversed itself  in the fourth 
quarter of  1995 and the first  quarter of  1996. In 
addition, the spread above the reference  rate at 
which lenders were able to place their bonds 
widened. The private sector's share in such 
placements, which had been nearly 60% in 
1993-1994, fell  to slightly over 35% in 1995, 
mainly owing to greater public-sector activity in 
Argentina and Mexico. There was thus a 
preponderance of  government bond issues, 
except in Brazil, where private bond issues 
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Table VIII-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: T E R N A I N A N I 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1995 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1 s t sem. 2 n d ¡ 
Total 2 760 7 242 12 577 
Argentina 21 795 1570 
Barbados . . . 
Bolivia . . . 
Brazil - 1837 3 655 
Chile - 200 120 
Colombia 
Costa Rica . . . 
Ecuador - 10 - 10 
Guatemala - 60 
28 794 18 241 23 395 6 829 16 566 
6 308 5 319 6 354 1594 4 760 
- 50 - - -
- 10 - - -
6 465 3 998 7 040 3 471 3 569 
322 155 300 - 300 
567 955 1083 410 673 
- 50 
Jamaica - - - - 55 - - -
Mexico 2 477 3 782 6100 11339 6 949 7 646 1 129 6 517 
Panama - 50 - - 250 324 225 99 
Peru - - - 30 100 - - -
Trinidad y Tobago - - 100 125 150 71 - 71 
Uruguay - - 100 140 200 211 - 211 
Venezuela 262 578 932 3 438 - 356 356 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), information  provided to ECLAC. 
a Gross financing. 
predominated, and in Chile, where the public 
sector did not issue bonds at all. The proportion 
of  bond issues denominated in deutsche mark and 
yen also increased gradually, owing to the low 
interest rates in those currencies. 
During the first  quarter of  1996, appreciable 
quantities of  bonds continued to be issued, under 
the stimulus of  the recent drop in international 
interest rates, and these, too, continued to be 
concentrated in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
(see table Vni-10). 
Portfolio  investment in stocks, both on local 
stock exchanges and abroad, chiefly  in the 
United States, was badly affected  by the Mexican 
financial  crisis and by political and economic 
disturbances in other countries of  the region (see 
table VIII-11). Primary issues of  depositary 
receipts in the United States market (ADRs) 
declined sharply from  US$ 4.7 billion in 1994 to 
only US$ 960 million in 1995. During the first 
quarter a number of  Latin American companies 
tried in vain to place ADRs, and from  the second 
quarter on, there were corporate issues only from 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Panama. Since the 
beginning of  19%, however, there has been a 
strong recovery. 
Stock prices at the end of  1995, as compared 
with the end of  1994, were down by 20% to 30% 
in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela and 
by 3% in Chile, while in Argentina and Peru they 
rallied. Although the Mexican financial  crisis 
affected  nearly all the stock exchanges during the 
first  few  months of  1995, they recovered later, 
especially in early 1996 (see figure  VÜI-2). 
According to figures  from  the Bank for 
International Settlements, the region's debt with 
the international commercial banking system 
increased by 3% and stood at US$ 230 billion by 
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Table V I - 1 
INTEREST RATES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 
(Average  values) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Short-term financial  market rates 
Germany 7.9 8.8 9.4 7.5 5.3 4.5 
Canada 11.6 7.4 6.8 3.8 5.5 5.7 
United States 8.1 5.7 3.5 3.0 4.2 5.8 
France 9.9 9.5 10.4 8.8 5.7 6.4 
Italy 12.4 12.2 14.0 10.2 8.5 10.5 
Japan 7.2 7.5 4.6 3.1 2.2 1.2 
Netherlands 8.3 9.0 9.3 7.1 5.1 4.2 
United Kingdom 14.7 11.8 9.6 5.5 4.8 6.0 
Long-term financial  market rates 
Germany 8.9 8.6 8.0 6.3 6.7 6.5 
Canada 10.9 9.8 8.8 7.9 8.6 8.3 
United States 8.6 7.9 7.0 5.8 7.1 6.6 
France 10.0 9.1 8.6 6.9 7.4 7.6 
Italy 11.5 13.2 13.3 11.3 10.6 12.2 
Japan 7.4 6.5 4.9 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Netherlands 8.9 8.7 8.1 6.5 7.2 7.2 
United Kingdom 11.1 9.9 9.2 7.9 8.1 8.3 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International  Financial  Statistics,  Washington, D.C., various issues. 
Table VIII-11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL STOCK ISSUES 1 











1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
98 3 891 3 964 6 022 4 704 962 
- 360 392 2 655 735 
- - 133 - 1 028 296 
98 - 129 288 799 224 
- - - 98 207 71 
- 3 531 3 077 2 913 1 679 . 
- - 88 - 100 371 
- - - 26 133 
- - - - 23 _ 
- - 146 42 -
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), information  provided to ECLAC. 




STOCK MARKET PRICE INDEXES IN DOLLARS 
Indexes December 1993=100 
9 3 9 4 j 9 5 | 9 6 
Indexes December 1993=100 
9 4 | | 9 6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Finance Corporation. 
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the end of  the year. Contributing factors  were 
increased borrowing in Colombia and Uruguay 
(20%), Chile (17%), Peru (12%), Brazil (11%) 
and Argentina (8%) and reductions in the 
remaining countries, of  which the biggest in 
percentage terms occurred in Nicaragua (-17%) 
and Ecuador and Mexico (-8%); the reductions 
in Nicaragua's and Ecuador's debts resulted from 
the rescheduling of  commercial debt. The growth 
of  the debt owed to commercial banks was due 
to the appreciation of  the main European 
currencies, but this situation was offset  in part by 
the devaluation of  the yen against the United 
States dollar. 
Syndicated loans, which a number of 
companies preferred,  continued to be granted 
with increasing frequency  in 1995, especially in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. In early 
1996 the interest rates on such loans compared 
very favourably  even with the most 
advantageous bond terms. The reasons for 
preferring  this type of  financing  were the greater 
speed at which credit be approved more quickly, 
particularly when a small number of  banks are 
involved, and the slackness of  bond markets at 
certain periods. 
The restrictions on the movement of 
short-term capital were tightened in 1995. The 
existing regulations in Colombia and Chile were 
augmented by a number of  measures adopted in 
Brazil to discourage inflows  of  this type of  more 
volatile capital, which is attracted by 
exchange-rate expectations and high domestic 
interest rates. 
c) International reserves and transfers 
In 1995 the region's reserves and related items 
shrank by US$ 5.6 billion because, while reserve 
assets (foreign  exchange) expanded by US$ 24.4 
billion, US$ 30 billion of  exceptional financing 
was used (see table VIII-17). TTiis was largely a 
result of  events in Mexico and Brazil. Mexico 
was able to meet its enormous short-term 
commitments thanks to compensatory capital 
provided by the IMF and the United States 
Treasury Department, resources that actually 
swelled Mexico's gross reserves by US$ 10.6 
billion. A US$ 13 billion increase in Brazil's 
reserves was made possible primarily by a 
massive influx  of  short-term capital. 
The figure  for  net transfers  of  financial 
resources (defined  as net inflows  of  voluntary 
and compulsory capital minus net profits  and 
interest) to Latin America and the Caribbean in 
1995 was positive and larger than in 1994. Net 
transfers  amounted to US$ 19.5 billion, owing to 
the extraordinarily large transfer  of  capital to 
Brazil (nearly US$ 20 billion), which was only 
partly offset  by the negative transfers  to 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and 
Venezuela (see table VIII-12). It is interesting to 
note that, excluding non-voluntary capital from 
the financial  account, the net transfer  of  resources 
to the region was negative for  the first  time since 
1991 (US$ 10 billion), whereas in 1994 a positive 
transfer  of  US$ 4.7 billion was recorded and only 
a year before  that, the figure  was US$ 24 billion. 
5. External debt 
In  1995 the region's  external  debt 
amounted  to US$  587  billion,  mainly  as a 
consequence of  the greater  liabilities  of 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia  and Mexico. 
In  most of  the remaining  countries  there 
was only moderate  growth  in external 
indebtedness  and in some there was even 
a reduction.  Despite  the higher growth 
rate of  the region's  external  debt,  the ratio 
of  debt  to exports  of  goods  and services 
declined  once more owing to the strong 
expansion of  exports.  Total  interest  paid  as 
a proportion  of  the value of  exports  also 
declined,  to only 15%, less than half  the rate 
recordedlo  years before.  Nevertheless,  there 
are still  a few  Latin  American countries 
whose debt-export  ratio  is over 200%. 
a) General trends 
The external debt of  Latin America and the 
Caribbean grew by 10%, the highest rate since 
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Table VIII-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: E SOURCE TRAN 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995b 
Latin America 
and the Caribbean 9 409 -16 595 3 465 28 183 30 733 8 960 19 755 
Argentina 358 -5 830 -1573 7 367 8 433 7 336 -584 
Bolivia -685 -45 7 218 393 45 196 
Brazil 2 093 -7 310 -8 570 584 -1633 -723 19 951 
Chile 2 286 841 -872 1185 763 1 813 -850 
Colombia 880 -2 237 -2 604 -1 816 440 1 392 2 247 
Costa Rica -42 64 341 355 334 191 86 
Ecuador 342 -792 -515 -897 -74 -81 -598 
El Salvador -388 294 -22 190 118 36 325 
Guatemala -221 -5 638 507 685 500 211 
Haiti 31 -34 58 -8 25 -28 247 
Honduras 44 11 79 161 -47 89 99 
Mexico 4 621 2 396 14 777 16 406 18 427 -1809 -1270 
Nicaragua -154 49 -272 339 136 344 351 
Paraguay 375 377 617 151 802 1450 1 177 
Peru -543 -164 905 1224 1 382 4 077 3 530 
Dominican Republic 319 -19 322 450 184 -545 -394 
Uruguay 728 -468 -162 11 231 439 337 
Venezuela -636 -4 659 311 1756 134 -5 566 -5 233 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a The net transfer  of  resources is equal to the net capital inflow  (including non-voluntary inflows)  minus net payments of  profits 
and interest. In this table, negative figures  indicate outward transfers  of  resources. b Preliminary figures. 
1982 (see table VIII-1). Thanks to the unusual 
expansion of  exports of  goods and services, 
however, debt burden indicators continued to 
lighten in most of  the countries of  the region. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that during 
the last two years, this improvement was due 
partly to exceptionally favourable  trends in the 
terms of  trade, and that public-sector borrowing 
increased sharply. 
In 1995, Mexico's external debt grew by 18%, 
chiefly  because the Government had taken on 
larger commitments with international institutions 
in order to finance  the redemption of  TESOBONOS. 
In Brazil, debt increased by 11%, partly because 
private firms  preferred  to borrow on the 
international market in order to avoid the high 
cost of  domestic borrowing. In Argentina and 
Colombia, foreign  liabilities -particularly of  the 
public sector- increased by more than 10%. 
By contrast, debt in a number of  Latin 
American countries went down in nominal terms 
in 1995, the most significant  reductions 
occurring in Nicaragua (-12%) and Ecuador 
(-4.5%), and, to a lesser extent, in Guatemala and 
Costa Rica. Nicaraguan debt was reduced 
through the buy-back of  its commercial debt at 
8% of  its nominal value and through forgiveness 
of  bilateral debt by some European Govern-
ments, while the reduction of  Ecuador's debt was 
chiefly  the result of  the debt- restructuring and 
debt-reduction schemes arranged with the 
commercial banks under the Brady Plan. 
Meanwhile, Chile's external debt remained 
virtually unchanged because of  the exceptional 
prepayment made by the Government and the 
Centra] Bank to multilateral institutions, which 
offset  the increase in private- sector liabilities. 
The secondary market reacted negatively to 
the Mexican devaluation at the end of  1994. The 
price of  debt paper in most of  the countries 
(except Chile and Colombia) dropped in the first 
quarter of  1995, falling  most sharply in Panama 
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Table VIII-
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: O S U R S E X T E R N A L 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995b 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 220 439 443 049 446 523 462 653 501 946 532 484 586 985 
Argentina c 27 157 62 233 58 413 59 123 67 802 79 345 89 679 
Bolivia 2 340 3 768 3 582 3 784 3 777 4 216 4 528 
Brazil 64 000 123 439 123 910 135 949 145 726 148 295 164 836 
Chile 11 207 18 576 17 319 18 964 19 665 21 768 21 825 
Colombia 6 805 17 848 17 312 16 862 18 370 21 280 23 431 
Costa Rica 2 209 3 924 3 992 3 992 3 827 3 818 3 794 
Ecuador 4 167 12 222 12 802 12 795 13 631 14 589 13 934 
El Salvador d 1 176 2 076 2 102 2 338 1 988 2 069 2 243 
Guatemala d 1 053 2 487 2 403 2 252 2 086 2 160 2 107 
Guyana 449 1 812 1 873 2 054 2 062 2 000 2 058 
Haiti d 290 841 809 873 866 875 901 
Honduras 1 388 3 588 3 441 3 539 3 904 4 152 4 372 
Jamaica 1 734 4 152 3 874 3 678 3 687 3 652 3 452 
Mexico 50 700 101 900 114 900 114 000 127 500 136 500 161 100 
Nicaragua d 1 825 10 616 10 312 10 806 10 987 11 624 10 242 
Panama d 2 271 3 795 3 699 3 548 3 494 3 663 3 710 
Paraguay 861 1 670 1 637 1 249 1 218 1 240 1 328 
Peru 9 595 19 996 20 787 21 409 23 998 25 460 27 487 
Dominican Republic 2 173 4 499 4 614 4 413 4 559 3 924 4 001 
Trinidad and Tobago 911 2 520 2 438 2 215 2 102 2 064 1 905 
Uruguay 1 165 4 472 4 141 4 136 4 293 4 605 4 852 
Venezuela e 26 963 36 615 32 163 34 674 36 404 35 185 35 200 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
* Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). b Preliminary figures.  c New estimates prepared by the 
Ministry of  Economic Affairs  and Public Works and Services for  1991-1995. Debt corresponds only to the stock of  gross 
public-sector debt and the debt of  some parts of  the private sector. It does not include short-term private-sector financial  debt 
nor, since it is gross debt, cumulative private-sector assets abroad. Figures for  1980 and 1990 (regional aggregates only) are 
taken from  the series in the World Bank's World Debt Tables 1995-1996. Note that these two series are not comparable since 
they are based on different  methodologies. As an illustration, the World Bank's figure  for  1991 is US$ 7 billion higher than the 
new official  estimate. d Public external debt. c The public debt does not include investment by non-residents in 
government securities. The figures  on private debt between 1991 and 1993 have been adjusted to account for  the privatization 
process and the elimination of  the system of  foreign-exchange  controls. f  Total debt according to official  figures  and data 
from  international financial  agencies. 
(-31%), Mexico (-28%), Peru (-23%), Costa Rica 
(-21%) and Argentina (-17%). Later there was a 
gradual but systematic recovery, and by the end 
of  the year the price of  debt paper in nearly all 
the countries where it was bought and sold had 
exceeded the levels prevailing at the end of  the 
previous year (see table VIII-14). 
b) The debt burden 
The region's debt burden dropped yet again, 
as it had since 1987. The ratio of  total interest 
payments to exports of  goods and services was 
15%, less than half  the ratio 10 years ago. This 
favourable  trend was the result of  a vigorous 
expansion of  exports, since interest payments 
increased because of  both the higher level of 
indebtedness and the steady rise in international 
interest rates (LIBOR rose by one percentage point 
between mid-1994 and mid-1995). The debt burden 
in the majority of  the countries, although not in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay and the Dominican 
Republic, which recorded moderate increases (see 
table Vffl-15).  In 1995 the ratio in seven countries 
(Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Venezuela) 
was under 10%. In another five  countr ies 
(Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico and 
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Table VIII-14 
LATIN AMERICA: PRICES OF EXTERNAL DEBT PAPER ON THE SECONDARY MARKET a 
(As  a percentage  of  face  value) 
1994 1995 
March June Septem-ber 
Decem-





Argentina 58 53 51 45 37 48 48 54 
Brazil 41 44 42 36 45 47 51 
Chile 95 95 95 95 95 _ _ 
Colombia 90 90 90 90 . _ _ Costa Rica 80 67 63 63 50 50 52 52 
Ecuador 44 41 41 30 26 31 32 35 
Honduras 34 35 36 36 _ _ 
Jamaica 85 83 83 83 _ _ 
Mexico 72 66 66 62 44 57 61 61 
Nicaragua 12 9 8 6 - . . . 
Panama 65 55 58 55 38 51 57 42 
Peru 60 50 59 58 44 58 65 70 
Dominican Republic - - - - - - -
Uruguay - - - - - - - -
Venezuela 57 53 49 48 42 49 51 54 
Source: United Nations, Department for  Economic and Social Information  and Policy Analysis, on the basis of  asked prices 
compiled by Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch. 
' Weighted by the amount of  bank debt. 
- Indicates that no transactions took place. 
Table VIII-15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF TOTAL INTEREST TO 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES a 
(Percentages) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995b 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 21.4 23.5 20.4 18.1 16.7 15.5 15.1 
Argentina 22.0 37.9 36.1 28.3 20.7 22.9 22.7 
Bolivia 25.0 25.0 24.4 25.0 23.2 16.6 19.0 
Brazil 34.1 30.9 27.2 20.8 18.0 16.6 20.2 
Chile 19.3 17.8 14.7 11.3 10.2 8.2 7.0 
Colombia 11.8 19.0 16.4 14.4 13.3 12.9 12.3 
Costa Rica 18.1 15.4 10.1 8.7 8.1 6.6 5.6 
Ecuador 18.1 34.1 29.8 23.3 21.6 19.0 15.8 
El Salvador 5.9 13.1 12.6 10.5 10.3 6.3 5.0 
Guatemala 5.3 11.2 8.9 8.9 6.1 5.6 5.2 
Haiti 2.1 7.9 7.7 11.3 10.7 17.5 10.1 
Honduras 10.6 18.0 21.1 25.9 23.7 22.3 15.7 
Mexico 27.7 19.0 18.0 17.5 18.3 16.7 15.1 
Nicaragua 24.3 58.3 110.3 158.5 115.6 102.2 54.2 
Paraguay 13.5 5.3 4.7 8.2 3.6 3.0 2.6 
Peru 20.8 29.6 23.4 25.8 26.3 22.9 22.2 
Dominican Republic 19.9 13.4 8.6 9.1 10.5 5.9 6.3 
Uruguay 11.0 26.9 21.2 15.7 14.3 13.7 14.7 
Venezuela 8.1 16.3 7.1 10.4 10.1 9.3 8.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Includes interest payments actually made and interest due but not paid. b Preliminary figures. 
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Table VIII-16 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF TOTAL DISBURSED EXTERNAL 
DEBT TO EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Percentages) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 209 276 276 267 271 249 228 
Argentina 274 420 406 400 434 429 376 
Bolivia 227 386 380 468 425 358 364 
Brazil 293 351 355 376 334 303 313 
Chile 188 181 156 152 167 151 114 
Colombia 128 206 191 182 200 198 170 
Costa Rica 185 200 182 155 132 116 91 
Ecuador 144 376 376 352 367 318 267 
El Salvador 97 213 234 240 175 126 102 
Guatemala 61 159 142 120 103 95 75 
Haiti 95 264 312 765 738 1365 326 
Honduras 147 348 339 340 366 356 307 
Mexico 224 209 223 206 208 192 179 
Nicaragua 369 2 707 3 048 3 494 2992 2 568 1581 
Paraguay 153 89 81 63 47 41 38 
Peru 233 480 488 486 544 448 403 
Dominican Republic 171 246 248 231 206 154 132 
Uruguay 76 207 188 157 156 142 148 
Venezuela 135 195 193 224 226 205 178 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Preliminary figures. 
Uruguay) the ratio was between 12% and 16%, 
while in Bolivia it fell  to 19% and in Argentina 
and Peru to 22%, The reduction in Argentina's 
debt burden was especially noteworthy; over the 
last six years it has fallen  by half.  Although 
Nicaragua reduced its debt burden, the ratio 
remained very high (54%). 
The ratio of  external debt to exports of  goods 
and services declined once more, owing 
particularly to the robust expansion of  exports, 
even though the rate of  external borrowing 
increased. For the first  time since the beginning 
of  the debt crisis in 1982, the external debt ratio 
was similar to the 1979-1980 ratio of  228%. In 
1995 the ratio fell  practically across the board in 
all the countries of  Latin America and the 
Caribbean, with the exception of  Bolivia, Brazil 
and Uruguay (see table VHI-16). 
c) Renegotiation of  external debt 
During 1995, important advances were made 
in renegotiating the external debt in most of  the 
heavily-indebted Latin American countries. 
Panama signed a definitive  agreement and Peru 
a preliminary agreement under the Brady Plan. 
Nicaragua bought back its debt with commercial 
banks and restructured its debts with the Paris 
Club, as did Bolivia and Haiti. 
In October 1995, Panama signed a definitive 
external debt restructuring agreement under the 
Brady Plan, covering US$ 2 billion in principal 
and US$ 1.5 billion in arrears. The "menu" of 
principal options included: a par bond with a 
30-year term and grace period, at an interest rate 
rising gradually from  3% to 5%, and a discount 
bond with a 30-year term and grace period at a 
45% discount and an interest rate equal to the 
six-month LIBOR plus 0.81%. The greater part of 
the interest was to be paid over 20 years, with a 
grace period of  10 years, at interest rates of  0.81% 
over LIBOR. 
Peru announced at the end of  1995 that, after 
a year of  negotiations, it had reached a 
preliminary agreement with commercial banks to 
restructure its debts under the terms of  the Brady 
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Table V I I - 7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CE OF EN 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Exports Imports Merchandise Balance of  trade 
of  goods f.o.b.  of  goods f.o.b.  trade balance in services" 
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 157 661 183 037 222 081 166 056 197 264 220 484 -8 395 -14 227 1597 •12440 -11 878 -10795 
Argentina 13117 15 839 20 969 15 543 20 078 18 728 -2 426 -4 239 2 241 -2 660 -2 856 -2158 
Bolivia 710 985 1042 1 068 1064 1215 -358 -79 -173 -129 -112 -126 
Brazil 39 630 44 102 46 506 25 301 33 241 49 663 14 329 10 861 -3157 -5 590 -5 346 -7 495 
Chile 9 199 11604 16 039 10 181 10 879 14 655 -982 725 1384 4 22 -149 
Colombia 7 429 8 756 10 396 9 087 11040 12 921 -1658 -2284 -2 525 97 181 -66 
Costa Rica 1 867 2102 2 750 2 627 2 788 2 954 -760 -686 -204 223 288 149 
Ecuador 3 062 3 844 4 358 2 474 3 282 4 095 588 562 263 -145 -177 -129 
El Salvador 732 1252 1 661 1766 2 407 3165 -1 034 -1 155 -1 504 24 -57 -65 
Guatemala 1 363 1 550 1 989 2 384 2 547 3 033 -1021 -997 -1 044 83 46 122 
Haiti 82 57 153 267 141 620 -185 -84 -467 6 -57 -85 
Honduras 853 918 1 162 944 1060 1 190 -91 -142 -28 -43 -12 -32 
Mexico 51885 60 882 79 542 65 366 79 346 72 453 -13 481 -18 464 7 089 -2 529 -2 604 871 
Nicaragua 267 351 529 659 784 852 -392 -433 -323 -57 -71 -99 
Panama 5 428 6 013 6 070 5 889 6 458 6 897 -461 -445 -827 234 165 467 
Paraguay 1 500 1 780 1 996 2711 3 498 3 667 -1 211 -1718 -1671 394 565 499 
Peru 3 515 4 555 5 572 4 049 5 576 7 688 -534 -1 021 -2116 -584 -520 -889 
Dominican 
Republic 511 644 743 2 118 2 276 2 375 -1607 -1 632 -1632 1135 1299 1609 
Uruguay 1 732 1913 2117 2 118 2600 2682 -386 -687 -565 282 450 358 
Venezuela 14 779 15 890 18 487 11 504 8 199 11 631 3 275 7 691 6 856 -3185 -3 082 -3 577 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
' Does not include factor  income. 
Table VIII-17 (cont.) 
_ , , , _ „ Balance on Balance on Trade balance Current transfers  . . income accounts current account 
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean -20 835 -26 105 -9 198 10 516 11819 13 610 -33 598 -34 955 -36 775 -43 917 -49 241 -32 363 
Argentina -5 086 -7 095 83 411 320 432 -2 372 -2 590 -2 914 -7 047 -9 365 -2 399 
Bolivia -487 -191 -299 228 267 234 -221 -202 -237 -480 -126 -302 
Brazil 8 739 5 515 -10 652 1 603 2 423 3 621 -10 323 -9 091 -11 105 19 -1 153 -18 136 
Chile -978 747 1235 386 358 355 -1 504 -1743 -1430 -2 096 -638 160 
Colombia -1561 -2 103 -2 591 1 138 863 694 -1 707 -1 793 -2 157 -2130 -3 033 -4 054 
Costa Rica -537 -398 -55 143 142 154 -225 -207 -236 -619 -463 -137 
Ecuador 443 385 134 130 145 231 -1255 -1210 -1 191 -682 -680 -826 
El Salvador -1 010 -1212 -1569 1004 1289 1389 -112 -95 -96 -118 -18 -276 
Guatemala -938 -951 -922 363 449 553 -127 -136 -156 -702 -638 -525 
Haiti -179 -141 -552 173 156 505 -11 -11 -28 -17 4 -75 
Honduras -134 -154 -60 81 82 96 -256 -255 -260 -309 -327 -224 
Mexico -16 010 -21 068 7 960 3 640 4 011 3 965 -11030 -12 363 -12 579 -23 400 -29 420 -654 
Nicaragua -449 -504 -422 234 241 75 -429 -466 -359 -644 -729 -706 
Panama -227 -280 -360 271 221 227 -620 -1 150 -454 -576 -1209 -587 
Paraguay -817 -1 153 -1 172 100 32 42 -95 -74 -67 -812 -1 195 -1 197 
Peru -1 118 -1 541 -3 005 484 502 422 -1009 -1064 -1 164 -1643 -2103 -3 747 
Dominican 
Republic -472 -333 -23 442 493 530 -395 -319 -344 -425 -159 163 
Uruguay -104 -237 -207 53 41 32 -192 -243 -173 -243 -439 -348 
Venezuela 90 4 609 3 279 -368 -216 53 -1 715 -1943 -1 825 -1 993 2 450 1 507 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
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Table VIII-17 (concl.) 
.lance on capital and u l u , „ „ ' ™ , ' o a n s , ' financial  account' Global balance Reserve assets Use of  IMF credit and 
Exceptional financing 
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 56 935 40 218 26 777 13 018 -9 023 -5 586 -20 464 5161 -24 376 7 446 3 862 29 962 
Argentina 7 079 9 466 414 32 101 -1985 -3 758 -561 69 3 726 460 1916 
Bolivia 378 76 258 -102 -50 -44 -134 -121 -131 236 171 175 
Brazil 6 871 7 696 31 109 6 890 6 543 12973 -8 709 -7 215 -12 920 1 819 672 -53 
Chile 2 681 3 855 921 585 3 217 1081 -171 -2918 -740 -414 -299 -341 
Colombia 2132 3197 4 404 2 164 350 -17 -152 -350 15 -12 0 
Costa Rica 436 376 322 -183 -87 185 60 65 -185 123 22 0 
Ecuador too -81 324 -582 -761 -502 -499 -449 233 1081 1 210 269 
El Salvador 177 131 423 59 113 147 -112 -113 -72 53 0 -75 
Guatemala 864 595 321 162 -43 -204 -110 2 158 -52 41 46 
Haiti -6 -25 275 -23 -21 200 -19 13 -200 42 8 0 
Honduras 126 307 250 -183 -20 26 100 -17 -135 83 37 109 
Mexico 30 632 11754 -14 652 7 232 -17 666 -15 306 -6 057 18 865 -10 654 -1 175 -1 199 25 960 
Nicaragua -375 -55 -496 -1019 -784 -1202 79 -81 -4 940 865 1 206 
Panama 299 806 681 -277 -403 94 -93 -106 -77 370 509 -17 
Paraguay 895 1521 1244 83 326 47 -86 -328 -47 3 2 0 
Peru 2 291 4 083 3 850 648 1980 103 -748 -3 038 -947 100 1058 844 
Dominican 
Republic 459 -227 -20 34 -386 143 -154 385 -113 120 1 -30 
Uruguay 433 677 557 190 238 209 -180 -243 -162 -10 5 -47 
Venezuela 1 463 -3 934 -3 408 -530 -1 484 -1901 144 1 173 1901 386 311 0 
Source: E C L A C , on the basis of  figures  from  the International Monetary Fund ( I M F ) and national sources. 
" Includes errors and omissions. 
Plan. The amounts include principal of  US$ 4.4 
billion and interest arrears of  US$ 5 billion. There 
are four  principal options: i) a par bond, guaranteed 
by the United States Treasury Department, with 
a 30-year term and grace period and with interest 
rates rising gradually from  3% to 5%; ii) a 
discount bond, also guaranteed by the United 
States Treasury Department, with a 30-year term 
and grace period, at a 45% discount and an 
interest rate equal to six-month LIBOR plus 
0.81%; iii) an interest-reduction bond with a 
20-year term and an eight-year grace period at an 
interest rate of  3.25% during the first  two years, 
rising to 4.5% in the ninth and tenth years and to 
LIBOR plus 0.81% in the eleventh to the twentieth 
years; and iv) a direct debt buyback option, part 
of  which the Government of  Peru used in 1995 
to buy back an amount not officially  disclosed. 
The greater part of  the interest was to be paid over 
20 years with a grace period of  5 years, at interest 
rates equal to the three-month LIBOR plus 0.81%, 
and the rate of  interest on unpaid interest would 
be 2.5% per year. 
In November 1995, Nicaragua, whose external 
debt was equivalent to six times its output in 
1994, bought back 81% of  its debt of  US$ 1,727 
million owed to commercial banks at 8% of  its 
face  value. This operation was financed  with a 
loan of  US$ 40 million from  the Inter-American 
Development Bank, grant of  a US$ 40 million 
from  the World Bank and US$ 25 million in 
assistance from  the Governments of  the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. In March 
1995, Nicaragua signed an agreement restructuring 
its bilateral debt with countries members of  the 
Paris Club; Bolivia followed  suit in March and 
December, as did Haiti in May and Honduras in 
February 1996. All these countries availed 
themselves of  the Naples terms, which aim to 
allow the poorest and most severely indebted 
nations to reduce their bilateral debt by 50% or 
67%. To qualify  for  these terms, countries must 
either have a per capita output under US$ 500 or 
a debt/export ratio of  over 350%. They must also 
have complied satisfactorily  with the adjustment 







1. General trends 
Argentina's economy contracted by more than 
4% in 1995, bringing to an end the expansionary 
phase of  the preceding four-year  period, during 
which gross domestic product (GDP) had 
increased by nearly 35%. The downturn in the 
economy was associated with an abrupt change 
in the trends in capital flows  and foreign  trade. 
The influx  of  financial  resources slackened 
considerably, while a trade surplus was recorded 
for  the first  time since 1991. A surge in exports 
mitigated the impact on the level of  economic 
activity of  the slowdown in domestic demand. 
The decline in output exacerbated 
unemployment. Inflation  continued to fall:  for 
the year as a whole, the consumer price index 
(CPI) rose less than 2%. 
During the first  few  months of  1995, there was 
considerable turbulence in the financial  markets, 
and demand for  assets plummeted. The 
government economic team managed to dispel 
doubts about whether the exchange-rate regime 
would endure and to prevent the problems in the 
financial  system from  worsening. Nevertheless, 
there was a credit squeeze, which clearly affected 
domestic demand and the level of  economic 
activity. The markets for  financial  assets began 
to return to normal in the second half  of  the year, 
although conditions continued to fluctuate. 
Deposits began to flow  back into the banks, and 
this, along with greater demand for  securities, led 
to a gradual relaxation of  the supply of  credit, 
thus easing the financial  constraints on real 
activity. However, the economy continued to 
suffer  the after-effects  of  the crisis that broke out 
in early 1995, and output declined in the second 
half. 
Towards the end of  the year, there were signs 
of  a turnaround in both demand for  industrial 
goods and output, boosted by favourable  trends 
in financial  markets and exports. These 
developments were reflected  in the first  quarter 
of  1996 in a recovery (adjusted for  seasonal 
factors)  in activity, although it still remained 
below pre-recession levels. The employment 
ratio, on the other hand, further  deteriorated; the 
unemployment rate in May was 17%, though the 
actual number of  unemployed declined, as a 
result of  lower labour force  participation. Tax 
receipts were eroded by the already depressed 
volume of  aggregate expenditure and cuts in 
social security contributions. In the first 
quarter of  1996, the national public sector 
posted a primary deficit  in terms of  its cash 
performance,  though the Government 
managed without too much difficulty  to raise 
sufficient  finances  through placement of 
securities. At the same time, the lack of 
inflationary  pressures became evident; the 
consumer price index for  the first  six months of 
1996 was actually negative. 
2. Economic policy 
The upheaval in financial  markets after  the 
Mexican peso was devalued had an adverse 
effect  on domestic activity, causing a shift  in 
Argentina's economic outlook in 1995. 
Monetary authorities faced  the challenge of 
dealing with liquidity problems in the financial 
system, while simultaneously keeping operative 
the convertibility system, which served as the 
frame  of  reference  for  price formation  and 
asset-holding decisions. In other words, they 
were forced  to deal with a critical situation 
within an institutional framework  that imposed 
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Figure 1 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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tight constraints on the Central Bank of 
Argentina. 
In early 1995, the main focus  of  economic 
policy was on reinforcing  expectations 
concerning the maintenance of  the convertibility 
regime, while at the same time implementing a 
variety of  measures to shore up the financial 
system. The authorities sent clear signals that 
they would adhere to the current monetary 
regime, and thereby managed to ensure that the 
uncertainty then prevailing in asset markets did 
not affect  expectations concerning the parity of 
the peso. 
The renewal of  the extended fund  facility  with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
had been suspended in 1994, was a signal 
designed to ease pressures on financial  markets. 
The targets set in this instance called for  strict 
fiscal  restraint in the second half. 
In March 1996, the authorities announced a 
series of  measures aimed at bolstering public 
revenues. The agreement reached with the IMF 
also entailed extensive financing  for  the public 
sector, to be provided both by the agency itself 
and by other international lending institutions. In 
addition, the Government undertook a special 
bond issue, which was absorbed by large 
domestic firms  and foreign  banks. 
Beginning in the second quarter, severe credit 
rationing had a major impact on demand and the 
level of  activity and also affected  tax revenues. 
The increased budget constraints hit some 
provinces especially hard, causing at times 
lengthy delays in payments, including wages. 
The palpable need for  economic stability was 
probably the major factor  behind the re-election 
in May of  President Carlos Menem, who made 
no changes to his cabinet. 
In the second half  of  1995, demand for 
financial  assets revived. The change in the 
economic climate was probably a reflection  of 
foreign  investors' greater willingness to channel 
funds  into the Latin American region, as well 
as the perception that the local market had 
overcome the crisis. Interest rates continued 
on their downward path, and, starting in 
May, the volume of  bank deposits staged a 
gradual recovery, though the upswing in 
credit was slow and marked by cautious 
behaviour on the part of  both borrowers and 
providers of  funds.  Internationa] reserves 
increasedsubstantially. 
In early 1995, the customs union between the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 
countries took effect.  Exhaustive negotiations 
were conducted throughout the year concerning 
aspects of  the area's trade regime. They focused 
particularly on the standards applicable to the 
motor vehicle industry and on the products that 
countries would include in their lists of 
exceptions to the general arrangements for  the 
customs union. MERCOSUR also entered into 
negotiations with Chile and Bolivia, with a view 
to setting up trade integration mechanisms, 
which came to fruition  in 1996 with the signing 
of  association agreements. 
a) Fiscal policy 
In 1995, the national public sector 
experienced a reduction in primary income and 
expenditure. The downswing in the level of 
activity and the pension reform  introduced in 
mid-1994 resulted in a decline in government 
revenues. A variety of  economic adjustment 
measures were implemented in an effort  to close 
the fiscal  gap. The ratio of  the national public 
sector financial  deficit  to GDP remained low, 
although somewhat higher than the preceding 
year. The overall deficit  in 1995 was equivalent 
to 0.5% of  GDP (excluding privatizations), while 
the financial  result showed a surplus on the order 
of  1% of  GDP (0.6% excluding privatizations). 
The national public sector's current income 
declined in nominal terms, because value added 
tax (VAT), which accounts for  an appreciable 
share of  tax revenues, applies primarily to 
consumption, which contracted sharply during 
the recession. Furthermore, the full  impact of 
social security reform  was felt  in 1995, since a 
proportion of  social security contributions 
shifted  to private pension funds,  and the number 
of  contributors to the retirement scheme 
declined. The entry into effect  of  the MERCOSUR 
customs union also brought about a decline in 
fiscal  revenues by reducing tariffs  on foreign 
trade. Lastly, it is likely that a combination of 
lower income and liquidity constraints faced  by 




ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 




Contribution to growth of  GDP C 
Consumption d 
Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate c 
Open unemployment rate 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 8 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial  account 
Overall balance 
International reserves (variation) 
External debt 
Gross debt (as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports)1 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
-1.9 -6.1 0.0 8.8 8.6 6.1 7.4 -4.4 
-3.3 -7.4 -1.3 7.4 7.3 4.8 6.2 -5.5 
-1.9 -7.2 2.6 9.2 9.8 6.9 7.3 -4.1 
-1.6 -9.5 1.7 10.2 7.7 4.5 6.2 -5.2 
-2.2 1.0 -1.1 3.8 9.7 7.9 7.3 
-2.0 -3.7 -0.1 7.2 7.3 7.2 8.4 -3.6 
Percentages 
-3.4 -2.5 -0.1 9.1 8.6 4.5 4.5 -4.1 
-0.4 -4.7 -1.5 3.5 4.9 2.6 3.9 -3.6 
1.4 0.2 1.8 -0.6 -0.1 0.2 1.3 1.6 
0.5 0.8 -0.1 -3.2 -4.8 -1.3 -2.3 1.7 
Percentages of  GDP b 
19.2 15.4 13.9 16.0 19.3 20.7 22.9 20.1 
18.1 14.5 17.1 15.6 15.3 16.7 18.1 18.9 
1.1 0.9 -3.2 0.4 4.0 4.0 4.8 1.2 
Percentages 
39.1 39.8 39.1 39.5 40.0 41.3 41.0 42.0 
6.3 7.6 7.4 6.5 7.0 9.6 11.5 17.4 
442.2 323.5 100.0 259.1 203.7 263.7 363.9 352.0 
Growth rates 
387.7 4 923.8 1 343.9 84.0 17.5 7.4 3.9 1.6 
431.6 5 386.4 798.4 56.7 3.2 0.1 5.8 6.0 
97.9 96.6 100.0 101.6 109.5 111.6 109.7 111.6 
0.0009 0.0290 0.4150 0.9171 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.03 
129.7 143.1 100.0 83.3 77.5 74.0 78.4 86.4 
Millions of  dollars 
-1 572 -1 305 4 552 -647 -6 546 -7 047 -9 365 -2 399 
3 555 5 106 7 954 2 820 -3 639 -5 086 -7 095 83 
11 149 11 766 14 800 14 386 14 795 15 624 18 509 23 859 
7 594 6 660 6 846 11 566 18 434 20710 25 604. 23 776, 
431 -8 008 -5 850 160 8 838 7 397 6 557 9 521 
-1 306 -9 562 -583 -828 2 429 32 101 -1 985 
1 888 -1 826 3 121 2 040 4 477 3 758 561 -69 
Percentages 
31.2 26.9 27.1 29.1 34.2 
40.1 48.9 25.4 24.0 19.0 7.1 7.1 5.4 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 





Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of 
banking system 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Dollar deposits 




Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign  currency 
Percentages of  GDP 
12.8 12.7 13.2 15.0 17.4 19.9 17.9 17.4 
15.2 13.9 15.4 16.2 16.8 17.3 16.9 17.2 
-2.4 -1.2 -2.1 -1.2 0.6 2.6 1.0 0.2 
3.9 2.6 1.7 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.1 0.6 
-6.3 -3.8 -3.8 -1.6 -0.1 1.4 -0.1 -0.4 
Growth rates 
273.8 8 013.1 230.5 151.9 15.0 32.0 
293.1 14 888.4 220.1 55.9 -21.6 14.2 
354.3 5 607.7 734.5 112.0 53.5 23.7 
337.6 4 102.8 1 070.8 146.2 50.4 34.8 12! 6 2.5 
483.7 213.7 4 718.7 65.5 73.8 47.1 11.1 -8.2 
442.2 1 105.0 1 802.9 105.2 59.9 40.3 12.0 -2.5 
473.1 268.5 64.7 60.7 25.9 2.5 
Annual rates 
-25.2 -10.4 -3.8 3.4 4.3 . 10.6 
81.9 43.6 12.5 14.3 17.2 23.5 
138.0 -8.8 13.1 10.1 8.2 12.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b B a s e d on constant 1990doIIars. cTheseentriesmeasuretheimpactofthevariationineachaggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Includes variation in inventories. e Percentages of  the total population. f  Percentages 
of  the economically active population (EAP). 8 Corresponds to the exchange rate for  exports. h Capital pending 
classification  according to the methodology used in the fifth  edition of  the Balance of  Payments Manual. Includes the banking 
sector and the non-financial  public and private sectors. 1 Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided 
by exports of  goods and services. J Includes the national administration, the national social security system and public-sector 
enterprises. Relates to final  budget figures. Interest rates on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1 9 9 0 = 1 0 0 ) b 
Real interest rate (annualized, 
On deposits 
On loans 
1993 1994 1995 a 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
12.1 12.3 8.9 7 .4 5.1 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.3 3.6 2 .2 1.6 
75 .0 74.4 73.3 73 .2 73.5 75.6 80.8 83.5 83.9 87.1 87.5 87.1 
4.5 -2.0 5.3 5.7 6.0 3.9 1.2 6.1 11.4 15.0 7.4 8.7 
14.9 8.7 15.8 17.7 19.9 16.6 12.6 19.9 22,0 31.3 26.3 14.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Refers  to the exchange rate for  exports. 
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In order to bolster government revenues, the 
authorities increased the VAT rate, suspended cuts 
on employer social security contributions, raised 
import duties and reduced drawbacks on exports; 
in addition, they approved facilities  for  settling 
tax liabilities and imposed severe penalties on tax 
evaders. 
By far  the largest increase in the national 
public sector's cash expenditure was for  interest 
payments; if  this category is excluded, total cash 
expenditure recorded a slight drop. In particular, 
outlays for  wages and salaries fell  by around 5%. 
Social security spending rose yet again (2.5%) 
though much less than in previous years (20% in 
1994). National government transfers  to the 
provinces declined by around 1%. Capital 
expenditure contracted by the equivalent of  1.1 % 
of  GDP. 
Privatization operations involving electricity 
distribution enterprises, a hydroelectric power 
plant, a gas distribution firm  and petrochemical 
companies generated resources equivalent to 
0.4% of  GDP, well in excess of  privatization 
receipts in 1994. 
Public-sector financial  debt rose by some 
6.8 billion pesos to exceed the 87 billion peso 
level. Part of  the increase was due to 
consolidation of  previously contracted debt, 
compounding of  interest and exchange losses. 
Throughout 1995, the Government was active 
in issuing and redeeming obligations. Among 
the debt issues were major loans granted by 
international agencies, under the terms of  the 
financial  package agreed to early in the year. 
The first  half  of  1995 saw a marked decline 
in demand for  government paper, but open 
market operations resumed in August once 
demand picked up. The bill and bond 
offerings  by the Government included 
issues denominated in yen and deutsche 
marks. 
Public finances  continued to be a subject of 
concern in the early part of  1996. In an effort  to 
raise tax revenues, the Government secured the 
approval of  the legislature to keep the VAT rate 
at 21% and to widen the base of  both this tax and 
the tax on profits.  In addition, reforms  to the 
public administration were proposed, including 
the elimination of  some agencies and staff 
cutbacks. 
b) Monetary policy and the credit markets 
During 1995, the money stock, which by 
virtue of  the convertibility system is in practice 
determined by demand, rose by a bare 3.5%. The 
cumulative increase was due to an upturn during 
the second half  of  the year, since there was a 
decline in the first  half.  The contraction in the 
demand for  money in the first  half  was linked to 
a marked drop in the demand for  domestic assets, 
stemming from  the lower volume of  transactions 
and the uncertainty surrounding the stability of 
the financial  system. Hence, the liquidity ratio 
comparing M2 with output fell  for  the first  time 
since the early part of  the decade. 
The financial  crisis necessitated intensive 
monetary management, within the limits set by 
the convertibility system. The authorities could 
count on a significant  external financing  package 
in a period of  heavy turbulence in the credit 
markets. To cope with the emergency, the 
authorities expanded the scope of  action allowed 
by the monetary system, while leaving the main 
features  of  the system unaltered, and resorted to 
external financing.  By so doing, they succeeded 
in limiting the effects  of  the turbulence on the 
banking system. Over the period in question, the 
financial  markets gradually returned to normal. 
Immediately following  the devaluation of  the 
Mexican peso, there was a sharp drop in demand 
for  bonds, and serious doubts arose as to the 
sustainability of  the exchange-rate system in 
view of  the anticipated contraction in external 
credit. The public increased its precautionary 
demand for  foreign  exchange, as reflected  in a 
shift  from  assets denominated in the local 
currency to assets in dollars. 
Foreign exchange reserves held by the Centra] 
Bank (US$ 2.6 billion) declined considerably in 
the first  two months of  1995, as did bank deposits 
in pesos. Until late February, however, deposits 
in dollars were only slightly affected  by 
withdrawals, although trends in total deposits 
varied widely from  one institution to another. 
Heightened uncertainty about the exchange rate 
put upward pressure on interest rates, but the 
differential  between the rates for  transactions in 
pesos and in dollars widened. In late February, 
the gap between peso and dollar rates on bank 
loans to blue-chip companies exceeded nine 
134 
ARGENTINA 
points per annum, in contrast to the difference  of 
just over two points in early December 1994. 
The Central Bank employed a variety of 
instruments to reassure markets about the 
continuity of  the exchange-rate system and to 
shore up financial  institutions' liquidity. The 
conversion into dollars of  the reserves banks held 
with the Central Bank served as a signal that 
policy was directed towards maintaining the 
close link between the peso and the dollar. 
Reserve requirements were relaxed, and 
minimum cash requirements for  peso and dollar 
accounts were made uniform.  The Central Bank 
also lowered penalties for  reserve shortfalls  and 
injected liquidity into the banking system. In 
addition, a safety  net was set up to assist 
institutions with liquidity problems. 
In late February, the authorities amended the 
Central Bank charter to expand its scope of  action 
in aiding the financial  system by means of 
rediscount operations, which had been severely 
restricted. The Central Bank was also authorized 
to transfer  any loan portfolios  it had acquired. 
The law governing financial  institutions was 
amended, empowering the Central Bank to 
restructure institutions before  suspending their 
operations. 
Financial turbulence intensified  in March, 
because of  the perception that the crisis far  from 
ending, threatened to deepen. Though there was 
no run on the banks, there was widespread doubt 
as to the soundness of  the financial  system as a 
whole. The decline in deposits spread to dollar 
deposits and to all categories of  banks, some of 
which could not meet their obligations at 
maturity. The banks' ability to lend fell  sharply. 
Interest rates, meanwhile, sky-rocketed; by 
mid-March, the prime rate was 27% for 
dollar-denominated loans and in excess of  40% 
for  peso-denominated loans. 
In March, tension in the credit markets eased 
with the announcement of  the external aid 
package linked to the IMF agreement and with the 
implementation of  fiscal  and financial  measures. 
Although there was no quick recovery, the specter 
of  accumulating deposit withdrawals faded. 
Beginning in May, signs of  recovery in the 
financial  markets strengthened -though not 
without fluctuations-  as doubts about the health 
of  the banking system dissipated. Thus, in 
December, the stock index was almost 50% 
above the low recorded in March, though it was 
still somewhat below the level in December 
1994. Moreover, there were signs of  an increase 
in deposits, especially in the dollar segment, 
which offset  a good part of  the decline in the first 
months of  the year. The increase in deposit 
holdings led to an overall decline in interest rates. 
By late 1995, rates in pesos were below the levels 
in mid-December 1994, while the analogous 
rates in dollars were a little higher. 
Just as the previous decline in loans had been 
less abrupt, so the recovery in bank lending to the 
private sector was less marked than the recovery 
in deposits. Contributing factors  were the 
repayment of  rediscounts, encouraged by the 
Central Bank, and of  foreign  lines of  credit 
together with a shift  in the emphasis of  lending 
towards the public sector. 
The recovery of  the financial  markets 
continued into the early months of  1996. The 
prices of  assets showed signs of  recovery, in a 
climate sensitive to fluctuations  in international 
financial  centres and short-term movements in 
the domestic economy. 
One of  the consequences of  the events of  1995 
was that the number of  financial  institutions 
dropped from  over 200 to around 150. This 
development was largely the result of  mergers 
and acquisitions, involving roughly 10% of  the 
sector's total assets. In addition, four  state-owned 
provincial banks were privatized. A relatively 
small group of  institutions, representing about 
2.5% of  the banking system's assets as of  late 
1994, had their licence to operate revoked or 
suspended. The larger banks were less affected 
by a loss of  deposits in the first  half  and 
experienced most of  the benefit  from  the 
subsequent recovery, and this increased the 
concentration of  intermediated funds.  The 
composition of  which loans and deposits with 
respect to currency changed, with an increase in 
dollar-denominated transactions. 
In September 1995 the Central Bank decided 
to replace the reserve requirements for  banks 
with liquidity requirements that they could meet 
by holding a variety of  assets. This measure was 
intended to help banks build back their liquidity 
and to encourage a reduction in the spread 
between lending and borrowing rates. 
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3. T h e m 
a) Economic activity 
The decline in output in 1995 of  around 4.5% 
was not as drastic as in previous recessions, but 
the turnaround was abrupt. The change in 
aggregate output from  one year to the next was 
nearly 12%. The recession was associated with a 
significant  slump in domestic demand, which, as 
had occurred in the expansionary phase, 
fluctuated  more than GDP. 
The substantial increase in export volumes 
reduced the impact of  the contraction in demand. 
On the supply side, activity in the goods-
producing sectors declined somewhat more than 
average, after  expanding less than GDP in the 
previous phase of  the cycle. Manufacturing  and 
construction both witnessed major downturns, 
which were mitigated by the output increases in 
natural resource-based sectors (agriculture and 
mining). The slump in domestic demand also 
affected  the service sector, which had 
experienced robust growth in previous years. 
The financial  upheaval that marked the early 
months of  1995 produced, though with 
something of  a lag, a break in the trend in real 
activity. During the first  quarter GDP remained at 
high levels, but showed a marked deterioration 
in the second quarter. The recessionary trend 
continued throughout the rest of  1995, and it was 
only in the final  months of  the year that signs 
emerged of  an upturn in the demand for  industrial 
goods. This positive trend became clearer in the 
first  six months of  1996, coinciding with the 
recovery of  the credit markets. Estimated 
industrial output figures  for  April and May 19% 
were higher than they had been a year earlier. 
Figures for  GDP in the first  quarter showed a 
decline with respect to the same period of  the 
preceding year, but a comparison with late 1995, 
after  adjustment for  seasonal factors,  reveals a 
more positive picture. 
Domestic demand fell  by more than 7% in 
1995. Aggregate consumption slipped by over 
5%, with very substantia] declines in purchases 
of  durable goods and slackening demand for 
services. 
As usual in fluctuations  in economic activity, 
fixed  investment varied much more than output. 
A decline of  some 16% in capital formation 
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variables 
entailed a drop of  around three points in the rate 
of  investment, which at 20% was nevertheless 
higher than the average for  1991-1994. The 
downturn in investment affected  both 
construction and purchases of  machinery and 
equipment. 
The genera] decline in demand for  assets in 
the first  half  of  1995 also affected  real estate. This 
was reflected  in a decrease in the volume of  sales 
of  completed units (and to some extent in prices) 
and a postponement of  new project starts. The 
second half  saw an increase in the supply of 
mortgage credit, which had played a major role 
in the expansion of  the sector in previous periods. 
The decline in spending on machinery and 
equipment marked the end of  several years of 
vigorous growth. Reduced demand for  capital 
goods in 1995 occurred across the board, 
affecting  both transport equipment and 
machinery, of  local and imported origin. 
In this context, a sustained increase in export 
quantities helped considerably to offset  the 
slump in aggregate demand. Though the increase 
in external sales was influenced  in some sectors 
by reduced local absorption, other contributing 
factors  were the generally positive trends in 
international markets and improved capacity to 
supply those markets. The growth observed in 
1995 extended to all major categories of  goods, 
both primary goods and manufactures;  a 
breakdown of  exports by destination reveals an 
increase in sales to Brazil. Import volumes fell 
after  several years of  rapid growth. The downturn 
recorded in 1995 reflected  a significant  decline 
in the demand for  final  imported goods, while 
imports of  intermediate goods held up and even 
showed a small increase. 
In terms of  the output of  the different  sectors, 
1995 was characterized by considerable setbacks 
in construction and manufacturing.  In fact,  of  all 
the major groups of  activities, manufacturing 
was the only one in which output fell  below the 
level recorded in 1993 (though trends in the 
various branches were quite mixed). 
Agricultural production rose, boosted by 
improved international prices. The grain harvest 
for  1994-1995 was well in excess of  44 million 
tons, the largest on record in recent decades, and 
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9% larger than the previous harvest, while 
production in the livestock sector was 
comparable to that of  the preceding year. During 
1995, there was a continuation of  the downward 
trend in domestic meat consumption, presumably 
as a result of  changes in eating habits. Because 
of  lower domestic demand, a higher proportion 
of  the cattle slaughtered went to export, and 
hence export volumes increased significantly.  At 
the same time, slaughtering was affected  by the 
drought in the pampas region. On a more positive 
note, the elimination of  foot-and-mouth  disease 
should open up prospects for  access to new 
foreign  markets. 
The brisk activity which characterized the 
mining sector in 1994 continued in 1995, with 
further  increases in the production of  oil (8%) and 
natural gas (9%).  The prospects for  metals also 
improved, as sizeable investments were planned 
for  the sector. 
Domestic sales of  industrial goods declined 
markedly in 1995, but external demand proved 
relatively stable. However, the various sectors 
differed  quite noticeably in their ability to 
channel supply towards foreign  markets. The 
desire to export acted as an incentive to firms  to 
strengthen their competitiveness through 
organizational changes, and in some subsectors, 
such as food  and consumer chemical products, 
through merger with foreign  firms.  Overall 
manufacturing  output contracted by almost 6%. 
The food  industries again managed to increase 
exports. This heterogeneous group comprises 
one of  the sectors that have made major changes 
in recent years, introducing new technologies in 
a variety of  activities and gaining a growing share 
in external markets. Thus, despite the slump in 
domestic demand, their production of  a number 
of  exportable goods increased, including 
vegetable oils and dairy products. In contrast, 
there were declines in categories, such as 
beverages, that are more sensitive to local 
consumption trends. 
The chemicals industry also exhibited mixed 
trends. Production of  many commodities 
increased, but consumer products, 
pharmaceuticals and petroleum products all 
suffered  setbacks. 
The iron and steel industry continued to 
expand, despite declining domestic sales. There 
was also growth in refining  of  non-ferrous 
metals, such as aluminium and zinc. On the other 
hand, metalworking industries experienced a 
sharp contraction. 
The motor vehicle industry also experienced 
a major slump. Production of  finished  vehicles 
plunged by 30%, to under 300,000 units, in spite 
of  increased sales to Brazil. The slowdown in 
domestic demand also affected  vehicle imports. 
Output of  basic services did not repeat its 
dynamic growth of  previous years, but was not 
severely affected  by the recession. One of  the 
outstanding features  of  the expansionary phase 
of  1991-1994 had been the rapid growth in "other 
services" reflecting  the strong rise in spending. 
The recession of  1995 had a reverse effect  on 
these sectors, although their output declined 
somewhat less than the average. Weak domestic 
demand caused a sharp drop in commercial 
activity, while the financial  sector was affected 
by the decrease in intermediated funds. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The rise in the consumer price index (CPI) 
amounted to 1.6% in 1995, less than half  that 
recorded in 1994, with the bulk of  the increase 
occurring in January (1.2%). Notwithstanding 
the VAT rate hike in April, the cumulative 
variation for  the rest of  the year was very slight, 
with declines in some months. For the first  time 
since the start of  the decade, the relative price of 
private services rose less than the overall level. 
In marked contrast to earlier periods, in 1995 
the wholesale price index (WPI) rose more than 
the consumer price index. The 6% increase in WPI 
was primarily attributable to higher international 
prices, especially for  agro-based products. 
The labour market had been in upheaval in 
recent years, as a result of  fluctuations  in the 
labour supply and weak job creation during the 
period of  economic expansion. The 
unemployment rate, which had risen above the 
12% mark in October 1994, hit 18.4% in May 
1995. 
The jump in unemployment was largely the 
result of  the increase in the labour force 
participation rate. The supply of  labour, which 
had dropped off  during 1994, rebounded in May 
1995 to surpass the all-time highs of  recent 
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decades. The decline in wages is believed to have 
obliged a large number of  the economically 
inactive, especially women and young people, to 
seek employment. 
The October survey noted a small increase in 
the number of  employed compared with the 
figures  for  May. At the same time, the survey 
revealed a drop in the labour force  participation 
rate; in this situation, the decrease in the labour 
supply was reflected  in the unemployment rate, 
which fell  by 2% for  all urban areas, although 
there was a simultaneous increase in the 
incidence of  underemployment. 
Nominal wages in manufacturing  changed 
very little in 1995, which meant a slight drop in 
real terms. It is likely that the erosion in average 
pay per person was more dramatic, due to a 
reduction in the average number of  hours 
worked. Moreover, it would appear that 
renegotiation of  lower pay levels was a 
widespread occurrence, particularly in the higher 
wage brackets. Another development with regard 
to labour costs was the reintroduction in early 
1996 of  reductions in employer social security 
contributions, after  the cuts had been suspended 
the year before  for  fiscal  reasons. 
c) The external sector 
In the early 1990s, Argentina enjoyed an 
abundant supply of  external credit, while 
residents showed a marked propensity to increase 
their expenditure; these two phenomena 
combined between 1992 and 1994 to expand the 
balance-of-payments  current account deficit.  In 
late 1994, there was a break in the trend in capital 
inflows,  and the overall picture changed 
abruptly. 
In 1995, the current account deficit  (-US$ 2.4 
billion) was one quarter of  the figure  recorded the 
year before  (-US$ 9.4 billion); this was 
attributable to the fact  that the merchandise trade 
gap (US$ 4.2 billion) turned into a surplus of 
US$ 2.24 billion. The real services deficit  also 
narrowed, largely due to a decline in spending on 
overseas travel. The financial  services deficit 
widened by about US$ 300 million, owing to an 
increase in profits  and dividends earned by 
foreign  investors. At the same time, it is 
estimated that higher interest payments on 
financial  debt were offset  by improved returns on 
Argentine residents' investments abroad, with 
the result that the net deficit  under the "interest" 
category decreased slightly. 
The first  quarter witnessed a sudden outflow 
of  private capital, leading to a sharp drop in 
international reserves. In the second quarter, the 
current account swung from  a deficit  to a surplus. 
During the same quarter, the public sector 
obtained a sizeable volume of  resources through 
loans from  international agencies and a bond 
issue placed with foreign  banks. In this manner, 
Argentina partially added to its reserves, despite 
another net outflow  of  foreign  exchange owing 
to private-sector portfolio  activity. The recovery 
was weak in the third quarter, but gathered steam 
in the final  months of  the year. 
Despite a reduced flow  of  credit to the country 
for  most of  the year, there seems to have been a 
consolidation of  foreign  direct investments, 
apparently based on decisions influenced  by 
factors  other than cyclical fluctuations  in the 
economy. In contrast, portfolio  transactions of 
the non-financial  private sector showed a 
sizeable deficit.  Net placements of  debt 
instruments by private-sector firms  were 
negative in the first  quarter, but over the course 
of  the year reached a volume somewhat in excess 
of  the figure  for  1994. In the aggregate, however, 
the various financial  transactions by firms  and 
individuals gave rise to a net outflow  of  capital 
on the order of  US$ 9 billion. The outflow  was 
partially offset  by borrowing by banks, 
especially during the first  quarter, when the need 
to maintain their liquidity levels led them to draw 
on foreign  lines of  credit. 
The public sector undertook numerous 
external financing  operations. A significant 
proportion of  these transactions involved loans 
from  international agencies, which represented a 
net inflow  of  funds  of  some US$ 4.2 billion. 
Privatizations were concentrated in the 
second half  and were responsible for  a capital 
inflow  of  US$ 960 million. National government 
bond issues generated a net inflow  of  somewhere 
over US$ 3 billion; most bond sales took place 
towards the end of  the year, when demand for 
Argentine paper had picked up. 
Total external financial  transactions by 
government entities resulted in an increase in 
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public-sector external debt by US$ 5.7 billion 
(from  US$ 61.3 billion to US$ 67 billion). Gross 
private financial  debt owed to non-residents 
increased, in spite of  net private capital outflows. 
In consequence, total external debt expanded to 
some US$ 89 billion, roughly US$ 10 billion 
more than at the end of  1994, though the 
debt-to-exports ratio improved (5 times in 1994 
to 4.4 times in 1995). 
Exports expanded by 32% in 1995, bringing 
their cumulative growth over a three-year period 
to 70%. In 1995, all major export categories 
recorded growth, including agricultural products 
(26%), fuels  (over 30%), and non-agro-based 
manufactures  (44%). 
A geographical breakdown of  trade flows  by 
destination shows that the percentage of  trade 
with MERCOSUR rose once again in 1995. 
Argentine exports to MERCOSUR countries 
increased by more than 40% in value and 
accounted for  about one third of  total exports, 
more than double the level five  years earlier. 
In 1995 there was a sharp decline in imports 
of  finished  goods, in a partial reversal of  the 
strong growth of  the preceding years. Imports of 
capital goods, for  example, fell  by almost a fifth, 
though their level was still 20% higher than in 
1993. Imports of  consumer goods slumped by 
over 25%, returning to 1992 levels. Despite the 
slowdown in domestic activity, particularly 
industrial output, imports of  fuels  and 
intermediate goods expanded. This was due 
primarily to the performance  of  categories such 
as chemical products and paper, prices of  which 
rose strongly in international markets; 
furthermore,  these goods were in many cases 
purchased as inputs for  industries that were not 




1. General trends 
In 1995 the growth rate of  the Bolivian economy 
slowed, and inflation  rose from  8% to 13%; on 
a more positive note, the current account deficit 
remained within a sustainable range, the fiscal 
gap declined, and international reserves 
increased; this set of  circumstances enabled the 
country to stave off  a crisis in the banking 
system. 
From a longer-term perspective, the most 
important development was the implementation 
of  structural reforms  formulated  by the 
Government that took office  in 1993, including 
its programme of  "capitalizing" public-sector 
enterprises. 
Output growth roughly equalled the average 
since 1987; trends in prices were also in line with 
the moderate inflation  rates prevailing since then, 
following  bouts of  hyperinflation  in the first  half 
of  the 1980s. Prices rose more rapidly in the first 
half  of  1996, but actually decreased in the two 
months that followed. 
The current account deficit  widened to just 
over US$ 300 million, reflecting  the fact  that 
import growth more than doubled that of  exports. 
The gap was financed  by increased capital flows, 
particularly foreign  direct investment. 
Macroeconomic management was facilitated 
by the reduction of  the weight of  the consolidated 
public-sector deficit  to less than 2% of  GDP, the 
lowest level in many years, due primarily to 
cutbacks in government spending and improved 
domestic and customs revenues. 
2. Economic policy 
Maintaining macroeconomic stability continued 
to be a high priority of  economic policy; despite 
this emphasis, monetary aggregates tended to 
expand. The trend was the result of  the special 
financial  assistance provided by the Central Bank 
of  Bolivia to the financial  system following  the 
failure  of  two banks and the liquidity shortages 
facing  other institutions owing to an abrupt 
decline in inflows  of  external resources triggered 
by the Mexican crisis. The reduction of  the fiscal 
deficit,  resulting in a substantial decrease in net 
credit to the public sector, allowed more room for 
manoeuvre in monetary management. 
The long-drawn-out negotiations for 
Bolivia's entry into the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) culminated in June 19% 
with the signing of  a trade integration agreement, 
which is set to take effect  in early 1997 and 
provides for  progressive automatic tariff 
reductions. 
Around 5,000 hectares -or about one tenth of 
the area devoted to coca plantations in the 
Chapare region in the centre of  the country-were 
destroyed as part of  the anti-drug programme 
conducted by the Bolivian Government with the 
support of  the United States. The eradication of 
plantations by farmers,  offered  US$ 2,500 for 
every hectare destroyed, is the chief  strategy in 
the campaign against drug-trafficking.  United 
States financial  aid was cut from  US$ 125 million 
to about US$ 90 million. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Since the tax burden in bolivia is below 
average for  Latin America, the key to reducing 
the public-sector deficit  is to increase revenues. 
Domestic taxation rose by the equivalent of 
more than 1% of  G D P in 1995, thanks to the 
increase in the transaction tax rate from  2% to 
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3%, improved revenues from  specific  consumption 
taxes and enhanced efficiency  in administration 
reflected  in the fact  that the number of  taxpayers 
was increased by more than 20%. 
Current expenditure declined by a similar 
percentage as a result of  a decline in personnel 
costs due to the elimination of  fictitious  posts and 
the fact  that wage hikes (7.5%) lagged behind 
inflation.  Education and health were the only 
sectors in which pay raises kept pace with the rise 
in consumer prices. 
Accordingly, the relative size of  the fiscal 
deficit,  equal to just over 3% of  GDP in 1994, fell 
below the 2% mark in 1995. 
Efforts  to cut back on spending should be 
facilitated  by the process of  capitalizing public-
sector enterprises, as outlays in the form  of 
subsidies to cover deficits  and contributions to 
finance  investment programmes are eliminated. 
One of  the immediate effects  of  the capitalization 
programme, however, was the almost 1% drop in 
the level of  income from  public-sector 
enterprises to 3.5% of  GDP. A portion of  both 
domestic and foreign  sales began to be shared 
with strategic partners, who now own half  the 
stock of  the capitalized firms. 
b) Monetary policy 
The banking crisis that loomed in the first  half 
of  1995 obliged the Central Bank to authorize 
major credit assistance to institutions in difficulty 
to prevent a liquidity crunch. That necessity 
complicated the task of  achieving the stipulated 
targets for  net domestic credit and international 
reserves and impeded the progress of  the 
stabilization programme. 
In order to meet these financing  requirements, 
and at the same time halt a major outflow  of 
resources abroad, open market operations were 
stepped up. Purchases and sales by the Central 
Bank of  its own certificates  of  deposit and 
Treasury bills were the most common operations 
used to control the money supply. 
In the first  half  of  1995, the banking system 
suffered  the turbulence caused by the 
intervention in and liquidation of  the Sur and 
Cochabamba banks in late 1994. In addition, one 
of  Bolivia's main banks, the Banco Boliviano 
Americano (BBA), was faced  with a substantial 
loss of  deposits amid rumors of  possible 
insolvency, a problem that was resolved in 
mid-1995 when ownership and management 
were transferred  to new investors. 
The greater supply of  external financing  and 
the reduction of  the fiscal  deficit  enabled the 
public sector to accumulate deposits in the 
Centra] Bank of  Bolivia, with the result that net 
domestic credit loaned to the public sector 
registered a considerable decline. 
Annual average interest rates have not varied 
to any great extent. However, analysis of 
quarterly figures  reveals, beginning in May 1995, 
a rise in both loan rates and rates on fixed-term 
deposits, together with a slight rise in the rate on 
deposits in savings banks. 
For the year as a whole, the money supply 
expanded by 24% and M2 by 20%, while the 
monetary base increased by just 13%, the slowest 
growth rate in recent years. International reserves 
expanded by US$ 130 million. Private-sector 
credit increased by 13%, while public-sector 
credit declined substantially. 
The enactment of  the new Central Bank Act 
established the autonomy of  the institution, with 
the aim of  promoting the development of  the 
financial  system and long-term macroeconomic 
stability. Its first  independent Board of  Directors 
was to be appointed in 1996. 
The volume of  transactions on the stock 
exchange languished at the US$ 1 billion level 
recorded the preceding year, marking an end to 
the dynamism observable since 1992. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
The Central Bank persisted for  the second 
year in a row in its efforts  to maintain a stable 
real exchange rate, in order to preserve the 
competitiveness of  the Bolivian economy 
vis-à-vis its main trading partners. The Central 
Bank continued to use a centra] reference 
exchange rate based on a basket of  four 
currencies-the dollar, the pound sterling, the yen 
and the deutsche mark- weighted according to 
their relative importance in the balance of 
payments. The official  exchange rate applied by 
the Central Bank took into account not only the 
real effective  reference  rate but also current 
conditions in the foreign  exchange market. 
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Table 1 
BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 3.0 3.8 4.6 5.3 1.6 4.2 5.1 3.6 
Per capita gross domestic product 0.7 1.5 2.3 2.8 -0.8 1.7 2.6 1.1 
Gross national income 2.5 2.2 6.1 5.9 -0.2 3.2 8.8 2.3 
Gross domestic product, by sector 
Goods 7.5 4.6 6.3 6.0 -0.4 4.5 5.4 3.2 
Basic services 1.2 7.5 5.4 6.6 4.6 6.2 9.5 5.0 
Other services -1.2 2.8 2.5 3.8 4.0 4.5 5.2 3.0 
Percentages 
Contribution to growth of  GDP 0 
Consumption 2.9 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.5 2.8 
Government -0.5 0 .1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 
Private 3.4 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 3.2 2.6 
Gross domestic investment -4.5 -2.1 2.0 3.7 0.6 0.7 -1.0 2.4 
Exports 0.9 3.6 2.0 1.4 0.3 0.6 2.8 1.1 
Imports 3.7 -0.1 -2.0 -2.6 -2.2 -0.1 -0.1 -2.7 
Percentages of  GDP B 
Gross domestic investment 13.6 11.1 12.5 15.4 15.8 15.8 14.1 15.9 
National saving 6.3 6.0 8.7 11.1 7.9 7.7 12.1 11.3 
External saving 7.3 5.2 3.8 4.3 7.8 8.1 2.0 4.7 
Percentages 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 51.9 51.3 51.7 50.7 52.5 53.7 55.1 
Open unemployment rate 6 11.6 9.8 7.3 5.8 5.4 5.8 3.1 3.6 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 129.3 117.4 100.0 165.6 164.8 181.2 199.9 196.3 
Growth rates 
Prices (December-December) 
Retail prices 21.5 16.6 18.0 14.5 10.4 9.3 8.5 12.6 
Wholesale prices 21.5 21.7 19.8 13.8 13.6 7.5 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100)b 110.5 94.5 100.0 97.9 81.3 79.4 92.8 92.5 
Nominal exchange rate 
(bolivianos per dollar) 2.35 2.69 3.17 3.58 3.90 4.27 4.63 4.80 
Real effective  exchange rate 
Index: 1990=100) 74.1 71.9 100.0 108.3 116.3 117.6 125.1 126.6 
Millions of  dollars 
Balance of  payments 
Current account -304 -270 -199 -217 -409 -480 -125 -303 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) -175 -161 -110 -181 -447 -488 -191 -300 
Exports 671 867 977 944 809 888 1 177 1 246 
Imports 846 1028 1 087 1 125 1 255 1 375 1 367 1 545 
Capital and financial  account -48 -118 78 172 414 405 394 534 
Overall balance -281 -400 -117 -121 -140 -102 -50 -44 




(as a percentage of  GDP) 108.6 86.5 70.6 61.1 61.1 59.6 64.9 65.2 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 38.6 27.7 23.2 22.0 23.1 21.8 15.3 17.0 
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Table 1 (concl.) 




Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking 
system 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
26.2 25.0 25.7 26.2 26.1 31.5 33.7 34.2 
22.2 21.7 22.3 22.4 22.5 29.9 29.8 28.9 
4.0 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.6 1.6 3.9 5.3 
7.1 5.9 5.4 6.4 6.4 8.2 7.1 7.2 
-3.1 -2.6 -2.0 -2.6 -2.8 -6.6 -3.2 -1.9 
Growth rates 
Net international reserves 1.9 -51.0 197.9 48.1 6.9 8.8 24.4 50.0 
Net domestic credit to the 
public sector 54.5 6.5 184.2 29.9 6.0 -75.2 
Domestic credit to the 
private sector 34.6 42.0 41.1 47.8 45.7 39.2 24.0 12.6 
Money (Ml) 34.7 3.1 17.6 25.2 19.0 14.6 33.5 23.5 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 49.8 54.1 -90.5 8.9 -19.5 8 62.9 -27.3 
M2 43.2 33.3 -56.5 22.7 13.9 14.0 37.1 18.2 
Dollar deposits 64.2 30.6 106.7 68.1 44.2 41.8 7.1 19.1 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 6.7 5.3 8.4 11.9 11.9 9.3 5.6 
On loans 18.4 20.7 23.5 32.7 40.8 43.5 36.7 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign  currency 8 2.8 8.4 12.2 12.4 12.1 12.1 13.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. 
g Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rale. 
Table 2 
BOLIVIA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
i ii in iv i ii m rv i n HI iv 
7.6 7.7 9.5 9.3 7.9 7.7 7.0 8.5 9.7 10.9 9.4 12.6 
114.8 118.6 117.9 119.2 121.4 124.6 126.8 127.7 127.7 127.2 127.6 123.7 
12.5 14.1 5.9 14.9 14.1 13.0 5.3 4.5 7.0 6.2 12.8 -3.8 
40.5 37.9 37.2 47.8 52.6 44.2 38.1 39.1 34.3 35.3 51.3 26.0 
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The exchange rate to the dollar rose by 4%, 
less than a third of  the increase in the consumer 
price index. Consequently, the export-weighted 
real effective  exchange rate remained stable in 
1995. If  exports to Argentina are excluded from 
the calculation, the rate goes up, but only by 4%. 
d) Structural reforms 
The structural reforms  on which Bolivia 
embarked in the mid-1980s have made a significant 
contribution to economic stabilization, but have 
failed  to produce accelerated growth. Over the 
last 10 years, per capita GDP has expanded by 
barely 1% per year. 
In an effort  to break out of  this pattern, the 
Government that took office  in 1993 set about 
implementing a fresh  round of  structural reforms, 
including in particular capitalization of  public-
sector enterprises, popular participation, educational 
reform  and administrative decentralization. 
Under the Popular Participation Programme, 
designed to promote decentralization, 
investment by municipalities more than doubled, 
leading to a substantial reallocation of  resources 
towards rural areas and provinces. 
Educational reforms  included a proposal for  a 
new curriculum and the restructuring of  the 
administration of  the national education system. 
Nevertheless, in its attempts to implement these 
programmes, the Government has met with some 
resistance, particularly from  universities and 
professors. 
In 1995, the private sector committed 
resources of  some US$ 1 billion in return for 
participation in the ownership and management 
of  a number of  large public-sector enterprises, the 
so-called capitalization programme, the most 
far-reaching  of  the structural reforms  introduced 
in Bolivia in recent years. In an enterprise 
undergoing capitalization, the public sector 
contributes the existing assets as initial share 
capita], while private investors, referred  to as 
"strategic partners", contribute fresh  capital, to 
be invested in the enterprise over a specified 
number of  years, in exchange for  a 50% stake in 
the company and management control. 
In June 1995, three generating plants owned 
by the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad (ENDE) 
were capitalized, in a deal that brought in some 
US$ 140 million. September and October saw the 
capitalization of  the Empresa Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) for  US$ 610 million 
and the national airline for  US$ 50 million. In 
December, the eastern and western networks of 
the Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles (ENFE) 
were capitalized for  some US$ 40 million. In 
addition, the Cochabamba electricity distribution 
utility was put up for  bid, raising roughly US$ 50 
million. In contrast, the implementation of 
pension system reform,  entailing capitalization, 
was delayed owing to a number of  setbacks. 
The sale of  Yacimientos Petrolíferos  Fiscales 
Bolivianos (YPFB) and the Vinto smelting company 
in 1996 was to complete the capitalization 
programme. The terms for  submission of  bids for 
the oil company were changed after  intense 
political negotiation and provided for  the capitaliza-
tion of  YPFB exploitation and exploration activities; 
the refining  division, employing the most 
workers, would remain entirely in government 
hands. The first  phase of  the capitalization of  the 
Empresa de Fundiciones Vinto ended with the 
pre-qualification  of  four  interested firms,  which 
must now submit their bids. The foreign  direct 
investment package included, besides the 
smelter, two large mines, Huanuni and Colquiri, 
and the concession for  these was to be awarded 
on the basis of  joint venture contracts. 
The passage of  the Telecommunications Act 
paves the way for  opening up this sector to 
market competition. In addition, a system of 
sectoral regulation (SIRESE) was set up, comprising 
a general superintendency and sectoral 
superintendencies (covering water, electricity, 
oil and gas, telecommunications and transport). 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The slowdown in exports of  goods and 
services from  15% to 5% was responsible for  the 
slackening of  economic activity in 1995. Growth in 
output, however, was similar to the annual average 
recorded since 1987. Per capita GDP rose once 
again, but remained far  below (-12%) its 1980 level. 
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Domestic demand strengthened in 1995, with 
a notable increase in gross capital formation. 
Private consumption expanded at a rate similar 
to that of  output, while general government 
spending rose by barely 1%. 
The upsurge in investment was marked by an 
increased percentage of  private investment. The 
trend was closely linked to the strong increase in 
foreign  direct investment (FDI), which financed  a 
third of  grass fixed  investment. It should be noted 
that the capitalization of  public-sector enterprises 
was only partly responsible for  the positive trend 
in FDI, because the resources contributed by 
strategic partners, particularly in the electricity 
and telecommunications sectors, did not 
materialize immediately, being held outside the 
country in trust accounts. 
The fastest-growing  sectors in 1995 were 
communications (10%), electricity, gas and 
water (9%) and construction and commerce 
(5%). The agricultural sector lagged behind, with 
growth of  just 2%, barely one quarter of  the 
figure  for  1994, as a result of  poor winter harvests 
and lagging production of  traditional crops. In 
contrast, production of  industrial crops, concen-
trated in the Department of  Santa Cruz and 
including soya, cotton, and sugar, rose by 14%. 
Mining production increased by a little over 
3%, with a rise of  close to 5% in the case of  oil 
and gas. The minerals that contributed most to 
the increased value of  mining output were zinc, 
tungsten and silver. Zinc replaced gold as the 
leading foreign-exchange  earner. The growth in 
oil and gas production was due to increased sales 
of  refined  fuels.  In August 1995, the final 
agreement for  the sale of  gas to Brazil was 
signed, involving export volumes of  up to 30 
million cubic feet  per day over a period of  20 
years. The cost of  building the Bolivian portion 
of  the requisite gas pipeline amounts to roughly 
US$ 420 million, which will be provided entirely 
by private investors. The pipeline is due to come 
on stream in 1997 and will bring additional 
export earnings of  about US$ 75 million a year. 
Growth in manufacturing  output was again at 
about the 4% level recorded in the two preceding 
years. Construction increased at a somewhat 
faster  pace, with the boost in activity in the public 
sector more than compensating for  the 
contraction in the private sector. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The rise in the consumer price level (12.6%) 
was almost two times the target set by the 
Government for  1995. 
Weather factors  were behind the rise in prices 
of  non-industrial crops, for  the most part 
non-tradable staples. Additional negative factors 
were the increase in international wheat prices 
and reduced donations of  this product. This led 
to a 50% increase in the price of  bread. 
The inflation  rate also had an import 
component, attributable to the real appreciation 
of  neighbouring countries' currencies, which 
made tradable goods from  these countries more 
expensive. Meat and potatoes were among the 
products most affected. 
Monetary factors,  such as the financial 
problems associated with the liquidation and 
intervention of  banks, tended to reinforce  price 
hikes deriving from  these supply problems. 
Beginning in the second half,  there was also an 
increase in government current expenditure on 
retroactive pay, bonuses and incentive payments, 
with the result that between November 1994 and 
August 1995 the average increase in money 
creation was over 20% per annum. This monetary 
trend was accompanied by a rise in interest rates, 
which increased the financial  costs incurred by 
the productive sector. On the other hand, the slow 
pace of  devaluation curbed inflationary 
pressures, due to the Bolivian economy's high 
degree of  dollarization. 
Some 60,000 jobs involving over 20 hours of 
work a week were created in 1995, chiefly  in 
commerce, services and manufacturing.  The 
unemployment rate was somewhat higher than in 
1994. The legal minimum wage was raised by 
8%, which represented a decline in real terms. In 
the private sector, real wages rose in mining, 
construction, financial  institutions and services, 
but fell  in manufacturing,  commerce, restaurants 
and hotels. Wages in the public sector held their 
ground in real terms. 
c) The external sector 
The external sector was notable for  the rise in 
imports (13%), in particular capital goods (38%), 
coinciding with an increase in total fixed 
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investment and foreign  direct investment. 
Exports of  mining products and oil and gas 
continued to expand at a satisfactory  pace, but 
non-traditional exports contracted, since 
increase exports of  soya, chestnuts, cotton and 
oils failed  to make up for  declining sales of 
jewellery, sugar and wood. The export surge of 
the previous year showed unmistakable signs 
of  slowing down. 
Accordingly, the weight of  the balance-of-
payments current account deficit,  which had 
been 1% of  GDP in 1994, tripled in 1995. 
However, sizeable inflows  of  external capital, 
especially of  foreign  direct investment, covered 
this considerable deficit. 
In fact,  the surplus on the financial  account 
widened from  close to US$ 400 million in 1994 
to US$ 530 million in 1995, a trend entirely 
attributable to foreign  direct investment, FDI 
amounted to US$ 370 million, almost three times 
the figure  for  the previous year, and this made it 
one of  the major sources of  investment financing 
in Bolivia. Analysis of  the development plans of 
the capitalized enterprises, including those in the 
telecommunications and energy sectors, suggests 
that in the near future  they will account for  a high 
percentage of  fixed  investment, to be financed 
entirely with external resources. 
The overall balance-of-payments  account 
showed a small deficit,  which was covered by 
special financing  obtained after  renegotiation of 
the public external debt with the Paris Club. 
Consequently, reserve assets rose by US$ 130 
million. 
By late 1995, the public external debt balance 
had reached the US$ 4.5 billion level, 7% higher 
than the previous year. One quarter of  the 
increase was attributable to movements in the 
exchange rates of  various currencies, with the 
rest almost exclusively due to an increase in 
multilateral debt. 
In 1995, Bolivia received more than US$ 200 
million in foreign  loans from  the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), together with 
somewhat smaller loans from  the World Bank 
and the Andean Development Corporation (ADC). 
This meant that most of  the US$ 700 million in 
foreign  loans were from  multilateral sources. 
Among the main bilateral lenders were Germany 
(US$ 50 million) and Spain (US$ 20 million). 
Externa] debt service amounted to some US$ 300 
million, divided evenly between repayments of 
principal and interest and commission payments. 
Disbursements were earmarked mainly for 
multisectoral and infrastructure  projects, 
especially in energy and transport. 
At the fifth  and sixth meetings of  the Paris 
Club, held in March and December 1995, Bolivia 
was able to reschedule some US$ 1 billion of  its 
debt and obtain a 67% reduction in its debt 




1. General trends 
In 1995 the Brazilian authorities continued to 
implement the Real Plan, which they had 
introduced in mid-1994. Within the framework 
of  this plan, Brazil succeeded in making the 
transition from  an economy beset by chronic 
inflation  to one that enjoyed greater stability and 
was carrying forward  a series of  structural 
reforms  in the areas of  trade liberalization and the 
downsizing of  the State's role in the economy. 
This was an unprecedented and still delicate 
situation, in which economic agents were just 
beginning to learn to function.  A significant 
decline in inflation  was accompanied by a rise in 
real wages and a build-up of  international 
reserves. 
Once the bulk of  the inertial component of 
inflation  had been eliminated, it became possible 
to achieve greater stability through the use of  an 
exchange-rate anchor and the application of  a 
tight monetary policy, although the cost of  this 
approach in terms of  reduced competitiveness 
and runaway real interest rates slowed the 
economy. 
In situations such as this, any modification 
of  foreign  exchange policy carries the threat 
of  renewed inflation.  Unless the fiscal  deficit 
is reduced quickly, the authorities will be 
obliged to make greater use of  monetary 
instruments. A copious inflow  of  overseas 
capital will be required to keep the country's 
external accounts balanced, and this 
presupposes very high domestic interest rates. 
In such a context, relaxing monetary policy in 
order to stimulate a recovery in economic 
activity may well be problematic, yet any 
further  slowdown in the economy may 
jeopardize the solvency of  the financial 
system, thereby exacerbating unemployment 
and making it even harder to balance the 
country's fiscal  accounts. 
The authorities' hopes of  breaking this vicious 
circle lie primarily in the momentum generated 
by the privatization process and in significant 
gains in productivity within the tradables sector. 
In the midst of  various domestic and external 
difficulties  and disturbances, the stabilization 
programme remained the Government's top 
priority. The Mexican crisis of  December 1994 
led to a reduction in the supply of  external 
resources for  the countries of  the region, and in 
Brazil's case, this resulted in a sharp drop in 
reserves. At the same time, however, domestic 
demand expanded vigorously as the stabilization 
programme began to bear fruit.  In order to stem 
the momentum created by the surge in activity, 
domestic interest rates were raised to over 30% 
in annualized terms and foreign  exchange policy 
was modified  through the introduction of  a 
system of  currency bands; this system delimited 
the parameters for  intervention by the Central 
Bank, which began to play an active role in the 
foreign  exchange market on a regular basis. This 
approach thus led to the creation of  a de  facto 
exchange-rate anchor. 
Once fears  that the Mexican crisis would set 
off  an uncontrollable chain reaction had 
subsided, capita] flows  rebounded so strongly 
that international reserves actually rose above 
their pre-crisis levels. Given the widening fiscal 
deficit  and the substantial influx  of  capital, 
monetary policy had to be tightened, and this had 
a delayed effect  on trends in output. Inflation  also 
began to abate further,  after  having levelled off 
for  a time. 
In 1995, after  15 years of  three- to four-digit 
annual inflation  figures,  the country recorded a 
rate of  around 22%, the lowest since 1973. The 
downward trend continued into 1996, with a 
variation of  a mere 16% for  the 12 months up to 
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plan has been far  more successful  than any other 
initiative mounted during the last 10 years. 
After  the vigorous expansion associated with 
the introduction of  the Real Plan, the level of 
activity fell  off  sharply from  the second quarter 
onwards, and GDP growth, which had been 
around 6% in 1994, consequently dropped to 4% 
in 1995. Investment exhibited a similar trend and 
thus remained low in comparison to its levels 
during the early 1980s. An important qualitative 
change was to be observed, however, in that the 
share of  imported capital goods increased 
considerably as the productivity of  capital 
climbed significantly.  Domestic saving 
weakened as external saving took its place. 
A spectacular surge in imports and moderate 
growth in exports resulted in a trade deficit  on the 
order of  US$ 3.2 billion for  1995, in stark contrast 
to the ample surpluses Brazil had been achieving 
ever since 1982. The current account posted a 
deficit  of  US$ 18.1 billion, or more than 2% of 
the gross domestic product (GDP). These 
imbalances were more than offset  by abundant 
inflows  of  capital from  abroad, although the bulk 
of  this capital was highly volatile. This 
about-turn in the country's external accounts 
eased the pressure that external capital flows  had 
been exerting on monetary policy while 
simultaneously expanding the supply of  goods, 
which helped to balance Brazil's product 
markets. 
The slowdown in growth and the high level of 
interest rates had an adverse effect  on the 
financial  sector, which was already reeling from 
the loss of  its former  inflation-generated 
earnings. The ratio of  debt arrears to total credit 
rose from  slightly less than 8% in 1994 to 12% 
in 1995. The Central Bank was obliged to 
intervene in a number of  major state and private 
banks and to set up a special programme to 
restructure the financial  system and provide 
deposit insurance. 
In 1995, the consolidated public sector slipped 
from  an operational surplus equivalent to 1.1% 
of  GDP to a deficit  of  5%. After  adjustment for 
inflation,  interest payments -measured as a 
proportion of  output- rose from  3.8% to 5.5% 
owing partly to higher real interest rates and 
partly to an increase in public debt. Higher 
outlays on public-sector wages and retirement 
pensions cut the primary surplus from  5.2% of 
GDP to a mere 0.5%. 
2. Economic policy 
When the Administration that had been elected 
the previous October, with a show of  widespread 
support from  the electorate, took office  at the 
start of  1995, it set its seal of  approval on the 
thrust of  Brazil's economic policy, for  the new 
President had played a key role in crafting  the 
Real Plan. Fernando Henrique Cardoso took 
office  at a time when external financing 
constraints were mounting as a consequence of 
the Mexican crisis and when the country's 
external accounts had recently taken a turn for 
the worse. From November 1994 on, Brazil's 
monthly trade figures  began to show increasingly 
large deficits,  and by June the negative balance 
had reached US$ 5.5 billion. Inflation,  on the 
other hand, had levelled off  at around 2% per 
month after  having taken a spectacular dive at the 
beginning of  the second half  of  1994. Its 
resistance to any further  descent was attributable 
to the buoyancy of  domestic demand and the 
persistence of  some remnants of  inertial inflation. 
Since any further  increase in the scope of  the 
fiscal  adjustment was out of  the question, the 
Government tightened up its monetary policy. In 
March, foreign  exchange policy was modified  to 
formalize  the system of  currency bands that had 
already, in actual fact,  been in use for  the past 
few  months. In addition, tariffs  on some products 
were raised in response to the soaring level of 
imports. Finally, most of  the remaining 
indexation measures were dismantled, including 
the annual adjustment of  wages on the basis of 
past inflation  and the indexation of  lending 
operations in the financial  system. 
a) Fiscal policy 
As implementation of  the Real Plan has 
proceeded, fiscal  accounts have undergone a 
marked deterioration, thereby jeopardizing the 
achievement of  a sustainable equilibrium in this 
area. The cost-reduction phase of  the Plan has all 
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A : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 




Contribution to growth of  GDP C 
Consumption11 
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Exports 
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Gross fixed  investment 
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External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate e 
Open unemployment rate 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(reais per dollar) 8 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports)1 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
-0.5 2.8 -4.7 0.1 -1.1 4.4 5.7 3.8 
-2.4 1.0 -6.4 -1.7 -2.8 2.7 3.9 2.1 
0.0 2.3 -4.9 0.9 -0.6 3.7 6.8 3.4 
-2.5 3.0 -8.1 -1.5 -2.4 5.4 7.6 2.1 
6.1 6.1 2.2 6.3 2.6 3.5 4.9 8.4 
0.9 2.3 -2.1 -1.1 -1.2 2.4 2.3 2.7 
Percentages 
-0.2 2.9 -0.9 1.6 -1.0 3.8 4.3 6.1 
-1.3 0.3 -2.7 -1.3 -1.7 1.5 2.7 1.1 
0.9 0.4 -0.4 0.3 1.7 1.3 0.8 0.1 
0.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 -2.1 -2.0 -3.5 
Percentages of  GDP B 
25.0 24.6 22.9 21.7 20.2 20.8 22.2 22.5 
26.1 24.8 22.0 21.3 21.9 20.8 21.9 18.7 
-1.1 -0.2 1.0 0.4 -1.7 - 0.3 3.8 
Percentages 
63.8 62.4 60.0 59.0 59.5 59.4 
4*2 3J 4.5 4.8 4.8 5.4 5.1 4.6 
129.9 133.1 100.0 112.8 102.5 113.0 108.0 113.9 
Growth rates 
993.3 1 863.6 1 585.4 475.8 1 172.0 2 497.6 929.3 22.0 
1 050.1 1 748.8 1 449.5 471.7 1 154.3 2 639.5 920.6 6.4 
114.8 106.1 100.0 102.7 101.5 101.8 103.3 97.4 
0.0953 1.0305 0.00003 0.00015 0.00164 0.03215 0.64250 0.918 
143.2 108.4 100.0 118.5 127.7 117.1 92.9 70.6 
Millions of  dollars 
4 156 1 002 -3 823 -1 450 6 089 19 -1 153 -18 136 
16 145 13 327 6 986 6 687 11 897 8 739 5 515 -10 652 
36 052 37 507 35 170 34 938 39 881 43 595 49 010 52 641 
19 907 24 180 28 184 28 251 27 984 34 856 43 495 63 293 
-9 207 -12 502 -5 532 -4 087 6 570 7 685 8 138 29 662 
-5 878 -12319 -9 651 -4 685 11 266 6 890 6 543 12 973 
1 250 893 474 -369 14 670 8 709 7 215 12 920 
Percentages 
34.3 25.2 27.9 32.2 36.2 33.3 26.1 20.4 
27.3 25.7 27.7 24.7 18.2 15.6 13.1 20.2 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Public sector 
Total income 24.0 25.9 31.7 30.3 29.2 29.4 32.2 33.7 
Total expenditure . 31.2 36.6 34.6 34.3 36.4 32.4 39.9 
Operating balanceJ -7.4 -6.6 1.2 -0.2 -1.8 -0.7 1.1 -5.1 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Net international reserves 15.0 3.0 -5.7 -6.0 152.5 35.6 20.5 
Money (Ml) 570.3 1 384.2 2 335.7 330.7 912.7 2 184.6 324.6 26.0 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits -11.0 57.1 3.3 34.7 31.9 23.0 26.0 24.8 
On loans ... 405.8 89.6 196.8 229.1 301.0 81.8 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign  currency -7.6 108.1 6.4 30.2 40.8 27.0 54.6 33.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Includes variations in stocks. e Percentages of  the working-age population. 
f  Percentages of  the economically active population (EAP). 8 This rate is expressed in reais per US$ 1 million for  the years up 
to 1989 and in reais per dollar from  1990 onward. h One real —Brazil's new currency— is equivalent to 2,750 cruzeiros 
reais. 1 Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. J Does not 
include the effects  of  inflation  on the interest rate. k Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
BRAZIL: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
i ii m iv i n III iv i II III iv 
Gross domestic 
product (Index: 












On deposits 6.8 35.3 22.2 27.8 35.5 43.0 7.8 17.8 33.0 24.7 25.9 15.7 
On loans 131.8 203.1 92.0 489.4 630.8 399.1 73.0 101.3 114.5 89.9 59.9 63.1 
Money (Ml) 
(12-month 
variation) 1 073.7 1 199.1 1 452.8 2 082.1 3 166.1 5 872.8 5 790.0 2 621.8 202.0 145.0 22.3 26.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b On the basis of  figures  calculated at constant domestic prices. 0 On the basis of  figures  expressed 
in reais. One real —the new Brazilian currency— is equivalent to 2,750 cruzeiros reais. 
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but run its course, for  any further  cutbacks would 
threaten the interests of  highly organized groups, 
and yet approval of  a tax reform  that would send 
out the right signals and thus augment fiscal 
revenues is still not on the horizon. Municipal 
and state government finances  are in disarray and 
state banks are facing  enormous losses on loans 
they had granted to their governments. 
The imbalance in public-sector accounts is not 
a direct result of  the stabilization programme, but 
rather the consequence of  policies that date much 
further  back. Paradoxically, the Brazilian 
economy's attainment of  greater stability has 
brought to light imbalances that had previously 
gone unnoticed. 
The consolidated public sector posted an 
operating deficit  (the operating balance excludes 
the effects  of  inflation  on interest payments) of 
somewhat more than 5% of  GDP, by contrast with 
the preceding year's surplus of  slightly more than 
one percentage point of  GDP. Of  the total 1995 
deficit,  nearly half  was generated by the states 
and municipalities, about one third by the centra] 
government (including the Central Bank), and 
the remainder by State-owned enterprises. 
Expenditures also exerted considerable 
pressure on the primary balance in 1995. The 
overall surplus fell  from  5% to 0.4% of  GDP, 
while the central government surplus (1.5%) 
turned into a 1.7% deficit;  the deficit  in the states 
and municipalities widened from  0.8% to 2.4%; 
and State-owned companies slipped from  a 
surplus of  0.4% to a deficit  of  0.9%. These 
downturns add up to more than six points of  GDP, 
which indicates that the rise in interest rates from 
4% to 5.4% of  GDP was not the decisive factor  in 
this turnaround. 
The slowdown in economic activity was 
reflected  in public-sector revenues. Although 
income was higher in 1995 than in 1994, the 
proceeds from  both federal  and state taxes started 
to dwindle in real terms in May, while 
expenditure continued to rise. This was as much 
a result of  higher financial  outlays as it was of  the 
difficulty  of  curbing non-financial 
disbursements. Treasury revenues (not including 
social security) expanded by 10%, expenditure 
by 17%, and legally- and constitutionally-
mandated transfers  by 21%. Consequently, the 
central government 's net income (after 
deducting the above transfers)  climbed by barely 
7%. 
Wages were up by 16%, financial  expenditure 
by 26% and other expenditure by 8%. At the 
same time, social security spending expanded by 
32% in real terms. The states and municipalities 
faced  even greater problems, since, given the 
sharp rise in wages, their payrolls were taking up 
more than 80% of  their revenue. 
The increase in public employees' wage 
levels was an outcome of  the policy of  awarding 
real wage increases which had been applied 
during the design phase and initial stage of  the 
Real Plan. The Government subsequently 
adopted a more cautious policy and became even 
more circumspect in this regard in 1996. The 
drop in the inflation  rate seen during the second 
half  of  1995, however, contributed to an 
improvement in real wages, despite the fact  that, 
in nominal terms, wage adjustments were 
smaller. 
Although only a small portion of  the increase 
in the deficit  was attributable to the sharp rise in 
interest payments -particularly on domestic 
debt- the authorities' tight monetary policy had 
a perverse effect  on public-sector finances. 
Interest payments were driven up by 26% in real 
terms by the expansion of  the debt and higher 
interest rates, especially on domestic liabilities. 
This measure should therefore  be seen as no more 
than an interim mechanism for  controlling 
demand within the framework  of  the stabilization 
plan until such time as the full  effects  of  the fiscal 
adjustment make themselves felt. 
Reserves were allowed to build up despite the 
fact  that the interest they accrued was 
considerably lower than what the Government 
was offering  on its debt paper, and this accounted 
for  a sizeable portion of  the increase in the central 
government's public debt. The apparent 
incongruity of  this policy stems from  the fact  that 
these reserves act, in effect,  as a form  of 
"insurance" for  the stabilization plan since, 
without a high level of  reserves, the plan's 
viability would be in jeopardy in the event of  any 
speculation-generated foreign  exchange crisis. 
In response to the growing deficit,  the 
Government urged Congress to pass 
constitutional reforms,  made cuts in its wage bill 
and took steps to improve the management of 
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public-sector enterprises. It also attempted to tie 
the financial  support it provided to state 
governments with cost-control measures and 
plans for  raising revenue collection at these 
administrative levels. Thus, the fiscal  adjustment 
was inarguably Brazil's major economic policy 
challenge for  1996. 
b) Monetary policy 
Monetary policy was the main instrument 
used to restrain domestic demand and relieve 
pressure on the balance of  payments. Starting in 
October 1994, the Central Bank introduced a 
series of  reserve requirements applying to 
deposits and even to loan operations within the 
financial  system, and this policy generated a 
sizeable spread between borrowing and lending 
rates. Strong growth in domestic demand and in 
credit operations, combined with foreign 
exchange pressures, induced the Central Bank to 
keep interest rates high, and indeed in real terms 
they reached record levels. The aim of  these 
measures was to discourage and penalize the 
build-up of  inventories. Persistent monetary 
constraints made the use of  lines of  credit 
unfeasible,  however, and, as a result, both consumers 
and business firms  began to find  it difficult  to 
meet their payment obligations. Defaults 
increased, which was a disincentive to the 
granting of  new loans. Thus, the costs associated 
with this policy are clearly connected with the 
imperative of  financing  a deficit  on current 
transactions of  approximately US$ 18 billion. 
Companies enjoying access to international 
markets sought out new sources of  finance  in 
order to circumvent the excessive cost of 
domestic financing.  At the same time, 
international investors were working through the 
banks with a view to conducting operations in the 
Brazilian market. Both of  these factors 
contributed to a vigorous upsurge in capital 
inflows  in the second half  of  1995. 
When inflation  plummeted in mid-1994, the 
financial  system sharply increased its credit 
operations in an effort  to offset  the drop in its 
inflation-related  gains. It soon felt  the effects  of 
the Government's stringent monetary policy, 
however, and a number of  public and private 
institutions lapsed into insolvency. 
There were also other, more specific  causes of 
this situation. The state banks faced  the prospect 
of  not being able to collect on a large portion of 
the loans they had made to state governments 
(e.g. BANESPA, the Banco del Estado de São 
Paulo S.A.) or of  holding a large number of  state 
securities (as in the cases of  Rio de Janeiro and 
Rio Grande do Sul) in their loan portfolios.  In the 
case of  the Banco do Brasil, problems arose 
because loans had been extended to troubled 
sectors, such as agriculture. The financial 
imbalances faced  by private institutions were due 
to a combination of  high default  rates on retail 
credit operations and poor management. 
In early 1995, the Central Bank found  it 
necessary to take over the management of  a 
number of  institutions and, in August, it had to 
do much the same with the Banco Economico. 
This bank, which is the eighth largest private 
bank in the country and the largest of  all in the 
north-east, had already been granted more than 
US$ 1.5 billion in financing  in order to help it 
maintain its liquidity ratio. 
As part of  its efforts  to promote a restructuring 
programme, the Central Bank created financing 
mechanisms and strengthened its intervention 
capabilities by establishing deposit insurance 
providing coverage for  up to 20,000 reais. In 
November, a merger was authorized between the 
Banco Nacional, which was suffering  from 
liquidity and solvency problems, and UNIBANCO; 
and in 1996, the merger of  two private regional 
banks (Banco Bandeirantes de Comercio S.A., in 
the south-east and Banorte, in the north-east) was 
announced. In 19%, the Banco Economico, 
whose operations had been suspended ever since 
the Central Bank had intervened, was acquired 
by another private national bank, EXCEL. 
The Central Bank was obliged to retain part 
of  the portfolios  of  the distressed banks and grant 
hefty  loans to the other institutions involved in 
these operations, at a cost equal to three 
percentage points of  GDP. The Government had 
to pump more than US$ 5 billion into the Banco 
do Brasil, which is the State's chief  banking 
institution. 
During the second half  of  1995, however, the 
Central Bank lowered reserve requirements 
substantially and eliminated the reserve 
requirement applying to bank lending operations. 
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Early in October, new mechanisms for  attracting 
funds  were introduced with a view to engaging 
in longer-term operations. The Central Bank has 
also been cutting its base rate. 
Owing to the prevailing level of  uncertainty, 
however, loan interest rates exhibited a good deal 
of  recalcitrance in the face  of  downward 
pressures despite these measures. As a result of 
the increased risk associated with the rising 
default  rate -as a consequence, in particular, of 
the careless actions of  commercial banks in the 
early days of  the Real Plan- lending operations 
were slow to get off  the ground, however. 
Measures aimed at stimulating domestic 
demand also fell  short of  their objective, as the 
constraints affecting  the terms of  consumer loans 
persisted during 1995. It was not until May 1996 
that the National Monetary Council extended the 
term for  such operations from  three to six 
months; later on, the restrictions on these 
transactions were lifted  entirely. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
The Real Plan brought with it a new foreign 
exchange regime. The Central Bank withdrew its 
commitment to hold the real exchange rate 
steady, and this resulted in a nominal revaluation 
in the first  few  months of  the Plan. The 
combination of  a new foreign  exchange regime 
and lower customs tariffs  fuelled  a rapid 
expansion in the supply of  imported products, 
which was essential to meet the surge in demand 
triggered by the abrupt deceleration in prices. 
At the beginning of  1995, however, the 
worsening external situation obliged the 
Brazil ian Government to clarify  its 
exchange-rate policy. In March, the authorities 
announced the introduction of  a currency band 
system, with the band's upper and lower limits 
initially being set at 0.84 and 0.93 reais. No 
specific  indexation rules were defined,  and the 
movement of  the band was to be based on the 
differentia]  between domestic and international 
prices and productivity gains. This mechanism 
had, in practice, already been in operation for  a 
number of  months, but its announcement marked 
the official  demise of  the pre-existing currency 
float,  which had led to a sharp revaluation of  the 
real, even in nominal terms. 
The implementation of  this new mechanism 
was hampered by speculative movements that 
siphoned off  US$ 4 billion in international 
reserves. The Central Bank adjusted the band to 
between 0.88 and 0.93 reais, which was 
tantamount to a nominal devaluation of  nearly 
5%. In May, the ceiling was raised to 0.98 reais, 
and at the end of  June the band was shifted  once 
again, to between 0.91 and 0.99 reais. This 
adjustment, unlike the change made in March, 
was greeted with equanimity by economic agents 
and produced no turbulence in the foreign 
exchange market. The Central Bank has taken 
action on a regular basis, even within the band, 
to avert sharp fluctuations.  This form  of 
intervention has not been clearly delineated and 
gives the impression that the authorities are 
following  -albeit erratically- trends in domestic 
industrial prices. 
During the remainder of  the year, minor 
variations were seen in the nominal exchange 
rate, chiefly  as a result of  action taken by the 
Central Bank. At the end of  January 1996, the 
establishment of  new band limits (0.97 and 1.06 
reais) ushered in what was, in effect,  a 
mechanism for  pre-setting the exchange rate. 
The momentum of  the nominal exchange rate 
slackened off  considerably as its 14% rise for 
1995 was followed  by an increase of  only 4% 
during the first  half  of  1996. Thus, the real 
exchange rate, computed on the basis of 
consumer price indexes, continued to slide, 
although more slowly than in the recent past. The 
1995 index of  the average real exchange rate was 
40% lower than its average value for  1978-1994, 
although the difference  is less (-23%) if 
calculations are based on wholesale prices. 
d) Structural reforms 
In 1995, the structural reforms  being carried 
out in the Brazilian economy were consolidated. 
The Constitution was amended in order to 
eliminate monopolies or relax restrictions on the 
participation of  private or foreign  capital in 
public services, most notably in the 
telecommunications and oil sectors. 
Draft  amendments to the Constitution dealing 
with the social security system, the civil service 
and the tax system were also submitted to 
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Congress. While these modifications  had not yet 
taken on their final  form  -the corresponding 
regulations had yet to be drawn up- they 
provided a clear indication of  the Government's 
intention to downsize the State, as well as a 
foretaste  of  major changes of  a nature likely to 
put Brazil's economic growth on a more solid 
footing. 
Although only one company - i n the 
electricity sector- was actually auctioned off  in 
1995, the privatization process gathered speed as 
the operation of  the western branch lines of  the 
railway network was contracted out and the 
Government divested itself  of  the Río de Janeiro 
electricity distribution company (this last 
operation brought in nearly US$ 2.3 billion and 
was the largest sale to be carried out since the 
privatization process was launched). In addition, 
preparations were being made for  the sale of  Vale 
do Río Doce, S.A. one of  the largest companies 
in the world in its field.  The operation of  two 
major, heavily-travelled 600-kilometre 
highways, both in poor condition, was also 
turned over to contractors who undertook to 
repair and widen these roads in exchange for  the 
toll fees.  In May 1996, a law was passed allowing 
private-sector and foreign  participation in the 
cellular telephone business, which had 
previously been the exclusive preserve of  the 
State-owned telecommunications company 
(TELEBRAS). 
A number of  states also embarked on 
privatization programmes in the hope of  pulling 
themselves out of  bankruptcy. What is more, the 
federal  government has been making its loans to 
the state governments and any debt-restructuring 
arrangements it may offer  them contingent upon 
the progress of  their privatization schemes. 
Import policy was modified  in 1995 in view 
of  the high levels of  imports recorded for  some 
product categories since the introduction of  the 
Real Plan. One particularly worrisome 
development was that the monthly average for 
motor vehicle imports during the first  two months 
of  1995 amounted to US$ 300 million, which was 
six times higher than the figure  for  the same 
period in 1994. Although the Government raised 
tariffs  on motor vehicles and electrical and 
electronic products from  20% to 32% at the end 
of  February 1995, the level of  such imports 
remained high throughout the first  half-year 
owing to expectations of  a further  tariff  increase 
to 70%, which was, in fact,  introduced in June 
along with a system of  import quotas. After  an 
adverse ruling by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), however, Brazil did away with these 
quotas, which were proving redundant in any 
case because of  a sharp decline in local demand. 
In addition, negotiations with Brazil 's 
MERCOSUR partners resulted in a plan calling for 
a phased reduction of  tariffs  on motor vehicles 
from  70% to 35% by 1999. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The sharp drop in inflation  from  July 1994 
onward strengthened domestic demand, thereby 
driving up the level of  economic activity, GDP 
had climbed by 6.5% in the third quarter of  1994 
and by 9.4% in the fourth,  and its momentum 
continued to accelerate in the first  quarter of 
1995, when GDP growth amounting to nearly 
10% was spearheaded by the manufacturing  and 
construction sectors, which recorded increases of 
16% and 11%, respectively, compared with the 
same period of  the year before. 
The restrictive monetary policy that had 
been in place since the previous October 
brought about a reversal of  this trend, however. 
The high default  rate on commercial credit 
obligations hurt industry, whose inventories 
started to build up toconsiderably high levels. In 
the second half  of  the year, a number of  sectors 
(includingtheautomotive industry) begantosell 
off  their inventories at a very rapid pace, 
triggering a sharp downturn in activity, and 
seasonallyadjustedindica tors pointed toa steady 
month-to-month contraction in manufacturing 
output. As a result, growth in 1995 was below 
2%, less than a quarterof  the annual rate recorded 
in the previous biennium. During the early 
months of  1996, this unfavourable  trend 
persisted, but in April signs of  a recovery began 
to be discernible. 
157 
The initial surge in industrial activity was 
made possible by a fuller  use of  installed capacity 
(with use rates reaching the unprecedented level 
of  nearly 83%), increases in productivity and, 
most importantly, ready access to imported 
inputs. TTie use of  installed capacity later fell 
back to around 75%, with marked differences 
being observed from  one branch of  industry to 
another. Capital and intermediate goods 
production flattened  out, while the output of 
consumer products continued to rise, particularly 
in the case of  durable goods (12%). 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Consumer prices climbed by 22% in 1995, 
with the rate of  increase slowing as the year went 
on. This trend continued into the first  few  months 
of  1996, although inflation  flared  up again in 
May. Wholesale prices rose a modest 6% in 
1995, chiefly  because agricultural prices fell  by 
13%. 
An important factor  in this encouraging result 
was the way in which the stabilization policy was 
implemented, both as regards the exchange rate 
and in terms of  the management of  interest rates. 
Brazil's introduction of  the real in July 1994 
drastically reduced the inertial component of 
inflation.  After  this remarkable start, 
stabilization policy concentrated on doing away 
with the remnants of  this type of  inflation  along 
with the last vestiges of  indexation mechanisms, 
but it also had to cope with what appears to have 
been an unexpectedly strong upturn in domestic 
demand which was itself  directly attributable to 
the slowdown in inflation. 
The price trends observed in the second half 
of  1995 were a reflection  of  a number of  factors, 
including the very gradual rise of  the exchange 
rate, the slowdown of  the economy, strong 
competition from  imports, the changes made in 
wage-adjustment mechanisms, a bumper harvest 
and the fact  that the authorities held fast  to their 
policy of  holding down increases in utility rates 
and charges to moderate levels. There was also 
some degree of  convergence between the prices 
of  tradables and non-tradables, as price increases 
among the latter slowed noticeably; this was 
particularly true of  rents and a number of  services 
which, in the second half  of  1994, had posted 
greatly above-average price rises that posed 
serious problems for  the stabilization process. 
The higher level of  employment registered 
during the early months of  the stabilization plan's 
implementation was short-lived. The rate of 
industrial employment in São Paulo, which had 
advanced by 2.5% between September 1994 and 
April 1995, fell  back by 8% during the remainder 
of  the year and then continued to slacken in the 
first  few  months of  1996, dropping to a level 
nearly 25% below the 1978 rate. This 
development was mirrored by trends in the 
unemployment rate, which descended between 
October 1994 and August 1995 but then began to 
rise rapidly. In spite of  this, the average annual 
unemployment rate in the country's major 
metropolitan areas fell  to 4.6% (from  5.1% in 
1994). 
Price stabilization contributed to an 
improvement in real wages in 1995. In May, the 
legal minimum wage was set at 100 reais per 
month, for  a rise of  42% which pushed its 
purchasing power for  the year as a whole up to 
22% above the average for  1994. In May 1996, 
it was raised again, to 112 reais. In São Paulo, 
average real wages in manufacturing  went up by 
nearly 9% in 1995. 
There was virtually zero growth in the average 
level of  formal  employment in 1995. In the 
informal  sector, however, an increase of  nearly 
5% was seen, while wages rose more than three 
times as fast  (15%) as in the formal  sector. This 
suggests that the main beneficiaries  of  the 
stabilization process have been lower-income 
groups. According to preliminary figures,  the 
income of  the poorest half  of  the population 
swelled by around 7.3 billion reais, while that of 
the richest quintile shrank by 12 billion reais 
(both figures  have been adjusted for  inflation), 
making this one of  the most far-reaching 
instances of  income redistribution in Brazil's 
history. 
c) The external sector 
In the first  quarter of  1995, Brazil's trade 
deficit  widened to US$ 2.3 billion, thus 
confirming  the shift  in direction observed in the 
last two months of  the preceding year. The upset 
in the balance of  trade, which until October 1994 
158 
BRAZIL 
had shown a monthly surplus of  nearly US$ 1 
billion, was chiefly  due to the jump in imports, 
whose average monthly value shot up from  just 
under US$ 2.5 billion to slightly over US$ 4 
billion; this upsurge was attributable, in its turn, 
to the revaluation of  the Brazilian real against the 
United States dollar in both real and nominal 
terms, to the acceleration of  the MERCOSUR 
tariff-reduction  programme and to the robust 
growth of  domestic demand. In the second half 
of  1995, the downward slide of  the real exchange 
rate eased, domestic demand cooled down as the 
economy slowed, and tighter import restrictions 
were introduced, and, as a result, the deficit  not 
only evaporated but, by the end of  the year, had 
given way to a modest surplus. In the first  half  of 
1996, the trade balance once again showed a 
deficit,  but it was considerably smaller than it had 
been during the corresponding period of  1994. 
The value of  merchandise exports totalled 
US$ 46.5 billion in 1995, which represented a 
rise of  5%. The most dynamic sector was 
semi-manufactures  (33%), which benefited  from 
higher international prices. Primary commodities 
slipped back by 1% owing to the poor 
performance  of  coffee  and soybeans, which was, 
however, partially offset  by improvements in 
iron ore and sugar sales. Exports of  manufactures 
expanded by a scant 2%, almost certainly as a 
result of  the low level of  the real exchange rate. 
In the first  half  of  1996, exports did better, 
particularly in the case of  manufactures. 
Merchandise imports continued their 
headlong ascent, thus drawing close to the US$ 
50 billion mark, which was 50% more than the 
preceding year's level. As the year progressed 
their rate of  increase slowed, however, as the 
breakneck speed of  their climb during the first  six 
months was gradually checked by restrictive 
policy measures and the cooling of  the economy. 
The increase in exports to MERCOSUR 
countries in 1995 was very small, mainly due to 
the poor performance  of  exports to Argentina as 
a result of  the harsh recession that gripped that 
country and the slide in its currency's real 
exchange rate against the real. Exports to Asian 
countries, on the other hand, expanded 
considerably thanks to a strong upturn in sales of 
iron ore and iron and steel semi-manufactures  to 
those markets. 
It is not surprising that external supply should 
have been used to meet the country's rapidly 
expanding domestic demand, in view of  its 
considerable reserves: some US$ 40 billion, or 
15 months' worth of  imports. It was also assumed 
that the flow  of  external resources, in the form  of 
either loans or direct investment, would continue. 
The Mexican crisis of  December 1994 cast doubt 
on the validity of  these assumptions, however. In 
the first  quarter of  1995, new overseas issues of 
Brazilian securities, which had totalled more than 
US$ 3 billion in October-December 1994, 
tumbled to less than half  that amount while, at 
the same time, the stock exchange recorded a net 
outflow  of  more than US$ 2 billion, in contrast 
to 1994, when the stock market had brought in 
over US$ 5 billion in external resources. 
During the second half  of  1995, a significant 
amount of  foreign  capital returned to the country. 
Commercial lines of  credit for  foreign  trade 
operations not only regained the ground they had 
lost, but actually registered an increase as a result 
of  the considerably larger volume of  resource 
flows.  In addition, foreign  sales of  stocks and 
bonds issued by privately-owned Brazilian 
companies picked up, swelling from  US$ 3.7 
billion in the first  half  of  the year to US$ 5.9 
million in the second half.  Brazil also moved 
back into international bond markets (Japan and 
Germany), where it floated  approximately US$ 
1.8 billion in Treasury bonds. Finally, direct 
investment (not including portfolio  investments) 
doubled to nearly US$ 3.9 billion, up from 
US$ 1.9 billion in the same period of  1994. 
More than half  the capital entering the country 
in the second half  of  1995 -over US$ 16 billion-
was short-term capital, however, despite the fact 
that Central Bank measures aimed at discouraging 
speculative inflows  had been in place since 
October 1994. During the first  quarter of  1995, a 
number of  these measures were relaxed, but some 
months later the Central Bank again raised tax 
rates in an effort  to reduce short-term inflows  and 
extended the applicability of  the relevant taxes to 
include foreign  exchange operations in the open 
market. Portfolio  investment inflows  also expanded 
significantly.  The end result of  all this was that 
total net capital inflows  amounted to US$ 30.7 
billion in 1995, which was equivalent to more 
than 60% of  the country's merchandise exports. 
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This large intake of  capital boosted Brazil's 
international reserves so sharply that they 
actually surpassed the levels registered before  the 
outbreak of  the Mexican crisis. Thus, after 
having shrunk by US$ 9.6 billion between 
November 1994 and April 1995, reserves 
expanded by US$ 20.5 billion during the 
remainder of  the year, totalling US$ 50.5 billion 
by the end of  December. This trend held firm 
during the early part of  19% and, by May, 
reserves stood at some US$ 56 billion. 
The copious flow  of  incoming capita] made it 
necessary to discontinue the reductions that were 
being made in the financial  tax levied on capital 
entering the country and to raise these tax rates 
back up to the levels in effect  prior to the 
Mexican crisis. 
Brazil's external debt climbed to US$ 159 
billion, or 7% more than the preceding year, 




1. General trends 
The Chilean economy's robust expansion (8.2%) 
in 1995 rounded out 12 consecutive years of 
growth at an average annual rate of  6.4%, making 
it the longest growth spell of  the post-war period. 
Inflation  continued to subside, falling  to a 
35-year low (8.2%). The economy's 
performance  was buoyed by the positive showing 
turned in by the external sector, where the terms 
of  trade improved by over 5 points of  GDP. Total 
demand was up by 12% and national income by 
almost 15%. Chile's trade surplus climbed to 
US$ 1.4 billion, while the US$ 640 million deficit 
registered on the 1994 balance-of-payments 
current account gave way to a surplus of  US$ 160 
million and international reserves rose by 
approximately US$ 1.1 billion. 
The strong position of  the external sector 
helped to boost national saving to a record 32% 
of  GDP, with fixed  capital investment amounting 
to 28% of  GDP. The public sector marked up a 
saving rate equivalent to 5% of  GDP and, for  the 
eighth year running, posted surpluses in its 
current and overall financial  accounts. In 1995 
and 1996, the public sector also made a total of 
US$ 3.4 billion in prepayments to multilateral 
and commercial banks. 
The growth of  the economy, in which external 
conditions were a major contributing factor, 
enabled the country to complete the adjustment 
process it had begun in 1993-1994, an 
achievement that launched domestic demand on 
a steep upward path. Actual results were higher 
than the projected figures  for  growth, the 
balance-of-payments  trade and current accounts, 
saving, investment and productivity, and were 
lower than the projections for  employment and 
capital flows.  The country just barely managed 
to reach its targeted level of  inflation,  perhaps 
because it failed  to take full  advantage of  the 
abundant supply of  external resources existing in 
the economy, thereby sparking a debate 
regarding the possible lack of  economic policy 
tools to deal with an upward trend in private 
expenditure. Interest-rate volatility -caused by 
premature reductions that made larger rate hikes 
necessary later on- was a corollary of  this 
phenomenon. 
Owing to the considerable lag in the 
employment level's reaction to the upturn in 
economic activity following  the completion of 
the economy's monetary adjustment at the start 
of  the year, the average annual employment rate 
edged up by a scant 1%. The mean annual 
unemployment level of  5.4% was lower than the 
average figure  for  1994 (6.0%), and the 4.1% 
increase in real wages fell  far  short of  the average 
gain in labour productivity of  over 7%. 
The gap between the growth rates for 
expenditure and output widened to 4.4 points and 
was particularly striking in the third quarter, 
when it reached 6.2 points, with GDP expanding 
at 8.9% and domestic spending at 15.1%. In the 
final  quarter, this gap narrowed back down to 5.4 
points as GDP growth picked up (9.6%), but it was 
clear that expenditure and output were at 
unsustainable levels which were hindering the 
achievement of  macroeconomic objectives. 
The steep rise in spending seen during 1995 
was in large part a transitory phenomenon caused 
by an improvement in the terms of  trade which 
made it necessary to adjust domestic expenditure 
and output in order to align them with their trend 
values. After  quickly shaking off  -in the first 
quarter- the effects  of  the Mexican crisis on 
interest rates, the exchange rate and the stock 
market, the Chilean economy resumed its rapid 
growth. Owing to the impacts of  the crisis, 
foreign  portfolio  investment was negative during 
the first  nine months of  the year, as was the flow 
of  short-term resources in the first  quarter, but 
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Figure 1 
L : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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both of  these developments were more than 
offset  by the improvement in the country's 
current account. 
Growth outpaced potential income in 1995, 
and the economy was free  of  inflationary  and 
balance-of-payments  pressures thanks to the 
surplus generated by the increase in national 
income, which made it possible to channel the 
excess expenditure into more imports. In 1996, 
the growth rate remained strong, but within a 
context of  declining national income -due to a 
deterioration in the terms of  trade- and high 
interest rates. Nonetheless, a widespread increase 
in economic activity was observed in the first 
quarter (9%), and double-digit growth rates were 
recorded for  mining (16%), construction (14%) 
and commerce (13%); the only exception to this 
upswing was the agricultural/forestry  sector, 
where growth came to a standstill. 
Indicators for  the second half  of  1995 pointed 
to a sizeable increase in domestic spending 
(15%) which was led by fixed  capital investment, 
with gains of  nearly 16% in the third quarter and 
24% in the fourth.  This required an upward 
revision of  1996 growth estimates and sparked 
concerns about the size of  the expenditure-output 
differential  which the country would start out 
with in 1996 and how this might affect  its chances 
of  achieving its inflation  target. 
The Central Bank felt  that existing spending 
and output levels had overshot the Chilean 
economy's medium-term growth potential, and 
in April 1996 it therefore  proceeded to adopt 
stricter monetary adjustment measures. This 
decision was based on the fact  that both the global 
and underlying inflation  rates were steepening 
alarmingly during the first  quarter, thereby 
jeopardizing the achievement of  the target 
inflation  rate, and that the gap between expenditure 
and output had remained at untenable levels and 
showed no clear signs of  narrowing. 
In addition to its overall buoyancy, the 
production sector also exhibited a number of 
major changes in ownership that heightened its 
economic concentration in major markets such as 
the banking and financial  system, tele-
communications, the airlines and the electricity 
sector. 
2. Economic policy 
Economic policy continued to adapt to a 
downward trend in the exchange rate which was 
associated with strengthening exports, 
productivity and external investment flows.  The 
monetary authority took further  steps to regulate 
short-term capital inflows  by expanding the 
coverage of  reserve requirements and providing 
for  the stricter enforcement  of  existing laws and 
regulations on the subject. 
The authorities sought to bring their monetary 
and exchange policies into line with the relative 
abundance of  hard currency existing in the 
Chilean economy by boosting the demand for 
foreign  exchange and cutting back on the supply. 
During the first  half  of  the year, the focus  was on 
reconciling reductions in the interest rate with 
additional measures for  opening up the capital 
account and curbing the inflow  of  short-term 
funds.  During the second half,  priority began to 
be shifted  to controlling the growth of 
expenditure. 
A change for  the better was seen in the 
expenditure-output gap, as it narrowed from  3.3 
points in the first  quarter to 2.3 in the second, 
while inflation  remained below 8%. Since the 
monetary authority expected the increase in the 
terms of  trade to slow considerably in the second 
half  of  the year, once it had altered the course of 
monetary policy by adopting the daily rate as the 
key rate for  the system, it relaxed its policy 
somewhat in May and June. As a result, the 
signals sent out by these lower rates added to the 
effect  of  the sharp upturn in the terms of  trade. 
a) Monetary policy 
In May, the overnight interbank rate became 
the chief  monetary instrument, thus supplanting 
the rate for  90-day Central Bank notes -which 
then came to be set by the market- as the 
principal monetary signal. This gave the market 
a larger role in determining the levels and 
structure of  interest rates and gave the authorities 
more control over liquidity by allowing them to 
increase the frequency  of  marginal movements 
in short-term rates without significantly 
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Table 1 
C : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate d 
Open unemployment rate e 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
Index: (1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
7.3 9.6 3.3 7.1 10.5 6.0 4.1 8.2 
5.5 7.7 1.6 5.4 8.7 4.2 2.5 6.5 
10.5 10.4 2.9 8.6 11.4 5.0 6.2 14.9 
9.0 10.3 3.6 5.0 8.0 4.5 3.7 6.6 
7.7 7.5 3.4 14.9 15.9 6.7 7.3 10.7 
5.0 7.8 3.2 7.2 10.2 6.2 3.7 7.1 
Percentages 
4.7 6.4 1.1 5.6 7.1 5.5 1.6 7.0 
0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 
4.3 6.0 1.0 5.2 6.6 5.2 1.3 6.8 
2.6 5.2 1.0 0.4 6.5 3.5 0.3 5.6 
3.8 4.6 2.6 3.1 4.2 0.6 3.6 3.3 
-3.9 -6.6 -1.5 -2.1 -7.2 -3.7 -1.4 -7.7 
Percentages of  GDPB 
23.4 26.1 26.3 24.9 28.4 30.2 29.3 32.2 
22.4 23.6 24.5 25.3 26.4 24.3 27.6 32.5 
0.9 2.4 1.8 -0.3 2.0 5.8 1.7 -0.3 
Percentages 
52.0 52.6 52.5 52.3 52.8 54.5 54.7 54.0 
8.1 6.2 6.0 6.5 4.9 4.7 6.0 5.4 
84.5 91.3 100.0 109.3 114.3 120.0 124.4 130.0 
Growth rates 
12.7 21.4 27.3 18.7 12.7 12.2 8.9 8.2 
3.3 22.8 25.7 16.5 8.9 6.7 7.8 8.2 
103.8 103.3 100.0 102.0 102.7 97.3 104.1 117.7 
245 267 305 349 363 404 420 396 
102.0 96.4 100.0 98.9 95.3 97.5 96.5 92.4 
Millions of  dollars 
-234 -705 -536 109 -703 -2 096 -639 160 
1 517 1 022 1 081 1 579 727 -978 747 1 234 
8 142 9 575 10 285 11 110 12 439 11 800 14 451 19 194 
6 625 8 553 9 204 9 531 11 712 12 778 13 704 17 959 
-773 1 211 3 051 823 2 884 2 778 4 573 1 168 
•1 124 387 2 371 1 234 2 500 585 3 217 1 081 
-756 -549 -2 122 -1 049 -2 344 -171 -2 919 -741 
Percentages 
79.3 64.0 62.4 52.3 47.1 44.4 43.1 35.3 
19.8 16.1 14.4 10.5 7.8 6.0 4.8 2.8 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
General government 
Current income 22.3 21.2 20.5 22.3 22.4 22.6 21.9 22.3 
Current expenditure 20.0 18.2 18.1 18.6 17.5 17.7 17.2 16.9 
Savings 2.3 3.0 2.5 3.7 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.5 
Capital expenditure (net) 1.2 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.9 
Financial balance 1.0 1.4 0.8 1.5 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.6 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  monetary 
system 
Net international reserves -26.0 25.2 124.6 34.8 62.8 17.8 22.5 
Net domestic credit 108.8 27.2 -10.8 36.2 -19.4 39.7 -3.9 
To public sector 3.5 -8.3 18.6 14.3 -2.9 11.8 -10.0 
To private sector 24.9 37.3 16.1 22.4 37.0 30.2 13.0 
Money (Ml) 53.5 5.5 27.0 39.7 21.2 29.2 -2.9 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 24.5 30.8 32.0 36.9 32.4 22.5 22.6 
M2 31.5 23.7 30.8 37.6 39.7 24.0 16.7 
Dollar deposits 50.2 46.8 28.7 23.2 -17.2 31.3 -20.8 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 2.1 7.6 10.4 3.1 5.0 5.3 5.7 5.1 
On loans 5.1 11.9 17.1 8.4 10.0 10.8 10.4 9.2 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency s 11.1 16.9 24.0 10.2 16.5 5.9 22.2 14.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
fl  Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990dollars. cTheseentriesmeasuretheimpactofthevariationineachaggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. 
g Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
CHILE: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %), 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Real interest rate (annualized, 
On deposits 
On loans 
Money (MIA) b 
(12-month variation, %) 
I 
1993 1994 1995a 
II III IV I II III IV I II DI IV 
124.3 125.9 128.2 128.0 129.3 131.8 133.0 133.9 
12.7 13.0 12.3 12.2 13.7 12.7 10.5 8.9 8.2 7.7 8.6 8.2 
96.2 100.1 97.8 95.8 97.0 96.0 97.4 95.5 96.2 93.5 89.5 90.4 
4.0 5.7 3.2 8.4 3.1 7.6 5.9 6.0 4.3 4.6 4.5 7 
9.5 10.2 8.6 14.7 8.1 12.2 10.7 10.8 8.6 8.4 8.2 11.6 
6.9 17.2 14.7 22.2 13.9 15.7 19.9 22.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b In the private sector. 
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impacting the market. It also heightened the 
volatility of  90-day rates and provided less room 
for  international interest-rate arbitrage. In 
addition, the real discount rate was lowered by 
0.6 points to 5.2% and then, in June, to 5%. 
In September, monetary policy was tightened. 
First, the Central Bank hiked interbank rates; 
next, a larger adjustment was made in long-term 
rates. Then, in December, it raised its discount 
rates and the rate on overnight funds  to 6% in real 
terms, thereby reversing the interest-rate trend 
that had begun to take shape in May. 
Late in April 1996, the Central Bank again 
raised interest rates, boosting daily rates to real 
annual levels of  7%-7.5% in an effort  to speed up 
the convergence of  the growth rates for  output 
and expenditure at levels more in line with the 
growth trend of  production capacity. 
At the close of  the first  half  of  1996, monetary 
policy remained tight, with the interbank rate 
standing at 7.5% in real terms. At around 7.4%, 
short-term rates were closer to where the Centra] 
Bank wanted them to be; the same could not be 
said of  long-term rates, however, which had 
undergone a series of  downturns and were 
hovering around 6.5%. 
b) Exchange policy 
In the first  half  of  1995, the provision 
requiring exporters to change 50% of  their 
earnings in the forma]  exchange market was 
eliminated and all such restrictions on these 
funds  were lifted.  Insurance companies and 
mutual funds  were allowed to invest abroad and, 
in June, fixed-  and variable-rate foreign 
investment options and margins for  institutional 
investors were broadened, thereby facilitating 
the diversification  of  foreign  portfolio 
investments. 
In an effort  to gain greater influence  over the 
structure and volume of  capital flows,  the 
authori t ies reduced the percentage of 
foreign-currency  deposits available for  use by 
banking institutions in the formal  exchange 
market and hiked the reserve requirement for 
financial  investments, secondary ADRS and 
foreign  deposits to 30%. In addition, they 
broadened the range of  overseas financial 
investments which banks would be allowed to 
undertake. Late in August, chapters XVin and 
XIX of  the Compendium of  Rules on 
International Exchange (covering investments 
made by Chileans and foreigners  using external 
debt paper purchased abroad at a discount) were 
eliminated after  the increase in the price of  such 
paper on the international market had made these 
provisions irrelevant. 
The trend of  the exchange rate, and 
specifically  the peso's appreciation against the 
dollar, continued to be a highly controversial 
subject. The nominal exchange rate climbed 
from  402 pesos to the dollar in mid-December 
1994 to a peak of  419 early in March as a 
consequence of  the financial  crisis that swept 
over the region. It thereupon began to fall  steadily 
until bottoming out at 368 pesos to the dollar in 
mid-June due to the steep depreciation of  the 
dollar against the yen and the deutsche mark 
during the first  half  of  the year. This trend was 
reflected  in the weightings used for  the currency 
basket, the country's hefty  trade balance, the 
steady incoming stream of  foreign  investment 
and the gradual resumption of  short-term capital 
inflows.  Starting in July, the combined effect  of 
the actions taken by the Central Bank at the 
national level, the dollar's revaluation on the 
international market and the upsurge in imports 
helped the dollar to rebound to 420 pesos as of 
the end of  November. 
In the first  half  of  December, the Central Bank 
altered its method of  adjusting the basket of 
currencies on which the currency band is based 
by deducting an additional 2% (in annual terms) 
for  international inflation  (0.2% at a monthly 
rate); this calculation is adjusted daily based on 
the level of  domestic inflation  minus 
international inflation.  Prior to the adoption of 
this measure, the basket was adjusted on the basis 
of  the country's domestic rate of  inflation  minus 
2.4 percentage points; since 13 December, 
however, 4.4 points are deducted, which 
translates into a 2% revaluation, in real terms, of 
the currency band's central rate. 
The previous practice of  deducting 2.4% for 
international inflation  was intended to maintain 
a real constant exchange rate. The use of  the new 
figure  acknowledges the existence of  a structural 
trend towards revaluation and eliminates the lag 
in the currency band. 
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During the second quarter of  1996, the 
movement of  the exchange rate was influenced 
by an upswing in the dollar on international 
markets, on the one hand, and by an increase 
in the supply of  foreign  exchange brought 
about by commercial and financial 
circumstances, on the other. One of  the effects 
of  the former  trend was to drive up the 
benchmark dollar rate and, hence, the currency 
band; and this, in conjunction with, the larger 
supply of  foreign  exchange, widened the gap 
between the benchmark dollar rate and the going 
rate on the market. As a result, the market rate 
dropped down to the floor  of  the band and, on a 
few  occasions, even lower, thus obliging the 
Central Bank to buy up dollars. A further 
adjustment of  interest rates in April 1996 opened 
up greater opportunities for  arbitrage, however, 
and these operations appear to have been on the 
rise during the last few  months. 
This was probably why the Central Bank 
moved to tighten up its control over speculative 
inflows  in mid-May by strengthening the 
enforcement  of  reserve requirements; to this end 
it ruled that external credits entering the country 
under chapters XIV and VI of  the Compendium 
of  Rules on International Exchange could not be 
extended more than once. This measure closes 
off  one means of  evading existing reserve 
requirements, since previously many credits 
were extended repeatedly without any reserve 
deposit being made. 
c) Fiscal policy 
The public sector posted an overall surplus of 
2.4% of  GDP (1.7% in 1994) and current savings 
amounting to 5.1% of  GDP (4.8% in 1994), 
making this the eighth year in a row that public 
finances  yielded current and general surpluses. 
Total savings covered the cost of  public 
investments, with enough left  over for  external 
debt payments and even prepayments. The gain 
in current income was due to the increase in tax 
receipts made possible by the faster  pace of 
economic activity and to the windfall  profits 
occasioned by the high price of  copper on 
international markets. 
The public sector made US$ 1.3 billion in 
prepayments on the Treasury's and the Central 
Bank's middle- and long-term external debt 
obligations with international agencies. This 
prepayment represented a structural adaptation to 
the changing status of  the country's external 
accounts, and its aim was to mitigate the effects 
of  the temporary terms-of-trade  bonanza on the 
build-up of  reserves. Over the next three years, 
such prepayments are expected to save the 
country US$ 280 million per year on its interest 
and amortization payments. 
Early in August, Congress agreed to raise 
direct taxes on cigarettes and fuel  by nearly 10% 
in order to help finance  a 10% increase in 
pensions under 100,000 pesos per month 
(US$ 245) and a 5% increase in educational 
subsidies. It also passed a number of  amendments 
to the tax code in order to close up loopholes that 
had permitted both companies and individuals to 
evade their tax obligations. 
Despite the growth of  current expenditure, 
fiscal  policy held the expansion of  public-sector 
spending in line with the economy's long-term 
trends, thereby strengthening public-sector 
saving and helping to reduce inflation.  The 
reduction of  public debt and international interest 
rates contributed to this accomplishment. 
The public sector continued to pare down 
its total external debt, with the level of  such 
debt tumbling from  US$ 16,380,000,000 in 
1987 to US$ 11,792,000,000 in 1990 and to 
US$ 5,874,000,000 as of  March 1996. 
d) Structural reforms 
The main reforms  undertaken in 1995 focused 
on the financial  sector and included legal changes 
that relaxed some of  the regulations governing 
institutional investments in infrastructure 
projects. Such investments are expected to total 
US$ 2.4 billion for  1995-1997, and steps were 
therefore  taken to modify  the rules and 
regulations concerning the operation of  pensions 
funds,  the insurance industry and investment 
funds  so that the diversification  and attraction of 
financial  resources could be tailored to fit  these 
kinds of  projects. 
In the case of  pension-fund  management 
boards (AFPs), the limit on equity investment was 
raised from  30% to 37% and the ceiling on 
external investment outlets was hiked from  6% 
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to 9%; the allowable number of  such instruments 
and of  destination countries was increased as 
well, and AFPs were authorized to invest in 
foreign  equities. 
Negotiations concerning the possibility of 
Chile becoming a party to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were once again 
delayed by the debate taking place within the 
United States Congress, but the Government of 
Chile continued to make headway in talks with 
Canada regarding the possibility of  concluding a 
free  trade agreement with that country by the 
close of  1996. The signature of  such a document 
would mean that Chile would have free  trade 
agreements with two of  the three parties to NAFTA 
(Canada and Mexico). Talks with the European 
Union also moved ahead, and in June 1996 a 
framework  agreement on investment and trade 
integration was concluded. 
The most notable advances to be made in the 
area of  trade agreements, however, took place 
within the framework  of  Chile's negotiations 
with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), 
which sparked a heated controversy within the 
country regarding what implications such an 
agreement might have for  traditional farmers.  In 
mid-June 1996, Chile signed a protocol 
regarding membership in MERCOSUR in a special 
category that would not make it subject to the 
common external tariff. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
Unlike the situation the year before,  the 
expansion of  production was primarily based on 
domestic demand (13%). The fastest-growing 
component of  expenditure was imports (22%), 
while the gains registered for  gross fixed  capital 
formation  (12%) and exports (9%) once again 
outstripped GDP growth. Private consumption 
(11%) remained closely in step with national 
income, showing an increase that was 
attributable both to higher wages and to a strong 
upturn in consumer credit. In contrast, public-
sector consumption rose by the moderate figure 
of  slightly more than 2%. 
Transport and communications (12%), 
commerce (11%) and fisheries  (10%) exhibited 
the highest growth rates, followed  by financial 
services (8%), construction and mining (7%) and 
manufacturing  (6.5%). 
In the first  quarter of  1996, economic activity 
maintained its exceptional buoyancy thanks to 
domestic demand; the expansion of  this segment 
of  demand (13%), which outdistanced the growth 
of  GDP (9%) by an ample margin, was led by the 
rise in investment (15%) and, secondarily, in 
consumption (12%). The value of  exports 
climbed by a mere 6% due to a downswing in the 
prices of  major export products (copper and 
wood pulp). 
The deterioration in the terms of  trade and the 
monetary restrictions that entered into effect  at 
the close of  December 1995 and in April 1966 
were expected to have a stronger effect  on the 
economy during the second half  of  the year. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The fact  that expenditure grew faster  than GDP 
drove up imports sharply and put pressure on the 
prices of  non-tradable goods and services. From 
the start of  the second quarter on, tradable goods 
exhibited an increase of  between 5% and 6% over 
the corresponding period of  1994, but the prices 
of  non-tradables shot up by between 9% and 
10%. This trend remained in place for  the rest of 
1995 and the first  quarter of  1996. 
Taxes on fuel  and cigarettes added three 
tenths of  a point to the increase in the consumer 
price index, but even so it rose by only 8.2% for 
the year. The trend value for  inflation  was 
somewhat lower, however, and the authorities 
therefore  set the next inflation  target at no more 
than 6.5%. 
This trend indicator began to deteriorate in 
January 1996, however, and by May had reached 
8.6%. Nevertheless, from  that point on, inflation 
was expected to abate as a result of  the low and 
stable rate for  the dollar on the domestic market, 
a partial reversal of  the rise in oil prices, and the 
impact that the deterioration in the terms of  trade 
and the country 's successive monetary 
adjustments were expected to have on spending 
levels. 
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Nominal wages closed out the year with a 
mean 12-month rise of  12.7%, which was less 
than the sum of  expected inflation  and produc-
tivity; thus, the 4.1% average gain in real wages 
was achieved without generating inflationary 
pressures. In the first  quarter of  1996, however, 
the rate of  increase in nominal wages accelerated 
to an annual level of  15%, which was well in 
excess of  expected inflation  plus productivity. 
Despite the rapid pace of  growth, net job 
creation was sluggish, and slightly less than three 
fourths  of  new jobs were in the generally 
low-productivity area of  community, social and 
personal services. Employment levels were down 
in agriculture and unchanged in manufacturing. 
The latest measurement of  the unemployment 
rate indicated that it had surged from  4.7% in the 
final  quarter of  1995 to 6.6% in the first  quarter 
of  1996; the two samples underlying these 
figures  were not, however, comparable. 
c) The external sector 
The balance of  payments registered a 
substantial improvement in the trade account and 
a slackening of  net capital flows;  in fact,  these 
inflows  were negative during the first  quarter, but 
then embarked upon a rapid recovery starting in 
the second quarter. As of  the end of  December 
1995, net international reserves amounted to 
US$ 14.8 billion, which was equivalent to 11 
months worth of  imports and practically two 
thirds of  the country's total external debt. 
The improvement in Chile's trade balance 
was accounted for  chiefly  by the strong upswing 
in the terms of  trade which had begun in the 
second half  of  1994 and, to a lesser extent, by the 
expansion of  export volumes. Merchandise 
exports were up 38% with a 12% gain in volume 
and a 24% rise in prices. Imports climbed by 35% 
based on increases of  25% in volume and 8% in 
prices. 
The value of  copper exports jumped by 53%, 
with prices standing 35% above the preceding 
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year's level. Exports of  traditional products other 
than copper (bleached pulp, fishmeal,  fresh  fruit 
and sawn lumber) swelled by 39% (with prices 
rising 25% and volume up by 11%) while 
non-traditional exports showed an advance of 
22% (with an increase of  10% in volume and of 
11% in prices). Within this last category, 
exceptionally strong advances were seen in 
exports of  processed marine products (an 
expansion of  24% for  tinned fish  and salmon) and 
processed agricultural goods (a 29% increase in 
dehydrated products, frozen  tomatoes and fruit, 
bottled wine and malt barley). 
The upturn in imports was accounted for  by 
increases of  44% in consumer goods, 37% in 
intermediate products other than fuel,  and 29% 
in capital goods. 
The balance-of-payments  financial  account 
yielded a surplus of  US$ 1.2 billion, as compared 
to US$ 4.6 billion the year before.  This change 
was due to the steep drop in net medium- and 
long-term capital inflows  caused by the country's 
prepayments on its external debt, a reduction in 
the use of  lines of  short-term credit, a negative 
balance for  short-term trade flows  and a sizeable 
decrease in portfolio  investment, which was 
actually negative in the second and third quarters. 
Portfolio  investment was hurt by the region's 
instability, the impact of  this situation on 
international markets, and the decision of  foreign 
investment fund  managers to repatriate capital 
and profits. 
Foreign direct investment slipped by slightly 
over 1% but, at almost double its 1993 rate, was 
still high. The decrease recorded in 1995 was due 
to a considerable increase in the capital 
remittances entering the country in connection 
with external debt swaps, since this increase was 
only partially offset  by the 2% gain in direct 
investments made under Decree-Law No. 600 on 
foreign  investment. Chilean overseas 
investments were down sharply (-26%) but were 
nonetheless very substantia] and still 




1. General trends 
Although the Colombian economy recorded an 
upturn on the order of  5% in 1995 while inflation 
fell  below 20%, the country also became mired 
in a serious and protracted political crisis which 
created a climate of  instability and uncertainty. 
Despite a more restrictive form  of  monetary 
control, total private consumption continued to 
rise significantly  (7%). External demand, gross 
investment and public spending also expanded 
considerably. 
The balance-of-payments  deficit  on current 
account continued to widen, amounting to ,4.5% 
of  gross domestic product (GDP), and was financed 
by a strong inflow  of  foreign  capital. Nevertheless, 
the peso lost value in real terms throughout 1995, 
thus reversing the trend of  previous years. This 
boosted exports of  goods, which outpaced 
merchandise imports. None-theless, the trade deficit 
in services was higher than in the preceding year. 
The fiscal  situation deteriorated somewhat, 
with the non- financial  public sector recording a 
small deficit  of  0.3% of  GDP, in contrast to a 2.6% 
surplus in 1994. Expenditure rose again in real 
terms and, hence, so did the non-financial  public 
sector's contribution to GDP, thereby reflecting 
the Government's intention to expand social 
programmes under the National Development 
Plan for  1994-1998. A tax reform  package 
designed to increase government revenues was 
passed by the Congress in late 1995. 
Monetary policy maintained its restrictive 
profile  as policy-makers strove to curb 
consumption and pursue the fight  against 
inflation.  The differences  that arose between the 
monetary authorities and the central government 
were settled by the temporary imposition of 
controls on interest rates. 
The monetary crunch coincided with the end 
of  the construction boom, which affected  a 
number of  related industries. The slowdown in 
consumption, which had enjoyed a strong 
expansion in preceding years (especially in the 
case of  vehicles and consumer durables) put a 
damper on activity in manufacturing,  transport 
and commerce. High interest rates only served to 
exacerbate the financial  situation created by the 
high level of  debt run up by economic agents in 
the previous period. 
Structural reforms  undertaken by the previous 
Administration were not pursued in 1995. The 
Government announced a privatization 
programme for  1996 which included plans to sell 
off  a number of  mines and banks which are 
expected to bring in over US$ 800 million. 
2. Economic policy 
Economic policy in 1995 was geared to resolving 
some of  the problems that had mounted up during 
the preceding three-year period. The dynamism 
of  previous years had been based on a rapid 
increase in public spending and private 
consumption, with the latter being financed 
through private borrowing on the domestic and 
foreign  markets. The gap between domestic 
savings and total investment was widening at the 
same time as the peso was gaining in value and 
the deficit  on the balance-of-payments  current 
account was expanding. This growth pattern was 
not sustainable in the medium term, and a change 
in macroeconomic management was therefore 
necessary in order to achieve more balanced 
growth. 
The first  policy change to be made for  this 
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1994, when the Bank of  the Republic started to 
implement a restrictive monetary policy even 
while fiscal  policy continued to be growth-
oriented. As inflation  had remained unchanged 
in 1994 and the peso continued its upward trend, 
during the first  part of  1995, the monetary 
authorities maintained their tight control over the 
money supply. With the high interest rates 
prevailing in the second quarter of  the year, 
demand started to cool off  and domestic activity 
began to slacken. This exacerbated the conflict 
between the objective of  maintaining vigorous 
growth in output and the effort  to check inflation. 
The conflict  was partially resolved in June, when 
the Bank of  the Republic agreed to control 
interest rates temporarily, while the Government 
decided to cut public spending to ease the 
pressure on the money market. 
In the second half-year,  interest rates declined 
slightly. However, by the end of  1995 they were 
on the rise again. In response to the growing 
political uncertainty in the country, the exchange 
rate shot up to the ceiling of  the exchange rate 
band and at some points even went above it. The 
Bank of  the Republic then stepped in to stabilize 
and support the Colombian peso. 
a) Fiscal policy 
In 1995, the non-financial  public sector incurred 
a deficit  of  nearly 1% of  GDP, whereas the 
previous year it had recorded a surplus. The 
deficit  run up by the central government was 
even larger, but was partly offset  by the financial 
surpluses recorded by the rest of  the non-
financial  public sector. However, this deteriora-
tion was not attributable to a greater increase in 
current expenditure than in current income but 
rather to the fact  that there were no revenues from 
privatizations in 1995. Without these entries in 
the 1994 accounts, there would have been no 
surplus for  that year either. Consequently, the 
fiscal  downturn registered in 1995 was not as 
significant  as it appears to be at first  glance. 
The non-financial  public sector's total income 
fell  approximately 3% in real terms, while 
expenditure increased by 9%. For the first  time 
in years, the central government's current 
expenditure was not lower than its current 
income, that is, central government savings were 
zero. The growth rate for  tax  receipts had been 
10% the previous year but was only 0.7% in 1995, 
while total central government disbursements 
swelled by almost 11%, which explains the size 
of  the central government deficit.  However, the 
breakdown in expenditure was different.  Increases 
in operating expenditure and transfers  were 
smaller than in 1994 whereas capital investment, 
which had been at a standstill, expanded 12%. 
Under Colombia's new constitutional 
provisions, transfers  to decentralized bodies 
increased further;  as a result, regional and local 
government finances,  which had shown a deficit 
of  0.6% of  GDP in 1994, balanced out in 1995. 
In the rest of  the non-financial  public sector, 
surpluses recorded by the country's electricity 
companies, the Empresa Colombiana de 
Petróleos (ECOPETROL) and the social security 
system helped to offset  part of  the central 
government's deficit  in 1995. On the other hand, 
the Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 
(TELECOM), the Metro de Medellín and the 
National Coffee  Fund were all in the red. 
To alleviate the pressure on the money 
market, in June the central government, acting in 
consultation with the Bank of  the Republic, cut 
back its current disbursements by 530 billion 
pesos (a sum equivalent to slightly less than 1% 
of  GDP). In December, the Congress passed a tax 
reform  package that extended the value-added 
tax (VAT) and raised the rate from  14% to 16%, 
cancelled certain taxes on foreign  investment and 
strengthened mechanisms for  reducing tax 
evasion. The central government expects this 
reform  to generate additional income in 19% 
equivalent to 1% of  GDP. 
b) Monetary policy 
In order to curb domestic demand, promote 
saving and check the upward movement of  the 
exchange rate, the Bank of  the Republic 
maintained its restrictive monetary policy in 
1995, setting itself  the goal of  holding inflation 
to 18%. The actual rate turned out to be somewhat 
higher than this target figure,  however. 
In the course of  the year, there was a contraction 
in the demand for  money (Ml), especially on 
current account; in turn, both the monetary base 
and Ml expanded less than expected. Ml 
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Table 1 
C O M A : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investmentb 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100)b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995' 
Growth rates 
4.2 3.4 3.8 1.6 4.0 5.1 6.3 5.7 
2.4 1.6 2.0 -0.2 2.2 3.3 4.6 4.1 
3.7 1.6 3.8 4.9 5.1 4.0 8.7 6.8 
4.0 4.4 3.0 1.6 1.2 1.3 4.4 5.4 
3.8 3.7 3.7 3.4 2.9 5.0 7.5 5.3 
5.9 2.4 3.8 2.0 4.8 6.6 6.6 5.7 
Percentages 
3.6 3.1 2.0 1.3 1.6 5.6 3.8 5.4 
0.9 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.5 0.7 
2.6 2.6 1.7 1.0 0.5 4.8 2.3 4.7 
1.7 -1.6 -0.2 -1.6 7.2 7.0 7.3 3.3 
0.6 1.4 3.6 2.1 1.5 0.6 0.8 2.4 
-1.6 0.4 -1.6 -0.2 -6.2 -8.2 -5.6 -5.3 
Percentages of  GDP B 
21.7 19.5 18.5 16.7 22.9 28.5 33.7 35.0 
21.1 18.9 19.9 23.0 25.4 22.7 26.0 26.1 
0.6 0.5 -1.3 -6.3 -2.5 5.8 7.7 8.9 
Percentages 
57.9 57.6 58.4 59.5 60.8 60.1 60.0 59.8 
11.3 9.9 10.5 10.2 10.2 8.6 8.9 8.9 
101.9 102.7 100.0 96.7 95.0 97.6 96.0 95.6 
Growth rates 
28.1 26.1 32.4 26.8 25.1 22.6 22.5 19.3 
29.5 25.6 29.9 23.1 17.9 13.2 20.7 15.4 
103.6 102.6 100.0 104.4 107.4 106.8 120.7 127.9 
299 383 503 604 681 787 827 915 
86.5 88.8 100.0 101.0 90.0 85.6 74.8 74.9 
Millions of  dollars 
-216 -201 542 2 349 912 -2 130 -3 033 -4 055 
565 1 200 1 821 2 741 1 174 -1 561 -2 103 -2 592 
6 751 7 322 8 679 9 101 9 241 9 174 10 761 13 773 
6 186 6 122 6 858 6 360 8 067 10 735 12 864 16 365 
940 407 26 -785 283 2 609 3 023 4 579 
194 363 638 1 834 1 209 2 164 350 
193 434 610 1 836 1 092 17 152 
Percentages 
43.4 43.4 42.4 40.7 32.4 30.7 26.7 26.1 
17.3 18.1 15.3 12.4 9.8 8.0 7.5 6.1 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Non-financial  public sector 
Current income 21.6 21.6 23.6 25.1 25.7 27.2 29.3 28.9 
Current expenditure 16.6 16.7 16.8 18.2 18.7 18.8 20.7 22.4 
Savings 5.0 4.9 6.8 6.9 7.0 8.4 8.6 6.5 
Capital expenditure (net) 0.5 0.1 0.4 - -0.2 -1.7 -3.6 -1.4 
Financial balance -2.2 -1.9 -0.5 - -0.2 0.3 2.6 -0.3 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking system 
Net international reserves 94.1 29.9 -2.1 -7.2 16.2 
Net domestic credit -0.4 39.1 84.2 25.8 30.1 
To public sector 40.9 -12.9 27.2 -15.0 -24.0 
To private sector 17.1 37.6 57.8 36.0 35.7 
Money (Ml) 8 28.1 39.1 32.8 22.3 20.2 
Local-currency savings and 
time deposits 30.7 27.4 45.8 50.0 29.8 
M2 29.9 30.9 41.7 41.8 27.4 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits -0.1 6.3 3.2 8.2 1.4 2.7 6.6 10.4 
On loans - 13.7 9.9 16.6 9.0 11.2 15.1 19.2 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency 3.7 4.0 9.8 -1.4 14.8 26.0 11.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1980 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  are obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. ° Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. 
8 ¿1 the private sector. h Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
I II HI iv I II M rv I N IN iv 
Consumer prices (nationwide) 
(12-month variation, %) 24.1 21.4 21.4 22.6 23.4 23.0 22.3 22.5 21.2 21.5 20.6 19.3 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 86.6 86.2 85.5 83.6 78.0 74.6 73.2 73.4 72.6 72.2 75.1 79.6 
Real interest rate (annualized, %) 
On deposits -9.5 3.0 7.9 9.4 -12.3 5.4 15.7 17.5 -2.6 9.0 18.1 17.2 
On loans -2.8 11.4 17.4 18.7 -4.8 14.7 25.5 24.8 4.9 17.2 28.1 26.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
' Preliminary figures. 
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increased by just over 20% and the monetary 
base by slightly over 11% (versus 25% and 28% 
in 1994). On the other hand, for  much of  1995, 
the growth rate for  the broadly-defined  money 
supply (M3)1 was higher than projected. Its overall 
increase for  the year -26%- was within the 
projected range, however. With respect to quasi-
money, the items showing the largest increase 
were savings deposits at commercial banks (46%) 
and deposits in savings and loan associations 
(38%). This indicates a change in the structure of 
monetary aggregates, which hampered the Bank 
of  the Republic's efforts  to control inflation. 
The restrictive monetary policy caused the 
upward path of  interest rates to steepen. Thus, by 
mid-1995, the rate for  deposits varied between 
32% and 35% and the lending rate was between 
43% and 47%. In June, the Bank of  the Republic 
imposed a temporary restraint on interest rates; 
this brought them down five  percentage points, 
and they then remained at that level for  the rest of 
the year. The monetary authorities also took steps 
to reduce the spread and average level of  reserve 
requirements for  the different  types of  deposits. 
The rate of  expansion of  total credit in the finan-
cial system (37%) continued to show signs of  cooling 
off  (it had stood at 44% the preceding year). 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
In 1995, there were two distinct phases in the 
movement of  the exchange rate. Until the 
beginning of  August, it was at the mid-point of 
the band. For the remainder of  the year, it stayed 
near the top of  the band and even went through 
the ceiling at times, thus reflecting  the political 
uncertainty that overwhelmed Colombia and 
forcing  the Bank of  the Republic to intervene in 
support of  the peso. One of  the measures taken 
consisted in modifying  the regulations governing 
its own foreign  currency position,2 the minimum 
amount was reduced from  40% to 0% and a 
maximum limit of  30% was imposed (previously, 
there had been no ceiling). The net result of  this 
moment of  the exchange rate was a real 6% 
depreciation of  the currency in December 1995, 
as compared with its level 12 months earlier, but 
the average annual rate was the same as for  the 
previous year. 
In the first  months of  1996, political distur-
bances again forced  the exchange rate up to the 
ceiling of  the currency band. To ease the pressure 
on the foreign  exchange market, the Bank of  the 
Republic made use of  its international reserves, 
drawing them down by around US$ 300 million. 
In the first  quarter of  1996, the Bank of  the 
Republic also relaxed some of  the restrictions on 
foreign  borrowing. It reduced from  five  to three 
years the minimum period during which foreign 
lenders must maintain special deposits with the 
Bank of  the Republicas a prerequisite for  loan dis-
bursement (after  which time they may qualify  for  an 
exemption); it also reduced the mandatory reserve 
requirement for  loans to less than three years. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
In 1995 the Colombian economy completed 
three years with an average annual growth rate 
of  over 5% (per capita GDP went up 4% while 
national income rose almost 7%). 
Unlike the situation in previous years, the 
sectors that produce non-tradables suffered  a 
decline as their growth rate slowed from  just over 
8% in 1994 to slightly more than 5% in 1995; on 
the other hand, growth in the tradables sectors 
strengthened, exceeding 5%. Final consumption 
continued to be the driving force  behind domestic 
demand, with a growth rate of  slightly over 7% 
(two percentage points above the level of  the 
previous year), but investment also maintained 
its pace and exports gained momentum. Aggregate 
supply again showed a larger increase than 
output, since imports again climbed significantly, 
albeit at a somewhat slower pace than in 1994. 
Total investment, which grew 10%, was the 
most dynamic component of  aggregate demand 
1 Currency outside banks plus all deposits in the financial  system subject to reserve requirements. 
2 This system constitutes a type of  foreign  currency reserve requirement. 
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in 1995. Unlike the previous year, public 
investment exhibited a much faster  increase than 
private investment did. 
The most vigorous sectors in 1995 were 
mining and services. The agricultural sector also 
recorded strong growth, while manufacturing 
and private construction experienced a slowdown. 
The sector that displayed the most dynamism 
in 1995 was mining, which, in a departure from 
the downward trend observed since 1991, posted 
an increase of  17%. Within the sector, there were 
very dissimilar patterns, however. Oil, gas, coal 
and nickel production grew strongly while the 
output of  iron ore, gold, silver and platinum was 
considerably lower. Oil production soared by 
30% with the intensive development of  the 
Cusiana deposits, which yielded over 170,000 
barrels per day in December 1995, more than 
quadruple the figure  recorded 12 months earlier. 
Total oil production in Colombia thus totalled 
580,000 barrels per day in 1995. 
Services, as a whole, grew more than GDP, 
despite what was actually a slowdown in the 
sector. Communications, government services 
and personal services -which expanded by 12%, 
8% and 7%, respectively- were the engine of  this 
overall increase. The sharpest decrease was in the 
financial  sector, which recorded a decline in its 
growth rate from  9% to just over 4% in 1995. 
Agricultural production was up 5%, thus 
turning in a more dynamic performance  than in 
previous years, thanks to good weather 
conditions and a favourable  international market 
situation. Coffee  production rebounded by 
almost 10% after  a downturn that had lasted three 
years. Permanent crops and the livestock 
subsector also showed satisfactory  growth (6% 
and 7%, respectively), in contrast with the 
sluggishness of  annual crops. 
Coffee  processing was down by 17%, for  the 
third consecutive year of  double-digit declines. 
The slowdown in the rest of  the manufacturing 
sector meant that its overall growth for  1995 did 
not even reach the 2% mark. The best results 
were posted by professional  and scientific 
equipment, beverages, paper and paper products, 
and food  items. Leather and leather goods, rubber 
products, milled wood, footwear,  and electrical 
equipment and appliances declined substantially. 
Other areas of  manufacturing  turned in a 
lacklustre performance.  This growth pattern was 
the result of  a series of  factors.  The liberalization 
of  the economy and contraband trade hurt 
textiles, leather and leather goods, and paper and 
paper products. The end of  the boom in the 
construction and automotive industries had an 
adverse effect  on the industries that provide them 
with inputs. The downswing in domestic demand 
affected  all sectors, although in varying degrees. 
The growth rate in construction (around 4%) 
was less than one-fifth  of  the previous year's rate. 
The decline in private construction (-3%), 
following  a phase of  vigorous expansion, was 
offset  by the increase in civil engineering 
projects (14%). 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Price movements were the most favourable  to 
be seen since the beginning of  the 1990s. 
Consumer prices went up almost 20%, three 
percentage points below the level recorded a year 
earlier. 
This trend was attributable to the authorities' 
tight control of  monetary variables, which 
slowed down final  consumption, and to the 
Social Pact on Productivity, Prices and Wages 
signed in December 1994, which set limits on 
increases in public utility rates and wages. With 
the exception of  health and other expenses, all 
items reflected  smaller increases in 1995 than in 
1994. The category of  the consumer price index 
(CPI) that showed the most moderate rise was food 
(16%, compared with 23% in 1994). In the first 
five  months of  1996, the cumulative variation 
was close to 13%, which was only slightly higher 
than the figure  for  the corresponding period in 1995. 
The movement in the producer price index 
(PPI) was 15%, compared with almost 21% in 
1994. The only exceptions to this general trend 
were the prices for  imports and exports other than 
coffee,  which went up 20% and 24%, respec-
tively. 
The employment situation which had not 
shown any major changes in the first  half  of  1995, 
worsened in the second as a result of  the 
slowdown in economic activity, especially in 
labour-intensive sectors such as construction and 
commerce, thereby reversing the positive trend 
observed since the beginning of  the decade. 
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Unemployment in the country's seven metro-
politan areas rose to 9.5% in December 1995 
(compared with 7.9% in December 1994), even 
though the labour participation rate was 
somewhat higher (61.2% in the final  quarter of 
1995) than it had been one year earlier. In March 
1996, unemployment in the seven metropolitan 
areas exceeded 10%. 
Due to the worsening labour situation, 
together with the effects  of  the Social Pact, wages 
remained flat  in real terms in 1995. 
c) The external sector 
In 1995, expenditure again outpaced income 
in Colombia. The current account deficit 
widened to more than US$ 4 billion, rising from 
4.4% to 5.2% of  GDP. This gap was covered by 
the surplus of  almost US$ 4.6 billion, or 5.6% of 
output, obtained on the financial  account. At the 
end of  1995, the Bank of  the Republic's net 
reserves stood at US$ 8.3 billion, reflecting  an 
increase of  US$ 300 million. 
The merchandise trade deficit  deepened by 
10% to US$ 2.5 billion. Stimulated by the real 
depreciat ion of  the peso and buoyant 
international prices (except for  coffee),  exports 
of  goods totalled US$ 10.4 billion, thus attaining, 
for  the first  time since 1992, a higher growth rate 
(19%) than merchandise imports, which went up 
17% to around US$ 12.9 billion. 
This favourable  export trend was based on the 
momentum generated by sales of  oil and 
petroleum products, ferronickel  and non-
traditional exports. The value of  sales of  oil and 
petroleum products improved by almost 70% as 
a result of  the upturn in international prices and 
the increased volume of  exports, which allowed 
the oil industry to reclaim its position as the 
leading export sector in Colombia. Non-
traditional exports also made significant  gains, 
climbing by over 16% to US$ 4.7 billion. This 
was particularly the case for  manufactures, 
especially chemicals, food,  and paper and paper 
products. After  recording strong growth in 1994, 
coffee  exports suffered  a setback, due to the 
marked downturn in international prices and a 
glut on the world market. 
Merchandise imports grew at a slower pace 
than in 1994. Intermediate goods showed the 
most dynamic growth, expanding by 
approximately 30%. Purchases of  capital goods 
from  abroad increased by a mere 6%. 
Whereas the merchandise trade deficit 
increased by 10%, the current account deficit 
widened by 34%. The main causes of  this sharper 
deterioration were the dramatic rise (114%) in 
interest paid out by the private sector, as a 
consequence of  the upward trend in foreign 
borrowing, and a 30% increase in remittances of 
profits  and dividends. 
Despite the Mexican crisis, capital inflows 
expanded by 50% to a record level of  almost 
US$ 4.6 billion. For the second consecutive year, 
long-term capital inflows  were greater than short-
term inflows.  Foreign direct investment amounted 
to US$ 2.6 billion, while portfolio  investments 
fell  US$ 420 million. It is estimated that 
two-fifths  of  foreign  direct investment went to the 
petroleum sector. In 1995, portfolio  investment and 
long-term externa] debt increased by just US$ 67 
million and US$ 72 million, respectively. 
Net short-term capital inflows  amounted to 
US$ 1.8 billion, compared with a net outflow  of 
almost US$ 500 million the previous year. Net 
short-term borrowing totalled US$ 1.2 billion 
and the net variation in external assets was close 
to USS 600 million. This latter figure 
corresponded to public-sector income from 
privatizations concluded in previous years. 
The total external debt amounted to US$ 23.4 
billion; this was a 10% increase, which was a 
lower rate than in 1994. One third of  the total was 
incurred by the private sector while 80% was 
long-term debt. The total debt in 1995 was 
equivalent to 26% of  GDP and net interest 
equalled 6% of  exports; both these percentages 
reflect  a downward trend and suggest that 
short-term foreign  debt does not pose a problem 
for  the Colombian economy. 
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1. General trends 
In 1995 the growth rate of  the Costa Rican 
economy dropped to just slightly more than half 
the preceding year's rate of  4.4%. The public-
sector deficit,  including losses sustained by the 
Central Bank of  Costa Rica, shrank to below 4% 
and the balance-of-payments  current account 
deficit  was slashed by 70%. In addition, foreign 
exchange reserves rallied so strongly that they 
exceeded the level agreed upon with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). Even so, inflation 
rose once again, climbing to nearly 23%. 
A combination of  factors  undermined 
economic growth and led to a marked drop in 
investment for  the second year running. The 
fiscal  deficit  having widened the year before,  the 
authorities introduced strict policies designed to 
balance public finances  in accordance with the 
agreement signed with the IMF in October 1994. 
A package of  fiscal  measures was not approved 
by the Legislative Assembly until the following 
September and, in the interim, a tight monetary 
policy had to be applied which led to a 
contraction in the supply of  credit. Moreover, the 
volatility of  international financial  markets in the 
wake of  the devaluation of  the Mexican peso 
helped create a climate of  uncertainty which 
caused a number of  external loans to be put on 
hold and made investors wary. 
Real activity was affected  in different  ways 
depending on the sector. Construction was hit the 
hardest, whereas agriculture and manufacturing 
grew faster  than gross domestic product (GDP), as 
did a number of  service sectors. 
The dramatic narrowing of  the deficit  on the 
balance-of-payments  current account was the 
result of  a surge in exports of  goods and services. 
Meanwhile, gross investment contracted while 
the domestic savings rate rose, so the need for 
external savings was cut by almost half.  The 
balance-of-payments  current account deficit  was 
financed  out of  inflows  of  private long-term 
capital. 
2. Economic policy 
Economic policy during 1995 was shaped largely 
by efforts  to reduce the public-sector deficit.  The 
authorities had intended to bring about a 
sustained increase in tax revenues by reforming 
the tax system, but the delays involved in passing 
the relevant bills meant that contingency 
measures had to be adopted in order to restrict 
spending and generate more revenue, most 
notably through the use of  import duties. The 
approval of  a tax package in August made it 
possible to dispense with some of  these 
provisions and contributed to the attainment of 
the public-sector deficit  target. Nevertheless, 
because of  the slow pace of  progress towards a 
solution of  the fiscal  problem, the Government 
once again had to resort to expensive domestic 
borrowing, thereby pushing up interest payments 
as a proportion of  public expenditure once again. 
Monetary policy was geared towards curbing 
liquidity. High reserve requirements and 
substantial open-market operations kept the rate 
of  expansion of  monetary aggregates below the 
rate of  inflation.  At the same time, regulations 
for  liberalizing the financial  sector were drawn 
up which were expected to lead to major 
changes in the sector's operation from  1996 
onwards. 
Foreign exchange policy continued to call for 
small, frequent  devaluations of  the currency. In 
nominal terms, the colón was devalued against 
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the dollar at a faster  pace than the year before  in 
order to maintain the real exchange rate. 
The authorities' price liberalization policy 
remained in effect,  while wage policy was 
modified  with a view to making pay levels more 
flexible. 
Notwithstanding the short-term tariff 
increases that were introduced to channel more 
revenue into fiscal  coffers,  trade policy continued 
to focus  on opening up the economy and 
diversifying  exports. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy sought to narrow the deficit  and, 
in the longer term, bring about a sustained 
increase in tax revenues, decrease the rigidity of 
expenditure and boost public-sector saving in 
order to cut down on the use of  costly forms  of 
domestic and external financing.  At the same 
time, the authorities set themselves the task of 
improving the allocation of  social spending. 
The draft  tax legislation that was submitted to 
the Legislative Assembly was designed to 
increase public-sector revenues, but the slowness 
with which these bills moved through the 
Assembly obliged the Government to adopt a 
variety of  emergency measures, including 
under-spending on the public-sector budget; the 
application of  a tax on coffee  exports which 
allowed the Treasury to share in the industry's 
windfall  profits  from  high international coffee 
prices; a temporary rise of  eight percentage 
points in import duties between March and 
September; and the introduction of  an excise tax 
on certain goods. 
Upon passage of  the tax reforms,  most of  these 
measures were discontinued. The modifications 
to the fiscal  regime took the form  of  the Fair 
Taxation Act, the Tax Adjustment Act and the 
Customs Act. Tax evasion was made a criminal 
offence;  the sales tax was raised temporarily 
from  10% to 15% but was eventually to be 
lowered to 13%; and a 1% tax on gross assets was 
introduced for  companies with capital exceeding 
the equivalent of  US$ 160,000. Stricter 
conditions were also stipulated for  the teachers' 
pension scheme (a higher minimum qualifying 
age, a longer period of  contribution and ceilings 
on pension levels). 
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Tax revenues went up by 10% in real terms 
and total public spending dropped by 5%, owing 
in part to a substantial reduction in capital 
expenditure. A slight decrease in overall current 
spending was the net result of  the differing  trends 
exhibited by its various components. Interest 
payments as a proportion of  total central 
government outlays were up from  17% to 26%, 
which limited the manoeuvering room available 
to fiscal  policy-makers. The authorities planned 
a significant  cut in the public-sector deficit  so that 
they would be able to limit bond issues and 
gradually ease the burden of  financial  liabilities. 
Priority was also given to changing the way in 
which Treasury bonds were sold through the 
introduction of  open bidding arrangements and 
variable interest rates. 
Pension payments continued to rise as a result 
of  the large backlog of  pending applications and 
the inevitable delay in implementing the new 
provisions. The wage bill for  the consolidated 
public sector remained constant in real terms 
despite plans to trim back administrative staff 
and to step up the implementation of  the labour 
mobility scheme. Civil service wages were 
subject to a variety of  automatic adjustment 
mechanisms. 
The overall public-sector deficit  (including 
Central Bank losses) shrank to less than half  its 
former  level, which left  it at around 3.5% of  GDP. 
The central government deficit  lessened 
somewhat, but was still over 4% of  GDP, whereas 
decentralized public-sector companies posted a 
handsome surplus. Central Bank losses equalled 
1.5% of  GDP. During 1995, both the central 
government and the non-financial  public sector 
as a whole managed a net amortization of 
external credits; as a result, net domestic 
financing  was substantia], although it fell  short 
of  the preceding year's figure. 
b) Monetary policy 
Despite the build-up of  international reserves, 
the growth rate of  claims on the financial  system 
slowed considerably. Both total domestic credit 
in the system and Central Bank credit, shrank in 
nominal terms. Although net credit to the public 
sector expanded by nearly 20% -owing 
particularly to the demand for  funding  for  the 
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Table 1 
COSTA MCA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage (lowest level) 
(Index: 1990 = 100) 
Prices (December-December) 
Domestic retail prices 
Wholesale prices 
Industrial producer prices 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990 = 100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(colones per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990 = 100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial  account 
Overall balance 
International reserves (variation) 
External debt 
Total external debt 
(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports)8 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
3.1 5.2 3.5 2.1 7.3 6.0 4.4 2.5 
0.3 2.4 0.8 -0.4 4.7 3.5 1.9 0.2 
2.3 4.5 5.2 3.5 9.1 5.4 6.9 5.6 
3.0 5.8 2.1 3.0 7.1 5.5 3.6 1.9 
6.0 7.7 6.6 3.5 11.0 8.8 7.6 5.2 
2.9 4.5 4.0 1.3 7.0 6.0 4.4 2.5 
Percentages 
2.3 5.2 3.9 -0.2 5.7 5.6 5.6 1.2 
0.6 0.7 0.4 -0.2 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.1 
1.7 4.5 3.5 0.0 5.1 4.6 5.1 3.8 
-1.8 2.4 1.1 -3.3 8.2 3.5 -1.2 -2.7 
3.0 3.6 2.5 4.0 4.6 4.3 1.9 4.8 
-0.3 -5.9 -4.0 1.6 -11.1 -7.3 -1.9 -3.4 
Percentages of  GDP B 
23.5 24.6 24.9 21.1 27.3 29.1 26.7 23.4 
17.4 15.7 16.3 19.4 21.3 20.0 20.4 21.7 
6.2 8.9 8.7 1.7 6.0 9.1 6.3 1.7 
Percentages 
94.5 96.2 95.4 94.5 96.0 95.9 95.8 94.8 
5.5 3.8 4.6 5.5 4.1 4.1 4.2 5.2 
95.1 99.1 100.0 92.8 92.5 92.7 93.6 91.0 
Growth rates 
25.3 10.0 27.3 25.3 17.0 9.0 19.9 22.6 
19.7 10.7 27.9 22.3 12.7 6.6 
10.4 6.2 19.9 21.9 
104.8 103.1 100.0 100.9 104.2 104.0 107.1 113.2 
75.8 81.5 91.6 122.4 134.5 142.3 157.3 179.3 
104.0 98.0 100.1 108.3 103.0 100.4 101.0 98.6 
Millions of  dollars 
-304 -480 -494 -99 -380 -619 -463 -137 
-91 -237 -383 -43 -341 -537 -399 -55 
1 611 1 831 1 963 2 190 2 580 2 906 3 281 4 147 
1 702 2 068 2 346 2 232 2 922 3 443 3 680 4 202 
-272 -183 -84 155 199 138 -122 197 
-351 -454 -535 156 21 -183 -87 185 
188 112 -197 416 177 -60 -65 
Percentages 
93.9 85.0 67.9 69.8 58.5 49.3 45.1 41.8 
19.8 17.9 9.6 5.7 5.0 5.0 3.7 2.5 
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Currency and credit 
Money balances of 
monetary system 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
26.7 26.7 26.1 27.6 28.2 28.2 26.1 27.7 
21.8 23.6 23.9 23.7 22.3 22.2 26.6 25.1 
4.9 3.2 2.2 3.8 5.9 6.0 -0.6 2.6 
4.9 5.6 4.8 3.9 5.3 5.4 6.1 4.5 
0.1 -2.5 -2.5 -0.1 0.7 0.6 -6.6 -1.9 
0.1 2.0 2.2 -1.6 -1.3 0.2 5.7 2.9 
-0.2 0.4 0.3 1.7 0.6 -0.9 0.9 -1.0 
Growth rates 
Net international reserves 83.4 29.2 -19.8 156.5 23.0 4.9 4.6 41.6 
Net domestic credit 16.7 4.0 30.4 4.7 24.3 31.5 27.6 -10.7 
To public sector 17.3 -2.4 30.7 4.9 -4.3 2.7 28.6 19.6 
To private sector 16.2 10.1 30.2 8.9 48.0 36.1 15.7 9.5 
Money (Ml) 21.6 18.2 7.5 29.0 36.0 7.8 31.1 1.1 
Local-currency savings and 
time deposits 20.1 21.6 44.4 22.2 40.9 40.1 10.6 -7.9 
M2 20.9 19.8 24.9 25.3 38.6 25.2 18.7 -4.0 
Dollar deposits 47.2 30.9 39.5 67.1 0.2 10.3 20.9 29.7 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits -7.7 5.2 -4.9 1.5 -1.0 7.3 -1.7 0.9 
On loans 3.2 17.6 4.0 10.8 9.8 19.3 11.0 11.1 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency -0.3 9.2 -0.4 -2.8 15.1 6.4 7.9 5.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990 dollars. 0 These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  In 1993 the wholesale price index was replaced by an industrial producer price index. 8 Refers  to net 
interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services, 
by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Interest rate on deposits, deflated 
Table 2 
COSTA RICA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990 = 100) 




(12-month variation, %) 
1993 1994 1995a 
I II III IV I II m IV I n in 
31.4 17.1 6.0 
IV 
10.2 9.3 8.9 9.0 11.3 12.0 16.3 19.9 23.6 22.3 22.0 22.6 
100.3 99.3 99.8 102.1 102.3 101.3 100.6 99.6 96.8 99.7 99.4 98.4 
10.3 -0.7 12.9 6.8 3.4 0.6 -3.7 -7.1 -4.9 -0.8 6.0 3.4 
21.2 11.0 25.7 19.5 16.0 13.6 9.5 5.2 6.2 9.7 15.3 13.4 
5.4 13.3 30.7 31.1 16.6 11.6 -0.1 1.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
Preliminary figures. 1180-day deposits. Short-term. 
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liquidation of  the Banc» Anglo-Costarricense-
credit to the private sector rose by only 9.5%, 
which was less than inflation;  meanwhile the 
behaviour of  other accounts as a whole 
(including, for  example, bond sales designed to 
regulate the money supply) was contractionary. 
Ml expanded very little (1%) during 1995 
(compared with 31% the year before),  which 
considerably eroded the real value of  the money 
supply. Sharper still was the decrease in 
interest-bearing local-currency deposits, which 
were down even in nominal terms. Local-
currency liquidity (M2) thus contracted by 
around 4% over the period as a whole (expressed 
as a proportion of  GDP, this aggregate fell  from 
29% in 1994 to 22%). At the same time, foreign-
currency deposits swelled by nearly 30% during 
the course of  the year. This was appreciably 
higher than the rate of  inflation,  and such deposits 
thus came to account for  over 35% of  the 
broadly-defined  money supply (M3). 
This shift  towards foreign-currency  holdings 
occurred largely in the first  half  of  the year and 
was sparked by the uncertainty engendered by 
the depreciation of  the Mexican peso, the delay 
in moving the tax package through Congress and 
the local currency's faster  rate of  devaluation. 
Towards the end of  the year, as uncertainty 
lessened, a stronger preference  for  deposits in 
colones made itself  felt. 
The main instruments used to control money 
creation were the high reserve requirements in 
effect  since the end of  1994 and open-market 
operations. Central Bank sales of  monetary 
stabilization bonds increased by more than 60%, 
which, in conjunction with the issuance of 
Treasury bonds, tended to push up the cost of 
money. The nominal interest rate on loans varied 
between 34% and 52%, while the rate for 
deposits ranged between 24% and 33%, 
depending on the banking group and the type of 
operation concerned. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
The exchange rate continued to be subject to 
a controlled float  as part of  a system under which 
the authorities influenced  the rate by means of 
market operations and mini-devaluations. 
Foreign exchange policy sought to bolster the 
real exchange rate, which had weakened the year 
before,  by increasing the pace of  these mini-
devaluations, especially during the second 
quarter. The real exchange rate was thus 
maintained for  a large part of  the year, although 
in its final  months the rate of  depreciation fell 
below the domestic inflation  rate. For 1995 as a 
whole, the cumulative rise in the exchange rate 
amounted to 18%, which represented a slight 
appreciation in real terms. 
The law setting forth  a new charter for  the 
Centra] Bank established the convertibility of  the 
currency and gave exporters the right to dispose 
freely  of  their foreign  exchange earnings. 
d) Reform  policies 
In an effort  to rationalize government expen-
diture, a programme to reform  the public sector 
was set in motion under which a number of 
agencies were closed down or dismantled and 
various ministries and institutions were merged. 
Six public-sector bodies involved in promoting 
agricultural production and exports were 
privatized. The ceiling on private-sector partici-
pation in the generation of  electricity was also 
raised from  15% to 30%, and the allowed 
maximum proportion of  foreign  ownership in the 
sector was increased from  35% to 50%. The 
Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) also set up 
a number of  mechanisms to promote private 
investment. In addition, under the terms of  the 
Public Works Concession Act of  1994, the private 
sector began to play a part in infrastructure 
activities; as part of  this trend, two companies 
started up stowage operations in Puerto Limón. 
The law establishing a new charter for  the 
Central Bank, which was passed in September 
1995 and came into force  in 1996, gives the 
Central Bank greater autonomy and is intended 
to improve the efficiency  of  the banking system 
as a whole, and that of  the Central Bank and the 
public-sector commercial banking system in 
particular. It puts an end to State banks' 
monopoly on current accounts and gives all 
financial  institutions access to the Central Bank's 
discount window. 
In October, the Government, the monetary 
authority and State commercial banks signed an 
agreement to strengthen the competitiveness of 
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the State's commercial banking system. Under 
this agreement, the Central Bank is to help 
support this system by applying lower reserve 
requirements and covering its foreign  exchange 
losses on foreign-currency  operations, while 
State commercial banks are to improve the range 
of  services they provide, reduce their 
administrative and operating costs and cut 
interest rate spreads. It was expected that the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) would 
assist in the recapitalization of  State banks. 
With the establishment of  the Super-
intendency for  Financial Institutions (SURGEF), 
supervisory coverage was extended to include all 
of  the country's financial  institutions, and the 
system for  drawing up and implementing 
prudential regulations was reinforced.  The new 
law included provisions intended to reduce the 
costs of  the State's commercial banking system, 
consolidate its financial  standing and, on this 
basis, bring about a decline in interest rates. As 
part of  this approach, a phased reduction in the 
legal reserve requirements for  all financial 
intermediaries was planned which is to lower 
such requirements to a uniform  level of  15% by 
1998. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The country's level of  economic activity was 
undermined by tight fiscal  and monetary policies, 
the uncertainty that reigned until the third quarter 
regarding the attainment of  macroeconomic 
targets, and protracted delays in the disbursement 
of  externa] loans. Annual GDP growth, which had 
averaged 6% during the preceding three years, 
slumped to less than half  that rate in 1995. 
Gross domestic investment fell  once more, 
this time by 10%, owing to the credit squeeze and 
cuts in public investment. The rate of  increase in 
consumption was 4% - 2 points lower than in 
1994- but the growth of  exports of  goods and 
services accelerated (8%) and the volume of 
imports expanded by 3%. 
The behaviour of  individual sectors was quite 
uneven. Construction slumped (-12%) as both 
public- and private-sector building declined. 
Construction of  tourism infrastructure,  which 
had expanded vigorously in previous years and 
helped to maintain the levels of  activity in the 
sector, began to flatten  out as the market for  hotel 
capacity became glutted. 
Despite financing  problems, agriculture and 
manufacturing  grew by more than 3%. Trends in 
the production of  traditional export goods were 
favourable.  The banana harvest yielded 112 
million crates, and great strides were made in 
raising plantation productivity, while better 
prospects in the international market boosted 
sugar-cane production. The coffee  harvest 
increased only slightly, however, as a result of  an 
agreement with other coffee-exporting  countries 
to hold back coffee  from  the market in order to 
keep prices up. Meanwhile, a drop was seen in 
the production of  staples such as rice, maize and 
beans. 
Although manufacturing  companies turned to 
external sources of  financing,  which relieved the 
financial  constraints on industrial activity, the 
sector faced  cost pressures from  such sources as 
the seven-month-long application of  higher 
import tariffs  and the increase, as of  August, in 
the value-added tax (VAT). 
An expansion in export-oriented manu-
facturing  activities was observed. The exception 
to this rule was the textile sector, which had to 
contend with foreign  competition (particularly 
from  Mexico) both locally and in the United 
States market, where the tariff  preferences 
established under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) were also a factor. 
Maquila  activity was very brisk, showing a 
growth rate of  nearly 30%. This trend was 
buttressed by the establishment of  new companies 
in the country's export processing zones. 
In order to promote the development of 
industry as the economy opens up to foreign 
trade, the National Competitiveness Council and 
the Coordinated Industrial Policy Imple-
mentation System were set up. 
In the services sector, transport fared  well, 
mainly thanks to the increasing number of 
tourism air routes. Although the electricity, gas 
and water sector expanded by 4%, cuts in public 
expenditure had an adverse effect  on 
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maintenance and, hence, on the electricity 
supply, which meant that energy had to be 
imported. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Inflation  climbed to nearly 23%, which was 
considerably more than the target rate, under the 
influence  of  the temporary hike in tariffs,  the 
increase in the sales tax, higher utility charges 
(the price of  electricity jumped by 25%) and the 
excise tax on fuel. 
Although the Government stepped up the 
implementation of  its price liberalization policy 
in 1995, a list of  700 exemptions to the sales tax 
was drawn up in order to offset  rises in the prices 
of  products included in the basic shopping 
basket. 
The economic slowdown was accompanied 
by a 1% increase in unemployment which pushed 
the rate above the 5% mark. In February 
public-sector posts were frozen  and, between 
July 1994 and July 1995, the number of  public-
sector jobs was slashed by around 1,800 under 
the Labour Mobility and State Reform  Programme. 
Average real wages fell  by 2%, while the 
minimum wage dropped somewhat more 
sharply. In the private sector, real wages went 
down by just over 2%, but in the public sector 
they rose slightly. Civil service wage adjustments 
were higher for  staff  in the lower grades. 
Income policy was directed towards 
introducing more flexibility  into the wage-setting 
process in order to avoid automatically 
incorporating inflation  into wages, allow the 
different  public bodies to adjust wages 
independently and link wages to worker 
productivity. 
c) The external sector 
In 1995, significant  shifts  were to be observed 
in external transactions. The current account 
deficit  narrowed to US$ 140 million, which was 
70% below its 1994 level and a mere one fourth 
of  what it had been during the preceding 
biennium. This was well within the target agreed 
upon with the IMF, which was that the current 
account deficit  should not exceed 3.6% of  output. 
The economy's performance  in this regard was a 
consequence of  the narrowing of  the trade gap 
and particularly of  the expansion in exports of 
goods and services, whose value leapt by 26%. 
Reserves swelled by US$ 185 million, which was 
more than double the target figure  set by 
agreement with the IMF. 
Exports were spurred by rebounding 
international prices, the reactivation of  the 
economies of  Costa Rica's main trading partners, 
the limited nature of  the variation in the real 
exchange rate and the lifting  of  restrictions on the 
use of  foreign  exchange earnings. Exports to the 
Central American countries soared by 46%, 
while the value of  Costa Rica's sales to the rest 
of  the world went up by somewhat more than 
13%. 
High coffee  prices were an influential  factor 
in the growth of  exports of  goods. Although 
coffee  prices started to slide in June, foreign  sales 
had already been arranged in advance on the 
futures  market. Thus, in spite of  the fact  that the 
volume of  physical sales fell  as a result of  Costa 
Rica's retention agreement with other exporting 
countries, the value of  exports was actually 38% 
higher. A portion of  the country's banana 
exports, which posted a 14% increase, went to 
non-traditional markets and fetched  favourable 
international prices. Sugar exports shot up (62%) 
owing not only to better prices on the 
international market but also to the opening up 
of  a new market in China. 
Non-traditional exports also gained 
momentum, expanding by 15%. Nearly half  of 
these sales were of  non-traditional agricultural 
products, while the remainder were of 
manufactures.  The former  included pineapples, 
melons, foliage  and ornamental plants, flowers, 
cassava and squash. Some of  the main exports of 
manufactures  were medicines, gold jewellery 
and chemicals. Exports of  textiles and clothing 
contracted by 18% due to the effects  of  a United 
States quota on imports from  Costa Rica and by 
competition from  Mexico in the markets of  its 
partners in NAFTA. Maquila  exports grew by 
29%, and tourism earnings were up by 6%. 
The value of  imports of  goods and services 
rose by 14%, despite the more sluggish pace of 
domestic activity. The increase of  nearly 6% 
shown by imports of  goods was attributable to 
higher international prices and the large imported 
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component of  non-traditional exports. Within 
this category, imports of  intermediate goods 
climbed by 14%, while there was a contraction 
in the value of  imports of  capital goods and 
construction materials. 
The deficit  on the factor  services account 
widened by some US$ 30 million as a result of 
increased profit  remittances and interest 
payments. Outlays in connection with the foreign 
debt were substantia], since nearly US$ 50 
million in arrears with the Paris Club were paid 
off  and advance payments were made on bonds 
to be purchased under the terms of  the rene-
gotiation of  Costa Rica's external debt. As a 
result of  these amortizations, the public external 
debt lessened slightly. In addition, a number of 
credits from  international organizations were 
withheld until the final  quarter because of  the 
delay in signing an agreement with the IMF. 
Thus, it was private inflows  of  capital 
-principally foreign  direct investment, which 
totalled US$ 350 million, and, to a lesser extent, 
external corporate loans- that provided most of 
the financing  for  the current account and helped 
build up reserves. The economic uncertainty that 
prevailed during the first  part of  the year did not 
translate into capita] flight,  by contrast with 
1994, and, in net terms, short-term private flows 





1. General trends 
In 1995, the Cuban economy managed to halt the 
strong downward trend in economic activity 
which had begun in the early 1990s, thereby 
bearing out a number of  signs observed in 1994. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) rose by 2.5%, after 
having fallen  by 34% during the first  four  years 
of  the decade, thus ending a six-year-long slide 
in per capita GDP. 
This outcome was attributable to the reform 
process set in motion in the early 1990s and to 
the increased availability of  foreign  exchange; 
nonetheless, the scarcity of  foreign  exchange 
continued to be one of  the main constraints 
affecting  the level of  activity in the Cuban 
economy, which is highly dependent on imports. 
The steps being taken to open up the economy to 
foreign  capital also contributed to the country's 
favourable  economic performance. 
In an effort  to deal with the serious distortions 
in Cuba's economy and society generated by the 
economic crisis and these distortions' negative 
impact in terms of  efficient  resource allocation, 
the authorities proceeded with structural reform 
initiatives designed to provide greater scope for 
private enterprise and gave macroeconomic 
policy a greater role in reducing the economy's 
severe fiscal  and monetary imbalances within the 
framework  of  its monetary reform  programme. 
The progress made in these areas in 1995 had 
positive effects  in terms of  inflation  and the 
defence  of  the Cuban peso, whose dollar parity 
improved significantly  on the parallel market, 
although the differentia]  between this rate and the 
official  rate remained quite large. 
These factors  were of  major importance 
because they had a strong bearing on the living 
conditions of  the population, most of  whom 
depend for  their livelihood on peso-denominated 
wages which, as in previous years, remained 
virtually unchanged in 1995. Although steps 
were taken to help narrow the wide gap that had 
opened up between this sector of  the population 
and those segments whose members work in the 
free  markets that have appeared in recent years 
or have some other form  of  access to dollars, 
people who receive their pay in pesos continued 
to be affected  by the low purchasing power of 
their earnings and by shortages in official 
markets. This gap has called into question the 
equitable distribution of  income which had been 
regarded as one of  the successes of  Cuba's 
economic system. 
Import capacity expanded thanks to increases 
in export earnings -despite a sharp slump in sugar 
production, which amounted to only 3.3 million 
tons- and in tourist arrivals and remittances from 
family  members residing abroad. Foreign invest-
ment also continued on its upward trend, and by 
mid-1995 had surpassed the US$ 2.1 billion 
mark, with half  of  this sum having already been 
disbursed. These investments mitigated the steep 
downward trend in total gross investment but did 
little to halt the prolonged deterioration of  infra-
structure and installed capacity, including 
dwellings, except in isolated sectors such as tourism. 
The economic climate prevailing in 1995 
carried over into early 1996; in fact,  according to 
official  estimates, the economy grew at a rate of 
almost 7% in the first  quarter, owing to the 
performance  of  agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing.  One particularly noteworthy 
development was that the sugar-cane harvest 
appeared to be heading towards its target level of 
4.5 million tons. On the external front,  the 
economic embargo imposed by the United States 
was reinforced  by the passage of  a law in March 
which, among other things, provides for 
sanctions against foreign  firms  whose activities 
in Cuba involve property confiscated  from 
American citizens after  1959. 
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2. Econ 
As in previous years, the basic parameters of 
Cuba's economic policy continued to be dictated 
by the need to improve the economy's functional 
capacity and to ensure the availability of  products 
vital to its operation and to the satisfaction  of  the 
population's basic needs while, at the same time, 
preserving the main features  of  the economic 
system and its achievements in the social sphere. 
In this context, the authorities carried forward 
the implementation of  structural reform 
measures designed to alleviate the shortage of 
foreign  exchange, which is one of  the most 
pressing problems facing  Cuba's economy, and 
to stimulate production activity in the country. 
These reforms  have led to the creation of  a new 
sphere of  primarily domestic, market-based 
economic activity which is positioned midway 
between the traditional State sector and the 
internationalized sector of  the economy. In a 
further  bid to close this rift  in the economy, Cuba 
continued to pursue its severe macroeconomic 
adjustment programme. This programme's 
objective is to reduce the fiscal  deficit  and the 
amount of  pesos in circulation as a means of 
diminishing the distortions affecting  the 
foreign-exchange  market and dampening 
inflationary  pressures. 
Thanks to the close interaction existing 
between the two major spheres of  economic 
policy - i . e . , structural reform  and the 
macroeconomy- the advances made in each of 
these spheres reinforced  those achieved in the 
other. Just as the alleviation of  sharp macro-
economic imbalances was a precondition for  the 
effectiveness  of  structural reforms,  so the 
implementation of  these reforms  contributed to 
the success of  fiscal  and monetary initiatives. At 
the same time, economic decision-making 
continued to be dominated by the trade-offs 
between social considerations of  distributive 
equity, external openness and the search for 
mechanisms to boost production. 
a) Structural reforms 
The steps taken to further  the processes of 
liberalization, deregulation, downsizing and 
decentralization of  the State in 1995 made it 
¡c policy 
possible for  enterprises to operate with greater 
autonomy within the framework  established by 
the economic plan. In the agricultural sector, 
some 4,150 cooperatives and 86,000 private 
producers existed alongside the country's 
extensive network of  State-run enterprises. Thus, 
in 1995 only about 30% of  Cuba's farmland 
remained in government hands, down from  over 
75% at the beginning of  the 1990s. 
The number of  self-employed  workers in the 
private sector rose to over 200,000 following  a 
decision in June to increase the number of 
permitted activities, lift  the ban on self-
employment for  professionals  working in areas 
other than their specialty, and permit restaurants 
to operate in private homes, provided they meet 
a series of  strict requirements. In addition, there 
are an undetermined number of  unregistered 
self-employed  workers. There are also some 70 
self-financing  arrangements in operation which 
allow State firms  to manage their own accounts 
in foreign  currency. 
As part of  the authorities' policy of  opening 
up the economy to foreign  capital, new 
legislation governing foreign  investment was 
enacted in September, in accordance with the 
constitutional reforms  of  1992, which allows the 
transfer  of  State property, either in whole or in 
part. The new law provides for  the more rapid 
processing of  investment proposals and permits 
the establishment of  wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises. (Previously, foreign  investors had 
been allowed to participate only as partners in 
joint ventures.) By the end of  1995, approxi-
mately 230 such enterprises had been set up, and 
the establishment of  another 160 was being 
negotiated. The new law also provides for  the 
creation of  free  trade zones and industrial parks; 
the relevant provisions, which were drafted 
during 1995, appear in the decree-law that was 
promulgated in June 1996. 
As part of  the country's economic decen-
tralization process and with a view to giving the 
National Bank of  Cuba (BNC) greater autonomy 
in implementing monetary policy, a start was 
made on differentiating  the functions  of  the BNC 
from  those of  the commercial banks which are to 
enter into operation in the future.  In addition, 
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Table 1 
CUBA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS CUBA 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
Growth 
Gross domestic product 0.7 -3.0 -10.7 -11.6 -14.9 0.7 2.5 
Per capita gross domestic 
product -0.4 -4.0 -11.6 -12.3 -15.4 0.3 1.4 
Gross domestic product, 
by sector c 
Goods -3.5 -16.2 -19.2 -16.7 4.2 
Basic services -8.2 -10.4 -13.2 -17.2 -0.9 
Other services -1.5 -6.1 -5.5 -13.4 -1.2 
Millions of  dollars 
Balance of  payments 
Current account -4 595 -3 624 -1 933 -403 -372 -81 -146 
Trade balance -4 609 -3 666 -2 021 -585 -374 -190 -316 
Exports of  goods and 
services 5 562 5 605 3 270 2 309 1 989 2 246 2 944 
Imports of  goods and 
services 10 171 9 271 5 291 2 894 2 363 2 436 3 260 
Capital account 5 700 3 700 1 900 402 388 79 143 
Percentages of  GDP 
External sector d 
Current account -23.6 -18.4 -11.9 -2.7 -2.5 -0.4 -0.7 
Trade balance -23.7 -18.7 -12.4 -3.9 -2.5 -1.0 -1.5 
Gross debt 58.3 47.3 44.0 
Government income and 
expenditure 
Total income 64.3 62.4 67.3 62.2 63.1 66.4 55.1 
Total expenditure 71.4 72.3 90.4 94.9 96.6 73.8 58.9 
Financial balance -7.2 -10.0 -23.1 -32.7 -33.5 -7.4 -3.7 
Growth rates 
Currency 
Liquidity 19.8 33.6 25.5 32.1 -10.0 -7.0 
Currency outside banks 11.4 41.7 23.0 11.6 -20.9 -1.5 
Regular savings deposits 28.4 26.5 27.9 51.6 -2.3 -10.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Calculated on the basis of  series in constant 1981 dollars at the official  exchange rate of  1 peso to the 
dollar. Calculated on the basis of  series in constant 1981 pesos, 
the dollar. 
there are to be at least two other multi-purpose 
banks: a new bank, to be called the Banco 
Agroindústria! y de Comercio, and the Banco 
Popular de Ahorro, which is already in existence. 
The work involved in setting up a network of 
currency-exchange offices  was also begun in 
September 1995, and the creation of  another new 
bank, the Banco de Inversiones, is planned; this 
process is slated for  completion in 1997. The 
reforms  being implemented in the financial 
system should make it possible to channel the 
foreign  exchange that is on hand in the country 
into domestic lending. Another of  these measures 
Calculated at the official  exchange rate of  1 peso to 
authorizes Cubans over the age of  18, regardless 
of  their residency status, to open foreign-
currency term accounts at an annual interest rate 
of  4%. 
Financial transactions involving other 
countries continued to be entrusted primarily to 
the Banco Internacional de Comercio and the 
Banco Financiero Internacional. As a 
consequence of  the decentralization of  foreign 
trade, by mid-1995 more than 230 enterprises 
were conducting their own purchase and sale 
operations with business concerns in the rest of 
the world on a direct basis; six years earlier, only 
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50 enterprises had been active in the international 
marketplace. 
b) Fiscal policy 
Cutbacks in public-sector spending made it 
possible to halve the fiscal  deficit,  which thus fell 
to under 4% of  GDP (versus more than 7% in 1994 
and a hefty  33% only two years earlier), even 
though government revenue was down from  the 
preceding year's level, which was the highest on 
record for  the 1990s. The structural reforms 
being undertaken in the Cuban economy had an 
impact on both the level and the composition of 
public-sector income and expenditure. 
Government revenue, measured in pesos at 
current prices, contracted by some 10%, chiefly 
as a consequence of  smaller inputs from  State 
enterprises in the form  of  profits  and asset 
depreciation. Receipts under these two headings 
were particularly lean in the first  half  of  1995 
because many enterprises were behind in their 
payments, and it therefore  became necessary to 
take steps to remedy this situation to some extent 
in the second six months of  the year. Even so, a 
large part of  these revenues were not made 
available to the Treasury until January 1996. 
Furthermore, as a result of  the decision to refrain 
from  depreciating idle production facilities, 
amortization payments dropped by some 40 
million pesos, or 10% of  the budget estimate for 
this item. 
This decrease was partially offset  by higher 
revenues from  other sources; an important 
contributing factor  in this regard was the 
institutional overhaul undertaken in 1994, one of 
whose main results was the reinforcement  of  the 
tax system. The increases made in mid-1994 in 
the prices and rates charged for  selected 
public-sector goods and services were reflected 
in higher receipts from  indirect taxes in 1995, 
despite the unfavourable  impact of  lower sales of 
such important sources of  indirect tax revenues 
as cigarettes and beer (tax receipts from  these 
products were 116 million pesos below the 
budgeted figure). 
The greater autonomy accorded to private 
enterprise led to an increase in direct income tax 
receipts from  self-employed  workers, farmers 
and cooperatives. In addition, the rising cumulative 
level of  foreign  investment was reflected  in higher 
foreign-exchange  receipts from  the taxes levied 
on the profits  of  joint ventures and workers' 
earnings, tarife  and other customs duties, property 
and motor vehicle taxes, and documentation fees. 
In particular, the new customs provisions that 
came into force  in July brought about a 
substantial upturn in revenues from  duties on 
non-commercial goods imported by passengers 
entering the country by air or sea. The fees 
collected for  airport services provided to airline 
passengers exhibited an increase as well. 
Spending fell  more sharply than income, with 
investment recording a steeper drop than current 
expenditure. The shift  seen in the composition of 
current expenditure was a reflection  of  the 
reforms  that have been implemented as well as 
of  government priorities. 
Reform  measures resulted in savings in a 
number of  areas. Economic downsizing and steps 
to boost production efficiency  made it possible 
to cut subsidies to loss-making public-sector 
enterprises by almost half.  This situation was 
especially noticeable in the agricultural sector, 
where a large number of  State-owned farms  that 
had previously recorded losses were turned into 
financially  self-sustaining  cooperative 
production units (UBPCs). Subsidies to many of 
these units were halted since, except in the sugar-
cane industry, agricultural losses plummeted 
from  700 million pesos in the first  half  of  1993 
to 57 million pesos in the same period in 1995. 
This made it possible to reallocate some 
assistance to strategic sectors, primarily other 
units in the sugar-cane industry whose financial 
performance  was still unsatisfactory. 
The reorganization of  the central government 
which was carried out in April 1994 led to a drop 
in expenditure on wages and salaries and on 
goods and services. Spending in the areas of 
sports, the arts and culture also declined. 
The reduction of  expenditure made it 
particularly necessary to set priorities. Spending 
on defence  and law enforcement  dropped, while 
outlays for  housing and community facilities  rose 
for  the third year in a row. There was also an 
increase in spending on education, health and 
social security (these items accounted for  almost 
one third of  the budget in 1995), as well as on 
science and technology and social welfare.  The 
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social security and welfare  systems have had to 
serve an ever increasing number of  people, with 
over 1.3 million persons (12% of  the population) 
drawing pensions and more than 116,000 
families  receiving welfare  payments in 1995. 
The high level of  social welfare  spending was 
a reflection  of  the economic crisis, and the 
transfer  payments made to about 10,000 workers 
who were laid off  owing to adjustment measures 
constituted a further  burden. In addition, as part 
of  the family  assistance programme, price 
subsidies were raised for  some goods, 
particularly for  such products as milk, beef  and 
veal, coffee  and fuels  for  household use. 
c) Monetary and foreign  exchange policies 
As of  early 1995, the monetary situation in 
Cuba continued to be quite complex owing to the 
use of  both a non-convertible local currency (the 
Cuban peso) and the United States dollar, which 
came to be employed more and more as the 
internationalized sector of  the economy gained 
ground. In view of  the distortions which this 
situation was generating within the economic 
system, the authorities took steps to put the 
money market on a more normal footing  by 
strengthening the Cuban peso. 
With this aim in mind, the authorities carried 
forward  their policy of  reducing local-currency 
liquidity, which had reached the unprecedented 
level of  11 billion pesos in late 1993 and had 
stood at 9.9 billion in December 1994, before 
slipping to 9.2 billion in December 1995. The 
amount of  pesos in circulation dropped by the 
same proportion as liquidity did, since the 
percentage of  liquid funds  deposited in regular 
savings accounts, which were paying a nominal 
return of  2% per annum, held steady at around 
60%. 
Since the fiscal  deficit  was driving up the 
local-currency money supply, the authorities 
resorted to measures that targeted the private 
sector in an effort  to reduce liquidity. In the wake 
of  the increases made in selected public-sector 
prices and rates in 1994, the mechanisms used to 
soak up part of  the local-currency money supply 
were expanded to include other spheres. In 
August 1995, approval was given for  a 
prepayment scheme under which discounts were 
offered  on mortgages held by the Banco Popular 
de Ahorro, which totalled 1 billion pesos as of 
mid-1995. People who repaid the entire amount 
of  their debt were entitled to a 25% discount, 
while those who paid back over 60% of  the 
mortgage were eligible for  a 20% discount. 
Pesos were not the only component of  the 
money supply, however. The scrip issued to 
workers for  the purchase of  goods was also a 
factor,  but no information  was available as to 
how much was in circulation. Moreover, since 
1993 United States dollars have been circulating 
in the Cuban economy in apparently ever-
increasing quantities. In the light of  the changes 
in the relative level of  liquidity in these two 
currencies, the exchange rate staged a striking 
recovery on the parallel market, moving from 
130 pesos to the dollar in mid-1994 to 25 pesos 
by late 1995. Thus, the enormous spread existing 
between the rate on the parallel market and the 
official  rate (which remained at par) narrowed 
markedly. 
Finally, there were also "convertible" pesos in 
circulation which had been introduced in 
December 1994 with a view to the eventual 
consolidation of  the exchange market. These 
notes are backed by the National Bank of  Cuba 
and can be used in the country's dollar stores; 
according to existing plans, at some point in the 
future  these stores will begin to deal entirely in 
convertible pesos. 
The currency exchange offices  which opened 
their doors in September 1995 set the selling rate 
for  convertible Cuban pesos at 30 pesos to the 
dollar and the buying rate for  dollars at 25 pesos; 
hence, the existence of  two exchange rates that 
were applicable to different  types of  transactions 
and sectors of  the economy became virtually 
official. 
d) Trade policy 
In addition to the aforementioned  trend 
towards the decentralization of  foreign  trade 
transactions, which continued into 1995, and the 
drafting  of  a decree-law regarding the creation of 
export processing zones, a number of  changes 
were made in the relevant legislation based on 
World Trade Organization guidelines. As part of 
the work done in this area, regulations were 
193 
established regarding customs valuation 
procedures, rules of  origin, the payment of 
customs duties and refunds  of  overpayments. 
In line with the priority placed on increasing 
and diversifying  Cuba's exports, 1995 saw the 
signing of  new partial- scope agreements 
providing for  reductions in tariffs  and specific 
duties with a number of  countries in Latin 
America, which is Cuba's largest regional 
market. Talks were also held with the European 
Union concerning the signature of  a trade and 
economic agreement, and a protocol was signed 
with the Russian Federation to strengthen 
economic ties with that country. This agreement 
provided for  an exchange of  1.5 million tons of 
sugar for  4.5 million tons of  oil in 1996 and the 
granting of  a loan to purchase equipment for  the 
Cienfuegos  nuclear power station. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
Aggregate supply increased once again in 
1995 owing to the expansion of  import volumes 
and an increase in output (up 2.5% of  GDP); this 
paved the way for  growth in household consump-
tion and gross capital formation,  but even so 
these variables barely exceeded the extremely 
low levels that had been reached after  a five-year 
downturn which cut output by more than a third. 
The slight rise in gross investment fell  far 
short of  the country's enormous needs in terms 
of  the replacement of  existing capital goods; this 
demand has been building up since the early 
1990s due to the sharp contraction seen in 
investment in the past. No specific  data are 
available on such investments, but the level of 
imports of  machinery and equipment, which 
serves as an indirect indicator, declined from 
over US$ 2.7 billion in 1990 to less than US$ 120 
million in 1994, while the deterioration of  the 
country's infrastructure  (including dwellings and 
production equipment) has clearly been very 
considerable. 
The structural reform  process was a defining 
feature  of  the economy in 1995, in spite of  the 
slump in the 1994-1995 sugar-cane harvest, 
which amounted to only 3.3 million tons (17% 
down on the preceding year). In response to this 
situation, the Government decided to seek 
external loans for  the purchase of  inputs which, 
together with a policy of  providing incentives for 
the industry's workers, were expected to boost 
sugar production to 4.5 million tons in the 
1995-1996 season. The incentive programme 
covered not only workers in the State sugar 
industry, but also those employed in cooperative 
production units, as well as private producers. 
Sugar production aside, output climbed once 
again (7% in the first  six months), and almost all 
sectors showed signs of  recovering from  their 
previous low production levels. The increased 
output of  intermediate goods, including 
fertilizers  (140%), steel (46%) and cement 
(27%), contributed to an upswing in other 
activities. This expansion did not, however, 
occur across the board. Decreases in production 
were recorded for  lubricating oils and greases, 
paper and paperboard, multilayer bags, and 
plastic boxes and cases, and there was a shortage 
of  such household fuels  as kerosene (the supply 
of  kerosene was 65% lower in 1995 than in 1990) 
and liquified  gas. 
The agricultural sector expanded by about 4% 
thanks to the incentives created in the course of 
the economic liberalization process; for  example, 
in 1995,30,000 families  were granted government-
owned land in usufruct.  Distribution problems 
hampered efforts  to get the food  supply to the 
population, however. The fishing  industry, 
which had adopted new administrative methods 
designed to make it financially  self-reliant  by 
drawing on its foreign-exchange  earnings, saw 
gross catches rise by roughly 13%. 
Mining and quarrying received a boost from 
the move to open up the economy to foreign 
capital. Oil and gas production increased by 
about 15% to 1.5 million tons, which covered 
30% of  the energy demand of  Cuba's thermal 
power plants as well as the energy needs of  such 
important sectors as the cement and asphalt 
industries. As of  mid-1995, oil exploration and 
drilling activities were being conducted offshore 
and at 12 onshore locations with the participation 
of  foreign  investors. Nickel production was up 
by 59% thanks to a combination of  increased 
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investment by Canadian firms  and the new 
foreign-currency  self-financing  schemes 
available to public-sector firms,  which helped 
expand the supply of  inputs. 
The construction industry suffered  from 
organizational difficulties  and, as in other 
traditional sectors, from  labour supply problems 
which prevented it from  achieving its production 
goals. Nevertheless, the sector experienced a 
significant  upturn as a result of  growth in 
tourism, agriculture, residential construction and 
other foreign-investment-related  areas. 
The energy sector grew for  the second 
consecutive year, in part due to the greater supply 
of  both locally-produced and imported 
petroleum; petroleum imports, which accounted 
for  four  fifths  of  the total supply, recorded a slight 
increase (2%). This made it possible to boost 
electricity generation by 5% and to extend 
residential coverage to 92% of  all households and 
thus increase per capita consumption. Power 
failures  continued to occur, however, owing to 
the deterioration of  installed capacity and 
inefficient  fuel  use. In an effort  to deal with this 
situation, the authorities stepped up the pace of 
negotiations regarding external financing  for  the 
completion of  the Juraguá nuclear power plant in 
Cienfuegos. 
Public transport witnessed a downturn, but 
communications services benefited  from  a 
greater volume of  long-distance calls, especially 
to the United States. The tourism sector 
continued to show impressive growth. The 
number of  foreign  visitors, especially from 
Canada, Italy, Mexico and Spain, rose from 
617,000 in 1994 to 720,000 in 1995; this showing 
was associated with both a 13% jump in the 
number of  available hotel rooms and the increase 
in occupancy rates. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Following the price and rate hikes which were 
introduced for  some goods and services in 
mid-1994, inflationary  pressures eased in 1995 
thanks to the shrinking fiscal  deficit,  a tight 
monetary policy and the competition in the 
marketplace prompted by economic 
liberalization measures. Prices continued to vary 
enormously due to the coexistence of  some 
markets where price levels were set by the 
authorities and others where prices were 
determined by supply and demand. 
In markets subject to price controls, essential 
goods continued to be subsidized and did not 
increase significantly  in price, but shortages 
forced  the Government to ration these products. 
Moreover, the steep upward trend in prices of 
products such as cigars, cigarettes and alcoholic 
beverages, which had begun in 1994, continued 
unabated. 
In the informal  sector, prices fell  by an 
estimated 50% as a consequence of  the 
liberalization process and the establishment of 
agricultural produce markets where prices were 
determined by supply and demand. Prices in 
these markets, which had begun to operate in 
October 1994 under State supervision, fell  by 
some 30% on average (prices were down by 
about 37% for  meat and 26% for  fruits  and 
vegetables) owing to the Cuban-peso liquidity 
squeeze and, to a lesser degree, an increase in 
supply. Nonetheless, prices in these markets 
continued to be far  higher than those prevailing 
in the official  market. The reasons for  this were 
the strong demand resulting from  the difficulties 
faced  by the State sector and cooperatives in 
increasing the supply they made available to the 
official  market and the rudimentary level of 
organization in agricultural markets, where, for 
example, the volume of  produce was not yet 
sufficient  to permit economies of  scale in 
transport. The situation with respect to rice and 
pork, both staples of  the Cuban population's diet, 
was indicative of  the drop in prices and of  price 
levels in the country's deregulated agricultural 
markets; the price of  rice plummeted from  90 to 
10 pesos per pound, while pork prices tumbled 
from  150 to 60 pesos per pound. 
These examples also serve to underscore the 
insufficient  purchasing power of  government 
wages, which crept up from  an average of  186 to 
193 pesos per month. This was enough to 
purchase rationed staples in the formal  market (at 
much lower prices than in the parallel market) but 
the individual quota remained inadequate. 
Nevertheless, in keeping with the policy of 
reducing the amount of  pesos in circulation, 
which made it possible for  prices in unregulated 
markets to fall,  wages were left  unchanged 
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except in rare cases of  sharp productivity 
increases. People who sold their products or 
services on the free  market and those who had 
access to dollars enjoyed higher incomes. A 
survey conducted in Cuba in October showed 
that such people were in the minority, however. 
The policy of  providing subsidies in 
convertible pesos and in kind, as well as scrip for 
use in stores in which transactions are conducted 
in pesos, was continued in order to ease the plight 
of  government workers whose wages are paid in 
pesos and to offset,  to some degree, the excessive 
incentives provided for  the internationalized and 
market-based sectors of  the economy, which 
were drawing human resources away from  the 
public sector. In 1995, inducements of  this sort 
were approved for  765,000 workers, compared 
with 115,000 in 1994. Most of  the recipients were 
engaged in priority activities that generated hard 
currency (including around 400,000 workers 
employed in the sugar industry, 80,000 in the 
cultivation and harvesting of  the coffee  crop and 
50,000 in tourism) and in the energy sector. 
The open unemployment rate surpassed 7%. 
In keeping with the social objectives of  the 
economic policy applied in recent decades, 1995 
saw a continuation of  the gradual realignment of 
staffing  levels and relocation of  surplus public-
sector workers as part of  a process designed to 
avoid mass layoffs.  Many of  these workers were 
relocated in faster-growing  sectors of  the 
economy (e.g., agriculture and tourism) while 
others became self-employed.  As the use of 
installed capacity was very low, under-
employment remained high, affecting  half  a 
million jobs according to official  estimates. 
c) The external sector 
The sustained drop in Cuba's import capacity 
which had begun in 1989 came to an end in 1995, 
thanks to an increase in the supply of  hard 
currency which was itself  due to growth in capital 
inflows  and higher earnings from  exports of 
goods and services. In spite of  this fledgling 
recovery, however, the value of  the country's 
imports of  goods and services at current prices 
was still not even one third as much as it had been 
in 1989. The more favourable  capital account 
balance was offset  by a widening current account 
deficit,  which was attributable to deficits  in the 
trade and factor-income  accounts. 
The dollar value of  exports rose by 17%; this 
development was the outcome of  a combination 
of  favourable  international prices for  export 
commodities and positive trends in traditional 
goods such as mining products (especially 
nickel), fish,  tobacco and some light 
manufactures.  Similar trends were also seen in 
exports of  cement and other building materials 
and of  goods produced by the iron and steel 
industry (especially steel products). External 
sales of  nickel and shellfish,  which were the 
country's second and third most important export 
items, recorded significant  growth as well. 
Sugar, which continued to be Cuba's leading 
export, also benefited  from  a rise in prices, 
although export volumes fell  markedly owing to 
the poor harvest. In fact,  sugar accounted for  less 
than half  of  total exports in 1995, compared with 
almost three quarters of  the total just six years 
earlier. 
Much of  the rise in the value of  imports was 
due to the higher prices charged for  such products 
as fuels  and foodstuffs,  which made up two thirds 
of  the import bill. The value of  oil imports, for 
example, rose from  almost US$ 750 million in 
1994 to US$ 870 million in 1995, even though, 
at six million tons, the volume of  imports was 
only slightly higher than in 1994 and was less 
than half  as much as was purchased in 1989. 
Cuba's foreign  trade activity, which remained 
subject to an economic embargo by the United 
States, continued to diversify.  The Latin 
American and Caribbean region became Cuba's 
leading market in 1995, absorbing 35% of  its 
exports. The region also took on great 
importance as a supplier for  Cuba due, in large 
measure, to significant  growth in imports from 
Mexico, which become one of  Cuba's main 
trading partners. Cuba's other major partners 
were Canada, China and the Russian Federation 
(despite, in the latter case, the huge decrease in 
trade with European countries that had formerly 
been part of  the socialist bloc, which accounted 
for  80% of  Cuba's foreign  trade in 1989 but 
barely 15% in 1994). 
As regards non-factor  services, tourism 
showed the best results, with gross earnings of 
US$ 1.1 billion (although this sector also 
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consumed a large volume of  imported inputs), 
which represented an increase of  almost 30% 
over the preceding year. Of  particular note was 
the growth in private-sector foreign  exchange 
earnings from  room rentals, restaurants and taxi 
services. Telecommunications services also 
played a larger role in generating foreign 
exchange as a consequence of  the upswing in the 
volume of  long-distance calls. Net factor 
payments continued to expand owing to the 
repatriation of  profits  and interest payments on 
the external debt. Thanks to remittances from 
abroad, unrequited private transfer  payments 
continued to expand -as they have been since the 
early 1990s- and thus reached a level of  US$ 600 
million. 
Foreign investment in Cuba rose for  the third 
year in a row, surpassing the US$ 800 million 
mark. The upsurge in domestic activity was 
based on the supply of  foreign  credit; never-
theless, given Cuba's lack of  access to sources of 
medium- and long-term finance,  the funds  it 
obtained were in the form  of  short-term loans at 
interest rates of  from  12% to 20%. These 
borrowings financed  a number of  production 
activities, including the 1995-1996 sugar-cane 
harvest, for  which a loan of  US$ 300 million was 
secured at an interest rate of  15%. 
Access to longer-term loans was made 
conditional upon a resumption of  debt servicing, 
which had been interrupted in 1986. Informal 
talks with the international financial  community 
regarding the possibility of  rescheduling Cuba's 
external debt of  over US$ 9 billion got underway 
in August 1995. Cuba's leading creditors are 
Japan (25% of  the total), Spain (13%), France 
(12%), Argentina (9%), the United Kingdom 




1. General trends 
The performance  of  Ecuador's economy in 1995 
was adversely affected  by a series of  unexpected 
events. A number of  key variables in the 
economic programme being implemented since 
late 1992 suffered  unanticipated impacts 
-pressure on the exchange rate, high interest rates 
and a fiscal  deficit-  from  the armed conflict  with 
Peru, a long period of  energy shortages and a 
political crisis which culminated in the 
resignation and departure from  the country of  the 
Vice-President of  the Republic. As a result, the 
targets set for  1995 could not be met, and the 
country therefore  witnessed a partial reversal of 
the favourable  trends of  previous years. 
The course taken by Ecuador's economy in 
1995 should be seen against the background of 
the economic programme which was launched 
towards the end of  1992, whose central elements 
have been the stabilization of  the exchange rate, 
fiscal  austerity and structural reforms.  During the 
first  two years the programme was in operation 
(particularly 1994), many of  its results were 
promising: inflation  fell,  international reserves 
rose, growth resumed and unemployment was 
reduced. Nevertheless, the authorities 
themselves admitted that the strategy presented 
a number of  problems, namely high and volatile 
interest rates, a tendency for  the exchange rate to 
appreciate in real terms and an increase in the 
current account deficit.  It also became clear 
during 1995 that the programme was highly 
susceptible to rapid changes in economic agents' 
expectations, particularly with regard to 
exchange rate policy; as a result, in the course of 
the year the authorities were twice obliged to 
adjust their economic instruments and 
reformulate  their targets. 
Against this background, gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew by 2.7%, largely owing to the 
strength of  exports and private investment, and 
per capita GDP was thus virtually unchanged. 
Meanwhile, inflation  continued on its downward 
path, albeit at a somewhat more moderate pee , 
reaching 23% in December. The non-financial 
public sector ended the year with a deficit 
equivalent to 1.9% of  GDP, the balance-of-
payments current account deficit  rose to 4.6% 
of  GDP and international reserves shrank by 
US$ 230 million. By the end of  the year, the 
financial  sector, which in preceding years had 
expanded strongly, was showing signs of 
weakness and the authorities were forced  to step 
in and apply a variety of  instruments to bolster it. 
The trends to be observed towards the end of 
1995 -i.e., the critical state of  public finances, 
high interest rates, pressure on the exchange-rate 
band and signs of  weakness in the financial 
sector- continued into early 1996. The 
uncertainties inherent in an election year, which 
culminated in a change of  Administration in 
August 1996, in an atmosphere devoid of  basic 
consensus on economic or social policy, also had 
a negative impact on economic agents' 
decisions. 
2. Economic policy 
In 1995 the Ecuadorian authorities followed  an 
economic policy consistent with the programme 
which had been in place since the end of  1992. 
The only change from  1994 was the introduction 
of  a currency band whose gradient was 
determined on the basis of  the expected rate of 
internal and external inflation  in an effort  to 
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thus maintain the real exchange rate. At the same 
time, a tight fiscal  policy continued to be applied, 
along with a monetary policy which aimed to 
bring down inflation  and reduce interest-rate 
volatility by controlling liquidity. 
However, political and economic factors  had 
effects  on a number of  different  variables 
-expectations regarding the exchange rate and 
inflation,  external capital flows,  high interest 
rates, unforeseen  expenditures and others- which 
led the authorities to take several measures, 
including two adjustments to the currency band 
and the introduction of  a more expansive fiscal 
policy. At the same time, although some reforms 
were implemented, the political situation 
hindered any significant  progress in the country's 
strategic modernization process -another pillar 
of  the economic programme. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal austerity was an important element of 
the stabilization programme implemented since 
the end of  1992, and indeed, the non-financial 
public sector's deficit,  which had stood at 1.7% 
in 1992, had been reduced to 0.2% by 1994. 
The armed conflict  with Peru at the beginning 
of  1995, occasioned a high level of  unplanned 
expenditure, however. Part of  this was covered 
by revenues from  special-purpose taxes (a 2% 
motor vehicle tax and a contribution equivalent 
to two days' pay from  public- and private-sector 
workers) but the year ended with a non-financial 
public sector deficit  of  1.9% of  GDP. Current 
expenditure, in particular, was up from  17.3% to 
21% of  GDP, largely as a result of  expenses 
relating to the hostilities with Peru and the cost 
of  subsidies on diesel fuel  (which rose 
considerably due to the shortage of  hydroelectric 
power) and, to a lesser extent, of  increased in 
interest payments. On the other hand, capital 
expenditure continued at the same level in real 
terms, so its share of  GDP remained at around 
6.5%. Transfer  payments in connection with the 
public sector's staff-reduction  scheme dropped 
from  0.8% to 0.2% of  GDP. 
While total expenditure went up from  24.6% 
to 27.6% of  GDP against a background of  slower 
growth than predicted, revenues only increased 
from  24.4% to 25.7% of  GDP. In a departure from 
previous years' practice, this higher deficit  was 
financed  exclusively with domestic resources. 
The public-sector imbalance continued into 
the early months of  1996, and by the end of  April 
the authorities were therefore  predicting a deficit 
of  2.3% of  GDP for  the year. A number of  factors 
contributed to this situation: various groups of 
public-sector employees received pay rises; 
several cases of  fraud  led to Treasury losses; 
extra capital was injected into the State-owned 
development bank, Banco Nacional de Fomento 
(BNF), whose portfolio  was also cleaned up; and 
low levels of  growth in production and imports 
made it difficult  to increase fiscal  revenues. The 
outgoing Administration announced its intention 
to reduce the deficit  by 1.4% through current and 
capital expenditure cuts, however, which would 
mean the Administration taking office  in August 
would inherit a shortfall  of  just 0.9%. 
b) Monetary policy 
Between the end of  1992, when the current 
macroeconomic programme was implemented, 
and 1994, money creation was fuelled  by an 
increase in international reserves; this was offset 
through sterilization operations consisting 
mainly of  a build-up of  deposits by the non-
financial  public sector in the Central Bank. In 
1995, however, these deposits shrank owing to 
the increasingly difficult  fiscal  situation. In 
addition, towards the end of  the year the Central 
Bank granted emergency loans to a number of 
banks and financial  institutions which were 
experiencing liquidity problems. Even so, 
despite these two highly expansionary factors, 
the money supply (Ml) grew by only 13%, far 
below the 1994 increase of  36%. The smallness 
of  this rise, which was also below the inflation 
rate, was a result of  the contraction caused by the 
drop in international reserves. By early 19%, the 
authorities were having to resort ever more 
frequently  to sales of  monetary stabilization 
bonds in order to control money creation and 
offset  the increase in financial-sector  borrowing. 
Several factors  -including the official  policy 
of  propping up the currency band, the financial 
system's efforts  to attract deposits in order to ease 
its acute liquidity crunch, the perception that 
country risk was higher as a result of  political 
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Table 1 
C A : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment b 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 





Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(sucres per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports)8 
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
10.7 -0.1 3.2 5.4 3.7 2.5 4.8 2.7 
8.0 -2.4 0.8 3.0 1.4 0.3 2.5 0.5 
6.2 0.8 3.9 4.8 4.8 0.1 7.7 3.4 
18.4 -3.8 -0.5 5.1 3.7 3.5 6.3 3.0 
6.2 8.0 4.7 6.1 5.8 4.5 4.2 3.2 
3.2 -1.6 3.0 3.8 2.6 2.4 3.1 2.2 
Percentages 
2.3 0.4 3.5 1.6 0.9 4.2 5.2 1.9 
0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
2.1 0.6 3.3 1.8 1.2 4.3 5.2 1.8 
-0.9 0.6 -3.2 5.2 -0.3 -0.9 1.3 1.7 
5.7 -0.1 2.6 2.0 3.2 1.2 3.0 2.2 
3.6 -1.0 0.4 -3.4 -0.1 -2.1 -4.7 -3.1 
Percentages of  GDP B 
20.7 21.3 17.5 21.6 20.5 19.2 19.5 20.6 
14.6 14.9 14.4 16.2 18.9 14.4 15.3 16.0 
6.1 6.4 3.0 5.3 1.6 4.8 4.2 4.7 
Percentages 
55.3 56.3 48.8 56.8 58.9 58.0 55.6 55.2 
7.0 7.9 6.1 8.5 8.9 8.9 7.8 7.7 
140.5 110.2 100.0 87.0 87.1 100.0 115.9 137.6 
Growth rates 
85.7 54.2 49.5 49.0 60.2 31.0 25.4 22.8 
66.8 80.1 45.5 48.0 54.7 39.2 18.2 
93.4 100.8 100.0 92.9 92.3 86.1 90.7 89.1 
302 526 768 1046 1 534 1 919 2 199 2 566 
92.3 94.6 100.0 95.2 94.7 83.5 78.2 78.8 
Millions of  dollars 
-683 -716 -366 -707 -215 -682 -680 -826 
440 539 880 483 800 443 385 134 
2 644 2 871 3 253 3 408 3 631 3 716 4 589 5 212 
2 204 2 332 2 373 2 925 2 831 3 273 4 204 5 078 
-588 -511 -806 -481 -633 156 -60 1 578 
•1 243 -1 112 -956 -1025 -947 -582 -761 -502 
-26 118 195 78 22 499 449 -233 
Percentages 
114.8 118.1 123.0 117.9 111.1 96.0 93.6 85.1 
34.7 37.3 33.3 29.0 22.5 20.9 17.9 14.3 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Non-financial  public sector 
Current income 21.5 26.3 27.1 25.4 25.8 26.6 .24.4 25.7 
Current expenditure 21.4 20.2 19.5 18.5 19.6 19.4 18.1 21.2 
Savings 0.1 6.1 7.6 6.9 6.2 7.2 6.8 4.1 
Capital expenditure 5.4 7.5 7.5 7.9 7.9 7.6 6.5 6.4 
Financial balance -5.3 -1.4 0.1 -1.0 -1.7 -0.4 -0.2 -1.9 
Domestic financing 1.8 -5.1 -3.3 -1.9 0.3 -2.3 -1.3 2.2 
External financing 3.5 6.5 3.2 2.9 1.4 2.6 1.5 -0.3 
Growth rates 
urrency and credit 
Money balances of  banking system 
Net international reserves 336.2 109.6 65.0 50.9 34.9 10.4 
Net domestic credit 10.5 21.9 35.7 47.6 56.9 81.3 67.7 
To private sector 38.4 42.3 66.5 61.2 77.8 77.4 49.1 
Money (Ml) 38.1 52.2 46.5 44.5 49.4 35.7 15.0 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 52.0 77.4 71.4 60.7 52.2 64.6 38.8 
M2 44.2 63.8 59.0 53.3 51.0 52.0 28.8 
Dollar deposits 806.1 1 385.0 239.9 202.7 135.8 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 33.7 -13.7 -7.8 -4.7 -7.9 1.0 6.9 16.7 
On loans -27.8 -7.4 -3.7 -1.2 -1.7 13.2 15.1 26.8 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign  currency 1 -25.3 -11.6 0.2 -1.9 4.1 17.6 11.6 13.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  Up to 1992, refers  to the exchange rate on the regulated market. From 1993 on, refers  to the exchange rate 
on the open market. 8 Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. 
h In 1994 and 1995, includes expenditures relating to staff  reductions. 1 Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in 
the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
ECUADOR: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
i ii in iv i ii in iv i ii m iv 
Gross domestic product 
(Index: 1990=100) 110.1 110.3 111.9 111.6 113.0 113.7 117.7 118.6 117.4 119.0 118.9 118.5 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation) 56.1 52.2 35.5 31.0 31.6 26.5 26.2 25.4 22.7 22.5 22.9 22.8 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 89.6 84.1 82.2 78.5 79.0 77.4 78.5 77.8 76.9 77.2 78.1 83.0 
Real interest rate (annualized) 
On deposits -5.3 -6.9 15.0 1.3 -5.1 3.3 15.2 14.2 18.8 9.8 17.4 20.9 
On loans 10.1 1.9 28.0 12.7 3.9 11.6 23.4 21.5 24.4 22.9 28.5 34.2 
Money (Ml) 
(12-month variation) 48.7 46.8 51.2 49.4 52.0 44.1 62.3 35.7 23.0 29.3 14.9 15.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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events, and the expansion of  domestic borrowing 
by the public sector- contributed to the marked 
volatility and very high level of  real interest rates, 
which far  exceeded those of  the previous year. 
The combination of  high interest rates -the 
reference  interest rate on deposits averaged 
16.7% in real terms, while the loan rate was 
26.8%- with an energy crisis and the scant 
expansion in domestic demand, which were 
affecting  production, led to an increase of  nearly 
90% in the delinquency rate, which had already 
gone up considerably in 1994. 
In late 1995 and early 1996, a number of 
financial  institutions were overtaken by a severe 
liquidity crisis, and some of  these investment and 
securities firms  collapsed. In order to stabilize the 
financial  system, the Central Bank granted 
around US$ 150 million in emergency credits to 
a number of  investment houses and banks, froze 
the issuance of  licences for  the establishment of 
new banks, provided incentives to encourage 
financial  institutions to merge, raised capital 
reserve requirements, and took steps to improve 
supervision of  the sector. 
In March 1996, the Central Bank intervened 
in the Conticorp financial  group and its 
subsidiary, the Banco Continental (one of  the 
largest banks in the country), authorizing a loan 
of  around US$ 160 million in order to avert its 
collapse and temporarily taking over its 
management. In addition, in order to clean up 
these financial  institutions' portfolios  and revive 
the production sector, a credit package was put 
together consisting of  a US$ 200 million loan 
from  the Andean Development Corporation and 
supplementary funds  from  the National Finance 
Corporation (CFN). 
High domestic interest rates stimulated a 39% 
rise in local-currency savings and time deposits, 
although this was markedly lower than the 
increase recorded in 1994. Owing to the 
prevailing level of  exchange-rate uncertainty, 
foreign-currency  deposits grew far  more -by 
138%- and accounted for  24% of  total quasi-
money in both local and foreign  currency. 
Nevertheless, the broad money aggregate (M2) 
(excluding foreign-currency  deposits) expanded 
by only 29%, compared with 52% in 1994, as the 
growth of  quasi-money was offset  by a smaller 
increase in Ml. As a result, the monetization 
process observed during previous years, which 
had been reflected  in an increase in M2 
(excluding foreign-currency  deposits) in relation 
to the monetary base, ground to a halt in 1995. 
During the first  half  of  1996, however, this 
process picked up once more. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
With a view to halting the continual 
appreciation of  the sucre, at the end of  1994 the 
authorities announced that they would replace 
the controlled float  of  the currency with an 
exchange-rate band whose crawl rate was set at 
12% at the beginning of  1995 based on the 
expected rate of  internal and external inflation. 
The main instrument used to keep the exchange 
rate within its pre-set limits was Central Bank 
intervention in the foreign  exchange market. The 
authorities found  it difficult,  however, to hold the 
rate within the band and on two occasions during 
1995 were obliged to adjust the band owing to 
changes in the expected rate of  inflation  and 
pressures on the foreign  exchange market. In 
February the band was raised 4%, while at the 
end of  October the rate of  crawl was increased 
from  12% to 16.5% and the band was widened to 
10% of  its central rate. 
Expectations of  a substantial nominal 
devaluation persisted, however, and the 
exchange rate hovered stubbornly near the 
ceiling of  the band. The exchange rate increase 
was thus greater than expected, and the year 
ended with a slight devaluation of  the sucre in 
real terms (around 2% of  its annual average rate 
against a basket of  the currencies of  Ecuador's 
main trading partners), thereby reversing the 
tendency to appreciate which the currency had 
exhibited in previous years. 
With a view to defending  their gains in terms 
of  stabilization and guiding expectations, the 
authorities announced that the currency band 
would remain in place until August, when the 
outgoing Administration's term of  office  would 
end. In addition, in order to curb currency 
speculation, in January 1996 they gradually 
began to lower the maximum percentage of  net 
assets which financial  institutions were allowed 
to hold in reserve currencies. During the first  few 
months of  1996, the price of  the dollar continued 
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to hover near the ceiling of  the band, but the 
increase in domestic inflation  did cause the local 
currency to appreciate somewhat compared with 
its level at the end of  1995. 
d) Trade policy 
At the beginning of  1995 the Andean Group's 
Common External Tariff  came into effect  for 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela at levels 
ranging between 5% and 20%, depending on the 
type of  product; an exemptions schedule was also 
established for  each country which would then 
be phased out over a four-year  period. 
Negotiations on Ecuador's entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) were also 
completed in 1995. The Ecuadorian Congress 
having ratified  the agreement in December 1995, 
the country joined WTO on 21 January 1996. In 
addition, an economic complementarity 
agreement with Chile came into effect  on 1 
January 1995, and an agreement was concluded 
with Cuba providing for  preferential  tariff 
treatment for  certain products. 
e) Structural reforms 
In 1992 the incoming Administration made 
structural reform  one of  the pillars of  its program-
me. Over the next few  years, anxious to increase 
the private sector's participation and the public 
sector's efficiency,  the Government revamped 
the regulatory mechanisms for  the financial, 
agricultural and hydrocarbon sectors, privatized 
a number of  State-owned enterprises, granted 
concessions to private companies to provide public 
services and restructured several public agencies. 
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In order to be able to introduce political, social 
and economic reforms  (e.g., the authority to 
dissolve Congress, social security reform,  a ban 
on strikes by public utilities), the Government 
conducted another referendum  in November 
1995. However, in the context of  the profound 
political crisis which culminated in the 
resignation and departure from  the country of  the 
Vice-President of  the Republic, the Govern-
ment's proposals were rejected. As a result, 
progress could be made only in those areas where 
a legislative majority was obtained. In one such 
instance, a bill was passed permitting the partial 
privatization of  Ecuador's telecommunications 
company, EMETEL, through the sale of  35% of  the 
corporation's stock to an international operator 
which would also assume the responsibility for 
managing and running the company and of  up to 
10% of  its stock to EMETEL employees. 
In August 1995, a block of  50.1% of  the stock 
of  the national airline, Ecuatoriana, was sold, and 
the sale of  a further  24.9%, divided up into small 
blocks of  shares, was envisaged. At the beginning 
of  1996 Congress passed a bill permitting the 
partial privatization of  the Ecuadorian Elec-
trification  Institute (INECEL) in three years' time. 
This bill was vetoed by the Administration, 
however, and as of  mid-1996 no consensus had 
been reached on the matter. 
By the beginning of  1995 fuel  distribution was 
being handled by private companies. During the 
course of  the year progress was also made in the 
process involved in putting concessions for  port 
services out to tender. In addition, the customs 
system was updated, the postal-service 
monopoly was eliminated and the national postal 
company was modernized. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
In 1995 GDP grew by barely 2.7%, and per 
capita GDP therefore  remained virtually constant. 
Factors such as the energy crisis, high interest 
rates and the uncertainty caused by the political 
crisis had an adverse effect  on growth. As a 
result, in each quarter except the second, GDP was 
down on the corresponding period of  the 
preceding year. 
Overall demand increased by 4.6%, thanks 
mainly to the robust performance  of  exports and 
private investment. Public-sector investment 
contracted, however, and growth in final 
consumption was also lower than the year before. 
This drop was due to the fall  in household 
consumption of  final  goods, public consumption 
having increased for  the first  time since 1990 as 
a result of  expenditures in connection with the 
armed conflict  with Peru. 
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Gross domestic investment went up from 
19.5% to 20.6% of  GDP, a rise that was attributable 
solely to private investment, since public-sector 
investment declined in real terms. This increase in 
investment was chiefly  financed  out of  higher 
gross national savings, which rose from  15.3% to 
16%. 
Agriculture and the finance  and real estate 
sector turned in some of  the best performances 
of  1995. With the exception of  coffee,  the main 
export crops expanded, but the harvests of  a 
number of  domestic-market crops fell.  Crude 
oil production was somewhat higher, with the 
pipeline operating at full  capacity. High 
interest rates and lower public-sector 
investment contributed to a decline in 
construction. In contrast to previous years, 
community, social and personal services 
expanded -albeit only by 1%- primarily as a 
result of  the growth in government services. 
After  contracting for  two consecutive quarters, 
GDP grew 0.7% in the first  quarter of  1996, a rise 
of  1.7% over the first  quarter of  1995. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
In 1995, the Government's macroeconomic 
programme was aimed at continuing to reduce 
inflation,  which had amounted to 25% at the end 
of  1994, by maintaining a stable real exchange 
rate, pursuing a tight fiscal  policy and controlling 
liquidity. Owing largely to unexpectedly sharp 
adjustments of  the exchange rate and an increase 
in the fiscal  deficit,  however, the downward trend 
in inflation  levelled off,  and from  March onward 
the 12-month inflation  rate held at between 22% 
and 23%, closing out the year at 23%. A 
maximum inflation  target of  19% was set for 
1996, but the first  half  of  the year once ended 
with an annual rate of  23% again. 
In 1995 the Government continued its policy 
of  boosting real minimum wages, which had 
fallen  70% between 1980 and 1991. In 1991 the 
country saw the beginning of  an upturn and in 
1995 minimum wages, including supplementary 
allowances, rose by 19% in real terms; thus, 
between 1991 and 1995 minimum wages won 
back a quarter of  the ground they had formerly 
lost. This policy had a positive effect  on real 
wages in medium-sized and large companies 
and, as a result, the annual average wage for  1995 
was up 10% on the previous year. 
Owing to the slower growth of  production, the 
labour market suffered  a drop in demand, with 
the number of  vacancies advertised falling  5% in 
comparison with 1994; this trend was even more 
pronounced at the beginning of  1996. The 
unemployment rate rose substantially in August, 
but dropped once more at the end of  the year; 
consequently, the annual average was similar to 
that of  the preceding year (7.7% of  the labour 
force).  As to the composition of  employment, 
there was a slight increase in the share of  the 
informal  sector. 
c) The external sector 
Having surged strongly in 1994, exports 
expanded yet again in 1995, albeit at the lower 
rate of  13%. It was a favourable  year for  all the 
major exports -commodities as well as 
manufactures.  The only exception was coffee, 
where falling  prices and export volumes cut the 
value of  exports to half  the preceding year's 
level. Many of  the country's other main export 
commodities, such as crude oil, shrimp and 
cocoa, made gains in terms of  both volume and 
price. There was also substantia] growth in 
banana exports thanks to an increase in volume 
and practically constant prices. Exports of 
manufactures  fared  even better than those of 
commodities and thus increased their share in 
total exports from  18% in 1994 to 19% in 1995. 
Exports to Ecuador's principal markets (the 
United States and the European Union) grew at 
about the same pace, while those to the Andean 
Group were down as a result of  the hostilities 
with Peru and a slowdown in exports to 
Colombia. 
Imports, including purchases of  arms, rose by 
25%; if  this category is excluded, then the 
increase was 16%. After  four  years of  notable 
growth, imports of  consumer goods, particularly 
consumer durables, suffered  a reverse in 1995. 
On the other hand, capital goods imports were 
up slightly, while a considerable increase was 
seen in imports of  raw materials and 
intermediate goods; this was particularly true in 




Consequently, in 1995 the merchandise trade 
surplus fell  by nearly half,  to US$ 260 million. 
Since arms purchases figured  prominently in this 
result, some improvement was expected in 1996. 
Meanwhile, the deficit  on trade in services fell 
slightly. Thus, the overall current account deficit 
increased from  4% to 4.6% of  GDP. During the 
first  few  months of  1996, however, the trade 
balance improved considerably owing to a drop 
in imports. 
The financial  account posted a large surplus. 
Thanks to the external debt restructuring 
agreement which Ecuador signed in late 1994, 
net disbursements to the general government 
showed considerable growth after  several years 
of  high negative figures.  At the same time, 
private borrowing in dollars soared (by more than 
US$ 700 million) due to the high cost of  loans in 
sucres. Foreign direct investment was somewhat 
lower, however, as a consequence of  declining 
investment in the petroleum sector and a 
slowdown in privatizations, although it was still 
high in historical terms. 
The year's economic and political problems 
contributed to an estimated US$ 600 million in 
other -primarily short-term- capital losses which 
were entered under the heading of  errors and 
omissions.1 
As a result, the overall balance at the end of 
the year showed a deficit  of  US$ 500 million 
(part of  which was covered by special financing), 
and losses of  reserves in 1995 amounted to 
US$ 230 million. In the first  quarter of  19%, 
however, reserves remained relatively stable. 
1 This item also includes amortization and interest payments for  previous years made as part of  the rescheduling of  Ecuador's 





1. General trends 
In 1995, the economy of  El Salvador continued 
growing in a stable environment, even though the 
targets set out in the monetary and financial 
programme were not fully  met. In a fourth  year 
of  significant  expansion, gross domestic product 
(GDP) grew by 6%. Large inflows  of  remittances 
from  Salvadorans resident abroad stimulated 
domestic demand and activities catering to the 
local market. Increased domestic spending 
continued to erode the real exchange rate, which 
encouraged imports. The trade deficit  widened to 
nearly 16% of  GDP, exacerbating the balance-of-
payments current account deficit.  Nevertheless, 
merchandise exports rose by 33% at current 
values, while volume expanded by 17%. 
Although the non-financial  public-sector deficit 
narrowed to less than 1% of  GDP, the rise in 
consumer prices (11%) was greater than in 1994. 
Mid-year adjustments to a number of  utility 
charges, minimum wages and the rate of  the 
value-added tax (VAT) affected  both costs and 
expectations, as did the increase in liquidity during 
the first  half  of  the year due to external borrowing 
by commercial banks and large private companies. 
Financing by means of  external short-term 
credits was encouraged by the spread between 
local and international interest rates produced by 
a fixed-rate  system of  currency convertibility, 
one of  a series of  measures designed to promote 
greater commercial and financial  openness in the 
economy. External funds  taken in by banking 
institutions fuelled  a rapid expansion of  private-
sector credit, which in the first  half  of  1995 
reached a level 40% above that for  the same 
period the preceding year. In order to control the 
increase in spending, monetary policy was tightened 
during the latter part of  the year. The higher cost 
of  credit restrained demand for  goods and services. 
2. Economic policy 
At the beginning of1995,  the Government announced 
a strategy of  gradual dollarization of  the economy, 
based on a fixed  exchange-rate system. The pro-
gramme included accelerated tariff  reductions, fiscal 
reform  and privatization of  State assets, as well 
as further  financial  reforms  and the establishment of 
a pension scheme based on individual capitalization. 
Uncertainty as to how these measures would 
be implemented and what their effects  would be 
led to some speculative behaviour that complicated 
the application of  policy, particularly in the areas 
of  finance  and foreign  exchange. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Government revenues swelled as a result of 
stricter supervision, the imposition of  harsher 
penalties for  tax evasion, and increases in a 
number of  tax and utility rates. The non-financial 
public-sector deficit,  excluding grants, narrowed 
considerably, reducing the public-sector 
financing  requirement (2% of  GDP in 1994) to 
less than half. 
The growth in public-sector current income 
was due chiefly  to a significant  increase in tax 
revenues. The tax ratio increased to nearly 12% 
of  GDP, one point higher than it had been in 1994, 
although still far  short of  the levels of  the 
mid-1980s. The biggest increases were in 
revenues from  income tax, VAT and import 
duties. The tax reform  adopted during the first 
half  of  1995 raised the VAT rate (from  10% to 
13%) and also increased taxes on cigarettes and 
on alcoholic and carbonated beverages. Since its 
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introduction in 1992, VAT has become the most 
important single tax, generating over two fifths 
of  total tax revenue. 
The wage rise (8%) awarded to public-sector 
employees in July and the commitments made in 
the peace agreements, especially concerning 
compensation payments to demobilized 
members of  the armed forces,  were factors  in the 
expansion of  current spending. On the other 
hand, better management kept the increase in 
public-sector current expenditure below target. 
In October, the Legislative Assembly passed the 
Transitional Financial Compensation Act, 
otherwise known as the Compulsory Retirement 
Act, which would eliminate 15,000 of  the 110,000 
public-sector jobs, starting in January 19%. 
Real public-sector investment kept pace with 
prices. Central government investment 
expenditure was significantly  higher, while State-
enterprise investment projects were limited. 
The fact  that revenues were higher and 
spending lower than planned meant that current 
saving improved from  2% to 3.2% of  GDP and 
covered more than 75% of  capital expenditure. 
Thus public-sector investments could be made 
without recourse to inflationary  financing  or 
significantly  higher external borrowing. 
The public-sector deficit  was financed  solely 
with external resources, since the Government, 
as planned, paid off  its domestic debt. Grants and 
donations, though less in amount than the 
preceding year, accounted for  over 60% of  net 
external credit to the public sector and 85% of 
the deficit. 
b) Monetary policy 
The Central Reserve Bank's monetary policy 
was geared towards maintaining liquidity levels 
that were consistent with growth in the economy 
and with the achievement of  the targets for 
inflation  and net international reserves. 
The measures that were adopted resulted in 
only moderate growth in the monetary 
aggregates compared with the year before.  The 
rate of  expansion of  local-currency liquidity 
(M2) slowed from  21% to 8%. Both the money 
supply and time deposits increased markedly less 
than in 1994. Growth in dollar deposits also 
slowed, although at 18% it still exceeded the 
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growth of  assets in local currency. While both 
public-sector credit and net international reserves 
in the financial  system contracted, the expansion 
of  liquidity was fuelled  by a significant  increase 
in loans to the private sector (30%). 
Domestic credit expanded as a result of 
various policy moves. During the early months 
of  the year, it was decided that the legal reserve 
requirement for  dollar deposits should be the 
same as for  local-currency deposits, which 
remained at 20% for  time deposits and 30% for 
demand deposits. In addition, the banking system 
was authorized to pay interest on dollar demand 
deposits with average daily balances exceeding 
US$ 5,000. These measures reduced the 
monetization of  dollar deposits, while the spread 
between domestic and international interest rates 
led banks to look for  short-term credit abroad. 
During the first  half  of  1995, total credit to the 
private sector was 40% higher than in the same 
period the year before.  This situation generated 
a surge in liquidity and raised inflationary 
expectations (particularly once the VAT increase 
was announced), putting pressure on prices as a 
result. The expansion of  credit was accompanied 
by a growing current-account deficit  due to the 
widening of  the trade gap. 
Under the circumstances, the Central Reserve 
Bank decided to curb aggregate spending in order 
to help stabilize prices and check the demand for 
foreign  exchange. During the second half  of  the 
year, the authorities took several steps to curb 
liquidity and in particular the expansion of 
private-sector credit. They raised the rate of 
interest on credit granted to banks through the 
Central Reserve Bank's automatic liquidity 
window and set a maximum term of  five  days for 
such credit. In addition, the reserve requirements 
for  both local-currency and dollar deposits made 
by the State and autonomous State-owned 
institutions and enterprises were increased, by 
15% for  savings and time deposits and by 5% for 
demand deposits. The 10% reserve requirement 
was also reintroduced for  foreign-currency  loans 
and guarantees with terms of  less than five  years 
obtained abroad by financial  institutions. 
The effect  of  these measures was to push 
interest rates up and to widen the spread between 
lending and deposit rates over the course of  the 
year to nearly five  percentage points. 
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Table 1 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 1.9 1.0 4.8 3.6 7.5 7.4 6.0 6.1 
Per capita gross domestic product 0.1 -0.9 2.8 1.5 5.2 5.0 3.7 3.7 
National income 2.8 1.6 10.9 5.8 11.4 9.7 9.5 6.9 
Gross domestic product, by sector 
Goods 2.0 1.5 3.8 3.8 8.8 -1.4 4.1 6.2 
Basic services 2.0 1.2 6.2 -2.9 9.1 6.8 5.2 5.6 
Other services 1.7 0.5 5.2 3.7 5.8 3.9 6.1 6.2 
Percentages 
Contribution to growth of  GDP C 
Consumption 1.6 1.5 13.9 3.2 7.7 8.0 7.5 9.5 
Government 0.5 -0.2 -6.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Private 1.2 1.7 20.3 2.9 7.7 7.9 7.3 9.1 
Investment 2.2 3.6 -2.8 2.4 4.4 1.8 1.5 2.7 
Exports -2.1 -2.7 4.1 -0.1 1.3 5.5 2.6 4.1 
Imports 0.1 -1.4 -10.4 -1.9 -5.9 -7.9 -5.6 -10.2 
Percentages of  GDP B 
Gross domestic investment 13.9 17.3 13.9 15.7 18.7 19.1 19.4 20.8 
National saving 11.5 11.6 8.4 11.2 14.9 16.7 19.1 17.0 
External saving 2.4 5.7 5.4 4.5 3.8 2.3 0.3 3.8 
Percentages 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 51.6 52.2 
Open unemployment rate e 8.7 9.9 7.7 7.7 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100)f 125.2 106.3 100.0 97.8 101.0 97.9 99.9 98.6 
Growth rates 
Prices (December-December) 
Retail prices 18.2 23.5 18.3 9.9 19.9 12.3 8.9 11.4 
Wholesale prices 4.6 11.6 22.5 -1.2 9.6 2.6 11.9 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 85.5 82.3 100.0 98.5 98.6 97.1 107.4 114.4 
Nominal exchange rate 
(colones per dollar) 5.00 5.48 7.69 8.08 8.44 8.70 8.74 8.76 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 86.9 82.8 100.1 98.4 98.2 88.0 83.9 80.9 
Millions of  dollars 
Balance of  payments 
Current account -129 -370 -261 -212 -195 -118 -18 -276 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) -369 -704 -651 -717 -950 -1 011 -1 212 -1 569 
Exports 939 909 973 898 975 1 138 1 639 2 209 
Imports 1 308 1 612 1 624 1 614 1 925 2 149 2 851 3 778 
Capital and financial  account 52 118 -11 -61 -4 87 84 423 
Overall balance -184 -111 27 -148 -134 59 113 147 
International reserves 




(as a percentage of  GDP) 29.7 32.8 43.8 40.1 38.6 34.1 31.2 29.9 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports)® 8.7 7.1 10.9 10.1 8.0 8.0 4.4 3.2 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Non-financial  public sector 
Current income 10.3 12.5 13.0 13.6 13.7 15.2 -16.1 
Current expenditure 11.8 12.8 13.8 13.4 13.0 13.3" 12.9 
Savings -1.5 -0.3 -0.8 0.2 0.8 2.0 3.2 
Net capital expenditure 4.3 2.5 4.1 6.7 -4.5 4.0 4.1 
Financial balance -5.9 -2.9 -4.9 -6.5 -3.6 -2.0 -0.9 
Domestic financing 2.6 -1.1 0.8 0.6 -0.3 -1.6 -1.2 
External financing 3.2 3.9 4.1 5.9 4.0 3.6 2.1 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking 
system 
-4.5 Net international reserves -21.2 69.6 92.6 1.7 26.1 13.7 10.3 
Net domestic credit 9.6 -32.6 10.4 22.7 37.5 45.5 26.2 15.0 
To public sector 4.0 -28.1 37.5 23.2 14.3 3.8 -27.5 -15.8 
To private sector 12.5 12.3 6.2 12.8 31.0 37.5 27.1 30.4 
Money (Ml) 8.3 12.8 22.1 6.1 31.8 12.4 10.2 4.4 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 14.0 -19.5 32.0 29.1 31.2 48.6 25.3 9.1 
M2 12.0 -8.7 27.9 20.0 31.4 35.9 21.0 7.9 
Dollar deposits 5.6 -34.1 99.0 1.7 58.3 18.4 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits -2.3' -5.8 -0.5 5.9 -6.2 2.7 4.3 2.8 
On loans -0.6 -3.9 2.2 4.2 -2.5 6.4 9.3 7.1 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency 15.0 16.3 -11.4 15.5 -0.8 22.4 12.5 14.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the 
economically active population (EAP). f  Real minimum wage in the manufacturing  and services sectors in San Salvador. 
g Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. h Interest rate on 
deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 




1993 1994 1995 a 
I II III IV I II III IV ii m iv 
21.2 23.4 15.0 12.3 13.0 9.9 9.7 8.9 8.7 9 .4 12.2 11.4 
92.3 90.1 85.1 84.5 83.3 83.8 84.4 84.1 83.0 82.8 79.8 77.9 
5.0 -2.8 4.6 4 .2 0.5 6.3 4.6 5.8 0.5 4 .4 -4.4 10.9 
7.8 0.6 8.8 8.5 4.7 10.9 9.9 11.8 5.9 8.4 -0.8 14.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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c) Trade policy 
The authorities had intended to reduce tariffs 
to zero during the Administration's term of 
office.  However, the demands of  a number of 
groups in the private sector and El Salvador's 
commitments as a member of  the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) forced  the 
adoption of  a more gradual approach. The first 
step was taken in April, when tariffs  on imports 
of  capita] goods were cut from  5% to 1%. The 
plan called for  reductions in 1996 in the tariff  on 
inputs and basic commodities of  non-local 
manufacture  to 1% and in the tariff  ceiling from 
20% to 15%. The tariff  ceiling would then be 
lowered by a further  three percentage points per 
year, to 6% in 1999. 
1995 saw the ratification  of  El Salvador's full 
membership in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and in that context negotiations took place 
on free  trade agreements between Mexico and 
what is known as the Northern Triangle of 
Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras), and between Colombia, Venezuela 
and Central America. Trade and investment 
agreements were also negotiated with the 
Dominican Republic and Panama. In addition, 
bilateral talks on reciprocal promotion and 
protection of  investments were opened with 
Ecuador, Switzerland, Spain, Chile, the 
Netherlands, the People's Republic of  China, the 
Russian Federation, Colombia and the United 
States of  America. 
d) Reform  policies 
In November 1995, the sale of  the last of  the 
banks under State supervision (Banco 
Hipotecario) was announced. This concluded the 
process of  financial  sector privatization which 
began in 1990. Progress was also made during 
the course of  the year in drafting  laws designed 
to reinforce  the solvency of  financial  institutions, 
extend their foreign  operations and promote 
improvements to their information  systems. The 
amendments to the legal framework  of  the 
financial  system would allow for  the 
establishment of  new banks and financial 
institutions and the participation of  foreign  banks 
in the domestic market. In addition, new 
proposals were drawn up for  tightening 
prudential bank supervision rules and 
strengthening the Superintendency of  Banking. 
Legislation on insurance companies, investment 
funds  and pension systems, is also being drafted 
to promote the development of  institutional 
investors. 
In the interests of  ensuring the soundness of 
financial  institutions and improving their 
efficiency  and competitiveness, a bill to amend 
the Banks and Financial Institutions Act was 
submitted to the Legislative Assembly. The 
amendments would entail a substantial increase 
in the minimum capital required to set up banks 
and financial  institutions, and such companies 
would have to list their shares on the Stock 
Exchange. The reforms  would also increase the 
ratio between equity and total weighted assets 
and alter the liabilities-to-equity ratio. A 
common reference  interest rate would be 
introduced, to be set by the banks and financial 
institutions and varied according to the type of 
credit transaction, in local or foreign  currency; 
all loans would then earn a rate based on this 
common reference  rate. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
With growth of  17%, exports of  goods and 
services provided the impetus for  a significant 
expansion (11%) of  aggregate demand. Private 
investment also forged  ahead (12%), which 
boosted gross fixed  investment by 10%. 
Growth in consumption speeded up (9%), 
eroding still further  the already meagre rate of 
domestic saving. This is an indication of  the 
extent to which economic activity in El 
Salvador depends on inflows  of  resources 
from  abroad, including private and official 
unrequited transfers.  It is estimated that 
remittances from  family  members alone are 
equivalent to 12% of  GDP. Within aggregate 
supply, the rate of  expansion of  the imported 
component was nearly four  times the rate of 
growth in output. 
2 1 4 
There were gains of  nearly 6% in 
goods-producing activities as a result of  the 
upturn (5%) in the agricultural sector due to good 
harvests of  coffee  and basic grains. 
Despite vigorous growth in the output of 
maquila  companies, the industrial sector lost 
momentum owing to the more intense 
competition from  imports that accompanied the 
increase in domestic demand and to labour 
unrest. Within manufacturing,  the most active 
subsectors were machinery and metal products, 
and textiles and clothing. 
Difficulties  in selling upper-middle-income 
housing and the glut of  shopping malls and office 
buildings slowed the expansion of  the 
construction sector to 6%. 
Hydroelectricity generation in 1995 was 
affected  by technical failures  and by the low 
levels of  the power station reservoirs during the 
first  few  months of  the year, so that thermal 
energy generation, whose direct production costs 
are higher, had to be stepped up. The rate of 
growth of  electricity and drinking-water services 
fell  to 5%. 
The growth of  the communications subsector 
was driven by the expansion of  local telephone 
services. Transport was also boosted by the 
increased demand for  haulage of  merchandise, 
particularly for  export or import. 
The greater purchasing power of  the 
population as a result of  family  remittances, 
combined with the price effect  of  tariff 
reductions and the real exchange-rate 
appreciation, helped commerce to maintain a 
strong growth trend. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Until the end of  the first  half  of  1995, the 
12-month variation in the consumer price index 
(CPI) tended downwards, but this trend was 
reversed in July with the announcement of 
increases in VAT, public utility rates (water, 
electricity and telephone) and minimum 
wages. In September, severe weather 
conditions hurt the vegetable and fruit 
harvests, driving food  prices up. The monetary 
and fiscal  measures that were taken slowed the 
pace of  inflation  by the end of  the year, and the 
cumulative variation to December was slightly 
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over 11%, compared with the target of  6%-8% 
set by the authorities. 
In July, public-sector employees received a 
pay rise of  8%, while in August the minimum 
wage for  private-sector workers and employees 
went up by 10%. These increases were barely 
enough to regain the purchasing power that had 
been lost to inflation. 
Despite the favourable  trend in GDP, job 
creation was insufficient  to reduce 
unemployment, which stood at around 7.7% 
nationally (7% in urban areas and 8.7% in rural 
areas). 
c) The external sector 
In 1995, the merchandise trade deficit 
widened by US$ 350 million, with exports 
expanding by 33% and imports by 31%. The 
trade deficit  in goods and services, which also 
grew (US$ 1.57 billion), was the equivalent of 
nearly one sixth of  output. 
Merchandise exports rose to a level of 
US$ 1,660 million. The value of  sales of 
traditional exports rose by 31%, largely owing to 
an increase in coffee  exports. The volume of 
coffee  exported was actually 12% lower than the 
year before,  but since the price of  beans rose 
substantially, the value of  sales increased by 
more than 33%. Non-traditional exports, which 
accounted for  nearly three fifths  of  total exports, 
expanded by 17%. By contrast with 1994, sales 
to the Centra] American region jumped (up 25%). 
More than 70% of  non-traditional exports found 
their way to CACM, notably medicines, paper and 
cardboard containers, perfume  and cosmetic 
products, aluminium products and refrigerators 
and freezers.  Even so, the interregional trade 
balance was again negative; the ample surplus El 
Salvador ran up with Honduras and Nicaragua 
only partly offset  the yawning gap in its trade 
with Guatemala and Costa Rica. Maquila  exports 
(especially clothing) totalled US$ 660 million, 
an increase of  50% over the 1994 level. 
The impetus of  economic activity, the 
appreciation of  the currency and stockpiling by 
companies in anticipation of  a VAT hike pushed 
up the rate of  imports of  merchandise, which 
swelled by 31%. Under a more open economic 
policy, goods imports as a proportion of  GDP rose 
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from  28% to 30%. In contrast to 1994, this 
expansion was spearheaded by consumer goods 
(33%), particularly durables, followed  by capital 
goods (27%) and raw materials and intermediate 
goods (23%). The greater availability of 
resources due to the growth of  family 
remittances, along with the first  half-year's  surge 
in private-sector credit, helped to fortify  the 
demand for  consumer goods. Imports of 
intermediate and capital goods were also boosted 
by the cut in the tariffs  on capital goods from  5% 
tol%. 
Net current transfers,  including family 
remittances and grants, were around US$ 1.4 
billion, which exceeded the value of  merchandise 
exports and financed  the bulk of  the trade deficit. 
Grants -the fruit  of  bilateral agreements, chiefly 
with the United States, Japan, Canada and 
Germany- totalled more than US$ 130 million. 
While the volume of  grants and donations was 
thus lower, there was an increase in (mainly soft) 
loans for  development projects. 
As a result, the deficit  on current account, 
which in 1994 had been negligible, soared to US$ 
280 million, the equivalent of  nearly three 
percentage points of  GDP. Nevertheless, inflows 
of  foreign  exchange through the capital account 
were enough to swell the net international 
reserves in the Central Reserve Bank by the end 
of  the year (US$ 935 million, or nearly three 
months' worth of  imports) by around US$ 150 
million more than 12 months previously. 
In 1995, a new stand-by agreement was signed 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
US$ 58 million. In addition to providing support 
for  the Government's reform  programme, the 
agreement allowed El Salvador continued access 
to financing  on concessional terms from  the 
international community, which helped to 
underpin the country's macroeconomic stability. 
Loans, of  which (70%) came from  the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
World Bank, rose to some US$ 930 million. 
Resources obtained through external cooperation 
agreements were allocated to the priority areas of 
education, health, water supply improvements, 
public security, justice, housing and the 
environment. 
The external public debt increased by more 
than US$ 170 million, although as a percentage 
of  GDP it fell  from  26% to 23%. The ratio of 
interest payments to exports was close to 6% and 
the debt service/exports ratio was slightly over 
17%, in both cases a marked improvement. 
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1. General trends 
In 1995 the Guatemalan economy expanded by 
5%, which was, faster  than in the preceding two 
years, thanks to good export prices and brisk 
domestic spending induced by a significant 
increase in private-sector bank credit. The 
growth in exports reduced the balance-of-
payments current account deficit,  but even so, it 
was still quite high. Inflation  also slowed to 
below 9%, but this may have been partly 
attributable to the delay in adjusting electricity 
prices. 
The country's economic performance  was 
matched by positive developments on the 
political front.  In 1995 presidential, 
congressional and municipal elections were held. 
A number of  political groupings participated in 
these elections, and the new President took office 
early in 1996. Although negotiations to end the 
internal armed conflict  proceeded slowly 
throughout 1995 with no sign of  significant 
progress being made, an agreement on social and 
economic issues and the agrarian situation, which 
had taken eight months to hammer out, was 
signed in May 1996. 
The prevailing conditions in international 
markets, which were reflected  in an increase of 
nearly 20% in the terms of  trade, had a positive 
influence  on Guatemala's macroeconomic 
performance.  Early in 1995 the prices of  its main 
export products -coffee  and sugar- rose 
substantially, although they moved downward 
again in the second half  of  the year. 
The foreign  exchange market, however, was 
affected  by both the expansion of  liquidity which 
had occurred in the last quarter of  1994 and the 
uncertainty characteristic of  a pre-election 
period. Furthermore, traditional means of 
regulating the money supply were rendered less 
effective  by the new types of  instruments which 
the country's banks began to use to attract funds. 
Although the Bank of  Guatemala sold foreign 
currency on several occasions in order to meet 
increased demand, as a result of  which 
international reserves fell,  the exchange rate 
continued to depreciate slowly. While significant 
progress was made towards achieving the 
monetary programme's targets for  net credit to 
the central government, they were not fully  met. 
The fiscal  deficit  was markedly lower, at 0.5% 
of  gross domestic product (GDP), thanks to a 
significant  increase in current government 
saving. This, in turn, was due to a contraction in 
expenditure and, in particular, to improved tax 
revenues. The tax ratio, however, remained 
below the levels recorded for  some other years 
during the 1990s and was low in comparison with 
other countries of  the region. In addition, the 
Bank of  Guatemala's losses were on a par with 
those of  the preceding year. 
The balance-of-payments  current account 
deficit  fell  to 4% from  the 1994 figure  of  5.6%. 
Although the trade deficit  also shrank, it again 
exceeded 6% of  GDP. Unrequited private 
transfers  rose considerably to just under 3% of 
GDP, but although this helped alleviate the need 
for  externa] financing,  the drop in capital inflows 
was reflected  in a decrease in international 
reserves. 
2. Economic policy 
In May 1995 the Government signed an (IMF), an earlier arrangement having been 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund suspended in late 1994 because that year's fiscal 
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Figure 1 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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targets had not been met. Broadly speaking, 
economic policy in 1995 focused  on stabilization 
objectives. In fiscal  terms, the authorities' aim 
was to boost tax revenues and bring down the 
public-sector deficit,  including its quasi-fiscal 
components. Monetary targets centred on a 
moderate expansion of  liquidity so as to protect 
international reserves. 
No major changes were seen in external trade 
policy. Tariffs  were kept between a maximum of 
20% and a minimum of  5%, although in the 
course of  the year the members of  the Central 
American Common Market agreed to adjust their 
tariff  range to 0%-15%. This measure was not 
implemented during 1995, however, and 
Guatemala remained at liberty to decide when it 
would begin applying the new tariffs.  Mean-
while, the country continued its efforts  to obtain 
terms comparable to those granted to Mexican 
exports in the United States market. 
Wages continued to be set through company-
specific  negotiations, although the Government 
did enact an across-the-board increase in the 
minimum wage towards the end of  the year. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The main objectives of  fiscal  policy were to 
reduce the public sector's overall deficit  to no 
more than 1.3% of  GDP, to increase tax revenues 
and to cut net credit to the central government. 
The central government's deficit  was below 
its target level, at roughly 0.5% of  GDP, while the 
positive trend in tax revenues brought about a 
partial reversal of  the sharp downturn in the tax 
ratio. On the other hand, the target for  net credit 
to the central government was not fully  met, for 
although the centra] government paid off  a large 
part of  its considerable loans from  the banking 
system, it was also forced  to draw on its deposits 
in order to deal with liquidity problems. 
One important feature  of  public finances  was 
the rise in tax revenues from  the equivalent of 
6.7% of  GDP in 1994 to 7.6% in 1995. This, 
together with only moderately higher current 
spending, led to a marked upswing in savings and 
enabled the Government to finance  part of  its 
capital expenditure with its own resources. 
Tax revenues increased by nearly 30%. 
Income from  the value-added tax (VAT) was up 
26%, owing to higher receipts from  imports and 
non-personal services, as well as from  customs 
duties, which rose significantly  (34%). After 
having fallen  in 1994, revenues from  direct taxes 
were considerably higher; income tax receipts, in 
particular, jumped by 60%. 
A large number of  administrative measures 
were implemented by the internal revenue 
service during 1995. First, quarterly income-tax 
payments were re-instituted after  correction of 
the technicalities that had resulted in their being 
declared unconstitutional. Moreover, early in the 
year the Constitutional Court upheld the legality 
of  the concept of  tax offences,  thereby paving the 
way for  the penalization of  tax evasion. In 
addition, the administration of  VAT was refined 
and stricter criteria for  tax credits were 
introduced. The fiscal  authorities also took a 
number of  steps to improve procedural aspects of 
the tax system, including the recruitment of 
auditors to investigate charges of  tax evasion, the 
establishment of  a customs audit section and the 
modernization of  the service's information 
systems. 
The central government's current expen-
ditures went up by less than 8% in nominal terms, 
which was somewhat more than in 1994, but was 
less than the inflation  rate. This was the result of 
a slight increase in its expenditure on wages and 
of  a nominal decrease in outlays on goods and 
services. Interest payments climbed signi-
ficantly,  however, and the Government's capital 
expenditure, which had fallen  in nominal terms 
in 1994, accelerated by 24.4%. 
Growth in revenue notwithstanding, fiscal 
management was conducted under difficult 
circumstances; in particular, the provision of 
several important government services continued 
to exhibit a number of  shortcomings. Further-
more, the illiquidity of  public finances  made it 
impossible to pay off  a floating  debt of  345 
million quetzals from  fiscal  1994, and the 
Government was obliged to incur further  debts 
of  the same type amounting to 1.27 billion 
quetzals in 1995. In addition, the central govern-
ment was up to two quarters in arrears on its transfer 
payments to the country's municipal governments. 
Nevertheless, the Government's financing 
needs were substantially lower. In 1995, external 
credit to the public sector contracted sharply and, 
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Table 1 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Prices (December-December) 
Domestic retail prices 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal banking exchange rate 
(quetzals per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 
Growth rates 
3.9 4.0 3.0 3.7 
0.9 1.1 0.1 0.8 
4.2 4.0 2.7 6.6 
4.3 3.1 2.6 2.8 
4.9 10.0 6.1 5.7 
3.4 3.6 2.8 4.0 
Percentages 
3.7 3.3 1.2 3.1 
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 
3.3 3.0 0.9 3.0 
-0.2 0.1 -0.2 3.1 
1.4 2.2 1.8 -0.8 
-1.0 -1.5 0.3 -1.7 
Percentages of  GDP B 
14.7 14.2 13.6 16.1 
11.5 11.6 8.4 11.2 
5.8 4.9 3.0 2.6 
Percentages 
52.5 52.3 52.1 52.1 
8.8 6.1 6.5 6.4 
157.5 141.3 100.0 80.7 
Growth rates 
11.0 20.2 59.8 10.0 
98.8 97.6 100.0 107.2 
2.62 2.82 4.49 5.03 
85.0 85.4 100.0 87.9 
Millions of  dollars 
-414 -367 -233 -214 
-462 -438 -244 -340 
1 269 1 424 1 568 1 688 
1 731 1 861 1 812 2 028 
81 225 -46 688 
-336 -87 -243 639 
-111 59 -42 558 
Percentages 
29.7 29.9 31.3 25.1 
11.7 10.3 10.7 7.6 
4.9 4.0 4.1 5.0 
1.9 1.1 1.1 2.0 
6.2 3.1 6.4 7.2 
4.7 2.2 2.1 3.5 
8.3 5.5 5.3 6.4 
4.4 5.1 5.2 5.7 
7.5 4.4 5.9 5.1 
0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 
7.1 3.9 5.6 4.8 
4.8 -1.1 -0.1 1.0 
1.8 2.7 0.8 1.8 
-9.1 -2.0 -2.5 -3.0 
19.9 18.0 17.2 17.4 
14.9 16.7 19.1 17.0 
8.0 7.7 6.7 4.9 
52.1 52.1 52.1 52.1 
5.7 5.5 5.2 4.3 
72.5 62.8 
14.2 11.6 11.6 8.6 
106.7 103.0 110.5 118.3 
5.17 5.64 5.75 5.82 
87.0 88.9 85.1 82.6 
-713 -702 -638 -525 
-962 -938 -951 -922 
1 883 2 033 2 271 2 800 
2 845 2 971 3 222 3 721 
571 688 644 448 
-27 162 -43 -204 
-65 110 -2 -158 
20.8 18.7 19.1 17.0 
7.6 4.9 4.2 3.8 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Central government sector 
Current income 10.1 9.4 7.9 9.0 10.1 9.0 7.6 8.4 
Current expenditure 10.1 10.1 8.5 7.6 7.8 7.5 6.9 6.4 
Savings - -0.6 -0.6 1.5 2.4 1.5 0.8 2.0 
Capital expenditure 2.4 3.1 1.7 1.5 2.9 3.1 2.3 2.5 
Financial balance -2.4 -3.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.5 -1.5 -1.5 -0.5 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking 
system 
International reserves 19.4 -57.7 -11.3 -1015.9 57.6 19.2 -15.8 -8.6 
Net domestic credit 11.9 9.8 20.5 15.1 11.2 5.8 39.6 15.7 
To public sector -11.7 23.5 -1.1 94.7 -31.0 -34.4 -47.4 -36.5 
To private sector 15.0 9.6 16.6 18.4 35.1 15.3 14.2 24.4 
Money (Ml) 14.3 20.7 33.9 18.3 5.4 21.1 34.9 8.2 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 9.2 14.8 13.7 64.1 27.4 3.4 20.1 13.5 
M2 11.1 17.1 21.7 44.1 19.5 9.0 25.3 11.5 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits - -5.2 -23.9 13.1 -3.4 1.0 -1.7 -0.8 
On loans 2.7 -2.7 -20.6 22.0 4.6 11.8 10.2 11.6 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign  currency 8 4.3 -5.4 -1.7 22.7 6.2 1.9 12.8 2.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990dollars. cTheseentriesmeasuretheimpactofthevariationineachaggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. 
g Nominal interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
GUATEMALA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
I II III IV I II III IV I II m IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 13.2 13.2 14.4 12.6 14.0 13.3 10.8 12.1 8.4 8.2 8.4 8.6 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 86.4 87.3 90.7 91.0 88.1 85.1 84.6 82.7 82.1 82.8 82.9 82.6 
Real interest rate (annualized, %) 
On deposits 5.6 -5.2 3.5 - -2.2 1.5 -1.8 -4.3 6.0 -9.8 2.0 -4.4 
On loans 16.3 4.9 15.0 11.1 8.5 13.4 11.5 7.5 19.2 5.2 14.9 7.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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as a result, domestic credit increased as a 
percentage of  total financing  (from  35.5% to 
80%) even though it decreased in volume. Since 
the Government is barred from  borrowing from 
the Bank of  Guatemala by the Constitution and 
maintains a policy of  settling up its debts with the 
financial  system, the Government launched 
public bond offerings  several times during the 
course of  the year at market rates for  short terms 
(around three months, on average) in what is still 
an emerging market. 
b) Monetary policy 
The multiplicity of  monetary policy objectives 
occasioned conflicts  in its implementation, since 
macroeconomic stabilization was the first 
priority, but the authorities were also trying to 
help bring down interest rates as a means of 
encouraging the expansion of  the economy. 
During the first  few  months of  the year, the 
thrust of  monetary policy continued to be 
expansionary, with net international reserves 
dropping from  around US$ 800 million at the end 
of  1994 to US$ 630 million by mid-February 
1995. Beginning in the second quarter, steps 
were taken to soak up excess liquidity and restore 
the level of  international reserves. Accordingly, 
the Bank of  Guatemala began to engage in 
open-market operations again and kept bank 
reserve requirements high. 
These attempts to restrict the money supply 
were hampered, however, by the commercial 
banks' efforts  to attract funds  using instruments 
that were not subject to reserve requirements, 
since this led to a sharp increase in credit and 
helped create secondary liquidity. As this 
undermined the effectiveness  of  the reserve 
requirement as an instrument of  monetary 
control, the Bank of  Guatemala relied heavily on 
open-market operations in which it offered  quite 
high rates of  return, with the result that it incurred 
operating losses of  around 1% of  GDP. 
The growth of  monetary aggregates slowed in 
1995. Among the factors  of  liquidity, the net 
effect  of  the financial  system's foreign  exchange 
operations was contractionary, and domestic 
credit expanded less than the year before.  Net 
credit to the public sector fell  once more, 
although there was an increase in private-sector 
loans, and bond sales undertaken as a means of 
controlling the money supply had a 
contractionary effect  as well. This resulted in an 
11% variation in currency liabilities, as against 
25% in 1994. The rate of  growth of  the money 
stock plummeted from  nearly 20% to 8%, and the 
expansion of  interest-bearing deposits was also 
down on the preceding year, from  20% to 13.5%, 
although it did outpace inflation. 
Interest rates were affected  by the borrowing 
operations of  both the Government and the Bank 
of  Guatemala. Annual average rates, for  deposits 
as well as loans, were below those of  1994 in 
nominal terms. However, since inflation  slowed, 
real average rates were higher, and indeed 
interest rates tended upwards over the course of 
the year, especially the rates for  63- and 182-day 
bonds. The spread between loan and deposit rates 
also widened, even though the new instruments 
which the banks were using to attract funds  cut 
the effective  reserve requirement by nearly five 
percentage points; thus, interest rate spreads 
increased in spite of  the fact  that reserve-related 
costs were lower. 
During 1995, the reform  of  the legislative 
framework  for  financial  activity proceeded; 
these measures included the enactment of  laws 
to strengthen superintendency of  banks and the 
capital structure of  financial  institutions. A 
directive was also issued giving the go-ahead for 
a complete liberalization of  interest rates. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
During the course of  the year, demand for 
foreign  exchange became stronger, which 
prompted the Bank of  Guatemala to step in. The 
Bank sold around US$ 80 million in all (USS 27 
million in April, US$ 13 million in October and 
US$ 41 million in November). These 
interventions, along with the monetary and fiscal 
policies that were being pursued, acted to contain 
the exchange rate. The currency depreciated 
against the dollar by around 5%, which translated 
into a slight drop in the real exchange rate. 
d) Public external debt policy 
The resumption of  Guatemala's agreement 
with the IMF restored its access to external 
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financing.  In June, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IDB) made the final  disbursement of 
US$ 35 million on a financial  modernization 
loan. None the less, public debt service (including 
both amortization and interest payments) was far 
higher than loan disbursements, which 
exacerbated the Government's financial  problems. 
Public external debt declined somewhat in 1995 
(-3%), while outlays in the form  of  amortization 
and interest payments fell  by 23%. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
In 1995 the Guatemalan economy grew by 
5%, thus exceeding the population growth rate 
(2.9%) fe»-  the ninth year in a row. Owing to the 
rather slow increase in production and the 
relatively high demographic growth rate, 
however, per capita income remained below the 
level achieved at the beginning of  the 1980s. 
Exports of  goods and services gave a fillip  to 
overall demand, swelling by nearly 9%. This 
performance  was a result of  the favourable 
conditions that prevailed in the markets for 
Guatemala's main export products. In addition, 
investment expanded significantly,  by contrast 
with 1994. Private investment, having fallen  by 
nearly 4% in 1994, recorded a rise of  8%, with 
the bulk of  this increase being accounted for  by 
housing, manufacturing  and commerce. 
Public-sector investment, for  its part, was up by 
5% -after  having declined in the preceding two 
years- owing to an increase in the resources 
allocated to the telephone system and other types 
of  infrastructure.  Consumption rose by 5%, 
boosted as much by Government as by the private 
sector. Contributory factors  included the increase 
in remittances from  abroad and the expansion of 
credit. 
In 1995, growth was widespread in the 
principal sectors of  the economy. Of  particular 
note was the performance  of  the construction 
sector, which, after  two years of  contraction, 
surged ahead by 8% thanks to the rise in 
public-sector investment and a boom in hotel-
building and other tourism-related projects (the 
stock of  hotel rooms climbed by around 10% in 
1995). The fact  that credit was more readily 
available was a further  positive factor,  since 
bank loans to this sector soared by 52%, 
thereby pushing up the construction sector's 
share in the total bank portfolio's  by two 
percentage points. 
Mining moved up appreciably (12%) thanks 
to a vigorous expansion in oil production (29%), 
which was stimulated by the sustained 
momentum of  investment and production 
operations, by virtue of  which output has tripled 
in the last seven years. 
Basic services rose by 6.5% -once more 
exceeding the growth rate recorded for  the 
production of  goods- as a result of  the extension 
of  the telephone system and an increase in 
electric power generating capacity. Other 
services grew by more than 5%, with tourism and 
finance  services both continuing to expand 
rapidly. By contrast, the pace of  growth in 
government and municipal services slowed as a 
result of  the Government's policy of  curbing 
current spending and the delay in making 
transfers  from  the central government to the 
municipalities. 
Goods production was more buoyant than in 
the preceding two years (3.5%) owing to the 
acceleration in agricultural and industrial growth 
and the strength of  the construction and 
hydrocarbons sectors, as mentioned earlier. 
Agriculture was hurt by excessive rainfall,  but 
not all subsectors were equally affected.  Trends 
in export products were favourable,  thanks to 
improvements in farming  techniques and 
infrastructure.  A further  important factor  in this 
good performance,  particularly as regards coffee, 
was the fact  that the rains did not fall  during the 
harvest. The extremely heavy rainfall  was 
expected to take its toll on the 1996 harvest, 
however. 
The growing mechanization of  the sugar-cane 
sector and the consolidation of  new 
cane-producing areas produced a record harvest. 
This sector has also benefited  for  many years 
from  government policies designed to boost its 
profitability.  By contrast, crops destined for  the 
domestic market, which are more vulnerable to 
the vagaries of  the weather, were damaged by the 
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excessive rains, and the maize, rice and bean 
harvests were therefore  thinner. 
The rate of  growth in the manufacturing  sector 
rose marginally compared with the preceding 
year, from  2.9% to 3.3%, owing mainly to the 
expansion of  exports. The increase in output was 
similar in the various subsectors of  industry. 
Exports of  manufactures  expanded more rapidly 
than in 1994, especially in the case of  plastic 
articles, foodstuffs  and chemicals. Garment 
exports produced in maquila  industries also 
expanded, but at a more moderate pace. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The inflation  rate in Guatemala was 8.6%, 
which was within the target range of  8%-10% set 
at the beginning of  the year. This achievement 
was chiefly  due to the fiscal,  monetary and 
foreign  exchange policies that were pursued, but 
was attributable in part to the delay in adjusting 
electricity rates, an issue that was not resolved in 
1995 because of  legal problems. The greatest 
price increase was again in education, while the 
prices of  clothing and of  transport and 
communications services rose less than the 
aggregated price index. 
The acceleration in the activity rate was due 
to a rise of  nearly 4% in employment, which 
drove down the open unemployment rate to 
4.3%. The level of  underemployment also fell 
slightly. Even so, the under-utilization of  the 
labour supply continued to affect  a substantia] 
percentage of  the active population. 
Real wages remained stable and at the end of 
the year an across-the-board increase of  10% in 
minimum wages was enacted. 
c) The external sector 
Better prices for  Guatemala's main export 
products, combined with an upswing in volume, 
pushed exports up faster  than imports (23% as 
against 15%). This brought the trade deficit  in 
goods and services down, although it remained 
high as a proportion of  GDP (6%). Thanks to the 
bountiful  stream of  private transfers,  including 
remittances from  Guatemalans living abroad 
(which account for  around 3% of  GDP), the 
country pared down its current account deficit 
from  5% of  GDP in 1994 to around 4% in 1995. 
Capital inflows  were lower than the current 
account deficit,  and consequently international 
reserves shrank by US$ 158 million. 
The value of  merchandise exports recorded its 
highest rise in the last six years. Although sales 
to the rest of  the world showed the most 
significant  increase (28%), exports to Central 
America accelerated faster  than in previous years 
(19%). The value of  traditional exports went up 
by a little over 20%, as increased sales of  coffee, 
bananas and sugar more than offset  the drop in 
meat exports. Non-traditional exports jumped by 
a sizeable amount (36%), the most notable 
performances  being in oil sales (48%) and 
clothing exports to the United States (27%). The 
latter amounted to US$ 175 million, which put 
the sector in fourth  place, following  coffee,  sugar 
and tourism, as a source of  foreign  exchange 
earnings. 
In the category of  trade in real services, 
tourism posted a surplus, after  having run up a 
deficit  in 1994. This sector generated US$ 210 
million in foreign  exchange, while outlays were 
cut to US$ 140 million. Meanwhile, current 
transfers  brought in just over US$ 550 million 
(23% more than in 1994), which was similar to 
the combined total for  coffee  and sugar exports. 
Merchandise imports expanded by 19%, 
chiefly  as a result of  the increase in purchases of 
intermediate goods (22%) and capital goods 
(20%), which outstripped the growth of 
consumer goods (12%) for  the first  time in some 
years. 
Capital inflows  came from  private-sector 
operations, as public-sector debt payments 
exceeded the credits received. There was a drop 
in incoming short-term capital, but flows  of 
long-term funds  to the private sector increased, 
mainly as a result of  investments in oil 




1. General trends 
The restoration of  a constitutional civilian 
government in October 1994 was an extremely 
significant  political development which changed 
the course of  the Haitian economy in fiscal 
1994-1995.1 The trade embargo imposed on the 
country following  the military coup of 
September 1991 was lifted,  and the foundations 
were laid for  the implementation of  an 
emergency programme with financial  support 
from  the international community. The inflow  of 
foreign  capital led to a spectacular rebound in 
imports, which was reflected  in a substantial 
current account deficit  -equivalent to 9% of  the 
country's already diminished gross domestic 
product (GDP)- and in an increase in the public 
sector's level of  expenditure and deficit.  This 
marked the end of  a crisis which had caused a 
10% reduction in national income since 1990, 
and the beginning of  a partial recovery that was 
reflected  in a rise in GDP of  almost 5%. 
Despite this partial reactivation, it is estimated 
that the rate of  unemployment remained above 
50%, and the informal  sector continued to be the 
principal source of  employment. Although the 
higher level of  economic activity and the inflow 
of  foreign  capital brought about an increase in per 
capita income, there has nevertheless been a 
sharp deterioration in the standard of  living, and 
social indicators for  a wide sector of  the 
population continue to be alarming. 
Faced with this situation, the Government 
formulated  an emergency economic revival plan 
geared to satisfying  the most pressing needs of 
the people and devised a structural adjustment 
scheme. On this basis, an economic and financial 
programme was developed with backing from 
the international community, which pledged to 
contribute US$ 1.7 billion over a three-year 
period. The programme was defined  in 
conjunction with multilateral financial 
organizations so as to fit  in with the macro-
economic framework  established under the 
standby agreement signed in March with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The availability of  financing  and the resultant 
increase in the supply of  imports, in addition to 
the adoption of  a moderate monetary policy, 
made it possible to bring the rate of  inflation 
down to 24% and to stabilize the exchange rate 
at around 15 gourdes to the dollar, notwith-
standing the accumulation of  US$ 200 million in 
international reserves. 
2. Economic policy 
The main objectives of  the economic authorities 
during the period under review was to overcome 
the critical situation created by the virtual 
collapse of  the national economy following 
three years of  military rule and the subsequent 
trade embargo and, during a second phase, to 
correct the structural and institutional defects 
which were hindering the country's 
development. Accordingly, the Government 
adopted a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme and a structural reform  plan which 
provided for  the reinforcement  of  public 
finances,  private-sector development, public-
sector reforms,  the privatization of  State 
enterprises and the implementation of  sectoral 
programmes. 
1 As is usual in the case of  Haiti, the years referred  to are fiscal  years, which run from  1 October to the following  30 September. 
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The direction of  economic policy and the 
economic programme's goals were defined  in 
concert with international finance  institutions; to 
assist with its application, standby funds  were 
allocated by the IMF, while the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
granted structural adjustment and technical 
assistance loans. In addition to the agreements 
signed with these organizations, various sectoral 
programmes were financed  by bilateral and 
multilateral agencies with the objective of 
contributing to the revitalization of  the economy 
and attenuating the social costs of  the crisis. As 
an initial step in facilitating  the procurement of 
fresh  capita] from  abroad, in December 1994 
Haiti made a commitment with the IMF, the 
World Bank and IDB to use US$ 65 million in 
grants from  10 donor countries and US$ 18 
million from  the Government itself  to pay off  its 
arrears on its debts with these multilateral 
sources. 
Most of  these fiscal  and monetary measures 
were implemented in the first  half  of  the year and 
proved to be successful:  inflation  went down and 
there was an improvement in the exchange rate. 
From July onwards, however, efforts  to curb 
public spending suffered  a number of  setbacks, 
prices climbed, and the exchange rate took a turn 
for  the worse. Furthermore, opposition to the 
privatization of  public corporations mounted in 
the second half  of  the year and prompted the 
resignation of  the Prime Minister in November, 
thereby interrupting this process and creating a 
climate of  uncertainty on the eve of  the 
presidential elections. Moreover, some bilateral 
and multilateral financial  organizations 
suspended the disbursement of  funds  that had 
already been approved in the expectation that 
new measures to reinforce  fiscal  discipline would 
be adopted. 
a) Fiscal policy 
When the constitutionally-elected President 
took office  in October 1994, the tax performance 
ratio had suffered  a drastic decline that had 
brought it to barely more than 3% of  GDP. Faced 
with this situation, the authorities took steps to 
increase current income; the measures included 
updating the reference  exchange rate used for 
customs valuations, increasing taxes on 
petroleum products and collecting service 
charges amounting to 3% of  the value of  imports. 
At the same time, initial steps were taken to 
strengthen budget performance,  reduce tax and 
customs duty evasion, and allow the sector to 
recover the estimated 80 million gourdes in 
arrears built up over the preceding years. To 
this end, approval was given for  the 
establishment of  an office  to monitor the 
country's 200 largest taxpayers, update 
company listings and automate customs 
operations. The principal fiscal  measures of  this 
sort were incorporated into a law that was 
enacted at the beginning of  March 1995, under 
which foreign  trade was also liberalized. 
Tax revenues were nearly three times higher 
than in 1994 and represented over 5% of  GDP. 
Total income (excluding grants and donations) 
was slightly below 6% of  GDP and thus came very 
close to the target figure  established under the 
economic programme. 
Although income taxes showed an increase, 
their contribution to total revenue was less than 
the sum of  indirect corporate taxes (turnover 
taxes) plus taxes on foreign  trade. The latter 
increased despite the decrease in tariffs,  as a 
result of  measures adopted and the higher volume 
of  imports. Public corporations recorded an 
operating surplus that far  exceeded its 1994 level. 
Furthermore, approximately 400 million gourdes 
were recovered which had been held in 
commercial bank accounts that had been frozen 
during the embargo. 
Current expenditure was 25% higher than 
expected, amounting to more than double the 
figure  for  the preceding year and about 10% of 
GDP. Not only did staffing  costs increase, but the 
other operating expenses of  the civil service 
climbed much more steeply, in particular during 
the second half-year,  due to the reactivation of 
the public sector. Some of  these funds  were used 
to defray  the cost of  replacing the armed forces 
with a civilian police force  (which is still in the 
process of  being formed)  and of  retraining 
demobilized staff  for  other jobs. Interest 
payments on the domestic and external public 
debts represented 6% of  current expenditure. 
Public investment in labour-intensive 
infrastructural  repair and maintenance projects 
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Table 1 
A : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 0.2 1.1 -0.1 0.8 -8.4 -1.3 -4.4 4.8 
Per capita gross domestic product -1.8 -0.9 -2.2 -1.2 -10.3 -3.3 -6.3 2.7 
Gross national income -0.3 -4.5 2.6 1.0 -9.7 0.2 -5.3 24.5 
Gross domestic product, by sector 
Goods 1.3 0.5 -1.1 -2.5 -10.5 -6.5 -3.2 5.8 
Basic services 6.8 3.4 3.0 -7.6 -12.2 -2.2 -23.1 12.6 
Other services -0.8 0.9 1.2 4.5 -2.5 4.1 -3.1 3.4 
Percentages 
Contribution to growth of  GDP C 
Consumption 1.0 -2.7 0.6 2.4 -9.9 2.8 -7.0 13.9 
Gross domestic investment -0.7 -1.0 -0.6 1.0 -4.9 -0.8 -0.5 18.8 
Exports -3.2 1.6 0.9 -0.6 -9.6 0.5 -4.7 16.8 
Imports 3.1 3.2 -1.0 -2.0 15.9 -3.8 7.8 -44.7 
Percentages of  GDP b 
Gross domestic investment 16.8 15.7 15.1 15.9 12.1 11.4 11.4 28.8 
National saving 14.0 11.5 13.8 12.5 12.7 10.2 11.7 23.6 
External saving 2.8 4.2 1.3 3.5 -0.6 1.3 -0.3 5.2 
Percentages 
Employment and wages 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 129.3 120.4 100.0 84.6 74.2 60.0 43.3 81.8 
Growth rates 
Prices (December-December) 
Retail prices 26.1 10.8 16.8 36.1 31.7 24.0 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 113.5 86.8 100.0 86.5 86.9 86.4 81.7 88.3 
Nominal exchange rate 
(gourdes per dollar) 5.9 6.3 7.4 7.7 9.1 12.4 14.2 15.3 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 93.1 96.4 100.0 94.0 95.2 112.0 91.5 80.5 
Millions of  dollars 
Balance of  payments 
Current account -40 -63 -22 -56 8 -17 4 -75 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) -206 -211 -197 -272 -135 -179 -141 -552 
Exports 275 237 318 260 114 117 64 276 
Imports 481 448 515 532 249 297 205 828 
Capital and financial  account 26 60 33 26 -21 -44 -16 120 
Overall balance -2 -16 -34 11 -6 -23 -21 200 




(as a percentage of  GDP) 73.1 78.0 53.9 48.2 50.2 55.8 60.1 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 8.3 9.5 7.9 7.7 11.3 10.7 17.5 10.1 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Central government 
Current income 9.4 11.0 8.7 8.7 6.6 5.1 3.3 5.7 
Current expenditure 9.7 13.6 11.4 10.4 10.1 7.5 7.2 9.6 
Savings -0.3 -2.7 -2.7 -1.7 -3.5 -2.3 -3.9 -3.9 
Capital expenditure 3.9 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.6 
Financial balance -4.2 -4.7 -4.2 -2.7 -4.1 -2.9 -4.2 -4.6 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking 
system 
Net domestic credit 6.7 17.3 6.9 3.0 27.2 26.4 27.9 -2.4 
To central government 8.0 12.2 9.4 -3.2 24.5 30.8 25.2 -15.8 
To private sector 8.4 30.6 3.5 6.7 4.5 40.0 8.7 56.6 
Money (Ml) 17.7 10.5 1.2 5.1 24.8 26.7 21.1 25.7 
Local-currency savings and 
time deposits 5.3 18.3 13.8 14.0 28.5 35.1 25.8 7.5 
M2 11.5 14.2 7.4 9.7 26.8 31.3 23.8 15.3 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates 
(at end of  period) 
On deposits6 -7.9 -5.5 -19.1 -22.0 -18.7 -3.2 -9.1 
On loans6 1.1 -4.1 -17.8 -13.6 -9.5 1.9 2.1 
Equivalent interest rate in 
-25.7 7.0 foreign  currency -8.4 3.1 -11.6 -11.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990dollars. 0 These entries measure the impactof  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate'S annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods 
and services, 
exchange rate. 
Figures up to September of  each year. f  Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the 
amounted to less than 1% of  GDP, but was much 
higher than in previous years; these funds  were 
over and above the external aid received by the 
country, which also grew. 
The overall deficit  was equivalent to slightly 
under 5% of  GDP, and over 80% of  this was 
covered by external funds  (grants and 
concessional loans); in addition, there were the 
domestic funds  that had been in accounts frozen 
during the embargo. In contrast, in the previous 
three years, it had been financed  almost entirely 
through issues by the Central Bank. 
The situation of  the rest of  the non-financial 
public sector was more variable. This sector's 
overall surplus, which enabled it to transfer  funds 
to the Government and pay off  a sizeable portion 
of  its debt with the Bank of  the Republic of  Haiti, 
came primarily from  the country's telecom-
munications company. Nevertheless, other 
companies which remained out of  commission, 
such as Haiti's cement factory  and wheat flour 
mills, had a negative impact on public finances, 
as did the electricity sector, since they continued 
to receive government support. No capita] 
income was recorded, as the privatization of  State 
enterprises was postponed. 
For the 1996 fiscal  year, a 25% rise in 
expenditure and income is expected. Just as in 
fiscal  1995, the financing  of  the deficit  will 
depend on the timely disbursement of  foreign 
assistance and concessional loans, given that 
current income would only cover around 75% of 
expenditure under the headings of  civil service 
wages and operating expenses. 
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b) Monetary and| exchange rate policies 
After  three years of  unchecked expansion, 
monetary policy resumed a moderate course; to 
achieve this, the authorities resorted to two 
instruments: bank reserve requirements and 
intervention in the foreign  exchange market. The 
monetary base, together with local-currency, 
expanded by approximately 15%; this growth 
rate was lower than the increase in the value of 
transactions and was within the limits agreed 
upon with the IMF. 
Unlike previous years, when the expansion of 
the money supply was caused by the need to 
finance  the fiscal  deficit,  net credit granted to the 
public sector diminished in 1995, due in part to 
the amortization of  advances granted in 1994 
against funds  held in accounts frozen  in 
connection with the international embargo. In 
addition, the guidelines of  the Bank of  the 
Republic regarding restrictions on credits to the 
public sector were adhered to more strictly. The 
changes noted in this area were in keeping with 
the arrangements made for  financing  the public 
deficit,  which relied chiefly  on foreign  capital for 
that purpose. Net inflows  of  foreign  assets 
increased substantially (by US$ 200 million). 
Credit to the private sector also rose (by over 
50%) as the situation in the banking system 
returned to normal. Consequently, the money 
supply's (Ml) 25% expansion exceeded the 
growth of  the monetary base, mainly as a result 
of  an increase in demand deposits. Quasi-money 
grew by only 7.5% because of  the low returns 
offered  on term deposits and the fact  that many 
savers preferred  to keep their liquid assets in 
dollar accounts, which more than doubled in 
value. Thus, the broadly defined  money supply 
(M3), which includes such accounts, increased 
by 25%, compared with a 15% expansion of 
local-currency liquidity (M2). 
In order to limit money growth, the monetary 
authorities, who had raised the reserve 
requirement for  demand deposits to 73% for 
commercial banks in March while the minimum 
reserve on term deposits was maintained at 20%, 
set the reserve requirement for  all types of 
deposits at a standard 48% in May and then raised 
it to 53.5% in September. These measures did not 
apply to dollar deposits, which recorded the 
greatest increase. The reduction of  liquidity 
towards the end of  the year made it possible to 
lower the minimum reserve requirement by two 
percentage points. 
When money growth accelerated in July 
partly as a result of  the increase in fiscal  outlays 
and the above-mentioned uncertainty regarding 
the authorities' future  economic policy stance, 
the foreign  exchange market started to show 
signs of  agitation. The gourde lost 4% of  its value 
between July and August and the rate of 
exchange rose to over 15 gourdes to the dollar. 
This pressure was attenuated by the intervention 
of  the Bank of  the Republic starting in August. 
Thus the currency fluctuated  between 13 and 15 
gourdes to the dollar throughout the year, 
reflecting  a 12% recovery compared with the 
period during which the embargo was in effect. 
A presidential decree was signed removing 
the ceiling on interest rates, which were 
exhibiting an upward trend, and the interest rate 
spread widened in response to the rise in the 
minimum reserve requirement. Depending on the 
size of  a loan and its purpose, the lending rate of 
commercial banks moved from  a range of 
ll%-20% at the beginning of  the fiscal  year to 
12%-25% by its end. The average rate offered  on 
term deposits (12 months) climbed from  5.5% to 
8.5%, but this was still equivalent to a negative 
return in real terms. 
c) Trade policy 
Trade policy tended towards a greater 
liberalization of  the trade regime. In December 
1994, the Government suspended import license 
requirements for  a period of  three months and 
reduced import duties on rice, sugar and cement. 
In March 1995, trade reforms  were strengthened, 
the import restrictions which still applied to 
seven agricultural products were removed and 
the range of  tariff  rates was reduced by 50% on 
average to a band of  0%-15%, with the exception 
of  the 25% rate applying to petroleum products. 
Furthermore, the obligation to repatriate 40% of 
export earnings was removed. As already 
indicated, customs valuations for  taxation 
purposes were increased and the market 




d) Structural reforms 
The Government proposed a series of 
measures designed to open up the economy, 
foster  private enterprise, demilitarize public life 
and privatize State enterprises. For these 
purposes, a presidential committee was 
established, composed of  prominent figures  from 
the public and private sector, to put forward 
measures to stimulate investment, modernize the 
economy and the legal and regulatory provisions 
governing investment activity, and promote 
privatization. A tripartite commission was also 
established to update and revise controversial 
provisions in the labour code. 
In order to contribute to the modernization of 
government services, various international 
finance  agencies granted Haiti technical 
assistance loans to supplement its structural 
adjustment financing.  However, one of  the 
principal aspects of  its reforms,  the privatization 
process, gave rise to political tensions and 
was therefore  discontinued. With the support 
of  the international community, various funds 
were also set up to mobilize private 
investment; one of  these funds  was oriented 
towards the implementation of  labour-
intensive projects, while another was 
designed to attract foreign  investment for 
infrastructure  projects. 
3. The main variables 
a)Economic activity 
Expectations created by the country's return 
to democracy and the support forthcoming  from 
externa] sources contributed to an economic 
recovery from  the stagnation caused by the 
embargo, as a result of  which output rose by 
almost 5%. External funding  fueled  a 110% rise 
in domestic demand, which was concentrated in 
the first  half  of  the year ; from  July onward, a slow 
down was to be observed due to the contraction 
of  available credit for  small businesses and the 
uncertainty caused by the political situation. 
Private consumption, which was boosted both 
by pent-up demand among the Haitian 
population and by the presence of  a sizeable 
United Nations contingent, was the factor  which 
contributed the most to the growth of  demand. 
Second in terms of  magnitude was government 
consumption, which rebounded considerably 
(70%). The increase in public capital expenditure 
led to an upswing in total investment of  164% in 
1995. On the other hand, private investors 
maintained a generally cautious attitude as they 
awaited signs of  greater stability. Exports also 
grew significantly  (280%), thereby regaining the 
admittedly low pre-embargo level. 
The expansion in demand was reflected 
mainly in imports, which grew more than 
threefold  and thus came to represent a much 
higher percentage of  domestic output (58%). In 
fact,  the level of  output was somewhat lower than 
the volume of  private consumption; this situation 
underscores the importance of  foreign  capital to 
Haiti, since external resources financed  not only 
investment but also part of  consumption. 
Consequently, there was an internal dissaving 
equivalent to 7% of  GDP. 
The country's vital agricultural sector, which 
accounted for  30% of  GDP, and government 
services were the only areas that did not display 
any dynamism. Unlike the rest of  the economy, 
agricultural activity contracted sharply (-11%), 
adding to the downward slide recorded since 
1992. Practically all agricultural products, 
whether intended for  domestic or export markets, 
reflected  a decrease. Tropical storm Gordon, 
which battered the country in late 1994, and the 
undercapitalization of  Haiti's rural areas led to a 
fall  in the sugar-cane, banana, rice and coffee 
harvests. Staple food  crops were also down, 
although to a lesser extent, as was meat output, 
for  which the demand has been dwindling for  a 
number of  years. Production was stepped up in 
the case of  only a few  items, especially mangoes. 
Almost all other sectors managed to show 
some degree of  recovery, following  a generalized 
slump. As part of  this trend, the construction 
industry experienced a boom (85%) as a result of 
infrastructure  and housing projects. Manufac-
turing grew 24%, following  a cumulative 
recession of  60% during the previous four  years. 
The most dynamic branches of  industry were 
consumer goods for  the domestic market and 
inbond assembly (maquila)  activities. The latter 
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showed promising signs of  recovery, with 75 
firms  in operation out of  the 145 companies that 
had been in place at the beginning of  the decade; 
the production of  garments and sports goods 
continued, but electronics lost ground. 
Basic services were fully  restored, but the 
expansion of  electricity generation, gas 
distribution and water supply capacities (40%) 
was insufficient  to meet demand. Prolonged 
interruptions in these services had an adverse 
effect  on the economy. The telephone network 
was expanded somewhat and, once foreign  trade 
had been resumed, the level of  activity in cargo 
handling services increased. Activity in 
commerce, restaurants and hotel services 
benefited  from  the increased availability of 
imported items and from  the demand generated 
by members of  international missions. Financial, 
insurance and real estate services showed slight 
gains and institutions devoted to mobilizing 
private funds  and processing foreign  transfers 
experienced a strong upturn. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Increased supply and the moderate increase in 
liquidity slowed the rise in consumer prices, 
which was 24% in 1995 (down from  32% in 
1994). Food prices recorded the highest inflation 
rate. 
Wages increased in 1995 after  being at a 
standstill for  several years. The minimum wage 
moved from  15 to 36 gourdes in May and some 
public-sector employees were also granted a 
raise. The real minimum wage rose significantly 
(89%), which allowed it to recover its 1991 level; 
nevertheless, its purchasing power was still 
lower than it had been 10 years before. 
Although no precise unemployment data were 
available, it is estimated that half  of  the economically 
active population was out of  work, while the informal 
sector provided employment and income to a 
large segment of  society. The maquila  industry 
which had provided almost 50,000 jobs in the late 
1980s, was hit by a crisis that virtually paralysed 
it in 1994, but by September 1995 it was 
employing almost 13,000 persons. Construction 
also contributed significantly  to job creation. 
The Office  for  Occupational Health and 
Maternity Insurance, which had been closed 
down, resumed its activities, providing coverage 
to nearly 43,000 workers, which was 7,000 less 
than in 1991. 
c) The external sector 
With the extraordinary surge in imports 
following  the lifting  of  the embargo, the 
economic upturn allowed no more than a partial 
recovery in export capacity and a slight increase 
in external sales, which, as a result, amounted to 
only slightly more than half  as much as they had 
just before  the coup d'état.  Increased shipments, 
together with the improvement in the terms of 
trade, raised the purchasing power of  exports. 
The value of  the merchandise purchased during 
the year (US$ 620 million) more than quadrupled 
in comparison with the preceding year, while 
exports were over US$ 150 million; 
consequently, an unprecedented merchandise 
trade deficit  of  close to US$ 470 million was 
recorded. 
The bulk of  imports (80%) originated in the 
United States. One third of  these purchases were 
food  products, in particular grains, soybean oil, 
sugar and beans. Purchases of  intermediate 
goods -including materials for  the maquila 
industry, building materials and fuels-  were also 
high. 
With respect to the export mix, the greater part 
of  external sales was accounted for  by the 
maquila  industry, which has been staging a 
somewhat slow recovery; next in importance 
were coffee  and coffee  products, essential oils 
and mangoes. 
In addition to the negative merchandise trade 
balance, expenditure for  real services in 
connection with Haiti's increased merchandise 
imports exceeded income under this heading, 
thus resulting in a trade deficit  of  some US$ 550 
million. The increase in interest payments on the 
foreign  debt had an adverse effect  on the factor 
income account, but was more than offset  by the 
larger inflow  of  private capital (US$ 108 
million). The current account deficit  stood at 
US$ 75 million, which was not only higher than 
the pre-coup figure  but also represented 9% of 
GDP. 
Thanks to the change in the political situation, 
both official  grants and donations and the loans 
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made available to the country were far  higher 
than in previous years; in fact,  they not only 
provided more than enough to cover the current 
account deficit  but also boosted international 
reserves by US$ 200 million, or the equivalent of 
four  months' worth of  imports. 
The external public debt amounted to US$ 900 
million dollars -US$ 26 million more than in the 
preceding fiscal  year- in spite of  the fact  that 
lending institutions paid out over US$ 100 
million in loans that had been granted 
beforehand.  This was achieved through a radical 
debt-rescheduling exercise. In December 1994, 
Haiti had paid off  its accumulated arrears 
(US$ 82 million), thus fulfilling  the requirement 
laid down by international financial  agencies for 
the provision of  fresh  funds.  Furthermore, in 
May, Haiti availed itself  of  the Naples Terms, for 
which the world's poorest countries are eligible, 
and obtained the cancellation of  US$ 75 million 
that it owed to members of  the Paris Club 
together with a rescheduling of  bilateral debts. In 
addition, it has made a commitment to accept 




1. General trends 
In 1995 the Honduran economy grew by 
3.2% thanks to the removal of  a number of 
obstacles which were hampering economic 
activity and which had caused output to decline 
the preceding year. Conditions in external 
markets, in particular, were more favourable,  and 
this had a very positive effect  on the terms of 
trade. This improvement also influenced  the 
trade balance and helped bring down the 
balance-of-payments  current account deficit. 
The public sector's financial  deficit  also 
narrowed, mainly as a result of  the tax changes 
that had come into effect  during the preceding 
fiscal  year. Nevertheless, the inflation  rate 
remained quite high, which affected  the 
purchasing power of  large groups of  the 
population. 
Economic policy was subject to the terms 
agreed upon with international credit institutions. 
The problems involved in meeting those 
conditions, on the one hand, and a lack of 
matching funds  at the local level, on the other, 
made it difficult  to obtain long-term loans, 
however. For example, the second tranche of  the 
country's structural adjustment loan from  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not 
become available until late in the year, once IMF 
targets and structural performance  criteria had 
been met. Even so, despite the reduced inflows 
of  external capital, international reserves rose 
-albeit only slightly- as a result of  the increase 
in exports. 
The process of  privatizing public-sector 
enterprises continued during 1995. The 
Government temporarily took over the 
management of  the Empresa Hondureña de 
Telecomunicaciones (HONDUTEL) for  the purpose 
of  reorganizing its finances  as a preliminary step 
to prepare for  the sale of  shares. According to the 
legislation governing the sale of  the company, 
51% of  the shares are to remain in the hands of 
the public sector. 
2. Economic policy 
Economic policy was geared toward a series of 
objectives, including cutting inflation,  reviving 
the economy and correcting price lags in inputs 
and basic services, as part of  a general policy 
scheme in which the interplay of  market forces 
figured  prominently. Throughout 1995, 
however, the authorities encountered difficulties 
in reconciling these diverse objectives, 
particularly in the case of  inflation.  At the 
beginning of  the year, for  example, inflation 
spurted in response to a rise in commodity prices, 
which had not kept pace owing to the application 
of  price controls during the last few  months of 
1994; later in the year, inflation  rose due to 
adjustments in the price of  a number of 
widely-used inputs and services and to the 
depreciation of  the currency on the foreign-
exchange market. 
Monetary policy aimed to contain the 
expansion of  liquidity, and the rates of  growth of 
the monetary aggregates did in fact  slow down, 
although they were still significant. 
Important tasks for  fiscal  policy were to 
regulate the changes resulting from  the tax 
reforms  that were introduced in late 1994 and to 
continue with the policy of  rationalizing public 
spending. Central government revenues 
increased in real terms, while expenditure 
contracted; this brought about a striking 
reduction in the fiscal  deficit,  which shrank from 
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the equivalent of  5.5% of  gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 1994 to below 3% in 1995. As a result 
of  this performance,  Honduras met the fiscal 
targets set in the IMF agreement. This 
improvement in the equilibrium of  public-sector 
finances  was in fact  mainly due to cutbacks in 
real investment by the Government, however. 
The management of  foreign-exchange  policy 
continued to be based on an auction system under 
which the Central Bank sets the upper and lower 
limits for  fluctuations  in the exchange rate. 
During the first  half  of  the year, the supply of 
foreign  exchange tended to outweigh demand. In 
October, however, in response to a surge in 
demand prompted by an unexpectedly small 
supply of  foreign  currency, the authorities 
allowed the rate of  crawl for  the reference 
exchange rate to steepen. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The mainstay of  fiscal  policy was the reforms 
implemented at the end of  1994, the results of 
which began to make themselves felt  in 1995. 
Under the provisions of  these reforms,  a 1% tax 
on net corporate assets was introduced; the base 
for  the sales tax was broadened by including 
services and eliminating a number of 
exemptions; interest income other than earnings 
on savings deposits became subject to income tax 
(at a flat  rate of  10%); and the tax on private 
motor vehicles was raised. A special taxation 
scheme was also devised for  coffee  growers, and 
the method for  computing the tax base for  foreign 
trade duties was changed. 
In 1995, the central government's current 
income went up by 14% in real terms, or by 
around two percentage points of  GDP. 
Expenditure, meanwhile, went down (-3.1%), 
although by considerably less than the preceding 
year (-14%). Consequently, the fiscal  deficit 
narrowed substantially. 
The surge in tax revenues, after  the preceding 
year's sluggishness, was primarily a result of  the 
broader application of  the income tax, higher 
receipts from  the general sales tax, and taxes on 
sales of  petroleum. Income tax receipts went up 
by 35% in real terms, thanks to the new tax on 
net assets, which, while it did not bring in 
significant  revenues on its own, did help to curtail 
tax evasion. A further  factor  in the rise in 
government income was the decision to withhold 
10% of  coffee  growers' windfall  profits  as an 
advance payment on their income taxes. Sales tax 
receipts were up 9% as a consequence of  the 
broader tax base and, to a lesser extent, the 
elimination of  a number of  exemptions. 
Revenues from  the various taxes on sales of 
petroleum products jumped sharply, boosting 
their share of  current tax receipts to 16%. The 
amount brought in by taxes on foreign  trade 
dropped in real terms, however, as import duties 
levelled off  due to the abolition of  the 10% import 
surcharge and the reduction of  the customs 
service charge from  5% to 3%. 
The central government's current expenditure 
held steady in real terms, after  a 12% fall  in 1994. 
Nominal pay rises were granted to teachers and 
health-sector workers, and a bonus equivalent to 
one month's wages was awarded to public-sector 
employees, but the increase in this item of 
expenditure was no more than the rise in prices. 
Interest payments, which account for  over a 
quarter of  current spending, remained stable. 
Capital expenditure continued to contract in 
constant terms, albeit more slowly than during 
the preceding year. In particular, a decline was 
seen in financial  investment, which includes 
credit to decentralized agencies; as in 1994, such 
loans were largely directed towards servicing the 
external debt of  the Empresa Nacional de Energía 
Eléctrica (ENEE). Real investment by the central 
government was lower as a percentage of  GDP. 
Some of  the largest investments made in 1995 
were in the communications, transport and 
energy sectors. 
The amount of  external financing  received by 
the Government exceeded its deficit;  this took off 
some of  the pressure to use domestic credit, 
which had been a common practice in previous 
years. 
b) Monetary policy 
The line followed  by Honduran monetary 
policy was dictated by its aim of  curbing 
inflation,  and in order to achieve this the 
authorities floated  bond issues on the market. 
Meanwhile, the Central Bank had planned to cut 
the 1994 reserve requirement of  40% to 34% by 
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Table 1 
O R : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 4.9 4.9 -0.8 2.0 6.3 7.0 -1.3 3.2 
Per capita gross domestic product 1.7 1.8 -3.7 -1.0 3.2 3.9 -4.1 0.3 
Gross national income 11.0 3.2 -2.7 3.5 3.9 10.7 2.2 3.1 
Gross domestic product, by sector 
Goods 4.2 8.4 -0.8 3.5 8.0 4.8 -3.1 4.3 
Basic services 8.6 5.9 6.8 2.2 3.1 4.8 0.6 6.1 
Other services 4.9 1.5 -2.3 0.4 5.3 9.9 0.2 1.5 
Percentages 
Contribution to growth of  GDP 0 
Consumption 2.3 4.7 -2.6 0.5 3.2 3.1 -0.2 3.5 
Government 5 1.3 0.4 -2.0 -1.3 1.5 0.2 -0.3 -1.2 
Private 1.0 4.3 -0.6 1.8 1.8 2.9 0.1 4.7 
Gross domestic investment 5.5 -0.9 0.7 4.1 3.3 6.8 2.1 -4.0 
Exports -0.3 1.5 0.2 -0.6 2.4 -0.3 -2.8 2.8 
Imports -2.6 -0.4 1.0 -2.0 -2.6 -2.5 -0.4 0.9 
Percentages of GDP b 
Gross domestic investment 24.1 22.1 23.0 26.6 28.1 32.6 35.2 30.2 
National saving 18.4 16.1 16.2 18.6 18.0 23.5 26.2 25.1 
External saving 5.7 6.0 6.8 7.9 10.1 9.1 9.0 5.2 
Percentages 
Employment and wages 
Open unemployment rate 8.4 8.0 7.1 8.0 6.4 7.5 5.0 6.0 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990 = 100) 94.1 85.4 100.0 96.6 108.7 110.2 94.8 89.6 
Growth rates 
Prices (December-December) 
Retail prices 6.7 11.4 36.4 21.4 6.5 13.0 28.9 26.8 
Wholesale prices 10.7 20.4 41.3 20.4 9.6 14.0 35.1 21.1 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 105.3 101.0 100.0 105.2 99.2 113.1 126.3 120.6 
Nominal exchange rate 
(lempiras per dollar) 2.00 2.00 4.10 5.32 5.51 6.59 8.63 9.49 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990 = 100) 60.4 56.1 100.0 107.9 102.4 112.5 125.3 112.3 
Millions of  dollars 
Balance of  payments 
Current account -181 -206 -228 -258 -351 -309 -327 -224 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) -115 -125 -94 -124 -192 -134 -154 -60 
Exports 1 026 1061 1 033 1016 1 041 1 067 1 166 1 425 
Imports 1 141 1 186 1 127 1 139 1 233 1 201 1 320 1 485 
Capital and financial  account 76 -39 37 -52 75 207 201 271 
Overall balance -198 -384 -299 -158 -247 -183 -20 26 




(as a percentage of  GDP) 92.1 92.2 129.3 117.0 109.4 122.6 145.1 129.2 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) e 16.6 16.6 17.2 20.2 25.0 22.8 22.3 19.3 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Central government 
Current income 15.0 14.7 16.4 17.4 17.4 16.6 16.0 18.1 
Current expenditure 17.4 17.9 17.2 16.5 16.6 17.6 15.0 14.8 
Savings -2.4 -3.1 -0.8 1.0 0.8 -1.0 1.0 3.2 
Capital expenditure (net) 4.5 4.2 5.6 4.3 5.7 8.2 6.5 6.1 
Financial balance -6.9 -7.4 -6.4 -3.3 -4.9 -9.2 -5.5 -2.9 
Domestic financing 2.6 4.1 -1.2 -3.3 -2.9 -0.4 0.7 -0.9 
External financing 4.3 3.2 7.5 6.6 7.8 9.6 4.8 3.8 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking 
system 
217.5 Net international reserves -16.8 -21.1 5.0 - - -67.2 38.3 
Domestic credit 9.0 12.5 16.2 5.1 14.1 56.2 26.7 6.5 
To public sector 14.9 19.7 8.4 -56.8 -23.6 -38.6 65.6 -
To private sector 5.3 8.6 6.6 16.5 24.8 14.9 24.7 21.1 
Money (Ml) 12.5 20.3 25.2 16.8 14.2 13.0 37.0 18.3 
Local-currency savings and 
time deposits 11.2 11.2 9.8 23.0 34.2 5.3 10.1 21.7 
M2 11.8 15.2 16.9 20.0 24.7 8.7 22.3 20.0 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates 
On deposits 1.9 -2.6 -20.0 -7.6 5.5 -1.1 -13.2 
On loans 8.2 3.5 -13.9 1.1 14.3 8.1 -3.1 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency 8.6 8.6 -50.1 8.6 4.9 -9.6 -12.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990dollars. c These entries measure the impactof  the variation in eachaggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate'S annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Open unemployment rate in Tegucigalpa. e Refers  to net interest as shown on the 
balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. f  Interest rate deflated  by the variation in the average bank 
exchange rate for  sales of  banknotes. 
Table 2 
HONDURAS: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
i ii III iv i ii III iv i ii m iv 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 7.3 10.3 13.2 13.0 16.5 21.7 24.1 28.8 33.8 29.3 28.3 26.8 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 105.1 110.7 115.0 119.3 120.4 129.2 127.3 124.2 114.9 112.9 111.0 110.4 
Real interest rate (annualized, %) 
On deposits 1.9 -5.6 -2.8 1.9 -9.8 -20.8 -9.4 -12.7 -22.3 -9.6 -7.3 
On loans 10.3 2.1 7.2 12.9 -0.5 -12.3 1.1 -0.5 -12.1 2.4 5.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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mid-1995, then to 27% and ultimately to 15%. 
To avoid fuelling  inflation,  however, the first  of 
these reductions was not made until June. 
Growth in liquidity was triggered initially by 
the influx  of  foreign-exchange  earnings from 
coffee  exports and, later, by the lowering of 
reserve requirements. To offset  this, the 
Government stepped up its open-market sales of 
bonds and of  a new kind of  Central Bank paper 
called "monetary absorption certificates" 
(authorization was given in January 1995 for  an 
offering  equivalent to up to 2% of  GDP). 
The expansion of  the money supply slowed 
throughout 1995, with Ml growing by 18%, i.e., 
only half  as fast  as the preceding year. 
Nevertheless, the various components of  the 
money supply differed  widely in their behaviour, 
as sight deposits rose by more than 30%, while 
currency outside banks increased by only 6%. 
Local-currency liquidity and broad money 
(including foreign-currency  deposits) moved up 
at similar rates (20%). Demand for  dollar 
deposits was influenced  by the Centra] Bank's 
decision midway through the year to authorize 
the use of  foreign-currency  accounts for 
investment and working capital. Until that time, 
the use of  such accounts had been restricted to 
exports. 
The expansion of  domestic credit within the 
financial  system (6.5%) was far  below the rate of 
growth in its deposits and thus there was a 
significant  drop in credit in real terms. This was 
primarily a result of  trends in public-sector 
operations, since, while the nominal volume of 
net loans to the Government diminished, other 
public-sector institutions' level of  indebtedness 
with banks rose in net terms. By contrast, credit 
to the private sector expanded (by somewhat 
more than 21%), albeit more slowly than 
inflation. 
On average, annual interest rates were slightly 
below those of  1994 in real terms. In the second 
half  of  the year, however, interest rates on loans 
moved upward. At the same time, the spread 
between annual interest rates on loans and 
deposits continued to widen (to nearly 17 points); 
in recent years the width of  this spread has been 
a cause of  financial  disintermediation. 
In order to improve the supervision of  the 
financial  system and promote its modernization, 
in late 1995 a number of  laws were passed 
governing the operation of  the system and the 
National Banking and Insurance Commission. 
This legislation was designed to regulate the 
operation of  the informal  financial  sector (which 
was not subject to the legal reserve requirement 
regime) and to encourage competition. 
c) Foreign-exchange policy 
Foreign-exchange policy was based on the 
measures adopted in mid-1994 in connection 
with the establishment of  a system of  foreign 
exchange auctions under which the Central Bank 
sets the upper and lower limits for  fluctuations  in 
the exchange rate. Under this system, the Central 
Bank buys hard currency from  its exchange 
agents at the market's reference  rate and auctions 
it off  to buyers whose bids have to be within 1% 
of  the benchmark exchange rate, which is set on 
the basis of  the reference  rate. 
During the first  few  months of  the year, as 
foreign  exchange was readily available, the 
lempira appreciated slightly in nominal terms. 
Later in the year, however, the demand for 
foreign  exchange climbed at the same time as the 
supply was squeezed by delays in the 
disbursement of  a number of  external loans. 
Consequently, the exchange rate began to rise 
slowly during May and June, but its pace 
slackened during the second half  of  the year. 
Thus, during the first  half  of  the year the dollar 
remained below its December 1994 price, but 
from  June onward it was higher, reaching 10.36 
lempiras in December. Even so, the nominal 
depreciation of  the currency was noticeably 
slower than in the preceding year, and below the 
domestic rate of  inflation. 
For some years now, foreign-exchange  policy 
has paid particular attention to ensuring that local 
production remains competitive in foreign 
markets. In 1995, the Central Bank added 
momentum to the movement of  the reference 
exchange rate by shortening the intervals 
between adjustments in the bid exchange rate; 
this was done, starting in October, by reducing 
(from  15 to five)  the number of  consecutive 
auctions after  which the bid price could be altered 




3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The Honduran economy revived in 1995, after 
the preceding year's drop in GDP. The growth rate 
of  3.2% produced a slight increase in per capita 
output, while national income rose at a rate 
similar to GDP. 
The contraction in the volume of  imports 
(-2.4%), however, hampered the expansion of 
overall supply, which was a modest 1.7%. At the 
same time, export volume swelled considerably 
(11%), while domestic spending was slightly 
lower (-1%); this was due to a sharp drop in 
investment, since consumption was up 4%. 
The removal of  the main obstructions in the 
Honduran economy cleared the way for 
rebuilding its levels of  activity. In particular, 
favourable  weather conditions not only helped to 
boost agricultural output but also contributed to 
an increase in the supply of  electric power (an 
energy shortage had had an adverse effect  on 
industry in the year before). 
The improvement in output was based on 
positive trends in primary sectors and, 
particularly, agricultural activity. Growth in 
manufacturing  returned to positive levels, but 
was rather lacklustre, while the output of  the 
construction industry declined once again (albeit 
by far  less than in 1994) because of  the cutback 
in public investment and the scarcity of  cement 
and other inputs. 
The agricultural sector expanded by nearly 
7%. Output both for  export and for  the domestic 
market was significantly  higher, resulting in an 
11% rise in crop-farming  production. Livestock 
production made some headway, although there 
was little real momentum, owing mainly to the 
downturn in the slaughtering of  cattle for  the 
foreign  market. 
Crop production for  the domestic market did 
well thanks to timely rains. The harvests of  the 
chief  crops in this subsector were higher, in 
particular maize, whose yield expanded by 33%. 
Increases were also recorded in beans (10%), rice 
(17%) and bananas (9%). 
Agricultural production for  export was also 
higher. Notwithstanding the restrictions imposed 
on imports of  bananas from  Latin America by the 
European Union, production was aided by 
improved conditions in foreign  markets. Thus, 
after  a two-year slump, yields increased by 12%. 
Coffee  production also recovered and was further 
assisted by good international prices. 
As to the remaining components of  the 
agricultural sector, forestry  continued at a 
standstill as a result of  the partial ban imposed to 
avoid overcutting, and fishery  output declined 
yet again. Shrimp farming,  which had flourished 
during the past decade, continued to suffer  from 
the ravages of  a disease that has proved very 
difficult  to eradicate. 
The manufacturing  sector showed a modest 
recovery (2.6%). From the standpoint of  supply, 
the increase in the availability of  electricity was 
an important development, while trends in some 
industries were affected  by an expansion in 
domestic demand for  manufactures.  The 
expansion recorded in 1995 was based on 
production in the categories of  food,  beverages 
and tobacco; textiles and clothing; chemicals and 
petroleum products; and basic metals. It should 
be borne in mind that the categories of  textiles 
and clothing includes the maquila  industry, 
which in recent years has shown signs of  great 
vitality. 
During 1995, the total supply of  electricity 
(2,526 kWh), including imports, was sufficient 
to satisfy  domestic demand without the need for 
rationing. Midway through the year, electricity 
charges were raised substantially in order to 
cover the distributor's operating costs and to 
create appropriate conditions for  investments 
which would help ensure a regular supply on an 
ongoing basis. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The increase in consumer prices slowed 
somewhat in 1995, with cumulative inflation 
over the year amounting to 27% (as against 29% 
in 1994). During the first  few  months of  the year, 
inflation  accelerated, mainly as a consequence of 
the jump in food  prices that occurred when, in 
December 1994, the authorities lifted  the 
temporary price controls which had been 
imposed on 40 staple foods  a short time earlier 
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Just as the impact of  this phenomenon began to 
fade,  price adjustments in other areas, such as 
electricity, fuel  and transport, started to make 
themselves felt.  The broadening of  the tax base 
for  the sales tax and, in recent months, the 
depreciation of  the lempira on the foreign-
exchange market were further  contributory 
factors.  Nevertheless, the second half  of  the year 
saw a slowdown in the growth rate of  the 
aggregate level of  prices. 
Minimum wages rose by 22.3%, having last 
gone up in mid-1993. Real wages, fell  by nearly 
6%, however, thus compounding the wage 
erosion observed in 1994. This situation 
occasioned a variety of  protests and, as a result, 
some groups of  workers won concessions 
designed to boost their wages. Midway through 
1995, wage-earners were awarded a bonus 
equivalent to an additional (fourteenth)  month's 
pay as an emergency measure to alleviate the 
slump in real wages. 
c) The external sector 
Honduras' balance-of-payments  current 
account deficit  dropped to slightly more than 
US$ 220 million, or the equivalent of  around 
15% of  the value of  its exports of  goods and 
services. This performance  was a reflection  of  the 
reduction in the merchandise trade deficit  made 
possible by a significant  increase in the value of 
exports of  goods. 
From the beginning of  the decade until 1993, 
fluctuations  in exports of  merchandise had 
displayed no definite  trend, but the momentum 
noted in 1994 took a firm  hold in 1995, and the 
value of  exports climbed by nearly 27%. 
International price variations played a major 
part in this trend. With the exception of  meat 
and silver, whose prices fell,  Honduras' main 
export products (traditional as well as 
non-traditional) brought higher prices; this was 
especially true of  coffee,  which registered a price 
hike of  more than 65%, and, to a lesser extent, of 
bananas (17%). 
Coffee  exports swelled to around US$ 350 
million, mainly owing to these higher prices. The 
amount exported during 1995 was 5% up on 
1994; the modest size of  this increase was 
attributable to the implementation of  an 
agreement among the Central American 
countries to withhold 20% of  their production 
from  the market. 
The recovery of  international banana markets 
prompted increases in both the prices and volume 
(in similar proportions) of  banana exports. 
Nevertheless, while their value rose by nearly 
40%, after  dropping sharply in 1994, this still did 
not restore them to 1993 levels. 
The volume of  shrimp exports contracted by 
10%, due to the lower level of  supply. Prices rose, 
but not enough to offset  their reduction in 
volume. 
In recent years there has been a rapid 
expansion of  the maquila  industry in Honduras. 
Although in 1995 it displayed less forward 
momentum, the value added by this activity still 
accounted for  a large share (around 15%) of 
exports of  goods and services. 
The value of  merchandise imports rose by 
12.5% (approximately the same as the preceding 
year's rise), to nearly US$ 1.2 billion. This 
buoyancy was shared in more or less equal 
measure by all the main product categories, with 
consumer goods, intermediate goods and capital 
goods all increasing at similar rates. A somewhat 
above-average rise was observed in petroleum 
and fuels,  as both prices and imported volumes 
were higher. 
In 1995 the surplus in real services widened. 
At the same time, however, rises in interest rates 
and profit  remittances pushed up the deficit  in 
factor  services slightly, from  US$ 190 million to 
US$ 200 million. There was also a moderate rise 
in unrequited private and official  transfers. 
Capital inflows  covered external borrowing 
requirements, so reserves expanded slightly. 
Long-term capita] flows  were down, however, 
with the exception of  direct investment, which 
jumped from  US$ 35 million to US$ 50 million. 
In 1995 there was a significant  reduction in the 
inflow  of  long-term funds  to the official  sector. 
Disbursements from  the IMF and the receipt of 
World Bank and Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) loans were held up by the country's 
delay in meeting a number of  the conditions set 
by the IMF, but this situation was ameliorated 
somewhat by the use of  short-term credit. Late in 
the year, when the majority of  the IMF targets and 
performance  criteria were deemed to have been 
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met, the second tranche of  the structural 
adjustment loan was disbursed. 
The external debt recorded a moderate 
increase (5%) which brought it to around 
US$ 4.4 billion. With the rise in exports, the 
debt-exports ratio dropped to 3.2, which, while 
still high, was the lowest figure  to be recorded 
since the start of  the decade. The increase in the 
debt in 1995 was a result of  higher public-sector 
borrowing, since private-sector indebtedness 
was virtually unchanged. Most of  Honduras' 
foreign  debt is with international agencies 
(nearly 60%) and multilateral lenders (37%). In 
order to ease the debt service burden, a proposal 
has been made for  the cancellation of  debts owed 




1. General trends 
In the wake of  the steep devaluation of  the peso 
in late 1994, in 1995 the Mexican economy was 
engulfed  by what proved to be the worst crisis to 
hit the country in modern times. The Government 
launched an emergency programme whose main 
objective was to bring about a swiftly  paced, 
in-depth adjustment of  the external sector in 
order to cope with the sudden interruption of 
external capital inflows.  Hemmed in by a severe 
crisis in the banking system, an extremely 
unstable currency and the threat of  a surge in 
inflation,  the economy shrank by nearly 7% in 
1995 and might well have contracted even further 
had it not been for  the export sector's rapid 
response to the adjustment of  the exchange rate. 
Nevertheless, with the help of  a generous amount 
of  international assistance, the authorities 
continued to pursue the development strategy 
whose implementation had begun in 1987 with 
the downsizing of  the State, and no major 
changes were made in their approach. 
The year 1994 had been a time of  great 
uncertainty in Mexico due primarily to political 
events in the country, even though trends in the 
main economic variables were more promising 
than they had been at any other time since the 
introduction of  the stabilization and structural 
reform  programme. Economic activity had 
picked up, inflation  had continued to subside 
until reaching a mere 7% per year, and the 
non-financial  public sector's deficit  was less than 
1% of  gross domestic product (GDP). 
Nonetheless, there were also some worrisome 
factors,  such as the sizeable deficit  on the current 
account of  the balance of  payments and a notable 
downturn in the inflow  of  external financial 
resources, which made it necessary to draw 
heavily upon the country's international reserves. 
In addition, since the assumption was that both 
the outflow  of  foreign  exchange and the 
increasing level of  uncertainty were temporary 
phenomena which would come to an end once 
the elections were over, monetary policy-makers 
had reverted to an expansionary approach. These 
factors,  together with the pessimistic 
expectations generated by the political 
situation, set off  the massive crisis that swept 
over the country in the final  10 days of 
December 1994. 
The adjustment programme implemented in 
1995 was based on strict fiscal  restraints and a 
highly contractionary monetary policy. From the 
very outset, it was backed by a credit package of 
over US$ 50 billion -made up chiefly  of  special 
loans from  the United States Department of  the 
Treasury and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)- of  which only US$ 27 billion had been 
used by year's end. Under an agreement signed 
with the IMF which included very strict 
macroeconomic targets, these external funds 
were of  crucial importance to the adjustment 
programme's viability. More specifically,  they 
made it possible to ensure the amortization of 
US$ 29 billion in foreign  portfolio  investment in 
short-term dollar-convertible government 
securities (tesobonos) which were to mature in 
1995. The inevitable outcome of  this bailout 
operation was an increase of  more than US$ 24 
billion in Mexico's external debt. 
The downturn in economic activity went 
through a number of  different  stages in the course 
of  the year. During the first  quarter, the decline 
in GDP was not very sharp, thanks to the strong 
forward  momentum of  the last three months of 
1994 and to the lag in the devaluation's effect  on 
domestic prices. The second and third quarters 
brought a production slump of  unprecedented 
proportions, however, after  which the 
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The collapse of  domestic demand was 
particularly striking in construction, commerce 
and many manufacturing  industries, all of  which 
are major employers and include a large 
percentage of  small businesses. Employment fell 
off  sharply, with open unemployment rising by 
nearly 1 million persons. Despite three wage 
adjustments, the highest rate of  inflation  in eight 
years (52%) drove down the population's real 
income levels (by 14% in the case of  people 
earning the minimum wage and by slightly more 
than that in the manufacturing  sector). 
As the economic recession deepened and 
financial  markets remained volatile, the 
authorities began to implement new economic 
policy measures which helped to dispel the 
country's financial  turbulence, although 
production was still slack. Towards the end of  the 
year, however, the peso was buffeted  by a series 
of  speculative assaults which drove the Bank of 
Mexico to intervene in the exchange market. 
Even so, the depreciation of  the peso amounted 
to 47% in nominal terms and 31% in real terms 
in 1995. 
The recession and the high level of  interest 
rates weakened the financial  position of  both 
businesses and households. This made it more 
difficult  for  them to service their debts and thus 
undermined the financial  stability of  the banking 
system, whose default  rate shot up so sharply that 
the Government was obliged to devise a number 
of  mechanisms to safeguard  the public's savings, 
help debtors restructure their loans and pave the 
way for  the financial  reorganization of  the 
commercial banking system. These programmes 
did help to improve the banks' capital positions, 
but they were also costly and were not successful 
in slowing the growth of  the banks' portfolio  of 
overdue loans. 
The adjustment of  the external sector was 
dramatic. The current account of  the balance of 
payments went from  a deficit  equivalent to 
around 8 points of  GDP to a virtually balanced 
position. Moreover, primarily as a result of  the 
interruption of  foreign  capital inflows,  the 
country posted a trade surplus for  the first 
time in seven years. On the other hand, a 
large-scale withdrawal of  external funds  from 
the money market (mainly as a consequence of 
the redemption of  tesobonos), a 13% drop in 
direct investment and a massive pull-out of 
investors from  the stock market caused the 
capital account to show a deficit  after  having 
posted increasingly large surpluses over the 
preceding seven years. 
During the early months of  1996, signs of  the 
recession persisted, but the downward trend was 
not as steep as before,  with GDP slipping by just 
1% in the first  quarter; nevertheless, 
unemployment was still high and real wages 
were still low. Inflation,  too, remained high and 
financial  markets swung back and forth,  but their 
general direction of  movement was a positive 
one. As of  the beginning of  May, the prime 
interest rate had fallen  by nearly 15 points, the 
stock market had moved up 16% (20% in dollars) 
and the real exchange rate had registered an 
appreciation of  nearly 13%. 
2. Economic policy 
The adjustment programme was launched in 
early 1995; its objectives were to reduce the 
deficit  on the current account of  the balance of 
payments, to quell the inflationary  spiral and to 
create the necessary conditions for  a reactivation 
of  the economy as quickly as possible. The main 
policy measures adopted under this programme 
were the establishment of  fiscal,  monetary and 
wage restrictions and the adoption of  a system 
of  floating  exchange rates to take the place of 
the currency bands which the authorities had 
been using as an anti-inflationary  anchor since 
1988. 
To back up this emergency programme, the 
country was granted a special US$ 27 billion loan 
package from  the United States Department of 
the Treasury and the IMF to help ease the pressure 
on the peso that had begun to build up early in 
the year when the swift  erosion of  reserves 
prompted investors to regard the planned 
conversion of  the US$ 29 billion in tesobonos 
that were to mature in 1995 as a high-risk 
operation. 
Since the recession continued to deepen as the 
year progressed, the emergency programme was 
modified  several times. In March 
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Table 1 
E O : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Prices (December-December) 




Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100)" 
Nominal exchange rate 
(new pesos per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
1.3 3.4 4.5 3.7 3.0 0.8 3.6 -6.6 
-0.7 1.5 2.5 1.8 1.1 -1.1 1.8 -8.2 
1.5 4.6 6.7 3.3 3.6 0.3 3.7 -8.3 
0.9 3.9 5.9 3.0 2.3 0.4 3.5 -6.3 
2.8 4.6 6.1 5.4 7.0 3.4 7.8 -3.6 
1.3 2.9 3.3 4.0 2.7 0.7 3.1 -7.6 
Percentages 
2.4 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.0 0.1 3.4 -7.1 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.5 
2.4 4.9 4.7 4.3 3.8 -0.1 3.2 -6.5 
2.2 1.0 2.2 1.6 3.3 -0.7 1.9 -10.7 
0.8 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.2 2.3 6.3 
-4.1 -3.7 -3.8 -3.6 -5.2 0.1 -4.0 4.9 
Percentages of  GDP B 
20.4 20.7 21.9 22.7 25.3 24.4 25.4 15.8 
19.3 18.1 18.8 16.8 15.9 16.0 15.6 15.5 
1.1 2.5 3.1 5.9 9.3 8.4 9.8 0.2 
Percentages 
51.6 51.8 51.8 53.3 53.8 55.2 54.7 55.0 
3.6 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.4 3.7 6.3 
124.4 114.6 100.0 94.4 91.2 90.3 90.0 77.3 
Growth rates 
51.7 19.7 29.9 18.8 11.9 8.0 7.1 52.0 
42.6 18.1 27.4 15.7 10.7 7.4 7.8 58.1 
85.6 92.7 100.0 100.2 103.6 103.2 103.8 97.4 
2.27 2.46 2.81 3.02 3.09 3.12 3.38 6.50 
110.0 103.2 100.0 91.1 84.1 79.7 81.9 121.1 
Millions of  dollars 
•2 374 -5 825 -7 451 -14 888 -24 442 -23 400 -29 420 -654 
2 414 -267 -3 110 -9 369 -18 618 -16 010 -21 067 7 960 
16 776 42 379 48 805 51 556 55 471 61 402 71 203 89 825 
14 362 42 646 51 915 60 925 74 089 77 412 92 271 81 866 
•4 495 1 110 8 441 25 139 27 039 33 760 15 787 -11 781 
[0 062 -211 2 218 7 973 1 745 7 232 -17 666 -15 306 
-6 721 542 3 261 8 154 1 173 6 057 -18 865 10 654 
Percentages 
58.3 46.3 41.9 40.0 34.6 35.3 35.2 65.0 
16.8 15.9 13.6 12.4 13.6 14.9 12.9 11.7 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
16.8 17.8 17.2 17.0 17.7 17.3 17.2 17.9 
25.3 21.2 17.3 14.6 13.6 14.4 15.2 16.4 
-8.5 -3.4 -0.1 2.5 4.1 2.8 2.0 1.5 
1.9 2.0 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.4 2.0 
0.7 0.4 - - -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 
-9.7 -5.0 -2.8 0.2 1.6 0.4 -0.8 -0.7 
Growth rates 
71.3 79.9 7.3 31.9 -57.0 267.5 
66.9 45.6 41.7 35.6 21.4 11.5 29.2 5.8 
70.1 13.5 17.7 -2.5 -51.9 1 131.8 
82.9 97.6 73.5 61.5 47.7 24! 3 40.3 -4.2 
65.8 38.6 64.7 124.8 14.7 17.9 1.1 2.3 
37.5 43.7 41.4 20.1 23.9 10.5 33.2 55.5 
42.2 43.0 46.2 47.1 20.4 13.4 21.3 38.6 
-4.2 69.8 10.6 9.8 28.6 12.3 89.9 86.0 
Annual rates 
7.3 13.8 1.0 -1.3 3.4 6.9 5.8 -7.7 





Capital expenditure (net) 
Adjustments 
Financial balance 
Currency and credit 
Money balances 
International reserves held 
by Bank of  Mexico 
Net domestic credit 
To central government (net) 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M 2 g 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits (30 days) 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency (30 days) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
"Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically 
active population (EAP). f  Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and 
services. 8 Includes dollar-denominated deposits. h Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
MEXICO: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
II III IV I II HI IV I II DI IV 
105.8 108.6 102.6 111.9 106.5 113.9 107.3 116.4 105.4 102.7 98.6 109.6 
10.9 10.0 9.6 8.6 7.3 6.9 6.8 6.9 15.0 33.8 41.7 48.7 
79.7 80.3 79.7 78.9 77.1 81.1 82.8 86.4 132.5 118.3 110.8 122.7 
7.0 8.6 6.1 5.8 1.1 8.6 7.6 5.9 -21.2 -18.4 5.4 3.3 
19.1 18.4 22.0 17.9 20.0 9.8 8.4 1.1 -17.6 -15.2 -10.5 2.6 
Gross domestic product 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Real interest rate (annualized, %) 
On deposits0 
Money (Ml) 
(12-month variation, %) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on non-seasonally-adjusted series at constant prices in pesos. 0 For 30-day terms. 
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macroeconomic goals were revised to fit  in with 
an economic environment marked by higher 
inflation  and slower growth, the prices and rates 
charged for  public-sector goods and services 
were increased once more, and the value added 
tax (VAT) rate was raised from  10% to 15%. In 
November, on the occasion of  the signature of 
the Alliance for  Economic Recovery, the 
country's macroeconomic targets were revised 
yet again, the prices and charges for  goods and 
services provided by the public sector were 
increased further  and a wage adjustment was 
slated to take effect  in December. 
Meanwhile, in a effort  to restore the 
profitability  of  investment in rural sectors, boost 
production, combat poverty, remedy the shortfall 
in the agricultural sector's food  output and offer 
food  products at competitive prices, the 
Government and trade union organizations in the 
sector signed the Rural Alliance, which was 
expected to begin making its effects  felt  in 1996. 
In order to shield the low-income population 
from  the impacts of  the adjustment, the 
Government adopted a number of  compensatory 
social measures but, even so, public expenditure 
for  social development shrank by 11% in real 
terms in 1995. 
Midway through the year, the Government 
unveiled the National Development Plan for 
1995-2000, in which it reaffirmed  its 
commitment to keeping public finances  on a 
sound footing  and to promoting deregulation, 
liberalization and a reduction in inflation,  as well 
as to placing priority on the resumption of 
sustained growth and increased employment. In 
view of  the serious problems triggered by the 
crisis, the Plan assigns top priority to the 
reactivation of  domestic saving; this source of 
savings is seen as providing the main means of 
financing  development in Mexico, while externa] 
savings are considered to play no more than a 
supplementary role in this respect. 
The adjustment programme's objectives were 
achieved for  the most part, since the deficit  on 
the balance-of-payments  current account was 
reduced considerably and the economy staved off 
any impending bouts of  hyperinflation. 
Nonetheless, 15 months after  the adjustment 
programme entered into effect,  the chances of  a 
resumption of  growth were still far  off  on the 
horizon. There are three primary objectives of 
fundamental  importance in this regard: i) finding 
a thorough-going solution for  the problems faced 
by the banking system and its debtors; 
ii) ensuring the continuity of  Mexico's inflows 
of  external resources with a view to stabilizing 
the exchange market; and iii) buttressing the 
tenuous reactivation of  production so as to foster 
greater confidence  on the part of  the public and 
pave the way for  a return to previous real wage 
levels. 
a) Fiscal policy and public finance 
The fiscal  policy applied during this period 
was extraordinarily harsh because of  the need to 
generate a large enough primary surplus to 
relieve the pressure on the exchange rate, cope 
with the sudden increase in debt service caused 
by the devaluation and the upturn in domestic and 
externa] interest rates, and free  up funds  to pay 
for  emergency programmes to assist those 
sectors of  the population that were harmed the 
most by the crisis. Moreover, the Government 
had taken on major financial  obligations in an 
effort  to firm  up the banking system's financial 
standing and help out the country's debtors. The 
cost of  doing so is estimated, at current values, at 
the equivalent of  5.7% of  GDP. In addition, in 
1996 approval was given for  a new programme 
to aid mortgage holders at a cost of  another 1.7% 
of  GDP. The total cost of  this programme in 1995 
had amounted to 1.6% of  GDP, mainly because it 
also included the cost for  that year of  one of  the 
programmes set up to restructure loan payments. 
The public sector was, for  all intents and 
purposes, in a balanced financia]  position, while 
its primary balance sheet (which does not include 
finance  charges) yielded a surplus equivalent to 
5.4% of  GDP. The fact  that this was more than 
double the preceding year's figure  attests to the 
scope of  the adjustment. 
The public sector's current revenues were 
3.8% lower in real terms due to a 13% drop in 
non-oil receipts which was partly offset  by a 21% 
jump in oil earnings, while the federal 
government's budgetary receipts slipped 2.6% as 
the net result of  a downturn of  almost 21% in tax 
revenues and a jump of  over 50% in non-tax 
income owing to a steep rise in oil royalties. 
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The decrease in tax revenues was a 
consequence of  the slackening of  economic 
activity, the fiscal  measures adopted to help out 
taxpayers, and a corporate liquidity squeeze. The 
erosion (also in real terms) of  income tax receipts 
was the outcome of  the capital losses sustained 
by businesses with debts denominated in foreign 
currencies, the measures taken to increase 
workers' disposable income and the reduction in 
the tax rate on corporate assets, among other 
factors. 
On the other hand, receipts from  the value 
added tax (VAT) edged down by a mere 1.4%, 
despite the contraction of  GDP and imports, 
thanks to the decision to raise the general rate 
from  10% to 15% in April. 
In real terms, public-sector expenditure 
shrank by nearly 5%; interest and other current 
payments on the debt virtually doubled, whereas 
outlays having a direct influence  on effective 
demand plunged by 15.6% in real terms. The 
pronounced decrease in government investment 
in physical assets was particularly striking, but 
the level of  investment in Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX) was higher and the implementation of 
emergency employment programmes continued. 
The total public debt had declined from  45.8% 
of  GDP in December 1994 to 43.4% by December 
1995, while the domestic debt shrank from  13.1 
to 6.9 points of  GDP, mainly as a result of  the 
redemption of  tesobonos; the net external public 
debt rose from  32.7% to 36.5% of  GDP, however. 
The gross external public debt (excluding 
Bank of  Mexico debt) swelled by more than 
US$ 15 billion as a consequence of  the 
international loans received by Mexico to help it 
deal with the economic emergency (and, 
especially, to pay off  tesobonos), disbursements 
of  IDB and World Bank loans, and the sale of  debt 
paper on international markets. Servicing the 
external debt absorbed an enormous amount of 
foreign  exchange -the equivalent of  35% of  total 
1995 export earnings- and the country's debt 
service is expected to remain high in coming 
years, which probably means that it will need to 
reschedule or negotiate a change in financial 
instruments in 1996 or thereafter. 
Unlike what had occurred in other crises, in 
1995 the country soon re-entered voluntary credit 
markets. Placements of  securities issued by the 
federal  government and the countries' 
development banks totalled more than US$ 6 
billion in 1995, and another US$ 5 billion was 
floated  during the early months of  1996. Most of 
these issues have been of  short- or medium-term 
securities and have yields far  above international 
benchmark rates. 
b) Monetary policy and monetary and 
financial  considerations 
As a result of  the authorities' tight monetary 
policy and the slump in economic activity, 
monetary aggregates showed an 
across-the-board decrease. The balances for  the 
monetary base and the money supply (Ml) were 
down by 23% and 30% in real terms, 
respectively. The intake of  funds  by all banking 
institutions as a group was 14% lower, while net 
credit to the private sector -which had risen 36% 
in 1994-fell  by 17%. Since this variable includes 
the effect  of  loan restructurings, the downturn in 
the amount of  fresh  credit flowing  into the private 
sector was actually even sharper. The trends 
exhibited by these monetary aggregates, as well 
as by the interest rate on deposits, indicate that 
monetary policy was, in fact,  highly restrictive. 
Nominal interest rates displayed an upward 
trend as a consequence of  the monetary squeeze 
caused by the adjustment programme and the 
need to maintain a high rate of  return on financial 
investments because of  the pressure exerted on 
the peso throughout 1995. For example, the 
average yield on 28-day treasury bills (cetes)  was 
48%, which was more than three times what it 
had been in 1994 (14%). During the first  few 
months of  1995, however, real rates on deposits 
were negative due to the lag in the adjustment of 
nominal rates that usually arises following  a 
steep devaluation; thereafter,  real rates exhibited 
a decidedly positive trend (although they were 
also quite volatile), averaging 15% for  the period 
from  May to December. 
The uncertainty overshadowing the economy 
in 1995 and the increasing severity of  the banking 
crisis played a part in widening the spread 
between lending and borrowing rates. Interest 
rates on deposits peaked in March, when the rates 
on 28-day cetes in the primary market topped 
80%, whereas the rates on loans were over 100%. 
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The amount of  government debt paper in 
circulation fell  by over 45% between the end of 
1994 and the end of  1995; this was mainly 
attributable to the redemption of  tesobonos, 
which went from  representing 66% of  all such 
securities to a mere 1.5% during this period. This 
reduction counterbalanced the increase in cetes 
and other public securities, one of  whose 
hallmarks was the growing percentage of  foreign 
stakeholders (probably former  holders of 
tesobonos)-, this was especially true in the case of 
cetes, where foreign  ownership amounted to 45% 
by the end of  the year. 
The stock market was extremely volatile, but 
its overall direction of  movement, in real terms, 
was downward. Early in the year the descent that 
had begun in late 1994 steepened, plunging the 
Index of  Prices and Quotations (IPYC) to its 
lowest point for  the year in March. Subsequently, 
the confidence  instilled by the adjustment 
programme helped to buoy prices, but this 
strengthening trend was interrupted in late 
September when the currency market began to 
show signs of  instability and pessimistic 
expectations began to form  regarding the balance 
sheets of  issuers; these factors  were then 
reflected  in the instability of  the IPYC in the final 
quarter. 
In the closing weeks of  the year, the IPYC rose 
considerably and, in early 1996, went on to break 
through the 3,000-point barrier for  the first  time 
ever. This rebound -in which both external 
financial  factors  and the undervaluation of  many 
stocks played a part- helped the IPYC to reclaim 
some of  the ground it had lost during its headlong 
slide in 1995. As a result, this indicator posted a 
17% nominal increase between December 1994 
and December 1995, although when calculated 
in dollars, it actually fell  by 27%. 
c) Foreign exchange policy and markets 
In 1995 a system of  floating  exchange rates 
was adopted to take the place of  the currency 
bands which the authorities had been using as an 
anti-inflationary  anchor for  the last seven years. 
In early 1995, uncertainty as to the emergency 
programme's chances of  fulfilling  the terms and 
conditions established for  the redemption of 
tesobonos contributed to the sharp depreciation 
of  the new peso, which reached its height in early 
March. Later on, the Government's modification 
of  the emergency programme and adjustment of 
its macroeconomic targets bolstered the recovery 
and stability of  the currency, but in September 
the persistent recession and a number of 
non-economic (primarily political) events 
combined to put an end to the stability of  the 
currency, which then remained unstable almost 
up until the end of  the year. As a result, the peso 
depreciated nearly 50% in nominal terms and 
31% in real terms in 1995. As the year drew to a 
close, the Bank of  Mexico had to inject funds 
(US$ 505 million) into the currency market on a 
number of  occasions to counteract the 
speculative pressure bearing down on the peso 
during the last quarter of  the year. 
d) Structural reforms 
In response to the crisis and the pressing need 
for  foreign  exchange, early in 1995 the 
Government announced further  deregulation 
measures, concessionary arrangements and 
privatizations that are expected to bring in around 
US$ 14 billion over a period of  several years. The 
most notable examples include PEMEX 
petrochemical subsidiaries (US$ 2 billion), 
electrical power supply (US$ 6 billion), satellites 
(US$ 1.5 billion), telecommunications, ports and 
airports; natural gas distribution and the railroad. 
Arrangements for  the privatization of  a number 
of  port terminals have already been made, work 
on the development of  long-distance telephone 
services is moving forward  and some 
concessions for  the provision of  electrical power 
have been awarded. Concessions for  radio 
tracking services and for  cable television and 
closed-circuit television services have also been 
granted. Plans to privatize PEMEX petrochemical 
subsidiaries sparked opposition from  various 
groups, however, so even though the bidding 
conditions were announced in October and the 
deadlines set for  the acceptance of  bids had 
already passed, the sale of  the first  group of  such 
firms  was still pending. 
Late in 1995, Congress passed a new Mexican 
Social Security Institute Act. This legislation, 
which was to remain in effect  until 1 January 
1997, provided for  reforms  in all five  branches 
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of  insurance coverage: health and maternity; 
disability and life  insurance; unemployment 
insurance for  older workers and retirement and 
old-age pensions; occupational hazards; and 
custodial care and social benefits.  As a means of 
boosting domestic saving, the new law alters the 
pension system and, in a departure from  the 
preceding legislation on the subject, authorizes 
the opening of  individual retirement accounts 
into which the retirement fund  contributions 
from  employers, the Government and workers 
themselves will be deposited. These accounts are 
to be managed by the country's recently created 
pension fund  administrative boards, which are 
governed by regulations that were approved by 
Congress in March 1996. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The economy was hit by the worse recession 
to occur in more than 60 years. The ensuing 
adjustment programme caused domestic demand 
to plummet and this, in combination with the 
reduction of  external capital inflows,  drove down 
output (-6.6%) and per capita GDP (-8.2%). The 
largest decreases were seen in the second and 
third quarters (10.5% and 9.6%, respectively); 
the contraction of  the economy during the first 
quarter was very slight, thanks to the forward 
momentum generated by the economic buoyancy 
of  the closing months of  1994. The downturn was 
still considerable in the last quarter of  1995 
(-6.6%), but the overall trend appeared to be less 
recessionary than before. 
All the components of  aggregate demand 
except exports suffered  considerable setbacks: 
total domestic demand fell  17% in real terms, 
public-sector consumption was down by 6% and 
private consumption by 9%, and public 
investment dropped 19% while private 
investment was 34% lower. Exports were the 
only component to post an increase (28%); had 
it not been for  their strength, output would have 
decreased even more sharply than it did. 
The recession's effects  were felt  in all 
branches of  the economy, but the most seriously 
affected  activities were the ones that cater to the 
domestic market (which are also the most 
important sources of  employment) -such as 
construction, commerce and some services- and, 
in general, the vast majority of  small businesses. 
The agricultural sector registered a 2.5% decline, 
manufacturing  was down by 4.6%, and services 
fell  back 7.6%. 
The agricultural sector was hit by a serious 
crisis in 1995. On the one hand, the slump in 
domestic demand was too severe to be offset  by 
the expansion of  exports; moreover, the supply 
of  agricultural products was lower because 
production was hurt by a number of  factors:  a 
25% reduction in credit in real terms and the high 
rate of  loan defaults;  the sharply escalating prices 
of  inputs; and droughts in the northern part of  the 
country early in the year which primarily hurt 
livestock production and spring/summer crops. 
Manufacturing  output shrank by 4.6%, thus 
recording a decrease of  a magnitude not seen 
since 1983. Businesses serving the home market 
lost a great deal of  ground, whereas the country's 
small number of  direct and indirect exporters 
managed to sustain their forward  momentum 
thanks, above all, to the effect  of  the devaluation. 
This was not enough to halt the downswing in 
domestic consumption however, and as a result 
only two of  the nine branches of  the 
manufacturing  sector (paper and basic metals) 
recorded higher levels of  output. 
This split in the market was also reflected  in 
the automotive industry, where the production of 
motor vehicles slipped 15% as the net result of  a 
71% drop in output for  the domestic market and 
a 35% jump in exports, which thus came to claim 
an 84% share of  this branch of  industry's total 
output. 
The two main causes of  the 23% slump in 
construction were high interest rates, which 
dampened the demand for  credit, and cuts in 
public-sector expenditure on infrastructure  and 
housing programmes. In real terms, the value of 
this sector's output was 15% lower than it had 
been 15 years earlier. 
Activity in the services sector was sluggish, 
with a striking 14% downturn in commerce. In 
retail sales, motor vehicle distributors, furniture 
stores, department stores, stationery stores, 
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bookstores, hardware stores, and clothing and 
shoe stores were hurt the most, with all of  these 
categories registering downturns of  more than 
20%. 
Economic trends remained unfavourable  in 
the first  months of  1996. In a prolongation of  the 
trend observed throughout 1995, GDP receded 
1% in the first  quarter of  1996. Nonetheless, there 
were already some signs that the situation would 
start to improve from  that point on. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Inflation,  which had tended to subside during 
the past few  years, surged upward in 1995, for 
the sharpest increase in consumer prices (52%) 
since 1987. Plunging domestic demand and wage 
constraints offset  the increase in costs brought on 
by the devaluation and kept inflation  from 
spiraling out of  control. The most critical point 
was reached in April, when inflation  was pushed 
up to 8% by the appreciation of  the dollar early 
in the year, the VAT rate hike and the emergency 
wage adjustment that was announced during that 
month. Inflation  then began to abate and 
continued to do so until August, at which point it 
leveled off  at around 2% before  closing out the 
year with a 3.3% upturn in December that was 
partially a seasonal phenomenon. 
The depreciation of  the peso pushed up the 
prices of  tradable goods by 17% more than those 
of  non-tradables. The price of  the basic shopping 
basket jumped 61%, which had an especially 
serious impact on the real income levels of  the 
working class. Producer prices climbed 59%, 
with particularly steep increases in the cases of 
the public sector (70%) and raw materials (73%), 
chiefly  because of  such products' external origin 
or their linkage with international prices. 
Minimum wages were raised three times in 
1995: in January (7%), April (12%) and 
December (10%). These wage hikes were not 
large enough to make up for  the loss of 
purchasing power caused by inflation,  however, 
and the real minimum wage therefore 
deteriorated by 14.2%. Real wages in the 
manufacturing  sector also weakened (-15.3%). 
With these decreases, the real minimum wage 
fell  to a scant one third of  what it had been in 
1980 while wages in manufacturing  activities 
were equivalent to 83% of  what they had been in 
that year. The population's real income is 
expected to decrease further  in 1996, although 
less sharply than in 1995. 
The open unemployment rate advanced from 
4.5% in January to a high of  7.6% in August, 
whereupon it receded to 5.5% in December, 
primarily due to seasonal factors  and the 
implementation of  temporary employment 
programmes. This last figure  is much higher than 
the end-1994 rate (3.2%) and indicates that over 
900,000 persons joined the ranks of  the 
unemployed in 1995, bringing the total number 
of  openly unemployed workers to around two 
million. 
These unemployment levels resulted in a 
record 5.4% drop in the number of  persons 
covered by the Mexican Social Security Institute 
(IMSS). The largest reduction was among casual 
workers, mainly in the construction industry. 
Manufacturing  activities continued to lay off 
workers, and the labour force  employed in this 
sector therefore  shrank by 7.5% in 1995. In 
contrast, the maquila  industry created over 
80,000 new jobs and was employing more than 
680,000 workers by the end of  1995, which was 
equivalent to about 30% of  total employment in 
the manufacturing  sector. 
Many workers who were laid off  from  jobs in 
formal  activities sought refuge  in the informal 
sector, which thus continued to help cushion the 
economy from  the effects  of  the crisis and social 
pressures. This phenomenon was also associated 
with a number of  adverse features,  however, such 
as low productivity, an absence of  social security 
coverage, and wage levels below those of  the 
formal  sector. 
c) The external sector 
Mexico's external accounts did an about-face 
in 1995. In a departure from  the trend seen in 
recent years, when a copious inflow  of  external 
resources had covered the country's growing 
deficit  on current account, in 1995 the capital 
account registered an outflow  of  US$ 8.5 billion. 
The outflow  of  portfolio  investment was 
particularly notable (-US$ 10 billion), especially 
since there had been a net inflow  of  over US$ 8 
billion under this heading in 1994. This 
254 
turnaround was in large part responsible for  the 
fact  that the capital account showed a deficit  for 
the first  time since 1990. In contrast, even though 
the flow  of  direct investment slackened 
somewhat, it was still considerable and was 
substantially above the levels recorded prior to 
1994. A sizeable net outflow  -over US$ 5 
billion- was also registered under the heading of 
errors and omissions. 
The small deficit  entered on the current 
account (US$ 650 million) was in stark contrast 
to the 1994 deficit  of  over US$ 29 billion. This 
change -equivalent to 8% of  GDP- was mainly 
attributable to Mexico's trade surplus. 
During this second year under NAFTA, trade 
with the United States yielded a record US$ 13 
billion surplus, making Mexico the country with 
the fourth  largest trade surplus with the United 
States in the world. Merchandise sales to the 
United States were 28% higher than before  and 
accounted for  84% of  Mexico's total exports. 
Imports from  the United States were down 5%, 
but still represented 74% of  total purchases from 
abroad. Trade between Mexico and its largest 
trading partner amounted to over US$ 120 billion. 
The US$ 2.6 billion trade deficit  on the 
services account in 1994 gave way to a surplus 
of  US$ 900 million in 1995 thanks, in particular, 
to a much larger surplus in international tourism 
services. Given the high level of  interest 
payments on the external debt, however, the 
deficit  recorded for  factor  services was not only 
large (US$ 13 billion) but was also 14% higher 
than the 1994 figure. 
The price competitiveness generated by the 
devaluation of  the peso and the sharp contraction 
of  domestic demand played a decisive role in the 
MEXICO 
achievement of  a surplus in merchandise trade 
(over US$ 7 billion) for  the first  time since 1989; 
it also constituted a major change from  the 
situation in 1994, when a deficit  of  over US$ 18 
billion had been posted. The fastest  growth rate 
to be recorded since 1980 drove exports up to a 
total of  US$ 79.5 billion, and external sales of 
products other than petroleum exhibited the 
largest increase to be seen in 21 years. Exports of 
manufactures  were up by 32% and accounted for 
84% of  the total, industrial exports expanded 
47% and external sales by the maquila  sector rose 
19%. The 41% increase in the motor vehicle 
industry's overseas sales was particularly 
significant  because of  the size of  its share in total 
exports (17%), but it is important to note that the 
export boom in 1995 was an across-the-board 
phenomenon. Exports of  primary products were 
bolstered by an improvement in the terms of  trade 
and thus expanded considerably. 
Merchandise imports were 8.7% lower, while 
imports of  intermediate goods maintained a 
modest growth rate owing to the heavy 
dependence on imported inputs exhibited by 
export and non-export firms  alike. The sharp 
downswing in domestic investment and 
consumption led to a notable decrease in imports 
of  capital and consumer goods (35% and 44%, 
respectively) despite a strong upturn in export 
firms'  imports of  machinery and equipment. 
The end result was a US$ 15 billion deficit  on 
the overall balance of  payments. Nonetheless, in 
order to build up reserves the authorities drew on 
a portion of  the emergency external assistance 
provided to the country, with the result that the 
year-end level of  reserves was US$ 11 billion 




1. General trends 
The Nicaraguan economy grew by more than 4% 
in 1995, pushing up the per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) for  the second time in ten years, a 
sign that the first  steps have been taken towards 
the stabilization and normalization of  daily life 
and economic activity now that the country has 
recovered from  the ravages of  war. 
The growth of  GDP was fuelled  by greater 
domestic and external demand. Improvements 
in relative prices led to an upturn in exports, 
while the resurgence of  investment and, to a 
lesser extent, private consumption, gathered 
pace. The supply of  goods and services was 
boosted in a variety of  ways: higher 
international coffee  and banana prices, for 
example, and legislation that had been passed 
at the beginning of  the 1990s to encourage the 
maquila  industry, constituted major incentives to 
the production of  tradable goods. Among 
activities oriented towards the domestic market, 
commerce expanded significantly  under the 
stimulus of  a relatively high level of  liquidity 
among urban upper-income groups and of 
extra-economic factors  such as a lessening in the 
activity of  armed bands in the northern areas of 
the country. 
During 1995, Nicaragua made progress in 
consolidating its macroeconomic adjustments, 
keeping inflation  under control (11%) and 
moderating its serious external imbalances 
through successful  renegotiation of  its 
overwhelming foreign  debt. Even so, little 
progress was made in reducing the consolidated 
fiscal  deficit,  which remained around 10% of 
GDP, in spite of  the marked increase in current 
saving by the public sector. 
2. Economic policy 
Economic management in Nicaragua is severely 
constrained by the country's extreme 
dependence on external resources, as evidenced 
by its inordinate level of  indebtedness and the 
persistence of  its trade deficit.  Domestic saving 
is in fact  negative: consumption exceeded 
national income by the equivalent of  4% of  GDP 
in 1995, and that figure  has been considerably 
higher in other years. The country has thus 
required continual transfers  of  funds  from 
abroad. 
In 1995, economic policy continued to 
develop in a context of  extreme austerity, in 
accordance with the adjustment programme, but 
not all the targets agreed with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) were met. The central 
objective, to reduce the fiscal  deficit  by 
increasing the primary surplus, was only partially 
achieved, which meant that the macroeconomic 
programme had to be renegotiated. It was 
replaced by an interim programme, which took 
account of  structural and political constraints. 
Meanwhile, international negotiations made it 
possible, for  the first  time in many years, to 
reduce Nicaragua's huge external debt. 
The easing of  tensions in the external sector, 
in combination with tight monetary and fiscal 
policies, helped to keep the exchange rate and 
prices in check. There remained, however, the 
very important question of  the extent of  use of 
factors  of  production. This issue lent critical 
significance  to the steps that were taken to temper 
the often  institutionalized rigidity of  the 
economic structure, which projected a high risk 
profile  to potential investors, and two promising 
developments in this respect were the National 
257 
Figure 1 
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Assembly's passing of  the act privatizing the 
public telecommunications company (TELCOR) 
and the all-party agreement to respect the 
agricultural smallholdings that had been created 
under the reforms  of  the 1980s. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The central objective of  fiscal  policy in 1995 
was to increase the non-financial  public sector's 
rate of  current saving. As a result of  the increase 
in revenue and restrained current spending, 
public saving as a proportion of  GDP went up 
from  2.7% to 6.2%. The improved fiscal 
performance  was not, however, enough to meet 
the targets set in the adjustment programme. 
Both tax and non-tax revenue rose. No 
important changes were made in the structure of 
taxation, but ground was won in the fight  against 
tax evasion and late payment, and in eliminating 
exemptions. The "tax machine" (alcoholic 
beverages and cigarettes) and income from  tariffs 
were helped by the increases in private 
consumption and imports. Income from  public 
utilities was boosted by higher charges. On the 
expenditure side, the labour mobility plan 
designed to cut administrative staff  remained in 
operation, although the results fell  short of  the 
target. The Government made efforts  to maintain 
the level of  infrastructure  investment. 
The increase in current saving, although 
tempered by the rise in capital expenditure, 
brought the consolidated deficit  down from  12% 
to 10% of  GDP. A number of  donor countries, 
seeing that the adjustment programme's targets 
were not being met, began withholding external 
funding.  Fresh talks with the IMF resulted in the 
interim plan mentioned above, but although the 
revised objectives were in large part attained 
during the latter part of  the year, the Government 
was obliged to go to the Central Bank of  Nicaragua 
for  net financing  of  around 3% of  GDP in order to 
cope with its short-term liquidity problems. 
b) Monetary policy 
Monetary policy in 1995 was an 
intensification  of  the restrictive approach 
adopted in previous years. The Central Bank of 
Nicaragua strengthened its institutional 
autonomy by preparing annual and quarterly 
monetary programmes, although it was unable to 
avoid granting credits to the central government 
in the second half  of  the year. 
The separation between the Central Bank and 
the credit market became more pronounced. Net 
Centra] Bank credit to the national financial 
system, which had been static as of  1993 and 
negative in 1994, contracted still further,  helping 
to slow the expansion of  liquidity. The Central 
Bank tried to intervene only in emergencies, as a 
lender of  last resort, with rapid-recovery 
instruments such as overnight loans or loans with 
a term of  a few  days. 
In April 1995, the use of  the legal reserve 
requirement as an economic instrument was 
extended, partly as a monetary control measure, 
but also with a view to forestalling  the effects  of 
excess liquidity in private banks, whose cautious 
policy on loans contrasted strongly with the 
upsurge in deposits. 
Yields on financial  assets, along with utility 
charges and other key prices, are adjusted 
regularly in line with exchange-rate variations, 
which implies a tight indexation of  the 
Nicaraguan economy as a whole. Nevertheless, 
despite the greater stability of  the monetary and 
financial  situation and high yields on córdoba 
deposits, which were adjusted by the exchange 
rate by means of  a "value-maintenance" clause, 
the spread of  dollarization revealed a lingering 
perception of  risk among the general public. 
In 1995, the Central Bank of  Nicaragua began 
using local-currency open-market operations, 
selling Negotiable Investment Certificates  (CENI) 
as a further  stringency measure designed to 
control liquidity and protect foreign  reserves. 
The first  auction, in July, was restricted to 
financial  institutions but subsequent auctions 
were open to the general public. Since these were 
not large-scale operations, however, they did not 
push interest rates up appreciably. 
The fragility  of  the Nicaraguan financial  system 
stems from  a number of  market imperfections. 
Although stabilization allowed deposits to recover 
and strengthened confidence  in the financial 
system, the perception of  productive activities, 
particularly agricultural activities, as a high-risk 
area continued to prevail. The risk was exacerbated 
by the failure  to clear up the State banking system's 
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Table 1 
A R : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product -15.7 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.8 -0.4 4.1 4.4 
Per capita gross domestic product -17.7 -3.2 -3.1 -3.6 -3.0 -4.2 0.2 0.7 
National income -18.2 3.4 0.3 20.8 -29.5 2.9 5.3 4.7 
Gross domestic product, by sector 
Goods -17.5 3.9 -1.0 -0.7 0.6 1.2 7.7 5.1 
Basic services -13.6 -1.4 2.0 3.9 1.8 -2.8 0.4 5.1 
Other services -13.9 -5.4 0.7 0.1 1.0 -1.9 0.3 3.4 
Percentages 
Contribution to growth of  GDP C 
Consumption -8.7 -11.7 -0.9 4.4 1.1 -4.9 1.0 -0.6 
Government -16.3 -6.4 8.2 -11.1 -2.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.9 
Private 7.6 -5.3 -9.1 15.5 3.4 -4.3 1.5 0.4 
Investment -7.2 -3.0 -2.5 2.1 0.0 -0.8 6.7 2.3 
Exports -0.9 4.1 2.1 -1.3 2.9 1.0 1.8 5.2 
Imports 1.0 10.0 1.2 -5.4 -3.2 4.4 -5.4 -2.5 
Percentages of  GDP B 
Gross domestic investment 20.5 17.6 15.1 17.3 17.2 16.4 22.2 23.4 
National saving -15.3 -0.4 0.8 17.0 -19.3 -12.0 -8.1 -3.3 
External saving 35.8 17.9 14.3 0.2 36.5 28.4 30.3 26.7 
Percentages 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 67.5 60.6 55.7 47.7 49.7 49.9 46.4 46.8 
Open unemployment rate e 6.0 8.4 11.1 14.2 17.8 21.8 20.7 18.2 
Average real wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 37.3 61.9 100.0 103.2 103.2 118.8 128.5 133.3 
Growth rates 
Prices (December-December) 
Retail prices 33 547.6 1 689.1 13 490.3 865.6 3.5 19.5 12.4 11.1 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
index (Index: 1990=100)fb 113.4 103.8 100.0 89.8 68.3 77.5 86.0 94.6 
Nominal exchange rate 0.27 15.66 689.96 4.27 5.00 6.12 6.72 7.53 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) g 125.4 150.0 100.0 104.6 104.9 108.3 113.3 118.9 
Millions of  dollars 
Balance of  payments 
Current account -715 -362 -305 -5 -834 -644 -729 -706 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) -583 -326 -290 -486 -610 -449 -504 -422 
Exports 273 341 392 338 309 367 453 648 
Imports 856 667 682 824 919 816 957 1 070 
Capital and financial  account 304 -89 -161 -544 -538 -503 -209 -561 
Overall balance -360 -520 -648 -464 -1 312 -1 019 -784 -1 202 
International reserves 




(as a percentage of  GDP) 474.0 929.5 675.1 646.6 585.8 589.3 605.5 532.5 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 96.0 60.1 55.3 107.4 156.1 114.1 100.6 53.1 
260 
NICARAGUA 
Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Central Government 
Current income 21.1 23.4 14.9 19.3 20.4 19.5 20.1 21.4 
Current expenditure 41.3 26.7 30.7 23.5 22.1 20.6 21.0 18.9 
Current savings -20.2 -3.3 -15.8 -4.2 -1.7 -1.1 -0.9 2.5 
Net capital expenditure 6.4 3.4 1.3 3.3 5.9 6.3 8.7 10.2 
Financial balance -26.6 -6.7 -17.1 -7.5 -7.6 -7.3 -9.6 -7.6 
Domestic financing 24.6 3.4 -5.2 -4.6 -6.1 - -1.5 1.1 
External financing 2.0 3.3 22.3 12.1 13.8 7.3 11.2 6.5 
26.6 6.7 17.1 7.5 7.7 7.3 9.7 7.6 
Real growth rates 
'urrency and credit 
Money balances 
Net international reserves 449.2 4.1 -51.6 132.7 -7.5 
Domestic credit 98.6 184Í9 494.1 461.2 10.5 9.7 1.1 
To public sector 98.1 191.9 295.5 794.4 6.4 6.2 -3.2 
To private sector 100.9 150.0 1 659.4 21.7 50.0 33.6 24.4 
Money (Ml) -2.9 -2.6 850.8 16.4 -4.4 36.3 13.4 
Local-currency savings and 
time deposits 195.7 67.5 808.0 39.9 48.7 96.9 26.1 
M2 6.8 841.8 21.1 7.9 55.8 18.6 
Dollar deposits 307.6 41.4 770.5 55.3 70.8 77.4 60.0 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (year end)1J 
On deposits (savings accounts) 8.5 8.9 8.8 
On loans (short-term) 19.7 20.1 20.3 
Equivalent interest rate in 
8.5 foreign  currency 8.9 8.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
"Preliminary figures.  Based on constant 1990dollars, cTheseentriesmeasuretheimpactofthevariationineachaggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Open unemployment rate in Managua. 
f  This rate is expressed in córdobas per US$ 1,000 for  the years up to 1987, in thousands of  córdobas per dollar for  the years 
1988-1990, and in gold córdobas per dollar for  1991-1994, at the official  exchange rate. 8 Based on the official  exchange rate. 
h Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. 1 Interest rates are 
covered by a clause requiring the maintenance of  dollar values; therefore,  once the nominal interest rate has been adjusted on 
the basis of  the real effective  exchange rate, it is equal to the real interest rate. For these purposes, the December-December 
variation in this index should be used. J These figures  represent a simple average of  the floor  and ceiling rates in the State 
and private banking systems. k Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
NICARAGUA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
i ii in iv i ii m iv i n m iv 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation) 21.1 18.9 23.9 19.5 4.0 8.2 8.9 12.4 12.1 12.2 8.6 11.1 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 106.6 109.0 108.2 109.3 110.2 112.7 115.6 114.5 114.0 121.0 122.4 118.0 Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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overdue debt. Despite the latent over-supply of 
resources in the financial  system, the banks 
preferred  to adopt a conservative strategy, even at 
the cost of  immobilizing some of  their funds. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
Foreign-exchange policy continued to 
develop in line with the plan devised two years 
before,  which provided for  the córdoba to 
depreciate in nominal terms by an amount 
roughly equal to its inflation  against the dollar. 
This policy not only kept the relative exchange 
rate more or less stable, with a slight depreciation 
during 1995, but also further  closed the already 
narrow gap between rates in the official  and 
unofficial  markets. 
Despite the slight increase in the real 
exchange rate, the argument as to whether the 
currency was overvalued did not abate. It was 
certainly no simple matter to pin down just where 
the misalignment might lie, given the very real 
changes that the economy was undergoing and 
the degree to which it was influenced  by such 
phenomena as the constraints on the supply of 
tradable goods and the widespread practice of 
adjusting prices and contracts in line with 
exchange-rate fluctuations. 
d) Trade policy 
During 1995, Nicaragua made progress 
towards full  institutionalization and 
normalization of  its relations with its main 
trading partner, the United States, and with the 
international community as a whole. However, 
the investment protection agreement that was 
concluded with the United States includes no 
specific  mechanisms for  resolving property-
related issues, which in a number of  cases involve 
Nicaraguans who have taken United States 
citizenship. Nicaragua also ratified  the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. 
Trade relations with the other members of  the 
Centra] American Common Market (CACM) 
continued to develop within the framework  of 
integration and liberalization established in the 
Guatemala Protocol. As regards the process of 
tariff  elimination, Nicaragua, like Guatemala and 
El Salvador, cut its tariff  on capital goods to 1%, 
and continued to follow  the specific 
liberalization timetable agreed with its partners 
in the region. 
e) Reform  policies 
In November, after  a long debate, the National 
Assembly passed an act partially privatizing the 
public telecommunications company (TELCOR). 
This decision brought to an end the initial process 
of  privatization of  productive companies and 
services, which was one of  the cornerstones of 
the Government's economic strategy. 
There are several aspects of  the TELCOR 
privatization that have a bearing on the general 
question of  property rights and the extension of 
the private sector's role in economic activity. The 
privatization was, however, a sign that the legal 
rights involved are gradually being consolidated. 
At the end of  the year, the Privatization Act 
was passed, establishing a legal framework  for 
the issuance of  definitive  titles to property and 
for  the programme of  compensation to former 
owners of  expropriated property. It also provided 
for  a huge issue of  new compensation bonds 
(US$ 650 million) which could be swapped for 
earlier issues and which were backed by United 
States Treasury zero-coupon bonds. The 
privatization of  TELCOR was also an instrument 
to raise funds  to back these new bonds, so as to 
provide better guarantees and boost their value 
on the secondary market. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
Overall supply expanded by nearly 5%, 
reflecting  the 4.4% rise in GDP and the 6% 
increase in imports (although this was less than 
the 1994 figure).  Exports, which swelled by 24%, 
were the fastest-growing  component of  demand 
during 1995. Investment also expanded for  the 
second year in a row, boosted by construction 
(19%) and, to a lesser extent, by expenditure 
on machinery and equipment, which rose by 
5%. 
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Despite Nicaragua's tight fiscal  policy, 
public-sector investment expanded by around 
10%, which was similar to the growth in private 
investment and the equivalent of  one-sixth of 
output. More than half  of  public-sector 
investment in 1995 went towards infrastructure 
projects. Nearly 70% of  private investment 
consisted of  purchases of  machinery and 
equipment, while the remainder went into 
construction. Foreign direct investment, 60% of 
which took advantage of  the favourable 
conditions granted by the law, amounted to some 
US$ 70 million. 
Aggregate consumption remained practically 
static, since the slight increase in private 
spending (0.4%) was offset  in part by a 
contraction of  more than 5% in government 
spending. 
By contrast with the preceding year, the 
higher level of  activity was spread throughout 
nearly all sectors. The recovery of  in 
manufacturing  did not really take off,  however, 
and there were great disparities within the 
agricultural sector. Medium- and small-scale 
farmers  and peasant agriculture, in particular, 
continued to experience grave difficulties,  while 
larger units, with greater capital resources and 
business capacity, went from  strength to strength, 
increasing their output by 5%. 
Also observable in 1995 was a continuation of 
the gradual trend away from  the use of  land for 
crops for  the domestic market towards the 
production of  export crops, as a result of  the 
movement of  relative prices and the 
segmentation of  the supply of  credit. 
Output from  the 1994-1995 and the 
1995-1996 harvests was very different.  In 
1994-1995, the yields of  a number of  products, 
both for  the domestic market and for  export, fell: 
the main exceptions in each group were beans 
and sugar cane respectively. There were sharp 
drops in the yields of  maize, rice, sorghum, 
banana, tobacco and cotton; the coffee  harvest 
also declined, although not greatly. Exports of 
the two most important traditional products 
expanded, however, as higher international 
prices prompted sales of  coffee  stocks and 
tempted banana-growers to divert a larger 
proportion of  their supply to external markets. By 
contrast, preliminary data for  the 1995-1996 
agricultural year indicate an increase in export 
crops and maize but a decline in rice, beans and 
sorghum. Beef  production contracted for  the 
second year running, owing mainly to low 
international meat prices and the lack of  a 
solution to the debt arrears that affect  a large 
number of  producers. 
Of  the remaining primary activities, the most 
vigorous was fishing,  where the output and 
export of  crustaceans expanded greatly. There 
was only a slight increase in forestry  but the 
sector performed  well inasmuch as exports 
nearly doubled. Mining output was up 11% 
owing to increased production of  all the most 
important minerals but silver. 
Within manufacturing,  there was a significant 
increase in agroindustrial production for  export, 
thanks to large earnings from  coffee,  sugar 
refineries  and marine-product factories. 
However, although manufacturing  output as a 
whole was assisted by a greater injection of  bank 
credit, it expanded by barely 3%, as it was still 
undergoing a difficult  process of  restructuring, 
diversification  and consolidation. On the other 
hand, there was rapid growth in 1995 among the 
maquila  industries operating in the "Las 
Mercedes" industrial free  zone, where there are 
17 factories  and around 8,000 workers, 
producing mainly clothing. 
Electricity generation was up by 6%, with 
supply roughly balancing demand. The main 
increases came in commercial and industrial 
consumption, for  the use of  electricity in 
irrigation dropped for  the third year in a row, an 
indication of  the recalcitrance of  the problems 
being experienced in many agricultural 
activities. There was slight growth in the 
remaining private services (transport, commerce, 
finance),  but government services continued to 
contract. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Consumer prices in Nicaragua rose by 11%, 
somewhat less than in 1994, but more than 
planned by the Government. Nevertheless, the 
more moderate rate of  inflation  made it easier to 
conduct foreign-exchange  policy in an organized 
fashion.  As in previous years, upward pressure 
on prices was mainly due to exchange-rate 
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adjustments being transmitted through the 
indexation mechanisms used in setting a number 
of  prices (though not wages); meanwhile, 
monetary policy was geared towards curbing the 
pressures of  demand. 
Although the open unemployment rate fell,  it 
remained above 18%. Moreover, the rate of 
underemployment rose, which meant that more 
than half  the labour force  (55%) was 
underutilized. At the same time, however, 
household surveys revealed a slight increase in 
the rate of  informal  employment in the main 
cities. 
c) The external sector 
The rise in the value of  exports and the 
slowdown in the expansion of  imports narrowed 
the trade and current-account deficits,  although 
the latter still exceeded total exports of  goods and 
services. Negotiations conducted during the 
course of  the year resulted in a reduction in the 
external debt, which was also restructured to 
provide more favourable  terms for  the country. 
Nevertheless, the economy continued to suffer 
from  serious external imbalances, with debt still 
at an extremely high level and the international 
trade deficit  persisting. 
Trends in the terms of  trade were favourable 
for  the third year in a row, although they did not 
reach pre-1989 levels. There was only a 
moderate increase in the average price of 
imports, while that of  exports rose by more than 
20%. Thanks above all to higher coffee  and 
banana prices and to the positive showing in 
exports of  seafood  and non-traditional products, 
the value of  exports of  merchandise rose by 50%. 
There was also a marked expansion in exports of 
manufactures  and those from  the free  zone, most 
of  which went to the United States, more than 
doubled, to US$ 80 million. 
There was significant  growth in imports of 
services (27%) and merchandise (9%). Imports 
of  consumer goods slowed, unlike those of 
commodities and intermediate goods for  the 
manufacturing  industry, which expanded by 
25%, and of  capital goods for  the same sector, 
which grew by 6%. The agricultural sector, on 
the other hand, made fewer  purchases of 
equipment from  abroad, while its imports of 
inputs increased only slightly. 
The momentum gained by exports helped 
narrow the trade deficit  in goods and services 
from  US$ 434 million in 1994 to US$ 323 million 
in 1995. This, and the reduction of  debt service 
payments, brought the deficit  on current account 
down from  US$ 730 million to USS 706 million: 
this was covered by the increase in debt arrears 
and by positive inflows  of  official  capital, chiefly 
in the form  of  grants and donations. 
Intensive renegotiations during the year 
enabled Nicaragua to reduce its external debt for 
the first  time in many years and restructure it in 
such a way as to wipe out nearly all its obligations 
to private creditors. 
In March 1995, Nicaragua once again opened 
negotiations with the Paris Club and reached 
agreement with the United States and the 
majority of  European countries on debt due and 
falling  due up to June 1997. The Netherlands 
forgave  Nicaragua's bilateral debt in its entirety, 
while France and Germany agreed to forgive 
77% of  Nicaragua's debt with them. Under the 
agreement with Italy, Nicaragua's debt with two 
Italian financial  institutions, the export insurance 
agency and a bank specializing in medium-term 
operations, was kept active. An agreement with 
Finland, which had also shown a willingness to 
forgive  Nicaragua's debts, was yet to be signed. 
Despite this progress, however, a large amount 
of  bilateral debt remained to be renegotiated, 
most of  it with the Russian Federation and Latin 
American countries. 
Nicaragua bought back a large part of  its debt 
with private creditors. The bulk of  this debt, more 
than US$ 1.3 billion dollars, had been contracted 
with commercial banks and dated back to before 
1979. The Government offered  to buy back all 
these obligations, but US$ 250 million in bank 
debt and US$ 20 million in debt to suppliers 
remained outstanding. The price negotiated with 
the creditors (8 cents per dollar of  nominal value) 
was similar to, or even less than, the secondary 
market price. 
These operations were financed  with a loan of 
US$ 24 million from  the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and contributions from 
the World Bank (US$ 40 million) and from  a 
264 
NICARAGUA 
number of  European countries, notably Sweden 
and Switzerland. 
The success of  the renegotiation process made 
it possible to make debt service payments in a 
more orderly fashion,  and the sum effectively 
paid (US$ 230 million) was in part financed 
through new official  loans from  a number of 
sources (notably the IDB and the Government of 





1. General trends 
In 1995 the economy of  Panama grew by less 
than 2%, continuing the sustained decline that 
replaced the momentum observable at the 
beginning of  the decade and signalled the end 
of  the cycle of  recovery from  the crisis of  the 
late 1980s. Consequently, the increase in per 
capita output halted and job creation remained 
sluggish. These trends were the result of 
adverse conditions that affected  two of  the 
three pillars of  the Panamanian economy: the 
international banking centre and the Colón 
Free Zone. 
The process of  revitalizing the infrastructure 
and management of  the Panama Canal, to be 
completed by 1999, was tied up with a number 
of  important economic reforms  carried out with 
financial  support from  international agencies, 
such as the restructuring of  the State sector, 
including modernization of  the tax system and a 
programme of  privatization of  public-sector 
enterprises and utilities; amendment of  the labour 
code; and the implementation of  legislation 
regulating economic activity. These policy 
measures, in particular those which addressed 
tax and labour issues, met with resistance both 
from  workers and in some business circles, 
leadingtoaclimateofsocial  tension thataffected 
production and may have been a factor  in the 
slowdown in private investment. 
Not only was private investment lower, but 
consumption declined, owing to the scant 
increase in jobs and real wages, and the 
external sector did not perform  as well because 
of  a decline in demand for  exports from  the 
Colón Free Zone, slower growth in the 
international banking centre and problems for 
Panamanian banana exports in gaining access 
to the European Union market, among other 
factors. 
Even against this background, there were a 
number of  achievements during the year, the 
most important being that prices maintained their 
traditional stability, the public-sector account 
posted a surplus, progress was made towards 
regularizing the payments situation for  both the 
external and domestic public debt, and structural 
reforms  were carried out to open up the economy 
to foreign  trade and investment. 
2. Economic policy 
Within Panama's peculiar economic and 
financial  structure, characterized by the lack of 
any official  monetary sector, economic policy 
focused  on reorganizing public finances,  an 
effort  that entailed renegotiating the external debt 
and continuing the process of  privatizing 
public-sector enterprises and utilities. The 
Government also implemented a number of 
credit policy measures to provide a stimulus to 
specific  activities. 
Of  particular importance were the 
introduction of  a set of  economic reforms  and the 
consolidation of  a number of  policies already 
in place under the economic modernization 
programme instituted by the Government that 
took office  in mid-1994. Central to those 
initiatives were reform  of  the State and 
revision of  the regulatory framework  for 
economic activity. The basic aim was to create 
conditions which would give fresh  impetus to 
productive activity, enhance the country's 
economic efficiency  and international 
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a) Structural and trade reforms 
In June 1995, the Universalization of  Fiscal 
Incentives to Production Act was passed 
modifying  the regime of  tariffs  on manufacturing 
companies' imports of  inputs and the incentive 
scheme for  non-traditional exports and 
introducing a temporary import and export 
system. Temporary fiscal  incentives were also 
provided to encourage investment in several 
productive activities and areas of  infrastructure. 
The programme of  privatization of  State-
owned companies remained in place, and 
although no privatizations were carried out 
during 1995, the Instituto Nacional de Tele-
comunicaciones (INTEL) was made a corporation, 
as a first  step towards the eventual sale of  49% 
of  its stock, which would raise nearly US$ 500 
million for  the State. During the first  quarter, the 
concession for  cellular telephone services was 
awarded, for  nearly US$ 73 million, and 
concessions were also awarded for  one copper 
mine and one gold mine. Plans for  1996 included 
concessions on the ports of  Cristóbal and Balboa 
and the privatization of  the electricity-generating 
company and a racecourse. The intention was to 
use the revenue from  these operations to set up a 
fund  for  public-sector investment in social 
projects. 
In one very important development, the labour 
code was reformed  with the intention of  making 
the labour market more flexible;  the amendments 
included measures designed to liberalize the 
conditions governing hiring and dismissal. To 
balance this, provisions were introduced making 
it easier to form  a union and establishing a 
severance fund  to guarantee payments to workers 
for  long service, unfair  dismissal and mutually-
agreed termination of  contract. 
In 1995 a number of  measures were adopted 
modifying  the regulatory framework  of 
economic activity. One such measure was a law 
protecting free  competition, which led to the 
establishment of  a supervisory board. A 
consumer protection law was also passed, and 
regulations were introduced to discourage unfair 
trade practices. Bills on copyright and industrial 
property rights were at the regulatory stage or 
under consideration by the Legislative 
Assembly. 
During the year, negotiations on trade or 
investment agreements took place with a number 
of  countries. Talks were held with the 
government of  the Chinese Province of  Taiwan 
with a view to setting up an industrial park on a 
strip of  land recently recovered from  the Panama 
Canal Zone; and agreements were signed with 
Korea to encourage Korean investment in 
Panama. Within the Latin American region, 
Panama joined the Andean Group, with observer 
status. 
Negotiations concerning membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) also gathered 
speed; Panama's application was expected to be 
approved by mid-1996. The move would involve 
a number of  commitments on Panama's part, 
including the elimination of  tariff  barriers. It was 
agreed that the maximum tariff  should be 
reduced from  40% to 30% over a five-year  period 
and that a minimum of  5% should apply to 
practically the whole range of  activities. Only for 
the agricultural sector were higher rates set, but 
these would be cut over time. Also envisaged 
were measures to liberalize the service sector, in 
which Panama, with a very liberal regime on 
services, already had a competitive position. 
b) Fiscal policy 
The tax reform  boosted government revenues, 
despite the slowdown of  growth in economic 
activity. Combined with restrained expenditure, 
this meant that central government posted a 
surplus equal to 0.8% of  GDP. 
The increase in revenue of  nearly 10% in real 
terms was a result of  greater receipts from  both 
tax and non-tax sources. Tax revenues were 
affected  by the income-tax reform,  which set a 
uniform  rate of  30% for  corporations and raised 
the rate for  companies operating in the Colón 
Free Zone from  8.5% to 15%. A system of 
quarterly advance payments was also instituted. 
Indirect taxes showed moderate growth, as the 
modest revenue yield from  export, production, 
sales and excise taxes was added to the relatively 
better performance  of  the transfer  tax and import 
duties. 
Non-tax revenue, which made up nearly one 
third of  current income, also recorded a 
significant  increase. Profits  from  State-owned 
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Table 1 
A A : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 





Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) S 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
-12.1 -3.1 8.0 8.1 7.5 3.8 3.8 1.9 
-13.8 -5.1 5.9 6.0 5.5 1.9 1.9 0.1 
-25.1 -19.0 24.8 4.4 8.5 4.6 -6.5 10.2 
-20.4 -0.3 7.9 12.8 10.5 8.6 3.5 1.1 
-5.6 -2.2 2.6 0.9 1.8 0.3 3.5 7.0 
-9.4 -12.5 11.2 5.6 10.0 2.2 5.8 1.5 
Percentages 
-9.6 7.8 -5.7 11.5 0.4 -1.1 -1.4 -1.4 
-4.0 -1.4 0.2 1.5 -1.4 0.4 -0.1 0.3 
-5.6 9.2 -5.9 9.9 1.9 -1.5 -1.4 -1.7 
-9.4 -1.8 12.9 1.7 6.6 3.0 3.9 1.2 
-12.7 -5.4 15.2 19.8 9.3 5.9 7.7 3.0 
19.6 -3.7 -14.5 -25.0 -8.8 -4.1 -6.4 -0.9 
Percentages of  GDP B 
6.6 5.0 16.6 17.0 21.9 24.0 26.9 27.6 
-7.3 17.8 4.4 12.4 10.8 8.3 16.2 7.3 
13.9 -12.8 12.2 4.5 11.0 15.7 10.7 20.2 
Percentages 
56.9 58.0 58.0 57.5 60.2 60.4 60.7 61.6 
16.3 16.3 16.8 16.0 14.7 13.3 14.0 13.7 
100.0 99.9 100.0 99.0 98.6 103.2 108.3 108.2 
Growth rates 
0.7 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.6 0.9 1.3 0.8 
101.1 100.5 100.0 98.8 98.3 97.9 96.3 93.5 
Millions of  dollars 
-210 256 -172 -324 -600 -834 -749 -1 197 
-164 256 -214 -390 -585 -832 -757 -1 172 
1 167 1 575 1 880 2 024 1 907 2 487 3 138 3 451 
1 331 1 319 2 093 2 415 2 493 3 320 3 895 4 623 
-199 -174 -76 215 192 323 457 411 
-211 -9 114 363 50 189 394 48 
-168 145 219 299 -347 86 338 48 
Percentages 
77.3 76.7 70.4 62.5 53.1 49.2 49.4 49.5 
9.0 4.0 1.4 1.4 4.9 2.1 1.3 0.8 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Central government 
Current income 12.4 11.4 24.1 18.2 18.4 19.0 18.0 19.6 
Current expenditure 16.8 17.1 17.4 15.7 17.7 16.5 16.7 16.3 
Savings -4.5 -5.8 6.7 2.5 0.7 2.5 1.2 3.3 
Capital expenditure 0.5 0.9 0.4 5.1 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.6 
Financial balance -5.0 -6.6 6.3 -2.5 -1.8 0.1 -1.2 0.8 
Domestic financing 5.4 6.6 -2.9 0.1 2.1 0.4 1.2 -1.1 




2.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 0.3 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 9.0 10.8 9.1 7.1 4.4 5.5 6.2 7.8 
On loans 12.7 12.1 11.5 9.1 10.5 9.6 10.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
"Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1980dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  Refers  to the industrial minimum wage. * Refers  to the contractual public-sector external debt and 
does not include adjustments for  currency fluctuation, 
by exports of  goods and services. 
Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided 
enterprises went up by 5% in real terms, even 
though two such companies had been privatized 
in 1994. In particular, the national lottery, the 
National Port Authority and the Colón Free Zone 
made larger contributions to revenues. Fiscal 
income from  non-tax sources included revenue 
from  the operation of  the Panama Canal, which 
increased by more than 10%. 
Total central government expenditure fell  by 
nearly 2% in real terms, after  rising in 1994. This 
outcome was chiefly  attributable to reductions in 
public debt service payments, which had been 
renegotiated and were 15% lower than in 1994. 
A tight public spending policy was reflected  in 
cuts in purchases of  equipment and supplies, 
other persona] services and current transfers. 
Under current spending, only salaries rose in real 
terms. 
Capita] spending, on the other hand, recorded 
a real increase of  nearly 7% as a result of  greater 
investment in education and health. In the course 
of  the year, contracts for  port and highway 
infrastructure  projects were awarded to private 
contractors, thus boosting private-sector 
investment. 
One of  the Government's main concerns was 
to regularize its public debt payments situation. 
With regard to domestic debt, the Government 
therefore  continued to redeem bonds maturing in 
1995 and extended to mid-1996 the deadline for 
exchanging expired bonds from  the period 
1988-1992. Treasury paper maturing in 1995 was 
redeemed on schedule and new issues were 
floated. 
With regard to externa] debt, 1995 saw a 
renewed effort  to deal with the country's arrears. 
Under the Brady Plan, debts of  around US$ 3.5 
billion with the commercial banking sector, 
including nearly US$ 2 billion in accumulated 
interest, were renegotiated. By the end of  the 
year, the majority of  Panama's creditors had 
opted for  restructuring, chiefly  through bonds 
with a reduction of  interest. It is estimated that as 
a result of  the agreement, reductions of  45% in 
the principal and 33% in the agreed interest will 
be achieved. The Government also renegotiated 
US$ 145 million of  its oil debt with Mexico at 
the beginning of  1996. In November, the 
Internationa] Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a 
drawing-rights agreement for  US$ 104 million. 
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c) Credit policy and the international 
banking centre 
In 1995, minor modifications  were made to 
the policies of  selective support for  productive 
activities. The conditions for  preferential  credit 
granted by banks to agricultural activities and 
backed by the Government were changed. 
Midway through the year, the discount on the 
local market reference  interest rate was cut, 
which pushed up the maximum rate for 
agricultural-sector borrowers from  7% to 8.75%. 
In addition, in order to encourage construction of 
low-income housing, the interest-rate subsidy 
was redefined  under the Universalization of 
Incentives Act to provide discounts which would 
vary according to the cost of  the dwelling. In 
other activities, the current market interest rates 
rose marginally, to between 10% for  industrial 
credit and somewhat less than 13% for  consumer 
credit. 
The legal reserve requirement and other 
banking regulations did not change during 1995. 
For the first  time since the 1987-1989 crisis, 
three-month Treasury certificates  were issued, 
for  a total of  50 million balboas. The arrears that 
had accrued as a result of  the suspension of 
payments on the 1988 issue of  certificates  were 
also paid off. 
The international banking centre's deposit 
and loan operations turned in a modest 
performance  compared with their vigourous 
growth since 1990. Credit from  the national 
banking system to the private sector, for 
example, expanded by 13%, a significant  change 
of  pace compared with the average annual 
increase of  22% recorded between 1991 and 
1993. Loans to the commercial sector, which 
accounted for  two thirds of  total credit and 
included loans to companies in the Colón Free 
Zone, together with loans to the next most 
important subsector, housing, grew at a slightly 
lower rate than total credit; credit to industry, on 
the other hand, increased by 28%, while credit to 
agriculture and fishing  declined drastically. For 
the second year in a row, there was only a 
moderate increase in consumer loans (13%), 
which had recorded growth of  over 50% during 
the three-year period 1991-1993. Credits to 
foreign  borrowers increased by 14%, appreciably 
less than in 1994. 
By contrast with the expansion in credit to the 
private sector, there was a contraction in credit 
to the public sector, thanks to the latter's 
improved finances,  and this held down the 
rate of  growth of  total credit to 6%. This trend 
was part of  an overall levelling-off  of  total 
assets within the national banking system, 
following  average growth rates of  20% over 
the period 1990-1994. The trend was also 
reflected  in a decline in other assets, including 
liquid assets. This downturn was accompanied 
by a halt in the upward momentum in deposits 
sustained in previous years: demand deposits 
grew moderately (6%), while savings and time 
deposits declined sharply (by 8%). It was 
foreign  banks, however, that accounted for  this 
turn about, while domestic deposits in fact 
increased. 
Banks operating under international license 
also recorded more moderate rates of  increase 
than in the recent past, even though both total 
assets and foreign  deposits expanded by between 
13% and 15%. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
There was a drop in the growth rate of  all 
components of  demand. Private investment lost 
impetus, particularly in construction, as a boom 
in luxury hotels and apartments and modern 
shopping malls came to an end. There was a 
slight upturn in fiscal  investment, especially in 
public infrastructure  projects. With job creation 
at a standstill and real wages moving only 
sluggishly, consumer spending declined for  the 
third year in a row. External demand also grew 
more slowly than the preceding year. 
The meagre expansion in supply has reflected 
GDP and imports about equally. Slow growth in 
services and in goods production overall meant 
that Panama's GDP rose by only 1.9%, half  the 
1994 figure. 
Despite this overall result, basic services 
did well (7% growth) particularly transport 
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services, boosted by heavy traffic  through the 
Panama Canal. In fact,  the Canal thanks to an 
expansion of  world trade, handled a record level 
of  tonnage. 
Commerce was one of  the categories hardest 
hit by the economic situation in 1995. Domestic 
trade, both wholesale and retail, languished as a 
result of  reduced consumption and less 
construction, while a sharp drop in the level of 
re-exports was reflected  in downturn in activity 
in the Colón Free Zone. Only in the hotels and 
restaurants category were results better, as 
increased tourism contributed to 6% growth. 
The activities of  banks and other financial 
establishments also expanded by 6%. Other 
private services -real estate, business and rental 
services- were static, however, tracking the 
performance  of  trade in goods and goods 
production in general. On the other hand, an 
increase in public-sector provision of  health, 
education and social security services led to a 
significant  rise in the level of  government 
services. 
With respect to goods production, the poor 
performance  of  some export categories was 
reflected  in a drop in the rate of  growth in 
agriculture. Banana production was down by 7% 
as a result of  frequent  bad weather and a strike 
by banana workers protesting the labour code 
reforms,  in addition to the effects  of  the European 
Union's imposition of  quotas on banana imports. 
Sugar-cane production was also lower (-6%), 
sugar cane having been replaced by other crops 
in some areas. Produce for  chiefly  domestic 
consumption, however, fared  relatively better. 
Rice and maize output was slightly higher, as was 
livestock production, which benefited  from  good 
prices for  beef  and pork and improved dairy 
production. Fishing turned in a very good 
performance  (28%), owing to a large catch of 
shrimp for  the foreign  market. 
Manufacturing  achieved virtually no growth 
in 1995, despite better showings by the textile, 
clothing and footwear,  chemical products and 
petroleum derivatives categories, all of  which 
expanded by more than 3%. In food,  beverages 
and tobacco production, the preceding year's 
levels were not maintained, while non-metallic 
minerals lost considerable ground (9%) because 
of  scant demand from  the construction industry. 
Construction itself  hardly grew at all during 
1995, in an intensification  of  the slump that had 
begun in 1994, following  a period of  growth 
averaging 70% during 1991-1993. Government 
incentives (such as preferential  interest rates) to 
encourage the building of  dwellings for 
lower-middle income families  did not offset  the 
depressive effect  of  the end of  the growth cycle 
that followed  the 1987-1989 crisis. Construction 
activity was also hampered by striking workers 
opposed to the Government's reforms, 
particularly labour code reforms. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Panama's economy continued to enjoy one of 
the region's lowest inflation  rates. The consumer 
price index (CPI) for  the capital went up by 0.9%, 
slightly less than in 1994. 
That average conceals significant  disparities 
among the prices in different  categories, 
however. Some prices actually fell:  there was a 
slight drop in the prices of  clothing and footwear 
and of  fish  a somewhat bigger drop in the case of 
fresh  fruit  and a fall  of  nearly 5% in meat prices. 
Meanwhile, other categories recorded 
appreciable price rises, as happened with coffee 
(34%), legumes and vegetables (9%) and oils and 
fats  (7%), and there were less marked rises in 
categories such as bread and cereals, rents, 
medical care, leisure activities and education. 
Imports contributed more than domestic 
products to the increase in consumer prices. This 
was shown by the behaviour of  the different 
components of  the wholesale price index, which 
went up by 2.9%, a figure  exceeding both the 
1994 rise in the wholesale price index and the 
1995 rise in the CPI. Wholesale prices of  imports 
rose by nearly 4%, and this movement was even 
more marked in agricultural products and crude 
oil (nearly 10%), basic metals (8%) and food, 
beverages and tobacco (7%). 
Nominal wage increases of  varying size were 
granted in a number of  sectors. Public-sector 
employees received an adjustment equal on 
average to the rate of  inflation;  pay within the 
national banking system went up by more than 
2%; and there was a 5% pay rise (up to 
September) in manufacturing  and commerce. An 
increase of  nearly 6% in the minimum wage, 
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which had not changed for  three years, was 
announced at the end of  the year. 
In general terms, the slackness in economic 
activity prevented the creation of  sufficient  jobs 
to absorb the increase in the economically active 
population. The ranks of  the open unemployed 
swelled by 3,000, although the national 
unemployment rate actually fell  slightly from  the 
1994 figure  of  14%. Unemployment tended to be 
concentrated in urban areas, particularly the 
Panama City metropolitan area. An important 
factor  in this situation has the gradual closing of 
military bases in the Canal Zone, which 
eliminated many directly- and indirectly-created 
jobs. 
According to partial indicators, however, 
employment was up in some sectors. The number 
of  Panamanian nationals employed in the 
international banking centre, for  example, 
increased by nearly 8% and in wholesale trade by 
just under 6%. There was a negligible increase in 
employment, however, in the public sector, no 
increase at all in some areas (hotels, restaurants 
and retail trade) and a decline in employment in 
other sectors, such as manufacturing,  where it 
declined by 3.5% during the first  nine months of 
the year, notably in beverages, tobacco, 
miscellaneous foodstuffs,  yarn and textiles and 
non-metallic mineral products. 
c) The external sector 
The deficit  on current account was reduced by 
more than half,  to somewhat under US$ 600 
million. This result was helped by a larger surplus 
in non-factor  services and by an appreciable 
narrowing of  the deficit  in factor  services, and it 
more than made up for  the near-doubling of 
Panama's merchandise trade deficit.  Lower 
payments for  factor  services were due to a 31% 
reduction in interest on the external debt as a 
result of  renegotiation. 
During 1995, trade in goods expanded more 
slowly than the preceding year, and this was 
reflected  in a small increase in exports (1%) and 
a somewhat larger increase in imports (7%). A 
key factor  in this result was the stagnation of 
re-exports from  the Colón Free Zone, due to a 
number of  causes. On the one hand, the main 
re-export markets were slacker, some as a result 
of  economic problems (Mexico, Argentina and 
Venezuela) others as a result of  armed conflict 
(Peru and Ecuador). On the other hand, currency 
revaluations in Japan and Korea, two of  the chief 
countries of  origin of  imported merchandise, 
pushed up prices considerably. 
Domestically-produced exports fared  better. 
Merchandise exports increased by 6%, totalling 
US$ 565 million, although the performance  of 
the different  categories was far  from  even. The 
value of  coffee  sales during the first  half  of  the 
year, for  example, was pushed up by high prices 
on the international market. Shrimp exports, too, 
grew by 17% owing to a bigger catch and higher 
prices. Earnings from  petroleum derivatives rose 
substantially as a result of  the recovery of  the 
refining  industry from  a fire  the year before. 
By contrast, the value of  sales of  Panama's 
most important export product, bananas, dropped 
by 8%. The decline was even greater for  beef 
(-29%), owing to flagging  demand in Mexico, its 
main market. Lobster and fish  oils also slumped 
badly (-27% and -24%). Non-traditional exports 
as a whole declined slightly too, as a result of  the 
drop in exports of  products such as cured cattle 
hides, leaf  tobacco and cosmetics. 
Imports of  goods for  the local market rose by 
8%. The growth rate of  imports of  intermediate 
goods fell  to 9%, which can be explained by the 
slowdown of  the economy in general and the lack 
of  movement in manufacturing  in particular. 
Imports of  consumer goods expanded faster 
(11%), however, as did capital goods (14%), 
largely owing to the purchase of  urban transport 
equipment and of  heavy machinery and 
equipment for  roadworks. 
TTtie public sector's external debt rose slightly, 
to more than US$ 3.7 billion. In particular, 
central government borrowing from  official 
sources increased. Disbursements totalled US$ 
168 million, and a large proportion of  these were 
from  the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB); half  of  this sum went towards health and 
rural infrastructure  projects. 
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1. General trends 
The upturn in the farming  sector, especially in the 
cases of  cotton and soybeans -two of  Paraguay's 
main export crops- was a key factor  in the 
3%-4% increase in the growth rate that was 
recorded for  the gross domestic product (GDP) in 
1995. Moreover, against a background of  fiscal 
equilibrium and exchange-rate stability, inflation 
fell  to an annual rate of  around 10%, the lowest 
figure  in 14 years. 
The management of  monetary policy was 
conducted within a highly adverse environment 
due to a financial  crisis which overtook a number 
of  private banks midway through the year. The 
authorities were able to prevent the crisis from 
spreading to the rest of  the financial  system, 
however, by providing deposit insurance for 
members of  the public and furnishing  financial 
assistance to institutions in distress. 
A portion of  the monetary expansion 
generated by the provision of  credit assistance to 
the banking system was absorbed through 
open-market operations; a nominal contraction in 
credit to the public sector, due to a surplus in the 
latter's financial  accounts and an increase in 
external borrowing, also helped bring the growth 
of  the money supply under control. 
The external sector once again posted a 
sizeable deficit  on current account, although the 
shortfall  was more than covered by capital 
inflows,  with enough left  over to produce a small 
increase in international reserves. As in previous 
years, Paraguay's massive external trade deficit 
was coupled with a large surplus under the 
heading of  net errors and omissions, which 
suggests that the country continues to experience 
difficulties  with regard to the registration of 
externa] transactions. 
This financial  instability led to a credit 
squeeze that affected  a number of  activities in 
1995, particularly commerce. In addition, during 
the first  half  of  1996, adverse weather conditions 
reduced the cotton harvest. Foreseeing a drop in 
fiscal  revenue, the Government raised public 
utility rates and fuel  prices. Even so, over the 
12 months ending in July, prices rose by around 
9%. 
2. Economic policy 
Price stability was once again the main economic 
policy objective in 1995. The original 
programme's linchpin had been the maintenance 
of  a robust fiscal  position, while the 
Government's policy of  exchange rate 
stabilization was seen as a means of  helping to 
curb cost-push inflationary  pressures. 
The implementation of  this strategy was 
disrupted, however, when a number of  financial 
institutions, which between them accounted for 
around one sixth of  the system's total assets, were 
overtaken by crises of  liquidity and, later, 
insolvency. The Central Bank intervened by 
taking over the management of  the troubled 
banks and granting them credit to cover their 
operating costs, meeting their commitments with 
foreign  correspondent banks and financing  the 
withdrawal of  deposits. In addition, steps were 
taken to create a safety  net for  the financial 
system. 
As a result, Central Bank credit to the private 
financial  system increased considerably, thereby 
leading to a degree of  monetary expansion which 
was incompatible with the objective of  bringing 
down inflation.  Although the public sector had 
continued to perform  as planned, policy-makers 
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decided to continue taking an active part in the 
open market by issuing "monetary regulation 
bonds" to soak up as much liquidity as possible. 
To this end, the real interest rate paid on these 
bonds, most of  which had a maximum term of  45 
days, was also raised to around 10%. 
An ample supply of  foreign  exchange made it 
possible to achieve the objective of 
exchange-rate stability; indeed, the authorities 
were so successful  in this regard that the price of 
the dollar rose only slightly during the year. In 
the area of  trade policy, the strategy of 
establishing global linkages was consolidated 
through subregional and international integration 
agreements. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Under the tax regime that came into force  in 
1991, the improvement of  collection procedures 
was the top priority for  fiscal  management. A 
special effort  was made to modernize the 
collection of  customs duties, bearing in mind the 
fact  that a considerable number of  transactions 
generally fail  to appear in fiscal  records. 
Improved tax-administration mechanisms 
boosted 1995 tax revenues by 18% in terms, or 
one and one half  percentage points of  GDP. The 
bulk of  this came from  taxes on foreign  trade, 
which grew by nearly half  in real terms. 
The upturn in spending, which amounted to 
two percentage points of  GDP, exceeded the 
increase in income, mainly because capital 
expenditure surged as a result of  a doubling of 
real public investment. 
These trends in income and expenditure 
caused the central government's balance sheet to 
show a small deficit.  However, the net balance 
recorded for  the remainder of  general 
government and the higher surplus run up by 
public-sector companies helped to raise the 
non-financial  public sector's surplus to the 
equivalent of  2.8% of  GDP. As a consequence of 
the public sector's external borrowing, its 
financial  management had a contractionary 
effect. 
The increase in expenditure was particularly 
steep in the last quarter, when half  of  the amount 
spent on physical investment for  the entire year 
was disbursed. Since, during the same period, 
spending on personal services also went up, fiscal 
management clearly deteriorated towards the end 
of  the year. In February 1996, with a view to 
restoring financial  equilibrium, the prices and 
rates charged for  goods and services furnished  by 
the public sector (water, electricity and petrol-
based fuels)  were raised considerably, and the 
gasoline tax was increased as well. Concern over 
the 1996 fiscal  outcome was nevertheless 
aroused by cuts in the taxes on trade in goods and 
services in the first  few  months of  the year and 
declining receipts from  taxes on foreign  trade. 
b) Foreign exchange policy 
During 1995, the system of  a floating 
exchange rate combined with Central Bank 
intervention remained in place. By contrast with 
the preceding four  years, when the monetary 
authority was a net purchaser of  foreign 
exchange, the Central Bank sold US$ 21 million 
more in dollars than it bought. 
Nevertheless, the price of  the dollar rose by 
barely 3% during the year, and consequently the 
guaraní appreciated by 5% against the dollar. The 
annual average real effective  exchange rate, on 
the other hand, rose by nearly 7% against a basket 
of  the currencies of  Paraguay's main trading 
partners, mainly as a result of  a sharp increase in 
the rate against the Brazilian real. The real 
effective  rate held relatively steady throughout 
1995, after  having recorded significant  increases 
during the second half  of  the preceding year. 
c) Monetary policy 
As was also true under the preceding year's 
programme, price stabilization was the main 
objective of  the monetary programme devised at 
the beginning of  1995. The financial  crisis that 
erupted at the end of  April seriously interfered 
with the original plan, however. 
Given the severe illiquidity that beset a 
number of  institutions in late May as a result of 
a run on deposits, the monetary authority took 
over the reins of  four  banks, one building society 
and two pension funds.  Since, taken together, 
these institutions controlled around one sixth of 
total deposits, the authority's move threatened to 
unleash a systemic crisis. Nevertheless, by 
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Table 1 
A : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(guaraníes per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
6.4 5.8 3.0 2.4 1.6 4.1 2.9 4.1 
3.1 2.6 0.0 -0.5 -1.3 1.2 0.2 1.3 
9.0 8.3 5.4 3.2 0.1 3.5 6.1 3.5 
8.7 6.5 2.0 0.4 0.8 4.0 0.6 5.2 
7.1 5.2 7.4 6.7 5.8 7.9 11.4 9.2 
3.6 5.0 3.6 4.1 1.9 3.6 4.1 1.9 
Percentages 
0.5 -4.4 11.7 4.0 7.4 6.2 11.9 1.2 
0.2 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 
0.3 -4.7 11.5 2.8 6.8 5.8 11.6 0.8 
0.8 2.1 2.0 2.0 -1.6 0.5 1.0 1.1 
8.4 4.6 4.3 2.1 -1.1 12.7 3.8 4.0 
-3.4 3.4 -15.0 -5.7 -3.1 -15.3 -13.7 -2.3 
Percentages of  GDP B 
20.7 21.6 22.9 24.3 22.3 21.9 22.3 22.4 
15.8 26.6 19.6 18.3 11.3 7.4 9.8 4.9 
4.9 -5.0 3.3 5.9 11.0 14.5 12.5 17.5 
Percentages 
63.1 64.2 61.0 59.4 60.8 66.3 
4.7 6.1 6.6 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.4 5.2 
102.9 104.2 100.0 95.4 87.1 83.7 86.0 87.4 
Growth rates 
16.9 28.7 44.0 11.8 17.8 20.4 18.3 10.5 
33.7 26.1 67.2 12.4 14.8 15.1 13.9 
91.1 95.5 100.0 100.9 102.7 98.2 106.8 101.3 
928 1 145 1 230 1 326 1 500 1 744 1 912 1 971 
96.5 101.9 100.0 86.9 90.6 93.9 97.4 106.8 
Millions of  dollars 
-210 256 -172 -324 -626 -811 -1 196 -1 197 
-164 256 -214 -390 -570 -816 -1 153 -1 172 
1 167 1 575 1 880 2 024 1978 2 604 3 045 3 451 
1 331 -1 319 -2 093 -2 415 -2 548 -3 420 -4 199 -4 623 
-199 -174 -76 215 111 176 397 411 
-211 -9 114 363 -24 83 326 48 
-168 145 219 299 -347 86 328 48 
Percentages 
62.3 45.9 30.0 26.6 18.7 17.3 16.9 16.3 
9.0 4.0 1.4 1.4 8.2 3.6 3.0 0.8 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Central government 
Current income 7.9 11.4 12.4 11.9 12.6 12.3 14.5 15.5 
Current expenditure 5.9 8.9 7.8 8.5 11.5 11.1 11.4 11.8 
Savings 2.0 2.5 4.6 3.3 1.1 1.1 3.1 3.7 
Net capital expenditure 1.3 1.0 1.5 2.5 2.4 1.8 2.1 4.0 
Financial balance 0.7 1.5 3.0 0.8 -1.4 -0.7 1.0 -0.3 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking system 
Net international reserves 46.3 -11.4 28.3 41.3 18.3 
Net domestic credit 70.7 288.4 34.5 8.2 22.5 
To public sector 21.6 
To private sector 59.6 39.2 35.7 36.7 9.9 
Money (Ml) 25.7 46.1 27.7 27.5 30.5 17.7 32.4 19.7 
Local-currency savings and 
time deposits 17.1 30.8 -9.1 5.2 25.0 4.1 59.2 43.0 
M2 20.6 37.3 20.0 35.3 35.1 18.9 38.4 31.2 
Dollar deposits 8.3 892.2 63.1 56.0 66.5 53.0 15.3 1.0 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) g 
On deposits 13.4 23.9 16.7 3.2 5.3 11.5 
On loans 30.0 35.6 28.2 11.9 15.2 21.1 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency -18.3 -9.1 5.0 9.1 17.9 19.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  Based on constant 1980dollars. c These entries measure the impactof  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population in Asunción. e Percentages of  the 
economically active population (EAP). Up to 1993, this figure  refers  to the Asunción metropolitan area. Figures for  1994 and 
1995 refer  to urban areas nationwide. f  Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of 
goods and services. 8 Figures for  1990-1992 are December-December rates; figures  for  1993-1994 are annual averages. 
Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
PARAGUAY: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
i ii in iv i ii HI iv i ii ni iv 
Consumer prices (nationwide) 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
18.0 18.6 16.6 20.4 22.4 20.9 20.9 18.3 14.3 14.9 12.2 10.5 
92.7 95.4 94.7 92.9 91.1 92.6 101.1 104.7 106.4 107.9 106.7 106.1 




-2.9 8.3 8.8 -1.3 -8.1 14.9 8.0 6.4 5.8 12.1 17.1 11.1 
4.9 16.9 17.8 7.9 0.4 25.8 18.3 16.4 12.8 21.4 28.1 22.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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providing coverage for  depositors in financial 
institutions, foreign  correspondent banks and 
other creditors, the Central Bank succeeded in 
restoring confidence  in the system. The monetary 
authority also took over the management of  these 
banks, whose doors remained open. 
The outcome of  all this was an enormous 
expansion of  the money supply that had not been 
foreseen  when the stabilization programme was 
being designed. Thus, during 1995, the credit 
which the Central Bank granted to the banking 
system for  the purposes of  furnishing  financial 
support and providing the system with a safety 
net increased by an amount equivalent to three 
quarters of  the entire addition to the money 
supply in 1994. Since this expansion was not 
compatible with the 10% target for  annual 
inflation,  the monetary authority proceeded to 
soak up excess liquidity through the sale of 
monetary regulation bonds for  terms of  between 
seven and 45 days at an annual interest rate of 
around 20%. Practically one third of  the increase 
in Centra] Bank credit to the banking system was 
sterilized by this means, and another third was 
absorbed through the contraction in bank credit 
to the public sector. Thus, with the help of  a slight 
drop in international reserves, the Central Bank 
managed to limit the expansion of  primary 
money to 19% of  the level recorded at the end of 
the preceding year. 
The interest rates offered  on these monetary 
regulation bonds during the first  half  of  1995 
exerted upward pressure on bank deposit interest 
rates. These rates later began to give ground, in 
line with the trend of  inflation,  but as inflation 
fell  more slowly, the real average interest rate 
was considerably higher than it had been in 1994. 
Given the slow movement of  the price of  the 
dollar, interest rates on local-currency deposits 
were actually far  more attractive in terms of  their 
foreign-currency  equivalent. Consequently, 
local-currency deposits made by the general 
public swelled by more than 40%, thus driving 
up broad money (M2) by more than 30%, while 
dollar deposits (which in previous years had 
grown rapidly) held steady. This indicates a 
return of  public confidence  in the banking system 
and a minimal level of  uncertainty concerning 
trends in the exchange rate. 
d) Trade policy 
On 1 January 1995, the Common External 
Tariff  (CET) entered into force  within the 
framework  of  the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), a limited customs union in which 
Paraguay is associated with Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay. In the early 1990s, these countries 
had agreed upon automatic reductions in tariffs 
and tariff  exemptions. During the first  half  of 
1995, the member countries decided to devise a 
programme of  action for  the remainder of  the 
century with a view to the establishment of  a 
fully-fledged  union by the year 2006. MERCOSUR 
was also accorded recognition by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
The entry into force  of  the CET, the progress 
made in establishing MERCOSUR and recent steps 
taken by neighbouring countries to control 
cross-border trade all constitute important events 
that may influence  the substantial volume of 
informal  trade that has traditionally taken place 
between Paraguay and its two big neighbours, 
Argentina and Brazil. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The surge in the production of  cotton (21%) 
and soybeans (23%) -following  a downturn in 
the former  and flat  growth in the latter in 1994-
was a key factor  in the 4% increase in GDP 
recorded in 1995, which was similar to the rate 
observed in 1993. Indeed, supply in the 
agricultural sector, which accounts for  one 
quarter of  GDP, expanded by more than 7% after 
having contracted slightly the year before. 
Manufacturing  and construction also picked up 
somewhat, resulting in a rise of  more than 5% in 
goods production, after  the negligible increase 
seen in 1994. 
The beverage, timber, and printing and 
publications industries continued to grow apace. 
There was also a sizeable increase in output from 
the tobacco, textile, leather and hides, and 
non-metallic minerals sectors, which reclaimed 
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the ground they had lost the year before.  Trends 
were favourable,  too, in clothing and footwear, 
although the starting-point for  these activities 
was very low due to the severe setbacks they had 
experienced in previous years. 
Basic services continued their brisk advance 
(9%), which was spurred on by increased 
electricity generation. Other services slowed, 
however, owing, in particular, to the sluggishness 
of  commerce and finance  as a consequence of  the 
banking crisis and the rise in domestic interest 
rates. 
These factors  held back private consumption, 
which expanded by barely 1%, the lowest figure 
in recent years. This poor showing was more than 
offset,  however, by an upsurge in the other 
components of  demand. The improved cotton 
supply, together with heavier demand from 
neighbouring countries, fuelled  a rapid 
expansion of  exports (9%). The real increase in 
government consumption (5%) also strengthened 
domestic demand, while fixed  investment, much 
of  it in the public sector, continued expanding at 
an annual rate of  over 4%. The resulting 4% 
upturn in total demand boosted the physical 
volume of  imports by a similar amount. 
b) Prices and wages 
The scant increase (3%) in the price of  the 
dollar during 1995 and the slow rate of  expansion 
in private consumption were important factors  in 
the near-halving of  inflation  to less than 11%, the 
lowest figure  in the last 14 years. 
The prices of  goods -particularly tradables 
such as food,  clothing and footwear-  rose at an 
annual rate of  nearly 8%, which was only half  as 
much as the increase in the prices of  housing, 
health and education services. 
The slowdown in inflation  was most marked 
in the first  half  of  the year since, during the 
second half,  the effects  of  the adjustments in the 
minimum wage and public utility charges made 
themselves felt.  The increases made in utility 
rates and fuel  prices in February 1996, along with 
the decision to raise the minimum wage again in 
April, also lent fresh  impetus to inflation.  Even 
so, the cumulative increase in consumer prices 
for  the 12 months up to July was only around 
9%. 
In May 1995, the minimum wage was raised 
by 15%, which added nearly 2% to that wage's 
real purchasing power in comparison to the 
preceding year's average. An even larger real pay 
increase was received by manual workers. This 
improvement in total wages was partly eroded by 
a slight rise in the unemployment rate, which 
reached over 5% in urban areas. 
c) The external sector 
As in previous years, Paraguay's current 
account deficit  with the rest of  the world was 
financed  out of  its copious inflows  of  foreign 
capital, a significant  proportion of  which 
continued to be entered under the heading of  net 
errors and omissions. 
It should be noted that, owing to serious 
shortcomings in the registration of  external 
transactions, Paraguay's balance of  payments 
contains a number of  inferences  concerning 
important entries in its current and capital 
accounts. For example, the level of  unregistered 
exports of  goods and services is 40% higher than 
the level of  registered exports. Furthermore, in 
1995, the figure  for  net errors and omissions -a 
heading which, although it figures  as part of  the 
capital account, may include transactions that 
have not been included in the current account-
was well over double the figure  given for 
registered capital movements. 
The value of  merchandise exports climbed by 
12% in 1995. Almost half  of  this increase was 
attributable to the increased supply of  cotton and 
the higher prices paid for  this product on the 
international market. Re-exports to neighbouring 
countries also continued to display a good deal 
of  momentum, expanding by more than one fifth. 
In addition to what has already been said about 
cross-border transactions, it should be noted that 
60% of  registered exports went to MERCOSUR, 
with Brazil alone accounting for  nearly half  of  all 
registered external sales. 
Net foreign  exchange earnings from  tourism 
services was also considerable. Having expanded 
by nearly 30%, tourism now accounts for  over 
one third (US$ 700 million) of  total merchandise 
exports. Royalties and fees  paid to Paraguay for 
the use of  the binational hydroelectric complexes 
at Itaipú and Yacyretá continued to generate 
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significant  inflows  of  foreign  exchange 
(approximately US$ 300 million, or three 
percentage points of  GDP). 
The value of  merchandise imports rose by 
only 5%. MERCOSUR was also a major supplier of 
registered imports (27% of  the total); this 
subregional grouping was the source of  nearly 
40% of  such imports and, of  that percentage, 
nearly half  originated in Brazil. 
The net outcome of  the country's current 
external transactions was a deficit  equivalent to 
13% of  GDP, which was similar in size to the 
deficit  recorded the preceding year. One third of 
this shortfall  was covered with long-term capital 
resources, with half  of  these resources being 
received in the form  of  direct investment and the 
other half  coming from  external loans. The 
remaining two thirds were entered under the 
heading of  net errors and omissions (US$ 840 
million), which includes short-term capital 
inflows  and transactions not registered in the 
current account. 
The public externa] debt expanded by 7%, 
thus rising to 15% of  GDP. This debt is evenly 




1. General trends 
Throughout 1995, the Peruvian economy 
continued to show the robust growth, investment 
upturn and stability that have characterized it in 
recent years. Continuity in economic policy and 
the structural reform  process were strengthened 
as a result of  President Fujimori's re-election in 
April. 
Beginning in the second quarter, however, the 
level of  economic activity showed a definite 
decline -a tendency that was accentuated in the 
first  quarter of  1996- owing to the measures 
introduced by the Government to rein in the 
excessive growth reflected  in an abrupt 
expansion of  imports. 
As early as the first  quarter of  1995, rapid 
growth in spending and the high income 
elasticity of  imports made it predictable that the 
merchandise trade deficit,  which had doubled in 
amount every year since 1993, would be very 
large. In June, the Government sent a letter of 
intent to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
in which it committed itself  to implementing a 
macroeconomic policy that would help reduce 
the rate of  growth, in order to put the 
balance-of-payments  current account on a path 
towards a more sustainable deficit. 
To this end, the authorities first  took steps to 
reduce the money supply and then in the last 
quarter cut back considerably on public-sector 
investment; this was accompanied, on the supply 
side, by a slow-down in fishing  activity. The 
combined impact of  these factors  was a sharp 
drop in the growth of  gross domestic product 
(GDP) from  13% in the first  quarter to virtual 
stagnation in the last quarter. As a consequence, 
the annual growth rate was a little under 8%, 
substantially lower than the impressive figure  of 
14% recorded in 1994. 
Growth in spending slowed less than growth 
in GDP, so that a substantial portion shifted 
towards imports; although this eased inflationary 
pressures, it also brought about a further 
deterioration in the merchandise trade balance, 
which showed a deficit  equivalent to 5% of  GDP. 
Notwithstanding deliberate attempts to cool 
down the economy, imports expanded strongly, 
showing that they would react only slowly to 
restrictive measures. The larger trade deficit  in 
turn led to a widening of  the balance-of-
payments current account deficit,  which reached 
7.5% of  GDP. 
The crisis that occurred in Mexico in late 1994 
had little effect  on inflows  of  external capital into 
Peru; the impact of  the crisis only began to be felt 
during the first  quarter of  1995, when deposits in 
foreign  currency and foreign  exchange reserves 
in the financial  system decreased, while the stock 
exchange price index and index of  trading 
volumes both showed declines. In the second 
quarter, however, nearly all these indicators 
began to recover. 
The slight rise in the nominal exchange rate 
owing to devaluations that did not keep pace with 
domestic inflation  combined with a slower 
expansion in the money supply and growing 
confidence  on the part of  economic agents, 
resulted in a further  decline in the inflation  rate, 
to just 10.2% in 1995, five  points lower than the 
year before  and in sharp contrast to the runaway 
inflation  of  the early 1990s. 
The most important development in the area 
of  international relations in 1995 concerned the 
preliminary agreement reached between the 
Peruvian Government and creditor banks. 
In accordance with the agreement with the 
international commercial banks to be formalized 
in the second quarter of  19%, as well as an 
agreement with the Paris Club, in June 1995, the 
Government was obliged to send a new letter of 
intent to the IMF, in which it committed itself  to 
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lowering the growth rate in 1996, in order to be 
able to reduce the balance-of-payments  current 
account deficit  and maintain inflation  just 
slightly above the level recorded in 1995. 
The turn in the level of  activity which had 
begun in the second half  of  1995 carried through 
into early 1996; in the first  quarter of  1996, 
output fell  by 3.2% with respect to the same 
period of  the previous year. However, there was 
no corresponding adjustment in the level of 
imports, the cumulative value of  which reached 
US$ 2,360 million in April 1996, equalling the 
figure  for  the first  four  months of  1995. Even so, 
the trade deficit  narrowed to US$ 510 million, 
USS 200 million less than in the same period of 
the previous year. This improvement was due to 
the positive performance  of  exports, which rose 
by 12% overall, with even higher growth for 
traditional exports. Inflation  accelerated during 
the first  two months of  1996 over 1% per month, 
but slowed again in April and May, to reach a 
cumulative figure  of  5.9% for  the first  five 
months of  19%, versus 4.8% for  the same period 
of  1995. 
2. Economic policy 
Peru's economic policy in 1995 can be divided 
into two periods: the first  six months were 
characterized by a policy of  strong growth in 
public spending, which accelerated in the period 
prior to national elections in April; in the second 
six months the rapid pace of  growth began to 
slow, after  public spending was cut and the 
increase in the monetary base was reined in to 
cool down an overheated economy. The aim of 
these policies was to improve the balance of 
trade, which had progressively worsened over the 
previous three years. 
a) Fiscal policy 
After  the first  half,  marked by rapid growth in 
both current expenditure (wages and goods and 
services) and capital investment, amounting to 
20% and 56%, respectively, compared with the 
same period in 1994, fiscal  policy became 
more restrictive. In the fourth  quarter, the real 
rate of  expansion in public-sector consumption 
dropped to under 5%, while capital expenditure 
fell  by 18% compared with the same period of 
1994. 
Moreover, Peru succeeded in meeting the 
target agreed upon with the IMF, which was to 
increase tax yield to about 14% of  GDP (including 
income from  the National Housing Fund and 
other revenues), one point higher than in 1994. 
This achievement came as the result of  a drive to 
improve administration undertaken by the Office 
of  the National Superintendent of  Tax 
Administration (SUNAT). The largest source of 
tax revenue was the general sales tax, which 
yielded the equivalent of  5.8% of  GDP, some 
2.5% of  the amount being attributable to imports. 
The slowdown in the growth of  fiscal 
expenditure in the second half  enabled the 
non-financial  public sector to post a small 
primary surplus (i.e., excluding interest 
payments) of  0.3% of  GDP at the end of  the year 
(versus 1% in 1994). In contrast to the previous 
fiscal  year, the non-financial  public sector ran an 
overall deficit  equivalent to 0.1% of  GDP. 
Excluding income from  privatizations, which 
totalled 1.6% of  GDP (versus 4.5% in 1994), 
financing  requirements increased to 1.7% of  GDP. 
The economic authorities are predicting that the 
slow down in government spending will continue 
throughout 1996, and for  this reason the latest 
letter of  intent submitted to the IMF has stipulated 
as a goal a primary surplus of  2.5% of  GDP. 
b) Monetary policy 
At the end of  the first  quarter, the need to 
restrain the expansion in domestic demand 
obliged the economic authorities to adopt a more 
restrictive monetary policy; they were assisted in 
this by the fact  that the influx  of  foreign  exchange 
was considerably lower than the previous year. 
The policy instruments used to absorb liquidity 
were the sale of  securities by the Central Reserve 
Bank of  Peru (BCRP) and deposits to the Central 
Bank by the public sector and Banco de la 
Nación; as a consequence, primary monetary 
expansion slowed from  57% in late March to 
37% in December. During the first  nine months 
of  the year, money creation was due to an 
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Table 1 
E U : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
National income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rat^  
(new soles per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 











(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports)® 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
-9.1 -12.9 -5.4 2.8 -0.9 5.8 13.9 7.7 
-10.9 -14.6 -7.1 0.9 -2.6 4.0 12.0 5.9 
-8.7 -13.2 -4.5 3.1 -1.4 5.4 14.2 8.1 
-8.2 -13.3 -4.6 4.5 -1.8 7.6 18.3 7.4 
-4.9 -8.6 -4.9 2.2 2.1 6.1 8.0 7.3 
-9.6 -11.5 -6.0 2.3 -1.9 3.9 11.0 11.5 
Percentages 
-7.4 -9.2 -4.8 1.1 1.1 2.7 7.8 5.2 
-1.4 -0.6 -0.8 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.8 
-6.0 -8.6 -4.0 1.0 0.9 2.4 7.1 4.4 
-2.1 -7.4 2.6 2.4 -0.2 2.5 6.8 5.8 
-0.6 1.6 -1.8 1.4 0.2 0.6 2.5 1.0 
1.0 2.0 -1.3 -2.1 -2.0 0.0 -3.3 -4.3 
Percentages of  GDP B 
22.8 17.7 21.4 23.1 23.1 24.2 27.3 30.7 
19.3 18.0 19.5 20.8 18.5 19.9 22.7 23.6 
3.4 -0.4 1.9 2.3 4.6 4.3 4.6 7.1 
Percentages 
61.2 61.3 57.2 58.8 60.8 59.7 62.4 
i".i 7.9 8.3 5.9 9.4 9.9 8.8 7.1 
210.1 114.5 100.0 115.2 111.1 105.7 127.4 116.7 
Growth rates 
[ 722.3 2 775.8 7 649.6 139.2 56.7 39.5 15.4 10.2 
[ 877.1 1 917.9 6 534.0 96.0 50.5 34.1 10.5 8.8 
96.8 94.1 100.0 94.3 93.5 90.1 91.2 95.3 
0.16 3.48 0.19 0.76 1.25 1.99 2.20 2.26 
195.8 122.1 100.0 82.1 80.9 89.1 84.6 85.6 
Millions of  dollars 
-1 334 132 -678 -813 -1 657 -1 643 -2 103 -3 747 
-416 920 57 -452 -1 152 -1 118 -1 541 -3 005 
3 563 4 387 4 165 4 261 4 403 4 409 5 681 6 821 
3 979 3 467 4 108 4713 5 555 5 527 7 222 9 826 
790 -285 526 -6 197 -29 1 452 3 037 2 608 
-2 586 -1 800 -1 754 -737 -790 648 1 980 103 
149 -241 -212 -899 -554 -748 -3 038 -947 
Percentages 
51.1 52.4 58.9 48.0 47.6 60.8 51.5 49.4 
29.2 22.0 24.9 18.1 21.1 21.5 17.3 13.9 
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Table 1 (concl.) 





Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 




Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking 
system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposit 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign  currency 1 










1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
9.5 11.3 11.4 13.0 13.7 
8.7 10.5 10.2 11.1 12.3 
0.8 0.8 1.2 1.9 1.4 
1.4 2.5 2.6 -1.0 2.0 
-0.6 -1.7 -1.4 2.9 -0.6 
-1.5 -1.4 -1.2 3.2 -0.1 
-0.7 0.5 -0.3 -4.2 -1.0 
2.2 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.1 
Growth rates 
24.9 183.6 25.5 20.0 106.6 10.4 
766.3 1 456.7 3 923.5 177.4 53.7 80.7 -20.0 63.4 
267.3 1 932.3 5 350.4 
500.9 1 860.2 5 505.0 2848 96.4 740 65.0 44.1 
491.5 1 805.7 4 627.2 124.6 71.3 48.1 58.1 23.4 
359.2 4 061.9 2 161.9 273.0 46.9 59.0 96.2 45.6 
440.3 2 400.4 3 508.1 164.4 60.5 50.0 71.5 30.7 
6.8 140.5 17.2 37.0 35.0 17.7 
Annual rates 
-47.2 -54.3 13.7 1.9 3.4 6.0 5.2 
-31.2 -13.0 248.2 55.8 41.2 32.8 24.0 
85.0 -33.8 83.0 12.7 8.8 24.1 6.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
Note: The growth rates under the heading "Currency and credit" referring  to 1990 were corrected with respect to those published 
in the "Economic Survey of  Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994-1995". 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each 
aggregate on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of 
that same aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. Percentages of  the working-age population. Percentages of  the 
economically active population (EAP). For 1987 and 1988 the exchange rate is expressed in new soles per one thousand 
dollars. g Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. h Growth 
rates on figures  in dollars. 1 Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
PERU: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
I II III IV I II III IV I II m IV 
Gross domestic product 
(Index: 1990=100) b 98.3 109.5 109.3 110.7 109.1 126.9 120.9 126.2 123.3 138.1 128.3 127.0 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 51.3 49.9 47.0 39.5 31.6 24.2 19.5 15.4 11.9 11.1 10.0 10.2 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 87.6 90.5 89.7 88.4 84.2 83.3 86.5 84.3 85.2 89.1 84.4 83.7 




























(12-month variation, %) 87.2 63.9 60.4 54.7 50.4 66.2 70.1 61.8 60.3 49.3 33.4 28.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  Based on constant prices for  Peru, without seasonal adjustment. c Based on quarterly averages. 
287 
external factor,  namely the increase in 
international reserves. In the final  quarter, it was 
necessary to rely on domestic sources 
-sterilization deposits of  the banking system- to 
meet external debt obligations; although this 
contributed to an expansion in the monetary base, 
it had no major impact on domestic prices, since 
the demand for  money increased during that 
period due to seasonal factors. 
The growing confidence  of  economic agents 
in government policy facilitated  the continued 
remonetization of  the economy, preventing the 
increase in the money supply of  some 23% in 
1995 from  having inflationary  effects. 
Local-currency quasi-money grew by 46%, 
foreign-currency  quasi-money by just 17%, 
reflecting  the fact  that the dollarization ratio (the 
ratio of  foreign-currency  deposits to total 
deposits) declined from  79% to 75%. 
The real interest rate on local-currency loans 
declined during 1995, averaging 24% for  the 
year, compared with 32% in 1994. Since the rate 
on deposits remained below 6%, the spread in the 
banking system was close to 19%. Interest rates 
on dollar-denominated loans showed a gradual 
increase, from  15% in December to an average 
of  17% for  the fourth  quarter, in response to the 
slower growth in deposits; this, in turn, caused 
the 30-day deposit rate to increase to 7.6%. The 
rise in interest rates on foreign-currency 
denominated loans, 60% of  total lending, tended 
to curb growth in economic activity during the 
final  quarter, despite the fact  that the rate was not 
used as an instrument of  monetary policy in 
Peru's economy, since open market operations 
were relatively minor. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
The system of  floating  exchange rates with 
Central Bank intervention remained in place 
during 1995. This, together with agents' growing 
confidence  in the local currency and economic 
stability, meant that the exchange rate for  the 
dollar continued to decline over the course of  the 
year, despite lower external capital inflows 
compared with 1994 and the concomitant decline 
in foreign  exchange sales. However, measured in 
terms of  the basket of  currencies of  Peru's main 
trading partners, the local currency did not 
appreciate significantly,  compared with the 
previous year. 
d) Structural reforms 
In 1995, Peru continued to privatize 
State-owned enterprises, although the 
programme proceeded at a less intense pace than 
in previous years, especially during the first  half, 
owing to the impact of  the electoral process and 
the uncertainty it generated. The most important 
operations of  this sort were the sale of  60% of  the 
stock of  Empresa de Generación Eléctrica de 
Lima (EDEGEL) for  US$ 520 million in October, 
and the sale of  68% of  the stock of  Banco 
Continental. Data provided by the Commission 
for  the Promotion of  Private Investment (COPRI) 
indicate that during 1995, privatization sales 
brought in revenue equivalent to US$ 1.1 billion 
and that future  investment commitments total 
somewhere in excess of  US$ 200 million. In 
addition, the process of  privatization through 
capitalization got under way. Under this method 
of  privatization, the Treasury does not receive 
any income, but rather accepts an investment 
commitment on the part of  a private agent, who 
in exchange receives a percentage of  the stock in ; 
the privatized entity. The first  experiment of  this 
type was the bidding on the Empresa 
Termoeléctrica de Ventanilla; the equity interest 
was awarded to a consortium made up of 
Peruvian interests and the Empresa Nacional de 
Energía (ENDESA) of  Spain, in return for  a 
commitment to invest US$ 120 million to 
increase generating capacity from  200 MW to 
480 MW. 
More recently, the process of  selling off 
Petróleos del Perú (PETROPERU) got under way 
with the auction of  60% of  the stock in the La 
Pampilla refinery.  Also privatized were a number 
of  facilities  owned by Electricidad del Perú 
(ELECTROPERU), Empresa Minera del Centro del 
Perú (CENTROMIN), and Servicio de Abaste-
cimiento de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de 
Lima (SEDAPAL), a water and sewerage 
enterprise, COPRI estimates that these 
transactions generated US$ 1.2 billion in 
revenues. 
During 1995, it became necessary to make a 
number of  adjustments to the social security 
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reform  process, in order to correct some 
shortcomings detected in the two years since the 
reforms  were implemented. Under the new 
arrangements, private pension funds  had been 
authorized to operate alongside the public 
system. The funds  began operations in 1993, but 
met with less success than had been anticipated. 
For this reason, the legislation was amended in 
July 1995 with the aim of  bringing costs in the 
private system -until then more expensive- into 
line with those in the public system, thus helping 
to attract people into the new pension system. To 
achieve that aim, the contribution channelled into 
the individual account under the private system 
was temporarily reduced from  10% to 8%, thus 
putting it on the same footing  as the public 
system. In addition, the "solidarity contribution" 
of  1% was abolished, as was the value added tax 
on commissions and insurance. Finally, 
beginning in November, authorization was given 
for  participants in the private system to switch 
freely  between funds. 
By December 1995, pension fund  assets had 
reached a figure  in excess of  US$ 710 million, 
and they could boast 1.2 million participants. The 
Office  of  the Superintendent of  Private Pension 
Funds estimated that after  35 months of  operation, 
the funds'  annual average return was 7%. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
In spite of  government efforts  to restrain 
domestic demand, its rate of  growth declined by 
just four  points with respect to 1994 from  15% to 
11%, considerably less than the level of 
economic activity, and the differential  meant that 
a larger proportion of  demand shifted  towards 
imports; as a result, imports grew by 27% at 
constant prices, a trend that revealed their marked 
downward inelasticity over the short term. 
Public-sector consumption increased by 10%, 
while public-sector investment rose by 16%. The 
expansion in fiscal  expenditure during the first 
half  had a strong multiplier effect  on 
private-sector spending, particularly on 
investment; however, since in the second half 
private investment followed  the downward trend 
of  public investment, gross fixed  capital 
formation  grew by only 20%, 11 points below the 
rate recorded the previous year. Nevertheless, the 
rate of  investment rose by over two points to 
nearly 30% of  GDP. This high level of  investment 
was financed  by both national savings (23%) 
-which increased nearly 1% with respect to 
1994- and external savings (7%). 
The pace of  economic activity gradually 
slowed during 1995, thus interrupting the rapid 
growth experienced since late 1994; this 
downturn worsened dramatically in the second 
half,  so that by year's end production was 
stagnant. The slow down was attributable to the 
impact on the fishing  industry of  ocean 
current-related adverse weather conditions; this, 
combined with the imposition of  closed seasons 
by the authorities in an effort  to conserve marine 
resources, led to a sharp drop in the sector's 
output (-14%). That, in turn, had a ripple effect 
on the resource-based processing industry, 
whose production levels declined by 6%, after 
growing by 15% in 1994. Public spending 
cutbacks and reduced liquidity also played a role. 
In consequence, growth in manufacturing  output 
dropped from  16% to 5% for  the year. In contrast, 
the expansion in commerce was strong (11%), 
although lower than the 17% recorded the year 
before. 
Thanks to good weather conditions, 
agricultural production once again expanded, 
though at a slower pace (6%); some of  the major 
crops recorded increased harvests: raw cotton 
(29%), sugar cane (16%), potatoes (34%) and 
soft  maize (24%). The livestock products 
showing the greatest increases were poultry 
(16%) and eggs (24%). 
The mining sector benefited  from  good prices 
for  metals on world markets, but recorded growth 
of  under 3%, showing that new investments in 
mining had yet to produce returns. Only copper 
and silver production registered significant 
expansion, growing by 11% and 10%, 
respectively. 
The rate of  growth in the construction industry 
fell  sharply from  32% in 1994 to 17% in 1995, 
chiefly  as a result of  reduced public spending on 
infrastructure.  During the first  half,  the sector's 
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growth was practically the same as the year 
before,  but subsequently dropped sharply to just 
7%. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The inflation  rate fell  to 10.2% in 1995, 
slowing most dramatically in the second and 
third quarters, for  a fifth  consecutive year of 
declining inflation.  One of  the chief  contributing 
factors  was the trend towards a more moderate 
increase in the nominal exchange rate. Other 
contributing factors  related to supply, the slow 
growth of  farm  prices and containment of 
monetary expansion helped keep inflation  down 
in the second half. 
Nominal wages and salaries rose only slightly, 
a factor  that also helped curb inflation.  The 
quarterly survey of  establishments employing 10 
or more workers found  that salaries declined by 
8% in real terms and real wages by 15%. On the 
other hand, the minimum living wage increased 
slightly (2%). 
With the exception of  commerce, the slow 
down in the pace of  activity was accompanied by 
a decline in employment. The demand for  labour 
in the manufacturing  and service sectors declined 
by 3% and 1%, respectively; in contrast, 
commerce increased its demand for  labour by 
10%. 
c) The external sector 
The weak point in Peru 's economic 
development has been its balance of  trade, which 
has deteriorated sharply in recent years, a trend 
that persisted in 1995. The merchandise trade 
balance incurred a deficit  of  US$ 2.1 billion for 
the year, while the deficit  in non-financial 
services totalled US$ 800 million, bringing the 
total trade deficit  in goods and services to 5% of 
GDP, almost two points more than in 1994. 
The deficit  on the balance-of-payments 
current account, excluding interest arrears owed 
to international private banks, amounted to 
US$ 3.7 billion, equivalent to 7.5% of  GDP. This 
shortfall  was financed  with US$ 1.7 billion in 
foreign  direct investment inflows  (including 
US$ 640 million from  the sale of  public-sector 
enterprises), and over US$ 2 billion in short-term 
capital flows,  including US$ 200 million in 
portfolio  investment. 
Special financing,  obtained through 
short-term external debt negotiations, debt 
cancellation and refinancing  of  external debt and 
payment arrears, amounted to US$ 840 million; 
as a result, net reserves increased by US$ 920 
million. 
Export performance  was highly satisfactory 
for  the second year in a row, increasing by 
US$ 1 billion. Traditional exports accounted for 
most of  the export growth, since prices for 
mining, fishing  and farm  products (with the 
exception of  coffee)  improved dramatically. 
The total value of  merchandise imports rose 
by US$ 2.1 billion, showing great inelasticity in 
response to the slow down in domestic spending. 
As in 1994, externa] purchases of  goods tended 
to be concentrated in intermediate and capital 
goods, which accounted for  more than 70% of 
the total and grew by almost 40%. The rate of 
growth in imports of  consumer goods -the first 
to be affected  by the downturn in economic 
activity- declined relatively little (33% as 
compared with 50% in 1994). 
The external debt totalled US$ 27.5 billion in 
December 1995, increasing by US$ 800 million 
in medium- and long-term debt and US$ 1.2 
billion in short-term debt. New medium- and 
long-term loans included US$ 206 million 
granted by the Paris Club and US$ 506 million 
granted by international institutions. 
The most important development in 
international relations in 1995 was the 
preliminary agreement reached between the 
Peruvian Government and representatives of  240 
creditor banks, headed by Citibank, under the 
Brady Plan. The preliminary agreement was 
based on a 45% discount on the face  value of  the 
external debt. The amount to be rescheduled 
included principal of  US$ 4.4 billion and interest 
arrears estimated at around US$ 5 billion. The 
annual debt service cost that will result from  the 
agreement, due to be signed in July 1996, will 
depend on a set of  options. 
There are four  options with regard to the 
principal: i) a par bond guaranteed by the United 
States Department of  the Treasury, with a 
30-year term and grace period, at rates of  interest 
rising gradually from  3% to 5%; ii) a discount 
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bond, also guaranteed by the United States 
Treasury, with a 30-year term and a 45% 
discount, at a rate of  interest equal to the 
six-month LIBOR plus 0.81%; iii) an interest 
reduction bond, with a 20-year term, amortizable 
in 25 half-yearly  instalments beginning the 
eighth year after  issuance; iv) a debt buyback 
option in the form  of  a Dutch auction, partially 
realized by the Government of  Peru during 
1995, for  an amount not officially  disclosed. 
Most of  the interest payment options involve a 
20-year repayment period and a five-year  grace 
period, at 0.81% over the three-month LIBOR; the 
interest rate on unpaid interest will be 2.5% per 
annum. Lastly, it will be possible to use the Brady 
bonds issued by the Peruvian Government to 
purchase public-sector enterprises that are up for 
sale. 
One of  the commitments contained in the 
preliminary agreement with the commercial 
banks requires Peru to pay 0.5% of  the principal 
on a quarterly basis and US$ 225 million when 
the agreement takes effect;  this amount is to be 
financed  from  the proceeds of  privatizations and 
by loans provided by multilateral organizations 
(the Inter-American Development Bank, the 





1. General trends 
In 1995, economic activity in the Dominican 
Republic expanded by a slightly higher rate 
(almost 5%) than in the preceding year and, as a 
result, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
increased for  the fourth  consecutive year, even 
though the unemployment rate remained high at 
16%. This trend was in keeping with the 
structural adjustment programme undertaken in 
September 1994 in an effort  to reduce the 
externa] imbalance, narrow the fiscal  deficit, 
limit the growth of  the money supply and curb 
inflation.  With the exception of  the targets 
relating to monetary expansion, these goals were 
met, mainly as a result of  the strong performance 
of  the external sector, which contributed to a 
substantia] increase in national income. 
The restraint of  fiscal  spending resulted in a 
small surplus in public-sector accounts. For its 
part, the strong performance  of  the tourism sector 
led to a turnaround in the current account, 
whose chronic deficit  gave way to a surplus, 
thereby permitting a build-up of  international 
reserves. 
The higher level of  national income boosted 
private spending, thus fuelling  an expansion of 
production and imports. This expansion was 
reinforced  by an upturn in credit based on the 
growth in the money supply caused by the 
build-up of  international reserves. The steadiness 
of  the nominal exchange rate and improved 
supplies of  goods helped to moderate pressures 
on prices, which rose 9%. 
In the first  quarter of  1995, the Dominican 
Republic was admitted as a member of  the World 
Trade Organization (WTC). During this period the 
country was also stepping up structural reforms 
relating to the liberalization of  both trade and 
investment. 
2. Economic policy 
The authorities' achievement of  a balanced 
budget was not matched by similar success in 
controlling monetary aggregates, since this goal 
was difficult  to reconcile with the maintenance 
of  a stable nominal exchange rate at a time of 
increased foreign  currency inflows. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy was in keeping with the 
guidelines established for  the adjustment 
programme initiated in September 1994 with a 
view to balancing the budget. The results were 
satisfactory,  since an overall surplus was 
recorded in central government accounts and in 
the accounts of  the consolidated non-financial 
public sector (0.5% of  GDP); in addition, the 
central government was able to save the 
equivalent of  seven percentage points of  GDP. 
The central government's surplus was 
attributable entirely to a decrease in spending 
from  slightly over 16% to 14.5% of  GDP, since 
income held steady at around 15%. 
The share of  tax revenue and non-tax revenue 
(93% and 7%, respectively) in the central 
government's total current income did not vary, 
and the tax ratio therefore  remained in the 14% 
range. Receipts from  direct taxes increased more 
sharply than indirect tax revenue due to the expansion 
of  the income-tax base and thus came to account 
for  close to one-fifth  of  total tax income. 
Product taxes, which represented 43% of 
indirect taxes, were clearly the largest component 
in this category and accounted for  half  the 
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increase in these receipts. Among these 
commodity taxes, the oil tax (38% of  the total) 
and the duty on the transfer  of  manufactured 
goods and services (19%) were the most 
important sources of  revenue. Taxes on foreign 
trade represented 29% of  tax revenue and were 
responsible for  14% of  the growth in total indirect 
taxes. The large share of  receipts accounted for 
by this item indicates just how sensitive tax 
revenues are to the trade liberalization process. 
Under an act which was passed in May to 
standardize excise taxes, beer and cigarettes are 
subject to a rate of  20% and alcoholic beverages, 
to one of  25%; however, it remains to be seen 
what effect  this will have on the tax yield. 
The decline in spending was attributable to a 
lower level of  capital outlays, which totalled 
close to 7% of  GDP in 1995, i.e., two percentage 
points less than in the previous year. Under this 
heading, fixed  capital investment and capital 
transfers  both declined and the relative weight of 
these items in overall spending thus fell  to 32% 
and 17%, respectively. Current expenditure rose 
very slightly -to approximately 8%- but the Govern-
ment obtained this result only by delaying service 
payments of  500 million pesos on outstanding 
debts and payments to contractors which could 
add up to over one percentage point of  GDP. 
In terms of  appropriations, the share of 
economic and financial  services increased at the 
expense of  disbursements for  social services, 
which contracted as a result of  the decrease in 
expenditure under the heading sewerage and 
drinking water supply. Despite the decrease in 
overall social spending, expenditure on 
education and health showed a slight increase, 
representing 4% of  total spending in 1995. 
The fiscal  surplus, together with the receipt of 
non-recurrent income from  domestic sources, 
enabled the central government to make 
payments on its foreign  debts and reduce its 
deposit liabilities with the Central Bank. 
b) Monetary and foreign  exchange policy 
Monetary policy had an expansionary effect 
due to a sharp increase in international reserves, 
notwithstanding the explicit objective of 
controlling monetary aggregates which was set 
out in the adjustment programme. The authorities 
continued to pursue the process of  amending the 
legal framework,  which they had initiated in late 
1994, in order to forestall  excessive money 
creation, and the Monetary Board passed a 
number of  resolutions designed to prevent the 
extension of  credit to the public sector. 
The build-up of  international reserves and, to 
a lesser degree, the expansion of  credit to 
decentralized government institutions made it 
impossible to achieve the authorities' monetary 
target. In order to be compatible with projected 
real GDP growth and the decline in the rate of 
inflation,  expansion of  the monetary base should 
not have exceeded 12% but in fact,  it was far 
above this level in spite of  the sale of  bonds in an 
attempt to regulate the money supply and the 
domestic credit restraints created by a policy of 
cutting back on loans, rediscounts and credit to 
the central government. 
The money supply (Ml) increased 23%, while 
local-currency broad money(M2) went up 20%; 
this may be attributed to the slower rate of 
increase in quasi-money, in which was 
apparently related to the downward trend in 
interest rates on deposits. 
Nevertheless, by the end of  1995, interest rates 
on deposits as well as on loans were still fairly 
high (approximately 13% and 27% in real terms) 
and the interest rate on domestic accounts 
denominated in foreign  currency was over 14%. 
A more stringent monetary policy would have 
yielded even higher rates, which would have 
pushed up the cost of  the domestic debt of  the 
Central Bank. Moreover, it would have added to 
the upward pressure on the local currency, which 
was being maintained by the monetary 
authorities at a constant exchange rate of  12.87 
pesos to the dollar, while the floating  exchange 
rate fluctuated  within a narrow margin below the 
14-peso mark. Since domestic inflation  was 
higher than the external rate, a small real 
appreciation of  the peso was observed. Indeed, a 
comparison of  annual averages reveals that the 
average for  1995 was 4% higher than the figure 
for  the preceding year. 
c) Trade policy 
The existence of  an official  exchange rate that 
was lower than the free  market rate meant that 
295 
Table 1 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 2.3 4.6 -4.9 0.8 6.7 2.2 4.3 4.7 
Per capita gross domestic product 0.1 2.4 -6.9 -1.2 4.6 0.3 2.3 2.9 
Gross national income 7.2 3.2 -12.0 7.0 4.4 3.7 7.1 8.6 
Gross domestic product, by sector 
Goods -1.0 4.6 -7.3 -0.4 8.9 0.4 5.5 4.0 
Basic services 0.6 5.6 -6.6 6.8 15.8 7.0 4.9 9.1 
Other services 5.8 4.5 -2.6 1.0 3.4 3.0 3.1 4.7 
Percentages 
Contribution to growth of  GDP C 
Consumption 5.3 4.5 -10.1 7.6 8.5 -2.4 1.8 1.4 
Government 0.2 • 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Private 5.0 4.4 -10.2. 7.5 8.3 -2.5 1.7 1.4 
Gross domestic investment -4.5 4.5 -4.5 -2.2 5.4 1.9 1.7 3.4 
Exports 1.8 -0.6 1.7 -2.4 1.6 2.3 3.2 2.3 
Imports -0.2 -3.7 8.0 -2.2 -8.8 0.4 -2.5 -2.3 
Percentages of  GDP b 
Gross domestic product 25.2 28.4 25.1 22.8 26.4 27.8 28.3 30.2 
National saving 24.9 22.9 20.8 20.2 15.5 21.3 26.0 32.5 
External saving 0.4 5.5 4.3 2.6 11.0 6.5 2.3 -2.3 
Percentages 
Employment and wages 
Real minimum wage 
(Index 1990 = 100) 115.0 102.9 100.0 97.0 118.0 112.1 119.1 121.6 
Growth rates 
Prices (December-December) 
Consumer prices 55.8 34.6 79.9 7.9 5.2 2.8 14.3 9.2 
External sector 
Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 137.1 131.1 100.0 119.2 116.1 124.3 126.7 139.2 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 6.11 6.34 8.29 12.61 12.79 12.68 13.16 13.62 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990 = 100) 151.0 109.2 100.0 100.6 101.3 96.0 95.4 93.5 
Millions of  dollars 
Balance of  payments 
Current account -19 -327 -280 -157 -708 -425 -159 163 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) -102 -463 -402 -351 -818 -472 -333 -23 
Exports 1 903 1966 1 832 1 857 1 911 2 210 2 544 3 026 
Imports 2 005 2 429 2 233 2 208 2 729 2 682 2 878 3 049 
Capital and financial  account -16 160 -17 -138 76 -65 270 -20 
Overall balance 1 -241 -418 253 -63 34 -386 143 
International reserves 




(as a percentage of  GDP) 73.8 56.7 58.4 55.0 45.4 45.0 37.7 35.0 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 14.2 6.3 8.7 3.9 6.3 8.1 3.6 3.5 
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Table 1 (conclusion) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Central government 
Current income 15.5 13.5 10.3 13.1 15.3 15.9 15.1 15.0 
Current expenditure 7.5 6.7 5.4 5.3 6.0 8.2 7.7 7.9 
Savings 8.0 6.7 4.9 7.9 9.4 7.8 7.4 7.1 
Capital expenditure 9.5 6.8 4.6 5.1 6.5 8.1 8.6 6.6 
Fianancial balance -1.6 -0.1 0.3 2.8 2.9 -0.4 -1.2 0.5 
Domestic financing 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -2.5 -2.2 1.4 2.1 0.5 
External financing 1.2 - - -0.3 -0.6 -1.1 -0.9 -1.0 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of  banking 
system 
Net international reserves 53.8 45.3 -91.4 519.3 
Net domestic credit 21/7 5.5 24.5 17.3 39.1 10.7 
Money (Ml) 21.1 27.6 15.3 25.1 2.3 23.5 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 18.0 48.9 38.9 30.3 13.9 18.2 
M2 19.6 37.4 27.1 27.9 8.7 20.4 
Dollar desposits 94.7 -71.4 -8.4 -3.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990dollars. 'Theseentriesmeasuretheimpactofthevariationineachaggregate 
on GDP growth, the coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Refers  to net interest as shown on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods 
and services. 
Table 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995" 
i ii HI iv i ii m rv i n m iv 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 7.6 4.3 4.3 2.8 5.6 8.2 10.0 14.3 14.2 11.8 11.8 9.2 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 96.6 98.4 97.5 97.2 95.9 94.9 95.8 94.8 91.8 95.3 94.4 92.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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certain export and import activities were actually 
subject to a system of  implicit subsidies and 
taxes. In particular, official  trade transactions 
penalize traditional exports, such as sugar, and 
subsidize the consumption of  petroleum and 
petroleum products. 
The Government ' s advocacy of  the 
prospective free  trade area of  the Americas 
(FTAA) and its decision to become a member of 
the existing Association of  Caribbean States 
(ACS) highlighted its intention to intensify  efforts 
to integrate the country into the global economy. 
On the other hand, the real appreciation of  the 
peso, in a context of  trade liberalization, did not 
provide any incentives to the tradables-
producing sectors of  the economy. 
Shortly after  the legislature had ratified  the 
agreements reached during the Uruguay Round 
in January 1995, the Dominican Republic 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Various bilateral arrangements were also 
renewed in 1995, including textile agreements 
with the United States and Canada which had 
originally been signed in 1979 and 1988, 
respectively. 
Moreover, in June 1995, the foreign  exchange 
surtax on imports was abolished system of 
minimum export prices for  agricultural exports 
was discontinued. The tariffs  applied to domestic 
and imported goods were standardized. 
Notwithstanding these measures, there is still 
some degree of  dispersion in the tariff  structure 
and, according to estimates, some sectors enjoy 
an effective  level of  protection of  over 200%. 
d) Structural reforms 
In the course of  the year, progress was made 
in the implementation of  structural reforms 
designed to provide a legal basis for  the 
liberalization of  the economy. In December 
Congress approved the new Foreign Investment 
Act, which replaces the legislation enacted in 
1978, with a view to attracting foreign  capital by 
offering  the same treatment as is granted to 
national investors. The proposal for  joining the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) was another step in keeping with this 
policy. 
The debate continued on a number of 
supplementary bills to the reform  package 
launched in September 1994 whose objective 
would be to close the fiscal  gap by raising income 
and reducing expenditure. The proposed 
amendments to the tax code seek to increase the 
tax yield, fiscal  transparency and administrative 
efficiency  and to prevent excessive money 
creation. The projected reform  of  energy 
legislation would ensure a more efficient  supply 
and a reduction in the government subsidy 
provided to the Corporación Dominicana de 
Electricidad (CDE). 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
In 1995 the rate of  domestic activity was on 
the upturn, and this higher growth rate (almost 
5%), together with the substantial improvement 
in the terms of  trade with the rest of  the world 
and the higher level of  private remittances, 
generated a substantial increase (over 8%) in 
gross national income. 
This increase was coupled with an expansion 
in aggregate domestic demand which was 
fuelled,  in particular, by private consumption and 
private investment, and this, in combination with 
the growth in the volume of  exports of  goods and 
services, resulted in a 5% rise in total demand. 
However, the bulk of  this higher level of  demand 
was channelled towards imports, which swelled 
by 5.5%. 
Private consumption was up 2% thanks to an 
increase in wages and family  remittances in real 
terms. The downward trend in real interest rates 
presumably gave the country's households 
greater access to credit facilities.  Gross 
investment maintained a growth rate of  almost 
double the 1994 figure  (11.6%); as a result, this 
variable, which had stood at 25% of  GDP in 1990, 
climbed to 29.4% within a context favourable  not 
only to stability in the exchange rate and in 
domestic prices but also to a downward trend in 
interest rates. 
Exports of  goods and services increased by 
almost 8%, which was a lower rate than in the 
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two previous years. The fall  in shipments of  the 
country 's two main exports (sugar and 
ferronickel)  was not entirely offset  by the rise in 
these products' prices on the international market. 
Almost one fifth  of  the total increase in GDP 
was generated by the agricultural sector, which 
grew by 6% in spite of  adverse weather 
conditions that included a drought in the first 
half-year.  The crop-farming  subsector played a 
key role in the increase and, within that subsector, 
a particularly strong performance  was turned in 
by grains (rice and maize), oilseeds (peanuts) and 
root crops (sweet potato and cassava), i.e., crops 
intended for  local consumption -which were up 
16%. On the other hand, export-oriented 
agriculture was down (-2%), primarily owing to 
a decline in the output of  the sugar industry, 
which was hampered by financial  difficulties, 
run-down machinery and equipment, and 
short-comings in the management practices of 
the Corporación Estatal del Azúcar (CEA). 
Livestock production recorded some gains, 
mainly under the headings of  poultry and milk. 
In contrast to the overall performance  of  the 
economy, the manufacturing  sector was in the 
doldrums, and its contribution to GDP fell  below 
14%. The country's in-bond processing 
industries turned in a highly dynamic 
performance,  however. In fact,  this segment was 
so buoyant that in 1995 it accounted for  almost a 
quarter of  total foreign  exchange earnings, its 
capital investment rate went up by 8% and 30 
new companies were founded,  bringing the total 
number of  such firms  to over 500 by the end of 
the year. On the other hand, local industries -in 
particular the sugar industry- did not benefit 
from  the growth in demand. Indeed as a result of 
financial  constraints and outdated technology, 
their production levels actually declined, with 
sugar and sugar products falling  back 10%, 
thereby obliging the Dominican Republic to 
increase its sugar imports from  35,000 to 40,000 
tons. 
The mining sector experienced a 9% 
improvement and its contribution to GDP growth 
amounted to 6%. Ferronickel production 
scarcely increased at all, even though demand on 
the international market was strong. 
The downturn in construction, a sector which 
in any event still recorded 6% growth, was 
marked by the uneven patterns of  public and 
private investment; the latter was stimulated by 
the increased availability of  housingand business 
loans and by the decrease in real interest rates. 
The Duarte highway and the Monción dam were 
the largest infrastructure  projects carried out by 
the Government in 1995, but the amount of 
public investment in construction was lower 
nonetheless. 
The performance  of  the different  production 
sectors was hindered by an inadequate electricity 
supply. The electricity, gas and water sector 
experienced a 4% downturn due to a decrease in 
the output of  the CDE and an increase in line 
losses. The contribution of  private producers, on 
the other hand, continued to expand, reaching 
one third of  the total available power supply for 
the year and alleviating the shortfall. 
Transport and communications were up 10%. 
Communications services expanded 
significantly,  particularly in the case of  the 
telephone subsector (19%), which substantially 
increased the number of  available lines. 
Telecommunications accounted for  14% of  the 
growth in output in 1995 and show considerable 
potential. The remarkable increase in tourism 
(17%) was mainly attributable to gains in hotel 
services. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
A number of  factors  combined to bring 
inflation  down from  14% to 9% in 1995. Some 
of  the most important of  these factors  were the 
carry-over effect  of  the tight monetary policy 
applied during the preceding year, the 
consolidation of  the real exchange rate for  the 
peso and an increase in the supply of  food 
poducts, which are the most heavily weighted 
component of  the consumer price index (CPI). 
Food, beverages and tobacco recorded the same 
rate of  increase as the overall index; on the other 
hand, the cost of  housing rose more sharply 
(12%), while clothing was up by just 5%. 
The National Minimum Wage Commission 
awarded a 20% increase -effective  as of  May- in 
the minimum wage for  workers in the private 
sector and in the country's export processing 
zones, which amounted to an improvement of 
close to 7% in real terms. The increase in 
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public-sector wages was more substantial: 30% 
and 19%, respectively. 
The available data indicate that the 
unemployment rate remained in the 16% range 
despite the increase in economic activity. The 
tourism sector accounted for  the highest number 
of  new jobs: 39,000. On the other hand, the rate 
of  job creation in the export processing zones, 
which provide employment to 8% of 
jobholders who declare their income, declined 
with the introduction of  changes in management 
policies. 
c) The external sector 
The performance  of  the external sector 
improved significantly.  The current account 
balance, which has traditionally shown a deficit, 
yielded a surplus of  US$ 163 million, while the 
capital account deficit  fell  to only US$ 20 
million. Following the substantial erosion 
observed the previous year, there was a US$ 113 
million build-up in reserves in 1995. 
The chronic deficit  in the country's trade in 
goods and services virtually disappeared thanks, 
above all, to the expansion in exports of  services, 
especially in the tourism sector. Tourism 
generated the most foreign  exchange earnings 
-US$ 1.6 billion- of  any single sector, thus 
bringing in the equivalent of  almost half  as much 
as the Dominican Republic's total sales of  goods 
and services on the export market. 
The value of  merchandise exports rose 15%, 
with an increase in volume and a rise in 
international prices contributing equally to the 
upturn. The volume of  exports of  some products, 
such as sugar, cocoa and ferronickel,  were down, 
however. In the case of  the last two of  these 
commodities, the decline in shipments was easily 
offset  by the rise in prices; this was particularly 
true in the case of  ferronickel  sales, whose value 
jumped 22%. The 14% rise in the price of  sugar 
was not sufficient  to offset  the decline in 
shipments, however, and the value of  sales thus 
showed a 12% contraction. Earnings from  the 
country's other main export products were 
higher, with textiles and bananas benefiting  from 
an increase in the quotas maintained by the 
United States on the former  and by the European 
Union on the latter. The value of  non-traditional 
exports approached US$ 190 million, or one 
quarter of  total exports. 
A larger increase in merchandise imports was 
observed, in absolute (US$ 100 million) as well 
as relative terms (4%), as a result of  an upswing 
in both their volumes and their prices. More than 
half  of  total imports were raw materials and 
intermediate goods, which expanded by 34%. 
The greatest relative increases were those 
recorded for  food  imports, however. On the other 
hand, imports of  durables and capital goods were 
lower. 
Remittances from  Dominican nationals 
residing abroad continued to increase, exceeding 
US$ 530 million. 
Largely as a result of  a slackening of  net 
capital outflows,  the capital account's tendency 
to move towards a more balanced position 
became more definite  than it had been before. 
Lower amortization payments and an increase in 
disbursed loans led to a decrease in long-term 
capita] outflows,  while the fact  that domestic 
interest rates were higher than external rates 
discouraged short-term outflows.  Another 
positive factor  was the continued moderate 
improvement in foreign  direct investment flows, 
which amounted to almost US$ 200 million in 
1995. 
The externa] debt remained in the US$ 4 
billion range but diminished as a percentage of 
GDP. In terms of  exports of  goods and services, it 
declined from  143% in 1994 to 123% in 1995; 
interest payments were also lower, representing 
just over 3% in 1995. 
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1. General Trends 
After  four  years of  rapid growth, the Uruguayan 
economy contracted by 3% in 1995 as a result of 
the fiscal  adjustment undertaken by the 
Administration that took office  in March and the 
slump in demand from  Argentina. The annual 
rate of  inflation  dropped to 35%, the lowest rate 
since 1982, and the fiscal  and external deficits 
narrowed. As a consequence of  the recession, 
open unemployment rose to almost 11% and real 
wages declined by 3%. 
The financial  disturbances that swept over the 
region following  Mexico's economic crash in 
late 1994 affected  the Uruguayan economy only 
indirectly, through their impact on Argentina. 
This was because the banking system in Uruguay 
channels the bulk of  its non-resident deposits to 
external borrowers and because the purchase and 
sale of  private debt paper on the securities market 
are of  negligible significance. 
On the other hand, as has also occurred under 
similar circumstances in the past, the Uruguayan 
financial  system increasingly came to be viewed 
as a haven within the subregion and therefore 
began to attract an additional inflow  of  funds 
from  residents of  neighbouring countries. 
However, the impact of  the turnaround in 
external financial  flows  on the Argentine 
economy triggered such a sharp contraction in 
this country's demand for  Uruguayan goods and 
services that stronger demand from  Brazil failed 
to offset  its effects. 
For its part, the Administration that took 
office  in March geared its economic policy to a 
rapid financial  adjustment; this adjustment was 
to be accomplished chiefly  through spending 
cuts, since, as private consumption slackened, a 
decrease in real income was anticipated. After 
climbing to 8% per year during 1990-1994, 
private consumption went down by 4% in 1995. 
The downturn in investment -which had 
expanded by one-third its total level during the 
previous four-year  period- was on a larger scale 
(8%). As the physical volume of  exports 
contracted less than the volume of  imports, the 
country's large deficit  in its external trade of 
goods and services diminished. 
A strong trend towards a narrowing of  the 
fiscal  gap and a decline in the rate of  inflation 
were the most notable features  of  the authorities' 
economic policy during the last quarter of  1995. 
The financial  programme for  1996 has been 
designed to bring inflation  down to 20% by 
reducing the public-sector deficit  to less than 1% 
of  GDP and by devaluing the currency by an 
amount similar to the expected rate of  inflation. 
With this aim in view, starting in April the 
devaluation rate applied to the floor  of  the 
flotation  band was reduced to 1.8% per month. 
As of  May, the cumulative variation in retail 
prices over the preceding 12 months had fallen 
to 30%. 
The economy remained in a recession during 
the first  few  months of  1996. Trade in goods and 
services showed a widening deficit  due to 
sluggish exports and a new burst of  momentum 
in imports. Against this background, the 
unemployment rate rose to over 12%. 
Since only moderate growth has been 
projected for  the other countries of  the Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Uruguayan 
economy will probably recover only partially 
from  the setback it suffered  in 1995. 
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2. Econ 
The short-term object ives of  the new 
Administration have been to bring inflation  down 
and restore the economy's external 
competitiveness. For the longer-term, the reform 
of  the social security system is high on its list of 
objectives in the area of  structural change. 
The implementation of  the Southern Common 
Market early in the year marked the culmination 
of  Uruguay's process of  integration with 
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The new Administration's decision to place 
priority on the effort  to reduce inflation  by 
maintaining the currency band's rate of  crawl at 
27% per year caused increased importance to be 
attached to fiscal  policy. 
The public sector's fiscal  deficit,  which had 
represented 3% of  gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 1994, widened to 3.7% in the 12-month period 
to March 1995. Given the fact  that any increase 
in government borrowing was to be avoided, 
financing  this deficit  through monetary 
expansion would have been incompatible with 
the objective of  lowering inflation  to an annual 
rate of  35%. 
The Administration's first  actions after  taking 
office  in March were to increase the tax load and 
cut back on government spending. The minimum 
and maximum value-added tax (VAT) rates of 
12% and 22% were raised to 14% and 23%, and 
the tax on personal income was raised and made 
applicable to the general public. In addition, the 
prices and rates charged for  public-sector goods 
and services were raised in real terms. The 
authorities' management of  public expenditure 
was geared towards slowing down investment, 
which had increased sharply, and reducing the 
proportion of  current expenditure. 
Fiscal policy thus assumed a procyclical 
character, inasmuch as, after  following  an 
expansionary line during the growth phase, it 
then began to focus  on bringing about an 
adjustment, hence becoming contractionary, in 
anticipation of  a fall-off  in both domestic and 
regional demand due to the ripple effect  of  the 
Mexican economic crisis. Moreover, by 
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ic policy 
awarding industrial firms  a six percentage point 
reduction in employer contributions, fiscal  policy 
was also used to buoy external competitiveness. 
The adjustment proved so successful  that the 
consolidated public-sector deficit  shrank to 2.1% 
of  GDP, which was three-tenths of  a point below 
the target. 
The pricing policy of  public-sector 
corporations and, in particular, the cutback in 
capital expenditure enabled these firms  to post a 
financial  surplus equivalent to 1.3% of  GDP, 
which was almost 1% above the figure  for  the 
preceding year. The central government surplus 
(even counting disbursements from  the police 
and armed forces'  pension funds)  represented 
over 3% of  GDP, thanks to a combination of 
higher revenues and lower current and capital 
expenditure. On the other hand, the deficit  of  the 
social security system widened from  5.2% to 
5.8% of  GDP, while the quasi-fiscal  deficit 
generated by the financial  system added another 
0.6%. 
The 2% real decline in fiscal  revenues was 
primarily due to the concentration of  external 
purchases within MERCOSUR, since it maintains a 
special system of  preferences  under which lower 
import duties are applied. About one-third of  that 
decrease, however, was due to the effect  of  the 
contraction in domestic consumption on tax 
receipts. 
b) Foreign exchange policy 
The affirmation  of  its commitment to carry 
forward  the country's existing exchange-rate 
policy was a priority matter for  the new 
Administration, since it eased the uncertainty 
prevailing among economic agents regarding the 
consequences of  the change in government and 
the repercussions of  the Mexican crisis on the 
Argentine financial  market. 
The Central Bank thus maintained its 
scheduled devaluations at the rate of  2% per 
month for  the minimum level of  the 7%-wide 
flotation  band. Accordingly, the peso depreciated 
by 27% against the dollar in 1995. Since the 
variation in domestic prices tended to be in line 
with the variation in the foreign-exchange  anchor 
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Table 1 
U A : MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal bank exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar), annual average 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital and financial  account 
Overall balance 
International reserves (variation) 
External debt 
Gross debt 
(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net debt 
(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
-0.1 1.4 0.6 3.2 7.8 3.3 6.9 -2.8 
-0.7 0.8 0.1 2.6 7.2 2.7 6.3 -3.3 
1.5 1.8 -0.1 4.8 9.6 4.0 8.6 -1.9 
-0.5 1.0 -2.3 1.2 5.8 -4.4 5.8 -2.7 
5.9 3.4 3.2 9.2 13.0 8.2 11.4 3.1 
1.0 3.0 1.9 1.3 4.7 5.1 3.9 -3.2 
Percentages 
0.4 1.5 -0.6 3.1 8.3 4.2 8.7 -3.2 
-0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.0 
0.7 1.3 -0.9 3.0 8.1 4.1 8.2 -3.2 
-0.9 -1.1 0.0 3.1 1.6 2.0 1.7 0.3 
0.7 1.6 1.7 0.3 3.3 0.5 1.7 -1.8 
-0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -3.3 -5.4 -3.4 -5.2 1.9 
Percentages Of  GDP 
12.1 10.8 10.8 13.5 13.9 15.4 16.0 16.7 
12.4 12.4 12.8 13.9 13.9 13.1 12.2 13.9 
-0.3 -1.5 -2.0 -0.4 0.1 2.3 3.7 2.9 
Percentages 
59.4 59.7 59.4 59.6 59.5 59.0 60.6 62.1 
8.9 8.6 9.3 9.1 9.0 8.4 9.1 10.6 
102.3 109.7 100.0 103.8 106.1 111.2 112.2 109.0 
Growth rates 
69.0 89.2 129.0 81.5 58.9 52.9 44.1 35.4 
60.5 80.7 120.7 68.6 46.9 31.1 41.0 27.7 
102.9 105.5 100.0 100.6 105.1 106.8 115.4 117.7 
0.359 0.606 1.17 2.02 3.03 3.95 5.06 6.35 
86.7 86.3 100.0 88.1 84.1 76.8 76.6 79.4 
Millions of  dollars 
22 134 186 42 -9 -244 -439 -348 
325 474 499 235 150 -105 -237 -208 
1 753 2 032 2 159 2 201 2 632 2 760 3 248 3 288 
1 428 1 558 1 659 1 966 2 482 2 865 3 485 3 496 
187 -6 -86 -429 -92 224 672 373 
-38 65 136 82 138 189 238 209 
-47 -3 40 114 186 179 243 162 
Percentages 
84.4 89.1 89.5 75.2 64.9 63.4 59.6 63.1 
42.2 41.4 35.5 25.7 20.5 19.2 18.6 16.5 
17.4 17.2 14.9 10.6 7.1 5.3 5.0 2.5 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
Non-financial  public sector 
Current income 21.8 23.8 28.9 31.1 31.8 30.7 32.0 32.2 
Current expenditure 22.4 23.5 24.5 25.7 26.4 27.7 29.0 29.1 
Savings 2.4 0.3 4.4 5.4 5.4 4.0 3.0 3.1 
Capital expenditure 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.8 6.0 4.5 
Financial balance -1.4 -3.5 0.4 1.3 1.4 -0.8 -3.0 -1.4 
Growth rates 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 58.2 156.5 161.1 66.9 45.8 25.5 48.7 56.7 
Net domestic credit 112.3 104.5 97.0 90.7 49.4 38.9 45.8 38.2 
To public sector 106.6 77.6 85.0 17.7 60.1 31.4 48.0 7.5 
To private sector 75.4 73.5 87.6 65.8 70.2 46.8 51.4 58.2 
Money (Ml) 62.4 69.1 112.3 95.5 70.1 58.4 42.2 31.9 
Local-currency savings and 
time deposits 54.6 59.1 66.4 76.6 44.1 47.6 27.5 57.9 
M2 58.1 63.5 87.5 86.4 58.3 53.9 36.4 41.6 
Dollar deposits 97.2 144.4 132.3 77.7 45.7 29.5 48.5 47.2 
Annual rates 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits -0.7 -2.3 -13.1 -3.1 -2.9 -8.7 -4.9 2.2 
On loans 19.5 20.3 20.5 39.8 37.0 29.4 35.5 47.9 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign  currency 8.7 4.7 0.4 10.9 9.1 10.3 9.0 9.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b Based on constant 1990 dollars. c These entries measure the impact of  the variation in each aggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate'S annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). Interest rate deposits, deflated  by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
URUGUAY: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1993 1994 1995a 
i ii in iv i II HI iv i II ni iv 
Gross domestic product b 
(Index: 1990=100) 114.9 111.9 114.9 117.0 119.2 123.0 123.3 123.6 122.1 121.2 115.3 119.3 
Consumer prices (nationwide) 
(12-month variation, %) 54.3 56.4 53.0 52.9 47.9 42.6 41.3 44.1 45.3 44.9 42.2 35.4 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 80.1 78.1 75.4 73.4 73.1 72.8 80.3 80.3 80.2 79.4 78.6 79.2 
Real interest rate (annualized, %) 
On deposits -9.9 -16.5 -7.6 -0.7 1.6 -5.6 -6.8 -8.6 0.7 -2.0 1.2 8.7 
On loans (not prime) 28.5 17.2 28.7 43.2 45.9 35.3 31.5 29.4 43.7 43.5 47.8 53.1 
Money (Ml) 
(12-month variation, %) 67.7 47.1 48.3 60.9 46.7 47.0 50.4 43.9 40.6 34.1 33.7 32.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  b On the basis of  seasonally-adjusted figures  at constant domestic prices. 
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and the relevant portion of  external inflation,  the 
local currency's ability to compete against the 
basket of  currencies of  Uruguay's major trading 
partners remained virtually unchanged. This was 
the result of  the Uruguayan peso's depreciation 
against the Brazilian real and its appreciation 
against the Argentine peso and the currencies of 
the other countries outside the subregion. 
Nevertheless, the annual average real exchange 
rate in 1995 was higher than the average 
registered for  the preceding year owing to the 
sharp appreciation of  the Brazilian currency 
during the second half  of  1994. 
c) Monetary policy 
Under this foreign  exchange policy, monetary 
policy played a passive (endogenous) role near 
the boundaries of  the currency band but became 
more aggressive within it. During most of  1995, 
the exchange rate for  the dollar stayed at or very 
close to the floor  of  the band. 
At this point, the Central Bank's policy 
management role was limited to maintaining the 
desired level of  liquidity while avoiding any 
sharp swings. The tools used by the Central Bank 
to accomplish this were the short-term interest 
rates that it paid on deposits made by the 
country's banks, the sale of  peso-denominated 
Centra] Bank securities on the open market, and 
the interest it paid on interest-bearing reserves. 
The monetary base expanded 22% in 1995 
owing to an increase in international reserves 
(US$ 210 million). Overall, net domestic lending 
by the Central Bank had a contractionary effect, 
but para-fiscal  expenditure generated about 
one-third of  the growth of  base money. The 
redemption of  bonds that had been floated  as a 
means of  regulating the stock of  money also 
added to the local money supply. On the other 
hand, financial  institutions' deposits with the 
Central Bank had a contractionary impact. Sales 
of  six-month foreign-currency  "monetary 
regulation bonds" brought in more than enough 
to cover the increase in credit to the public sector 
(most of  which consisted of  credits to the central 
government that were denominated in foreign 
currencies and were paid through the Central 
Bank). This method of  financing  marked a 
departure from  the approach used in previous 
years, when the Government had issued 10-year 
Treasury bonds at floating  rates linked to the 
London Interbank Offered  Rate (LIBOR). 
The money supply expanded 32% in 1995, 
which, broadly speaking, meant that Ml kept 
pace with nominal transactions. Savings and time 
deposits increased more swiftly  (58%), partly 
because of  technological developments such as 
increased availability of  automatic teller 
machines and the more extensive use of  bank 
cards for  the payment of  personal wages into 
savings accounts. Towards the end of  the year, 
higher real returns also played a part, since, in 
nominal terms, interest rates declined more 
slowly than inflation.  Another factor 
contributing to the expansion in quasi-money 
was the high rate of  return in dollars of  interest 
paid on local-currency deposits at a time of 
strong public confidence  in the system of 
pre-established adjustments in the exchange rate. 
The broadly defined  money supply (M2) thus 
grew (42%) more than consumer prices. 
Bank credit to the private sector swelled 
almost 17% in real terms. This expansion was 
derived from  the increase in credit denominated 
in foreign  currency, which represented 80% of 
total credit, since local-currency lending 
remained fairly  constant. Consumer credit, 
which has low default  rates, showed the highest 
increase and mainly took the form  of  credit cards 
issued by banks or by companies specializing in 
this form  of  financing  that have been founded  by 
banks in partnership with other business firms. 
Offshore  transactions continued to expand. 
Indeed, following  the Mexican crisis and its 
impact on the Argentine financial  system, the 
level of  these types of  transactions surged. The 
expansion of  this market was manifested  in an 
increase not only in the volume of  deposits by 
and loans to non-residents but also in the 
number of  institutions involved. Although 
almost all the institutions in the banking 
system carry out operations of  this sort, the 
number of  firms  whose main business activity 
is externa] financial  intermediation increased 
in 1995. Non-resident deposits grew by 
one-third in 1995, amounting to close to US$ 
3.15 billion. Loans to non-residents climbed at a 
slower pace, reaching US$ 950 million by the 
end of  the year. 
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d) Structural reforms 
As part of  its structural reform  process, 
Uruguay joined forces  with Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay within the framework  of  the Southern 
Common Market, which became operative on 1 
January 1995. A common external tariff  entered 
into force  and the bulk of  the trading operations 
among these countries were liberalized. Since 
these instruments are subject to a list of  exemptions, 
this will be an imperfect  customs union for  some 
time to come. In the course of  the year, advances 
were made in the negotiations concerning the 
possibility of  Bolivia and Chile becoming 
members of  MERCOSUR and in the formation  of  a 
free  trade zone with the European Union. 
Intra-MERCOSUR trade has intensified 
considerably. In 1995, the subregion bought 47% 
of  Uruguay's merchandise exports and sold it 
46% of  its imports, compared with 35% and 40%, 
respectively, in 1990. 
As another facet  of  the country's structural 
reform  process, changes made in the social 
security system in 1995 became effective  in April 
1996. The level of  expenditure under Uruguay's 
pay-as-you-go social security system has been 
very high (over 16% of  GDP) and has been running 
up a deficit  equivalent to around 6% of  GDP. fa 
1995, this distributive system was replaced by a 
mixed scheme consisting of  a pay-as-you-go 
component and a funded  component. The new 
system divides up pensionable remuneration into 
three brackets. Up to a salary level of  close to 
US$ 800, both employer and employee contributions 
are compulsory and are paid into the distributive 
(or joint) scheme. Between this level and 
US$ 1,600, employer and employee contributions 
are still compulsory but are apportioned to two 
different  funds;  the employer's contribution is 
credited to the public distributive system and the 
employee's contribution is paid into the 
individual funded  pension system, which is 
managed by private companies. Above this 
second limit, contributions are channeled 
entirely into the funded  system and are optional. 
The new system is mandatory for  workers under 
40 years of  age and optional for  older employees. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The economic turnabout was led by domestic 
demand -which contracted almost 3% after 
expanding at an average annual rate of  8% in 
1991-1994- and was the key factor  in the 
performance  of  the Uruguayan economy in 1995. 
External sales and imports, measured at constant 
prices, recorded similar declines. Thus, GDP fell 
back almost 3%, after  having grown at an annual 
pace of  5% during the preceding four-year 
period. 
The fiscal  adjustment -particularly as 
reflected  in cutbacks in public investment during 
the first  half-year-  and the shrinkage of  domestic 
demand in Argentina in the second half  of  the 
year were the main causes of  the erosion of  total 
demand. The turnaround in private consumer 
spending was considerable; having expanded by 
32% in the four  preceding years (11% in 1994), 
it receded 4% in 1995. The downswing in gross 
fixed  capital formation  was even more 
pronounced. In the case of  investment, the 4.5% 
increase recorded the year before  was cancelled 
out by a much sharper decline (7.6%) in 1995. 
Nevertheless, the notable rise in stocks, 
especially in the case of  agricultural products, 
more than made up for  this setback, and gross 
domestic investment therefore  exceeded its 1994 
level. This overall showing was compounded by 
a drop in the real level, in terms of  value, of  the 
demand for  tourism services, almost all of  which 
is generated by residents of  neighbouring 
countries, especially Argentina. 
The external demand for  goods was also 
affected  by the decline in demand from 
Argentina. In particular, there was a sharp 
reduction in this country's purchases from  the 
automotive industry, whose level of  production 
tumbled to half  its former  level. On the other 
hand, demand from  Brazil and stronger prices for 
traditional exports served to boost certain 
branches of  industry. 
Weakening demand, in its turn, prompted a 
real decrease (-6%) in the level of  imports, 
although it was still double the 1990 figure. 
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Within this economic environment, the most 
seriously affected  activities were construction 
(-15%) and commerce, restaurants and hotels 
(-11%). In the first  case, the downturn was 
evident both in public works, on account of  the 
fiscal  adjustment, and in private construction, 
which suffered  from  the fact  that building 
projects in Punta del Este and neighbouring 
resorts came to a virtual standstill. 
The slump in manufacturing  was also drastic 
and was a result of  downswings in transport 
equipment, textiles, machinery and metal 
products, non-metallic minerals, chemicals, 
paper, meat and sugar. Nevertheless, with the 
return to normal operations of  the State-owned 
oil refinery,  which had been undergoing 
retrofitting  during the previous year, the overall 
decline in manufacturing  was no more than 3%. 
By contrast, electricity services expanded 
-although the low water levels caused by the 
drought prompted an increase in thermo-electric 
power generation- as did transport and, above 
all, communications. There was also an increase 
in agricultural production, as a result of  advances 
in farm  output. Gains in rice, barley and 
sunflower  production accounted for  much of  this 
result, since the wheat harvest was down. In the 
livestock subsector, increases in the output of 
beef  and dairy products compensated for  the 
decline in wool production. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
As a consequence of  the fiscal  adjustment and 
the overall recessionary situation in the 
subregion, for  the first  time in several years 
consumer price movements tended to fall  into 
line with the combined effect  of  the rate of 
exchange and imported inflation.  Indeed, the 
price of  the dollar was up 27%, while the rate of 
international inflation  affecting  the country 
(approximately 7%) served mainly to underscore 
the higher levels of  prices in dollars in European 
countries, inasmuch as, unlike the situation 
during previous years, inflation  originating in 
neighbouring countries was quite low. In this 
context, consumer prices rose 35% in 1995, the 
lowest rate on record since 1982. 
The weakness of  domestic demand affected 
the labour market, reducing both the demand for 
labour and the real average wage (the latter was 
3% lower than in 1994). Since personal income 
tax rates were also increased in the course of  the 
year, the real erosion of  wage-earners' income 
was even greater. 
In addition to the decline in the demand for 
labour, there was also an increase in the labour 
supply. From a long-term perspective, however, 
employment levels were high and the activity 
rate (62%) was above the average for  the decade 
(60%). Nonetheless, the average unemployment 
rate for  the year was close to 11%, with the 
highest level in the last nine years being recorded 
in the second half  of  1995. 
The rise in unemployment was particularly 
intense in the construction sector, since it was in 
the downswing of  its business cycle, and in 
commerce, where production fell  back sharply as 
a result of  the decline in domestic demand. 
Employment was also lower in manufacturing;  a 
downward trend has been in evidence in this 
sector for  a number of  years now and has brought 
the unemployment rate in manufacturing 
activities in Montevideo to close to 13%. 
Agriculture and transport and communications 
services managed to sidestep this general slump. 
c) The external sector 
As in previous years, foreign  capital inflows 
were more than sufficient  to finance  Uruguay's 
current account deficit,  and the country's 
international reserves therefore  rose once more. 
In 1995, the gap in the current account was 
reduced to 2% of  GDP (versus almost 3% in 1994) 
and externa] funds  equivalent to over 3% of  GDP 
were received. 
In the first  half  of  the year, Brazil 's 
implementation of  the Real Plan had a favourable 
impact on Uruguay's external accounts, whereas 
the fall-off  in demand from  Argentina had just 
the opposite effect.  The terms of  trade remained 
stable, since both merchandise export and import 
prices increased by slightly over 6%. 
The increase in the value of  commodity 
exports made the largest contribution to the 
improvement in the trade balance, since earnings 
from  merchandise exports rose almost 11%, 
whereas purchases were up by only 3%. Even so, 
the trade balance showed a US$ 565 million 
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deficit,  equivalent to just over 3% of  GDP. The 
expansion in exports was entirely attributable to 
the increase in purchases by Brazil, which were 
43% higher than in 1994 and represented 
one-third of  total exports -the largest share ever 
to be accounted for  by a single trading partner. 
The expansion took place in the first  half-year; 
in the second, there was an abrupt slowdown. The 
sluggishness of  economic activity in Argentina, 
on the other hand, resulted in a 30% reduction in 
exports to that country, whose share of 
Uruguay's total exports thus shrank to 13%. 
Weakening Argentine demand also affected 
income from  tourism, which declined 3%. 
Traditional exports recorded the strongest 
growth (16%) due to higher prices, since 
shipments of  meat and wool were lower than in 
the previous year. The value of  external sales of 
all non-traditional exports was up 8%. Another 
factor  contributing to this increase was the 
upswing in exports of  commodities, in particular 
dairy products, barley, fish  and rice. The 
continuing brisk expansion of  wood exports 
represented the initial returns on major forestry 
investments. By contrast, exports of  transport 
equipment were down by a full  half  following  a 
rapid growth phase based on bilateral agreements 
with neighbouring countries. 
Merchandise imports continued to advance, 
albeit at a substantially slower pace. Purchases of 
capita] goods recorded the highest rise (12%), 
while the steady growth of  imports of  consumer 
goods brought their share of  the total to 28%. 
Imports of  raw materials and of  non-petroleum 
intermediate goods declined, however, as a result 
of  the downturn in manufacturing. 
The deficit  registered on the external current 
account was more than offset  by capital inflows 
of  around US$ 560 million. Official  borrowing 
in the form  of  sales of  debt instruments brought 
in half  of  the inflow.  Direct investment was again 
a significant  factor,  contributing a total of  US$ 
120 million. Net errors and omissions climbed to 
US$ 185 million; although private capital 
inflows  accounted for  a substantial portion of  this 
amount, unregistered purchases by 
non-residents, in particular by Argentines, 
represented a considerable percentage as well. 
Thus, international reserves held by the monetary 
authority (the Central Bank and Banco de la 
República Oriental del Uruguay) continued to 
increase, as has been the pattern for  over 10 years 
now. 
The public sector's gross external debt rose 
5%. Private debt not backed by government 
guarantees, including non-residents ' 
foreign-currency  deposits in Uruguayan banks, 
increased by almost US$ 1 billion, but as banks 
did not lend out the entire amount on deposit, 
their net debt decreased to less than US$ 450 
million. Total external debt service remained at 
about 4% of  GDP, of  which three quarters 




1. General trends 
In 1995, the Venezuelan economy continued to 
be marked by internal and external imbalances, 
despite price control and exchange rate measures 
in place since mid-1994 in an attempt to 
moderate their impact. Although this situation 
created uncertainty and inflationary  expectations 
and restrained domestic activity, the economy 
benefited  from  greater international demand for 
oil and gas, together with expanded output by the 
national oil company, which was committed to 
implementing an investment programme over a 
period of  several years. Accordingly, oil 
production rose by about 6%, enabling the 
Venezuelan economy to achieve 2% growth after 
two years of  recession. This was not enough, 
however, to prevent a further  rise in the 
unemployment rate to over 10% of  the labour 
force  in the second half  of  the year. 
Imbalances persisted in the fiscal,  monetary 
and externa] spheres and were compounded by 
interaction between the three. The fixed 
exchange rate system that remained in place for 
most of  1995 was a major obstacle to government 
efforts  to curb the fiscal  deficit  accumulated over 
a period of  several years. In consequence, the 
public sector ran a large deficit,  equivalent to 6% 
of  GDP, though lower than that of  1994, since the 
most serious phase of  the 1994 banking crisis had 
been surmounted. The deficit  fed  money supply 
growth and put pressure on prices, thereby 
contributing to an outflow  of  capital and a loss of 
reserves, which foreign  exchange controls could 
not prevent. The decline in reserves amounted to 
US$ 1.9 billion, in spite of  a positive trade 
balance and current account position attributable 
to higher export earnings. 
With abundant liquidity still in the system and 
demand for  money falling,  inflation  hovered 
around 57%, though this figure  was lower than 
the previous year owing to price controls and 
maintenance of  the nominal exchange rate for 
most of  1995. The rise in prices had an adverse 
effect  on real wages, since nominal wages failed 
to keep pace with inflation. 
Faced with the problem of  overcoming these 
imbalances and curbing exchange losses within 
the framework  of  the economic policy then in 
place, the authorities decided in April 1996 to 
begin implementing a wide-ranging adjustment 
programme dubbed the "Agenda Venezuela", 
which provided, among other things, for  the 
lifting  of  exchange rate and price controls. They 
also renewed efforts  to seek additional funding 
from  the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). 
2. Economic policy 
The Government left  in place the exchange and 
price controls it had introduced in July 1994 and 
persevered in its efforts  to rein in the fiscal 
deficit,  which was creating a highly inflationary 
climate. Once it was no longer bound by an active 
exchange-rate policy, the Central Bank of  Venezuela 
attempted to mitigate the pressure on prices by 
ensuring that liquidity did not expand excessively. 
Due to the difficulties  in achieving those 
objectives and the decline in foreign  exchange 
reserves despite exchange controls, the 
authorities began in the second half  to lay the 
groundwork for  a return to self-regulating  goods 
and foreign  exchange markets; their efforts  took 
the form  of  the above-mentioned adjustment 
programme, which served as the framework  for 
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Annual rate 
H Gross domestic product 
1"' .1 Gross national income 
1 981 1 983 1 98S 1 987 1 1 991 1 993 1 995 
As percentages of Q DP 
loan negotiations with the International 
Monetary Fund and other multilateral agencies. 
The programme was finally  implemented in 
mid-April 1996, and it was also at this time a 
preliminary agreement was reached with the IMF 
on a stand-by loan of  US$ 1.4 billion. The chief 
features  of  the programme were the dismantling 
of  exchange controls and liberalization of  foreign 
currency transactions, the gradual lifting  of  price 
controls, and measures designed to reduce the 
fiscal  deficit  substantially. 
As part of  the opening of  the oil industry to 
foreign  capital, in 1995 the Congress passed a bill 
allowing foreign  firms  to explore for  oil in new 
areas and take part in oil and gas production on 
a profit-sharing  basis with Petróleos de 
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA); this move resulted in 
tendering on several exploration areas in January 
1996. There was no change in tariff  policy, apart 
from  the reduction of  some duties applicable to 
the motor vehicle industry and the replacement 
of  the price-range scheme of  farm  price supports 
then in effect  with the Andean Group-scheme. 
a) Fiscal policy 
In 1995, the central government deficit 
declined only slightly to a little under 5% of  GDP, 
just one percentage point less than in 1994. 
Overall the public sector recorded a financial 
deficit,  though there was a significant 
improvement with respect to the 1994 budget 
results, thanks to sizeable disbursements in the 
form  of  assistance to banks; the deficit  narrowed 
from  the equivalent of  14% of  GDP in 1994 to less 
than 6% in 1995, owing to improved results by 
decentralized public-sector agencies, such as the 
Deposit Insurance and Bank Protection Fund 
(FOGADE), responsible for  providing financial 
assistance to ailing banks. 
Consequently, the current revenues of  central 
government, which were equivalent to 16% of 
GDP, continued to lag behind expenditure, which 
amounted to 21% of  GDP. This shortfall  was 
chiefly  a result of  the maintenance over most of 
the year of  a fixed  exchange rate for  the bolivar, 
which prevented the local-currency equivalent of 
dollar earnings, of  crucial importance to the 
budget, from  increasing in step with other budget 
items affected  by the high domestic inflation  rate. 
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For example, revenues from  PDVSA taxation 
increased by less than 40% in current bolívares, 
i.e., declined in real terms, in a year in which the 
firm  posted its largest net dollar profit  ever. The 
decline meant that the oil sector's contribution to 
fiscal  income dropped yet again and accounted 
for  less than 50% for  the second year in a row. 
The percentage of  central government financing 
provided by oil revenues had been on the wane 
since the start of  the 1990s, tax revenues from 
petroleum declined from  approximately 19% of 
GDP in 1990 to below 8% in 1995. 
Non-oil revenues decreased in real terms, 
despite the tax reforms  introduced in 1994, 
especially the application of  the general sales tax 
to wholesale transactions and luxury 
consumption, receipts from  which more than 
doubled. Income tax receipts roughly kept pace 
with inflation.  Together, the two taxes 
contributed more than two thirds of  non-oil 
revenues. 
Expenditures were affected  primarily by the 
growth in interest payments on the public debt to 
nearly 5% of  GDP. This growth was due in 
particular to payments on domestic bonds. The 
drive to reduce spending was once again 
reflected  in a low level of  government fixed 
investment, which again accounted for  barely 3% 
of  the total. Analysis of  the distribution of 
expenditure by sector indicates that, debt 
servicing aside, the greatest relative increase was 
for  social development, while the largest sums 
continued to be earmarked for  education, though 
not in amounts sufficient  to keep up with 
inflation.  The second largest component of 
budget expenditure was defence,  which 
remained unchanged in real terms, thus 
overtaking health spending, which grew at only 
half  the rate of  inflation. 
With these results, central government saving 
was meagre, equivalent to less than one 
percentage point of  GDP. Moreover, the gap 
between total expenditure and income might well 
have been greater, were it not for  the fact  that the 
Government was behind in debt service 
payments and in wage and transfer  payments. 
The gap was covered largely by domestic 
borrowing through the sale of  government 
securities and central bank financing.  Securities 
were also placed in the German market in the 
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Table 1 
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate d 
Open unemployment rate e 






Terms of  trade 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Nominal exchange rate 
(bolívares per dollar) 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of  payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 
(goods and services) 
Exports 
Imports 






(as a percentage of  GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of  exports)® 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Growth rates 
5.7 -8.8 7.0 9.7 6.1 0.7 -2.5 2.3 
3.0 -11.2 4.4 7.1 3.6 -1.6 -4.6 0.1 
1.6 -5.1 15.2 3.1 3.3 -2.0 -3.3 3.4 
6.1 -8.4 9.9 10.2 5.4 2.9 -1.7 3.7 
8.0 -4.3 1.3 5.8 5.1 1.6 -2.2 3.8 
5.7 -8.8 4.3 7.9 6.3 -2.1 -2.7 -1.6 
Percentages 
7.7 -9.0 1.6 8.2 7.2 -0.9 -4.8 2.2 
0.8 -0.2 0.4 1.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 
6.9 -8.9 1.1 6.9 7.2 -0.5 -4.2 2.2 
3.2 -12.0 -0.9 8.2 6.4 -4.1 -6.2 2.8 
1.6 1.2 5.5 2.6 -0.6 3.8 2.0 1.7 
-6.8 11.0 0.8 -9.3 -7.0 1.8 6.5 -4.4 
Percentages of  GDP B 
22.8 11.9 10.2 16.8 21.9 17.7 11.8 14.2 
10.8 16.9 27.2 20.1 15.0 14.0 16.3 16.7 
11.9 -5.0 -17.0 -3.3 6.8 3.6 -4.5 -2.5 
Percentages 
56.7 57.5 58.6 60.1 59.6 58.2 59.1 61.6 
7.3 9.2 10.4 9.5 7.8 6.6 8.7 10.3 
163.3 126.1 100.0 86.5 123.3 108.0 121.0 113.3 
Growth rates 
35.5 81.0 36.5 31.0 31.9 45.9 70.8 56.6 
17.0 106.2 20.4 23.1 26.0 47.4 89.5 
72.2 91.0 100.0 83.4 81.0 76.4 76.8 77.0 
16.61 34.68 46.91 56.82 65.60 87.30 148.63 176.84 
81.2 96.1 100.0 93.9 88.5 88.9 92.5 72.9 
Millions of  dollars 
•5 809 2 161 8 279 1 736 -3 749 -1 993 2 450 1 507 
•3 891 4712 9 355 2 698 -1 629 90 4 609 3 279 
1 052 13 988 18 806 16 388 15 514 16 119 17 197 19 757 
4 943 9 276 9 451 13 690 17 143 16 029 12 588 16 478 
•2 043 -5 432 -5 023 1 741 2 700 2 002 -3 636 -3 182 
•4 735 -1 668 1 514 1961 -1 348 -530 -1 484 -1 901 
•3 872 1077 4 376 2 645 -845 -144 -1 173 -1901 
Percentages 
66.5 82.2 74.5 68.8 66.3 68.2 70.0 49.9 
14.7 16.5 5.9 -0.2 5.4 6.2 4.4 
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Table 1 (concl.) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 
Percentages of  GDP 
18.2 19.4 22.4 22.8 17.2 16.5 17.2 15.9 
16.8 16.7 18.7 16.9 15.6 13.9 14.6 15.1 
1.4 2.7 3.7 5.9 1.6 2.6 2.6 0.8 
3.5 1.5 2.6 2.1 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.9 
-6.1 -1.1 -2.1 -0.1 -3.8 -2.5 -6.8 -4.8 
Growth rates 
-25.4 211.9 69.4 51.0 18.9 11.7 35.5 45.1 
41.6 -21.1 49.4 47.2 17.5 43.1 108.4 38.3 
811.3 87.0 0.6 -63.2 191.0 254.9 182.3 110.1 
30.8 13.2 25.1 47.9 33.1 12.0 6.5 46.4 
22.8 9.5 41.2 51.2 8.3 10.6 129.9 34.3 
9.1 64.2 72.5 48.7 23.3 32.1 29.9 38.3 





Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Currency and credit 
Money balances of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit1 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Local-currency savings 
and time deposits 
M2 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
Annual rates 
On deposits -17.2 -24.0 -2.3 3.9 7.0 16.9 -11.0 -17.7 
On loans -17.5 -27.8 3.6 11.3 15.0 24.8 2.6 -5.2 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign  currency1 9.0 -20.3 15.3 12.6 9.1 29.6 9.4 -1.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures.  Based on constant 1990dollars. cTheseentriesmeasuretheimpactofthevariationineachaggregate 
on GDP growth. The coefficients  were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by the level of  that same 
aggregate as a percentage of  GDP. d Percentages of  the working-age population. e Percentages of  the economically active 
population (EAP). f  Beginning in June 1992, includes food  and transport allowance. 8 Refers  to net interest as shown 
on the balance of  payments, divided by exports of  goods and services. h Includes as expenditure net loans granted, 
extrabudgetary expenditure and Central Bank losses, which in 1995 were equal to 2.8% of  GDP. 1 Includes the net amount 
of  other accounts, which in 1995 was equal to -1,290 billion bolívares. J Interest rate on deposits, deflated  by the variation in 
the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
VENEZUELA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product 
(Index: 1990=100) 
1993 1994 1995a 
i II in rv i ii in rv i II m iv 
119.9 120.3 123.5 118.8 109.4 109.8 102.2 101.5 119.4 119.4 126.2 126.5 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 34.1 35.9 39.0 45.9 47.5 60.2 69.6 70.8 70.4 61.3 51.7 56.6 
Real effective  exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Real interest rate (annualized, %) 
On deposits 
On loans 
90.0 ¡.8 87.9 85.5 83.8 97.1 101.6 88.2 81.2 73.9 67.7 69.0 
14.8 23.4 12.8 16.7 17.3 -19.0 -19.0 -23.3 -12.3 -21.4 -8.8 -28.5 
24.6 33.7 21.1 19.9 32.8 -6.4 -7.8 -8.1 3.9 -10.4 4.6 -19.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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amount of  500 million deutsche marks, although 
on less favourable  terms than on previous 
occasions. This was the first  issue placed abroad 
by Venezuela since 1993. 
The task of  putting public finances  in order 
formed  a central focus  of  the economic 
adjustment programme contained in "Agenda 
Venezuela", a plan aimed at drastically reducing 
the public deficit  in 1996, despite elimination of 
the bank loan tax (which Congress declined to 
extend). In April 1996 a major increase in petrol 
prices was announced, and Congress was 
presented with a proposal to raise the tax rate on 
wholesale transactions and on luxury 
consumption (renamed the "general sales tax") 
from  12.5% to 16.5%. Also contemplated were 
measures to reduce tax evasion, raise utility rates, 
revive the privatization programme, grant 
subsidies for  public passenger transport and 
provide a comprehensive social programme to 
alleviate the adjustment programme's adverse 
effects  on lower-income groups. 
b) Foreign exchange policy 
The exchange controls introduced in June 
1994 remained in place during 1995, and the 
exchange rate of  170 bolívares to the dollar held 
until mid-December. As a result, the strong rise 
in domestic prices translated into a sharp 
appreciation of  the real exchange rate. Halfway 
through the year, national exchanges were 
authorized to trade in bolívares dollar-
denominated Brady bonds representing external 
public debt, a step that amounted to the creation 
of  a parallel foreign  exchange market. The 
exchange rate implicit in these transactions 
gradually rose, reaching around 350 bolívares to 
the dollar in late 1995 and 500 bolívares in March 
1996. 
In October 1995, it was announced that this 
implicit exchange rate would officially  apply for 
travel abroad and credit card transactions outside 
Venezuela. This measure remained in effect  until 
10 December, when the Government and the 
Central Bank adjusted the exchange rate, 
applying a uniform  rate of  290 bolívares to the 
dollar for  all transactions. 
The promised return to a floating  exchange 
rate took effect  on 22 April 1996, as part of 
"Agenda Venezuela". From that date onwards, 
the bolivar was allowed to float  freely  and in the 
absence of  Central Bank intervention in the 
foreign  exchange market, it quickly stabilized at 
around 465-470 bolívares to the dollar. However, 
the Centra] Bank contributed to this result, as it 
reduced demand for  dollars by offering  high 
yields at its money desk, which resumed 
operation for  the first  time since 1992. The 
Centra] Bank subsequently intervened in the 
foreign  exchange market in order to shore up the 
exchange rate and early in the second half  of 
1996 set up a currency band system under which 
the bolivar was allowed to float  within a range of 
7.5% on either side of  a central parity of  470 
bolívares to the dollar, which was to be increased 
by 1.5% a month to the end of  the year. 
c) Monetary policy 
After  following  an active policy of  selling 
securities in 1994 in order to absorb part of  the 
liquidity generated by the public sector, the 
Centra] Bank decided in mid-December of  that 
year to suspend its issues in order to facilitate  the 
sale of  government bonds. Open market 
operations recommenced in late January 1995 
with a new instrument known as "monetary 
stabilization bonds" (TEMs), which replaced 
zero-coupon bonds. 
The financing  of  the budget deficit  was the 
chief  factor  contributing to money supply growth 
in 1995. Central Bank credit to the public sector 
practically doubled during the period, and credit 
to the central government increased at an even 
greater rate. The injection of  liquidity continued 
to stimulate demand for  foreign  currencies and 
helped bring about a loss of  international 
reserves, which served to moderate the effect  of 
the extra liquidity on the growth of  the monetary 
base until the bolivar's devaluation in December. 
Given this moderate expansion in liquidity, 
the Central Bank stepped up open market 
operations at certain times with the aim of 
supporting the trend. Over the year as a whole, 
however, new issues were insufficient  to offset 
redemptions of  maturing securities. This caused 
the monetary base to expand by roughly 25% in 
1995, while the money supply (Ml) increased by 
about 34%, far  less than nominal GDP. Growth in 
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broad money (M2) was only slightly higher 
(37%). Real balances held by individuals 
continued to decline during the first  quarter of 
1996, while nominal liquidity rose by a mere 
6%. 
The decline in real balances reflected  not only 
trends in the money supply, but also a noticeable 
decline in demand for  money in a context of 
raised expectations of  inflation  and devaluation, 
together with persistently low interest rates. 
Rates on deposits continued to be negative in real 
terms, as were rates on loans for  a large part of 
the year. To provide the market with guidelines, 
the Central Bank changed the regulations 
governing upper and lower limits for  rates during 
the year. 
The trend towards negative real interest rates 
intensified  in the first  quarter of  1996. However, 
in the last week of  April, following  the 
dismantling of  controls on the foreign  exchange 
market and the elimination of  the 
above-mentioned limits, interest rates began to 
move sharply upward as a result of  intervention 
by the Central Bank, which offered  high rates at 
its money desk and on its sales of  TEMS. The rise 
however, did not offset  the high prevailing rate 
of  inflation.  The yield on TEMS subsequently 
dropped to around 40% in early June. The 
"Agenda Venezuela" provided for  a rise in 
interest rates, which, once inflation  had declined, 
would result in positive real rates on loans and 
deposits in coming months. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
GDP rose by 2.3%, which was barely sufficient 
to compensate for  the decline in per capita GDP 
registered in 1994. Gross national income grew 
at a faster  rate, owing to favourable  trends in 
foreign  transactions. 
With the domestic economy sluggish, it was 
external demand which gave the economy 
momentum and boosted output. A leader was the 
oil sector, which grew by about 6%, with both 
production and exports of  petroleum maintaining 
the upward trend evident in recent years. Crude 
oil production climbed from  an average of  2.5 
million barrels per day in 1994 to 2.75 million in 
1995, while exports of  crude oil and refined 
products rose from  2.3 to 2.5 million. 
In addition, investments by oil companies in 
Venezuela provided a stimulus to other local 
industries; the latter, together with a number of 
export-oriented non-oil industries, were able to 
compensate for  the poor performance  of  the rest 
of  the economy, which was hurt by yet another 
decline in private-sector investment (-15%). 
Thanks to investments in the oil sector, however, 
total fixed  investment decreased by only 1% and 
as a result continued to be equivalent to a little 
under 14.5% of  GDP. 
Since external saving did not contribute to this 
level of  investment, national saving was clearly 
higher, although even so it did not exceed 17% 
of  GDP, 10% lower than in 1990. Nevertheless, 
domestic saving was close to 30% of  GDP, owing 
to the need to meet external obligations and other 
effects  of  external transactions. 
Imports, the other component of  aggregate 
supply in the economy, expanded significantly 
(19%), fuelled  by the increasing real appreciation 
of  the local currency and the build-up of 
inventories due to expectations of  devaluation. 
In keeping with this pattern of  activity, 
sectors producing tradable goods, other than the 
oil sector, grew by over 4%, while sectors 
producing non-tradables contracted by almost 
1 %. The worst performer  in this last category was 
the construction industry, which suffered  a slump 
for  the third year running (on this occasion 
-11%). Another major factor  shaping the overall 
trend was the decline of  more than 3% in the 
important sector of  commerce, restaurants and 
hotels. On the other hand, the two mainstays of 
the economy, mining and manufacturing,  whose 
tradable output (including oil production and 
refining)  was predominant, grew by around 5% 
and 7% respectively. Once more there was a 
notable increase in bauxite production. 
These results were reflected  in trends in the 
mining-based processing industry: production of 
steel, aluminium, and petrochemicals such as 
olefins  and fertilizers  increased, generally by 
significant  amounts. In contrast, cement 
production felt  the impact of  the slump in the 
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construction industry. In addition, there was a 
decline in the number of  motor vehicles 
assembled locally, which in turn depressed tire 
production. 
For the first  time in the decade, the 
agricultural sector, a relatively insignificant 
contributor to GDP, was unable to maintain its 
previous level of  production, despite improved 
harvests of  products for  domestic consumption 
(except fruit)  and increased fish  catches. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
During 1995 the Government continued to 
control the prices of  some basic goods and 
services, a policy that entailed periodic 
authorized readjustments. In this context, the 
relatively moderate growth in liquidity and the 
maintenance of  the exchange rate meant that the 
increase in the consumer price index (CPI) was 
lower than the previous year, though it was still 
high. Prices rose by almost 57% in 1995, 
compared with 71% in 1994, with the wholesale 
price index recording a slightly smaller increase. 
This sizeable rise in prices was chiefly 
attributable to reduced demand for  money and its 
counterpart, increased velocity of  circulation, in 
a climate of  raised inflationary  expectations. 
The factors  that moderated price increases 
were most in evidence during the first  three 
quarters of  1995, when inflation  slowed. 
Devaluation of  the bolivar in December led to a 
fresh  spurt in prices. Inflation  further  intensified 
following  the devaluation, an increase in petrol 
prices and the elimination of  controls that 
occurred in April 1996. By the end of  the first 
half  of  1996, the cumulative inflation  rate over 
the previous 12 months exceeded 100%. The 
adjustment programme called for  a sharp 
slowdown in prices in the second half. 
Due to these factors,  local products increased 
more in price than imported items. The rise in CPI 
originated primarily in the service sector, 
including both public services (electricity, 
transport and communications, among others) 
and private services (rents, education, restaurants 
and hotels), which because of  their non-tradable 
nature were less exposed to competition from 
imports. Late in the year, however, there were 
steeper price hikes on durable goods. 
Inflation  had a strong impact on real wages 
and salaries, which again declined (by around 
14% in urban areas), since the wage increases 
authorized in 1995 did not keep pace with 
inflation,  despite the anti-inflationary  measures 
adopted. One government initiative was to grant 
subsidies to private-sector workers on lower 
incomes; in conformity  with labour regulations, 
it also raised public-sector wages by some 30% 
and readjusted the urban minimum wage from 
21,000 to 31,000 bolívares. 
The expansion of  domestic activity was not 
sufficient  to absorb the nearly 600,000 workers 
who entered the labour market, many because of 
declining living conditions. The employment 
rate rose, but so did the open unemployment rate, 
which climbed from  8.5% in the second half  of 
1994 to 10.2% in the same period of  1995. The 
proportion of  workers employed in the informal 
sector varied little from  the high level recorded 
the previous year; more than 48% of  workers fell 
into this category as of  late 1995, compared with 
under 41% two years before. 
c) The external sector 
For the second year in a row, the 
balance-of-payments  current account showed a 
surplus in 1995, although at US$ 1.5 billion it 
was considerably lower than the figure  for  1994 
(US$ 2.45 billion). This result was once again 
due to the large merchandise trade surplus 
(US$ 6.9 billion), since the service and income 
profits  balance continued to be in deficit. 
Again in 1995, there was net outflow  of 
capital; though lower than the previous year, the 
figure  was close to the US$ 3.2 billion mark. 
Consequently, foreign  currency reserves shrank 
by US$ 1.9 billion in spite of  the exchange 
controls in effect.  By the end of  the year, the level 
of  international reserves had declined to less than 
US$ 11 billion, enough to finance  eight months' 
worth of  imports of  goods and services. 
The merchandise trade balance benefited 
from  a new expansion of  exports, although, in 
contrast to the previous year, the value of  imports 
also rose. Greater international demand for  oil, 
stemming in part from  the economic upturn in the 
developed countries, led to an increase in 
the average price of  Venezuelan fuels  from 
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US$ 13.20 per barrel in 1994 to US$ 14.80 per 
barrel in 1995. This improvement, combined 
with expanded export volumes, resulted in over 
US$ 1.8 billion in additional sales, which 
nonetheless did not match the high level recorded 
in 1990. Oil continued to be the leading export 
product, with a share of  more than 70% of  total 
merchandise exports. 
With regard to non-oil exports, the bulk of  the 
increase in sales was in aluminium and 
petrochemicals, the two main categories after  oil, 
which experienced growth of  around 50%. In 
contrast, sales of  gold, which had shown 
promising growth the two previous years, fell  by 
three quarters. Colombia consolidated its 
position as the leading market for  Venezuela's 
non-traditional exports, while the relative share 
of  the United States, the second most important 
market, continued to decline. 
Despite foreign  exchange rationing at the 
official  price, imports rose by US$ 3.4 billion, 
marking a reversal of  the downward trend 
evident in the two preceding years. The level of 
imports thus reflected  large pent-up demand, 
resulting from  the maintenance of  the local 
currency's nominal value, and the build-up of 
inventories in expectation of  a devaluation. 
Much of  the increase however, was due to a 
significant  rise in unit prices. In terms of  volume, 
the expansion was concentrated in consumer 
goods and raw materials; in contrast, imports of 
building materials declined. Transport 
equipment was responsible for  the slight increase 
in capital goods purchases, since imports of 
machinery and tools fell  by about 10%. 
Trade in services resulted in a deficit  of  almost 
US$ 3.6 billion, larger than the previous year's, 
despite the fact  that foreign  travel expenses, the 
main item in this account, declined slightly due 
to changes in the availability and price of  foreign 
exchange authorized for  the purpose. The deficit 
on the factor  income account was attributable to 
public debt interest payments; such payments 
exceeded US$ 1.9 billion in 1995. 
The deficit  recorded on the capital and 
financial  account was attributable notably to the 
amortization of  long-term external debt and the 
outflow  of  short-term private capital. 
Amortization amounted to over US$ 3.2 billion, 
a considerable increase over the preceding year. 
Adding in higher interest payments, total external 
debt service reached the unprecedented figure  of 
over US$ 6.3 billion in 1995. Owing to the net 
deficit  in these capital flows,  total external 
indebtedness declined for  the second consecutive 
year, to around US$ 38.7 billion by the end of 
1995. Public-sector liabilities accounted for  88% 
of  that amount. 
The remainder included debt incurred for 
short-term financing  of  imports, which 
underwent a considerable shift  in 1995. In 
contrast to previous years, reimbursements were 
well in excess of  new credits, and as a result the 
surplus of  almost US$ 1 billion in 1994 turned 






ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
1. General trends 
Gross outputof  the English-speaking Caribbean1 
subregion expanded by 2.6% in 1995, less than 
the preceding year, resulting in an increase of 
1.2% in per capita gross domestic product (GDP). 
In most countries of  the subregion, the growth 
rate slowed, and in three, economic activity 
contracted as a result of  natural disasters: 
hurricanes in Anguilla and Antigua and Barbuda, 
and a volcanic eruption in Montserrat (see table 
1). Meanwhile, inflation  recorded an overall 
decline. Most countries, especially the smallest 
maintained their traditionally low rates of 
inflation,  although in some of  them the rise in 
prices was higher in 1995 than in the preceding 
year. In the larger countries with higher inflation, 
strong macroeconomic measures were taken to 
curb inflation.  The process of  trade liberalization 
undertaken in some countries also helped to 
reduce inflation  by allowing an influx  of  cheaper 
goods. Suriname, where inflation  had risen to 
350%, achieved a significant  reduction, bringing 
the rate to under 40% in 1995. 
Overall, the trade balance deteriorated in the 
Caribbean countries, with exports expanding by 
18% and imports by 26%. TTie service account 
also showed poor results, especially with respect 
to income from  tourism, at a time when the 
number of  residents of  the subregion travelling 
abroad was also on the increase. Nevertheless, 
current transfers  more than tripled as a result of 
greater inflows  of  grants and insurance 
payments, so that the current account deficit  was 
reduced. Under the capital account, an 
improvement was noted in portfolio  investments 
and long-term private capital inflows,  and this 
generated an overall surplus and an expansion in 
international reserves. 
Economic activity was conducted in a context 
of  heightened anxiety as Caribbean Governments 
sought to stabilize their economies in the face  of 
reduced protection under revised trading 
agreements. This shift  in policy required 
Caribbean firms  to improve their productivity in 
order to respond to growing competition from 
abroad and presented a major challenge to 
Caribbean authorities one requiring concerted 
action in macroeconomic and trade policies. 
Regional producers also faced  a wide range of 
difficulties.  Banana producers, for  example, had 
been accustomed to reserved access to the 
European Union market. Similarly, some 
manufacturing  activities that had become 
accustomed protected domestic or regional 
markets were affected  by the reduction in the 
common external tariff  in the countries of  the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).2 
While the issues faced  by all countries were, 
in general, similar, their responses differed  quite 
widely. Some tried to apply innovative measures, 
while others limited themselves to tried and 
familiar  policies which had worked well in the 
past. The success of  these policies depended on 
their credibility and the countries' prospects for 
integration into global markets. 
In general, the smaller countries seemed to 
experience a greater sense of  vulnerability in the 
1 The expression "English-speaking Caribbean" is a succinct way of  referring  to the following  countries and territories of  the 
Caribbean subregion for  which data were available: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The Dutch-speaking countries of  Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname are also included. Countries 
for  which sufficient  information  was not available have been excluded. 
2 These include the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and the countries of  the Organization 
of  Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). 
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Table 1 
CARIBBEAN SUB REGION: TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual  growth  rates) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 1981 1990 
1990 
199^ 
Caribbean subregion 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.9 3.6 2.6 b -0.2 2.^ 
Antigua and Barbuda c 3.5 4.3 1.7 3.4 5.5 -3.8 6.4 2.1 
Barbados -3.2 -4.0 -6.2 1.5 3.8 2.7 0.9 -0.5 
Belize 10.3 3.1 9.5 4.3 1.5 3.8 4.5 4.4 
Dominica 6.3 2.2 2.7 1.9 2.1 1.8 4.4 2.1 
Grenada 5.2 3.6 1.1 -1.3 2.3 2.3 4.9 1.6 
Guyana -3.0 6.0 7.8 8.2 8.5 5.1 -2.7 7.1 
Jamaica 5.5 0.7 1.5 1.4 0.8 0.5 2.5 1.0 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.0 3.8 3.6 4.0 3.2 2.0 5.8 3.3 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 7.0 3.1 6.5 1.3 0.4 3.0 6.5 2.9 
Saint Lucia 4.4 2.3 7.1 2.3 2.8 3.8 6.8 3.6 
Suriname 0.1 3.5 5.8 -4.5 -0.8 0.5 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.5 2.7 -1.7 -1.6 4.2 3.5 -2.4 1.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  converted into dollars at constant 1990 prices. 
" Preliminary figures.  b Does not include Suriname. 0 Based on figures  at factor  cost. 
face  of  new international developments. Natural 
disasters caused severe damage in several 
single-product economies, while political 
changes affecting  banana exports to Europe 
served as a reminder to the smaller producers in 
the Organization of  Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) that they could no longer rely on 
guaranteed markets. 
In short, 1995 was a difficult  year for  most of 
the countries. The smaller OECS states, whose 
previous economic performance  had been sound, 
seemed increasingly vulnerable, partly owing to 
natural disasters. Guyana had experienced a 
steady expansion since 1991, and growth 
remained good in 1995, although the strong 
momentum of  the early 1990s seemed to be 
slipping. Both Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago were gradually adapting their economies 
to more open markets, but while new prospects 
were opening up for  the latter in industries related 
to natural gas and petrochemicals, Barbados had 
greater difficulty  in sustaining steady growth in 
its export earnings. Jamaica continued to 
experience high inflation  and low growth, the 
protracted period of  adjustment and high 
debt-service costs seeming to sap policy resolve 
and investor confidence.  Loose monetary policy 
in 1995 rapidly eroded the external account and 
the value of  the currency and threatened to negate 
past efforts  to contain inflation. 
For the OECS countries, the challenge was to 
raise productivity in traditional exports, 
especially in bananas; diversify  economic 
activities, preferably  into export-oriented 
industries; and expand their tourism sectors 
along sustainable lines. Fiscal accounts also 
required revision to make revenues less 
dependent on import taxes and secure a more 
stable source of  revenues for  national 
development without creating disincentives to 
industry. For the OECS countries as a group, 
aggregate product expanded by about 2%, 
reflecting  a steady decline since 1992. 
Nevertheless, individual country performance 
3 The OECS is made up of  Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. For the purposes of  this study, it also includes Anguilla, which, while not a part of  the OECS, 
is a member of  the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. 
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varied widely. Some countries, such as Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Lucia, 
managed in 1995 to reverse the poor performance 
of  the two preceding years by expanding 
agriculture and tourism. In contrast, Anguilla and 
Antigua and Barbuda, both strong performers  in 
the period 1993-1994, experienced shocks to 
their economy and a serious decline in tourism. 
Others, like Dominica and Grenada, continued 
their modest performance;  Dominica showed a 
slightly slower rate of  expansion owing to a 
contraction in the agricultural sector, while 
Grenada, experienced a slightly better rate of 
growth, led by agriculture, since performance 
was weak in the tourism sector. Montserrat, 
meanwhile, suffered  its second year of  economic 
contraction, reflecting  the uncertainty and 
dislocation caused by its sporadically active volcano. 
The remaining CARICOM countries recorded a 
slowdown in economic activity compared with 
1994, except for  Guyana, which continued to 
grow strongly, although at a slower pace because 
of  problems that cut down on production in the 
gold sector, one of  the main contributors to the 
country's recent economic recovery. However, 
the agricultural sector remained buoyant, despite 
a contraction in the sugar industry, with rice, 
livestock and forestry  activities all expanding. 
Both manufacturing  and the service sectors 
also expanded. A strong performance  in these 
export-oriented industries helped to narrow the 
balance-of-payments  current account deficit, 
although amortization payments widened the 
overall deficit.  Stronger fiscal  accounts allowed 
increased capital spending. Inflation  was also 
trimmed to half  the level recorded for  1994. 
In Trinidad  and Tobago,  minimal growth in 
the petroleum sector and a decline in export 
agriculture resulted in slower economic 
expansion. Production increased slightly in the 
petroleum sector and by 2.5% in the non-oil 
sector, ensuring a general economic expansion 
for  the second consecutive year. The application 
of  tight fiscal  and monetary policies yielded a 
surplus in the public sector and 
balance-of-payments  accounts, while both 
inflation  and the unemployment rate fell. 
In Barbados,  the rate of  expansion achieved 
in 1994 was not replicated because of  a weaker 
performance  in the sugar subsector and only 
modest growth in tourism. Nevertheless, the other 
agricultural subsectors and industry demonstrated 
an unexpected vitality and merchandise exports 
expanded; in spite of  this, the balance of 
payments deteriorated because of  increased 
domestic demand. Credit to the private sector 
swelled by almost 40%, requiring a rise in interest 
rates in the second half  of  the year. The restrictive 
fiscal  policy helped to curb monetary expansion, 
and inflation,  although steeper than in 1994, still 
remained low. Unemployment also fell. 
Jamaica  continued to experience economic 
instability in 1995, after  the progress achieved 
towards the end of  1994, including a decline in 
inflation  that persisted into the first  few  months 
of  1995. Credit was eased with a view to 
stimulating the economy, and this led to a 38% 
expansion of  the broad money aggregate (M2). 
Expanding credit, together with large wage 
increments granted to public and private sector 
workers and substantial private transfers  all 
served to increase demand. The effect  was a 
sharp deterioration in the external account, a 16% 
devaluation of  the Jamaican currency and a 
reversal of  the downturn in the rate of  inflation, 
which averaged 1% per month in the first  half  of 
the year and 2.7% in the second. Overall, 
economic performance  was sluggish, with 
expansion averaging only 0.5%, practically the 
same as the average for  the period 1991-1994. 
The listless performance  in 1995 was due to 
difficulties  in stabilizing the economy, the cost 
of  debt-servicing and poor results in some 
sectors, notably manufacturing  and mining. 
Economic activity gathered pace in Belize, 
benefiting  from  strong growth in agriculture 
(8%), manufacturing  (4%) and public utilities 
(3%). Export earnings were strong and imports 
contained, so that the overall external balance 
showed a surplus. Fiscal performance  continued 
to be problematic, for  although the deficit 
narrowed, this was at the expense of  capital 
outlays. A revised tax system was introduced 
towards the end of  the year to include a value 
added tax, and measures were taken to cut back 
on current expenditure. Inflation  rose marginally 
while still remaining low. 
Lastly, in Aruba, one of  the non-CARicoM 
countries, tourism-led growth, once again 
ensured a strong performance. 
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Table 2 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
(Percentages) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Barbados 17.2 23.0 22.1 21.8 19.7 
Jamaica 15.4 15.7 16.3 15.4 16.2 
Trinidad and Tobago 18.5 19.7 19.8 18.5 17.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
2. Fiscal policy 
Public finance  remained a key area of  focus  for 
Caribbean Governments as they adjusted their 
economies for  integration into the global 
economy. They were increasingly cognizant of 
the fact  that fiscal  deficits  siphoned off  resources 
from  production activities, yet the demands for 
government intervention in areas such as 
infrastructural  development, human resources 
and social equity remained acute. In view of 
these competing claims, countries resorted to 
different  methods to secure fiscal  balance. Tax 
systems were also placed under scrutiny to 
ensure that they did not discourage individual 
initiative or new corporate investment and yet 
provided for  a stable source of  revenue. Tax 
reform  had previously been undertaken in several 
countries with the above aims but also as a 
response to the impact of  trade liberalization. In 
1995, Belize joined in with the adoption of  a 
value added tax, the full  effects  of  which were 
expected to be felt  in 1996. 
The fiscal  position of  the OECS countries 
deteriorated in 1995, with an overall deficit 
equivalent to 2.5% of  GDP, compared with 1.8% 
the preceding year. Revenues expanded by 4%, 
but taxes on imports, which accounted for  close 
to 60% of  tax revenues, declined by 4% owing to 
exemptions granted for  the purchase of  materials 
to repair hurricane damage. This reliance on 
commercial taxes complicated the situation of 
the OECS countries, given the steps being taken 
to liberalize trade within CARICOM and with the 
rest of  the world. Current expenditure, on the 
other hand, increased to almost 22% of  GDP, 
leaving just under 2% of  GDP for  capital 
expenditure and causing some countries to 
continue to record current deficits.  Within total 
expenditure, wage for  public employees and 
transfers  increased. 
The erosion of  the fiscal  account was 
particularly notable in Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
where the deficit  amounted to 6% of  GDP. Both 
current and capital expenditure increased, and 
the current account went from  a surplus of  0.4% 
in 1994 to a deficit  of  1.1% in 1995. Capita] 
expenditure rose by 70%, with the bulk of  this 
sum being allocated to infrastructure  projects. 
The deficit  also increased in Antigua and 
Barbuda, with the current account moving into a 
deficit  position again after  achieving a fleeting 
surplus in 1994. This deficit  widened from  2.4% 
to 3.4% of  GDP as a result of  the outlays required 
to deal with the effects  of  the hurricane. In Saint 
Lucia, the deficit  also expanded, from  0.7% to 
1.6% of  GDP. The erosion was most evident in 
the current account, notably under wage 
expenditure. In Grenada, sustained efforts  to 
reduce the fiscal  deficit  bore some fruit,  since 
measures taken to improve tax collection and 
restrain current and capital spending eliminated 
the deficit,  which had been equivalent to 2.4% of 
GDP. 
In 1995, Barbados  recorded a fiscal  surplus of 
just under 1% of  GDP, compared with a deficit  of 
2% in 1994, as increases were seen in current 
income as well as expenditure. The improvement 
in current income was due to the higher income 
tax revenues yielded by the expansion of  the 
payroll tax base, and to higher corporate and 
property taxes. The increase in expenditure was 
attributable to the settlement of  arrears, 
adjustments in remunerations and higher 
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disbursements for  interest payments and 
subsidies. Capital expenditure, however, 
declined by 13%, thereby reversing the upward 
trend observed in the two preceding years. 
In Belize,  after  a period of  steady expansion, 
the fiscal  deficit  started to diminish gradually in 
1994 and dropped to 4.8% of  GDP in 1995 despite 
a further  erosion of  the current surplus, which fell 
to 2% of  GDP in 1995. Fiscal revenues declined 
by around 3%. Under tax revenues, income tax 
receipts were lower as some taxpayers benefited 
from  tax relief  while others build up arrears 
owing to flaws  in the tax-collection system. In 
contrast, receipts from  international trade 
improved with the implementation of  stricter 
enforcement  measures by customs authorities. 
Total expenditure declined by over 7%, as the net 
result of  a 3% rise in current expenditure and a 
decrease of  almost 28% in capital expenditure; 
current spending on wages and salaries, 
pensions, interest payments and transfers 
increased. Having failed  to meet their fiscal 
targets, in late 1995 the authorities adopted new 
policies designed, inter  alia,  to cut back on the 
number of  civil servants, along with interim 
measures to compensate for  tariff  rollbacks. The 
introduction of  a value added tax was also 
scheduled for  1996 under a sweeping tax reform 
programme designed to offset  the reductions to 
be made in tariff  rates as the trade liberalization 
process proceeded. 
In Jamaica,  the stabilization of  the exchange 
rate and lower inflation  provided a basis for 
policymakers' target of  a fiscal  surplus of  2% of 
GDP. However, stricter measures -aimed at 
achieving a surplus of  3% of  GDP- became 
necessary by the middle of  the year owing to the 
absence of  a tight monetary policy. Meanwhile 
fiscal  income showed a substantial gain of  almost 
50%. Tax revenues also increased to almost 22% 
of  GDP (a rise of  5% compared with the preceding 
year) thanks to higher taxes on income, 
consumption and trade. Gains in receipts from 
consumption and trade taxes reflected  buoyant 
consumption, while the upturn in income tax 
receipts was attributable to substantial wage 
increases in both the public and private sectors. 
Authorities were able to hold down expenditures 
in part because of  lower interest payments. 
However, expenditure on wages and salaries 
went up by about 19% as a result of  retroactive 
wage payments to civil servants. Amortization 
payments showed a 32% decline due to reduced 
debt obligations, improved debt management, 
and debt forgiveness  and rescheduling 
operations. It was thus possible to boost gross 
investment in 1995 and achieve a small surplus 
compared with a deficit  equivalent to 5% of  GDP 
in 1994. 
In Trinidad  and Tobago,  fiscal  accounts 
showed a surplus, as in the previous year. 
Although some of  the tax measures that were 
implemented reduced the yield of  certain taxes, 
fiscal  income grew by 11%, while expenditure 
expanded by 9%. The current surplus thus 
increased by 1% of  GDP to 2.4%. Revenue 
increases derived mainly from  the petroleum 
sector, although corporate and personal taxes in 
the non-oil sector also were higher despite 
reduced tax rates; however VAT revenues were 
down slightly and receipts from  international 
trade also declined as tariffs  were lowered. All 
categories of  current expenditure rose slightly, 
including wage payments, as the Government 
paid part of  the sum it owes to members of  civil 
service. Subsidies also increased, following  the 
restructuring of  two public-sector enterprises, 
while interest payments on the public debt rose 
marginally. Capital expenditure, which rose by 
30%, was allocated mainly to upgrading physical 
infrastructure. 
3. The main variables 
a) Level of  economic activity 
i) Crop-farming  sector.  The performance  of 
the agricultural sector was satisfactory  in almost 
all countries except Trinidad and Tobago. In 
Barbados,  a reduction in sugar output was offset 
by other crops, which recorded strong increases. 
The agricultural sector in Belize,  which is quite 
diversified,  turned in a robust performance  in 
1995, primarily because of  a 53% expansion in 
citrus production. Fires in the country's 
sugar-cane fields  caused a 15% drop in sugar 
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output, and banana production also slipped, but 
several domestic-market crops posted higher 
production figures. 
In Jamaica  the agricultural sector's expansion 
continued for  the sixth consecutive year, 
although at a slower pace. Growth was 
underpinned by both non-traditional exports, 
which recorded gains of  5%, and traditional 
exports, especially bananas and sugar, even 
though sugar production figures  were slightly 
lower. In Trinidad  and Tobago,  export 
agriculture recorded a scant 2% expansion 
whereas agriculture for  the domestic market 
enjoyed a recovery of  almost 5% following  the 
downturn of  preceding years. The 8% decline in 
sugar production was too severe to be offset  by 
the expansion, albeit fairly  strong, of  other 
subsectors. Accordingly, the sector as a whole 
contracted by almost 1%. 
THEOECS countries recorded moderate growth 
in the agricultural sector in 1995 with the 
exception of  Dominica, where hurricanes 
devastated the banana plantations, thus making 
it a difficult  year for  the island. Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines recorded a marked improvement 
in agricultural output, especially of  bananas, 
while attempts to diversify  production into new 
areas geared to both the domestic and export 
markets met with varying degrees of  success. In 
Saint Lucia and Grenada, the sector expanded by 
7%-10%. Following two years of  contraction, 
agricultural growth in Saint Lucia was 
attributable mainly to the upturn in the banana 
industry, although figures  for  non-traditional 
crops also improved. In Grenada, growth was led 
by the cocoa (50%) and nutmeg (20%), crops 
which recovered from  an earlier decline. In 
Montserrat, the sector suffered  a 1.2% 
contraction due to natural phenomena. 
Bananas 
Banana production was affected  by 
uncertainty over future  European Union (EU) 
marketing regulations and adverse weather 
conditions. The latter prompted wide swings in 
the earnings of  several producing countries, 
although the export volumes and earnings of 
CARICOM countries as a whole were up by 7% 
and 8% respectively. The OECS countries 
performed  somewhat better, but not well enough 
to make up for  the contraction of  the two previous 
years; export earnings increased by 10% in 
response to a 13% expansion of  shipments. 
Within the OECS group, performance  was 
mixed, reflecting  the vagaries of  the weather and, 
specifically,  the impact of  hurricane damage in 
Dominica. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
recorded the strongest performance  with a 54% 
rise in export earnings, thus making an almost 
complete recovery from  the downturn caused by 
adverse weather conditions in 1993 and 1994. 
Similar circumstances surrounded the recovery 
in Saint Lucia, where, however, the 11% 
expansion in earnings was insufficient  to 
counteract the 32% decline recorded over the two 
preceding years. The most seriously affected 
country was Dominica, where banana production 
was suspended altogether in the last quarter of 
1995 and earnings fell  by almost 20%, thus 
prolonging the downward trend seen during the 
past three years. 
In Belize,  export figures  plunged when 
unseasonably dry conditions, followed  by 
flooding  and irrigation problems, destroyed 
almost 20% of  the crop. Labour disputes further 
hampered production although a reallocation of 
EU quotas -due to the fact  that several Windward 
Island producers were unable to meet theirs-
allowed Belize to export an additional 12% by 
volume. In Jamaica,  favourable  weather, 
improved technology and better management all 
contributed to the over 8% increase in export 
volumes. Productivity also improved in the 
major plantations, resulting in an increase in the 
yield per hectare. 
In addition to their inability to meet their EU 
quotas, the Windward Islands also experienced 
problems in producing bananas of  a suitable 
quality, and the prices they were able to 
command therefore  declined by 11%. All 
Caribbean producers, moreover, face  the 
prospect of  having to compete freely  on the 
European market as a result of  the pressure being 
brought to bear on the European Union through 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the 
United States and other producers in the Americas. 
Sugar 
Sugar producers within CARICOM continued to 
benefit  from  preferential  prices for  their exports 
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to the United Kingdom. In 1995, the average 
price moved up from  US$ 607 to US$ 670 per 
ton, a much higher figure  than the going price on 
the world market, which was on the order of 
US$ 390. Despite this preferential  treatment, a 
number of  producers were unable to meet their 
contractual obligations, and the industry 
continued to decline. 
Sugar production in Barbados  contracted 
further  in 1995, falling  to less than one-third of 
the 1980 level. Having dropped by over 20%, the 
total volume was thus 28% below the volume 
necessary to meet export commitments. 
Accordingly, Barbados had to invoke the force 
majeure clause in order to defend  its preferential 
quota. In contrast, the industry performed 
creditably in Belize,  for  while the size of  the 
sugar-cane harvest declined slightly, sugar 
output remained the same because processing 
efficiency  rates were better. Nonetheless, exports 
declined marginally, although the quantities sold 
under preferential  arrangements increased thanks 
to the temporary reallocation of  other producers' 
unmet export quotas. The increased volumes 
exported to the preferential  markets, together 
with the relevant prices, boosted earnings by 
18%. In Jamaica,  sugar output declined slightly, 
although the volume and value of  exports 
increased by 15% and 30% respectively. Despite 
this increase, Jamaica did not meet its full  quota 
allocation of  156,000 tons for  1995. Exports from 
Saint  Kitts  and Nevis  increased slightly and were 
sold in their entirety on the United Kingdom 
market, where favourable  prices and exchange 
rate movements increased earnings by over 12%. 
As was also the case of  a number of  other 
sugar-producing countries, Trinidad  and Tobago 
recorded lower production figures  than in 1994, 
partly because of  unfavourable  weather 
conditions. Nevertheless, the shortfall  was 
covered by these countries' large inventories, 
and, accordingly, both export volumes and 
earnings actually increased. 
ii)  Manufacturing.  This sector constitutes a 
relatively small portion of  most Caribbean 
economies, inasmuch as its contribution to GDP 
exceeds 15% in only a few  cases. It is based 
essentially on three types of  industries: 
agroindustrial activities, industries geared to the 
local or regional market, and new activities, often 
set up in free  zones, which mainly produce goods 
for  export. The performance  of  the first  set of 
activities is usually determined by the pace of 
agricultural production but, as in traditional 
agriculture, generally show little vitality. The 
second set of  activities once flourished  under the 
high levels of  protection provided for  the 
regional CARICOM market or for  national markets 
in the larger islands. Many of  them are now 
stagnant or on the decline, however, as they find 
it difficult  to expand globally or even to satisfy 
internal needs as these markets are opened up to 
external competition. The third set of  activities 
are essentially assembly industries that produce 
for  international markets. These enterprises, 
which have been affected  relatively little by the 
disincentives associated with the outdated 
systems in use in the manufacturing  sector are 
still fragile,  but are thriving. 
In Barbados,  the manufacturing  sector 
expanded for  the second consecutive year, 
although this must be seen in the light of  an 
average decline of  4.9% over the four  preceding 
years. Indeed the output of  the sector did not 
match either that of  1989 or of  1978-1981, when 
CARICOM trade was at its height. This 
performance  reflected  the difficulties  being 
experienced by traditional activities in adapting 
to new circumstances. In Belize,  where 
manufacturing  is closely related to agribusiness, 
the sector's growth in 1995 was attributable 
mainly to increased production of  the citrus fruits 
used to make juices and concentrates. 
In Jamaica,  the manufacturing  sector 
contracted slightly in 1995 due, among other 
factors,  to reduced protection, deficient 
infrastructure,  regulatory obstacles, crime and 
labour disputes. Nevertheless, a 12% rise in 
exports of  manufactured  goods coincided with an 
increase in imports of  machinery and equipment. 
Gross export earnings from  the free  zones 
climbed by 10%, and inflows  to the local 
economy from  these inbond industries were up 
by 26%. Taken together, these indicators point to 
an industry in transition, where traditional, 
protected sectors are finding  it difficult  to 
improve their productivity, while some 
non-traditional export activities are expanding 
their market share. 
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Manufacturing4  in Trinidad  and Tobago 
continued to grow but more slowly than in 1994, 
when it had advanced by 18%. Nevertheless, the 
expansion was broad-based, with assembly and 
related industries progressing by 15%, printing 
and paper up by 10% and food  processing up by 
6%. Declines were recorded, however, in 
beverages and tobacco, and garments and 
footwear.  Generally speaking, the sector seemed 
to be weathering the shift  to a more open 
economy relatively well. 
Manufacturing  activity in the OECS countries 
was concentrated in agroindustry, garments, 
beverages and the assembly of  electronic 
components. The sector suffered  from  the 
constraints associated with limited market size 
and low productivity and, as in other Caribbean 
countries, was particularly vulnerable to the 
effects  of  market liberalization. Nevertheless, it 
recorded 6% growth in 1995, following  a 2.5% 
contraction the previous year. Manufacturing 
output expanded in six member countries thanks, 
in particular, to increases in soap production in 
Dominica, in the output of  paper products and 
alcoholic beverages in Saint Lucia, where the 
sector rebounded from  a slump in 1994, and in 
rice processing in Montserrat. The sector 
contracted, however, in Antigua and Barbuda 
and in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; in the 
first  of  these countries, the downturn was due to 
disruptions caused by hurricane damage. 
iii)  Petroleum  and mining.  The petroleum 
sector accounted for  28% of  GDP in Trinidad  and 
Tobago  in 1995, but its growth rate flattened  out 
following  an 8% expansion in 1994. This 
reflected  a slower pace of  activity in exploration, 
production and refining,  the suspension of 
operations in a major south-coast well and 
numerous labour disputes. The petrochemicals 
subsector grew by only 3%, after  having 
expanded by 25% in 1994. Towards the end of 
the year, construction was started on a new 
methanol plant which was due to come on stream 
in 1996 at the same time as a new ammonia plant. 
Mining and quarrying accounted for  almost 
9% of  GDP in Jamaica,  down slightly from  the 
previous year. This was the result of  a 6.5% 
contraction in the bauxite and alumina subsector, 
4 The oil and sugar industries are not included here. 
following  labour disputes and operational 
problems. Total exports declined in volume by 
about 7%, whereas alumina shipments increased. 
Prices were buoyant throughout the year, 
however, so the industry's gross earnings showed 
gains of  about 16%. 
iv) Tourism.  This sector is a major source of 
foreign  currency earnings in most Caribbean 
countries, with the exceptions being Guyana, 
Suriname and Trinidad, although tourism was the 
main source of  activity in the latter's twin island 
of  Tobago. 
In general, stopover arrivals increased only 
marginally throughout the Caribbean. After  a 
slow start in the first  quarter of  the year, arrivals 
picked up in the second and third quarters. There 
was a slowdown in the final  quarter, however, as 
a result of  hurricane damage at several major 
destinations. While reallocation was made to 
unaffected  areas to handle much of  the 
subregion's tourist flows,  uncertainty regarding 
weather conditions discouraged a number of 
potential travellers. 
The OECS countries experienced a 4% 
reduction in stopover arrivals. The most seriously 
affected  were Antigua and Barbuda, with 
stopovers down by over 18%; Montserrat, with a 
decrease of  17% due to volcanic activity; and, to 
a lesser extent, Saint Kitts and Nevis (6%). In all 
cases, arrivals were strong in the first  half  of  the 
year, but then dropped off  drastically after  the 
hurricane season. Just the opposite occurred in 
some OECS destinations, however, such as Saint 
Lucia, where tourist arrivals were up by about 
6%. Dominica and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines recorded an increase of  7%. Cruise 
passenger arrivals were up in all the OECS 
countries, especially Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines (47%), where income from  tourism 
was further  boosted by a steady flow  of  stopover 
guests. Total visitor arrivals for  the OECS, 
including cruiseship passengers, increased by 
4% in 1995; this is regarded as a creditable 
performance,  given the number of  natural 
disasters, but the sector's rate of  increase was, 
nonetheless, clearly lower than in 1994 (10%). 
The larger CARICOM countries recorded a 
modest advance in stopover arrivals. Barbados, 
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although benefiting  from  tourist reallocations 
following  hurricane damage in neighbouring 
islands, still recorded an increase of  less than 4%. 
The sector's performance  in the early part of  the 
year was weak, with a decline of  2.5% being 
recorded for  the first  quarter, but a 7.5% rise was 
recorded for  the remainder of  the year. Similar 
trends were observed in the Bahamas and 
Jamaica, where stopover arrivals showed a 5% 
increase for  the year. 
Among the non-CARicoM countries, the 
tourism sector's performance  was mixed. Tourist 
arrivals were down in the countries that suffered 
hurricane damage, in particular Anguilla (12%), 
the United States Virgin Islands (18%), and Saint 
Maarten (over 18%); tourist arrivals to the 
Netherlands Antilles as a whole decreased by 
about 14%, although Curaçao recorded a decline 
of  only 1%. 
The United States remained the main source 
of  tourists, and arrivals from  that country showed 
the sharpest increase (5%) as well. Saint Lucia 
benefited  the most from  this increase, as it 
recorded a gain of  over 10%, while Jamaica, the 
Bahamas and the OECS countries recorded 
increases on the order of  5%. Arrivals from 
Europe were up 3%, with the main destinations 
being Dominica and Saint Lucia and, to a lesser 
extent, the other CARICOM countries. On the other 
hand, tourist arrivals from  Canada contracted by 
3%, affecting  mainly Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, and Grenada, where visitor arrivals 
were down by over 15%. Jamaica and the 
Netherlands Antilles recorded over 5% growth. 
b) Prices 
Most of  the Caribbean countries, and 
especially the smallest among them, maintained 
their traditionally low rates of  inflation,  although 
in a number of  the OECS countries, prices rose 
faster  in 1995 than in 1994. The exceptions were 
Antigua and Barbuda, where the rate was 
negative, and Anguilla. In such countries as the 
Bahamas, Barbados and Belize, the rate 
remained low but did show a slight increase. The 
larger countries, where inflation  was higher, 
applied restrictive macroeconomic policies 
designed to curb price rises. The process of 
economic liberalization under way in some 
countries also helped to tame inflation,  since 
producers and consumers were able to secure 
lower-priced imports. 
In Barbados, inflation  was modest for  the third 
consecutive year, in part because of  the wage 
freeze  which had been imposed in 1991 but was 
lifted  in 1995 when wage settlements providing 
for  an average adjustment of  3% were signed. 
Price rises were noted in areas such as alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco and housing. Prices rose 
marginally in Belize,  with increases being noted 
in the categories of  medical care, rent, water, fuel 
and power. In Guyana, the rate of  inflation 
continued to fall,  thereby resuming the trend that 
had begun in 1991-1993 but had been interrupted 
in 1994. Contributing factors  were a relatively 
stable exchange rate and lower customs duties. 
In Jamaica,  the authorities set themselves the 
goal of  bringing the annual average rate of 
inflation  down to 12%. They did achieve a 
reduction compared with 1994, but failed  to 
reach the targeted rate. Actually they were ahead 
of  their target for  the first  six months, with an 
average rate of  6%, but then inflation  accelerated 
in the second half-year.  This acceleration was 
due mainly to a looser form  of  liquidity 
management, which increased demand, thus 
eroding the external account and leading to a 
depreciation of  Jamaica's currency. A fall  in 
output for  some crops, the increase in wheat 
prices on the international market and the 
removal of  subsidies for  some foodstuffs  all 
contributed to significant  price rises in the food 
and beverage category. The price of  fuel  also 
rose, but less sharply (just over 9%). 
The rate of  inflation  fell  in Trinidad  and 
Tobago  for  the second consecutive year, mainly 
as a result of  trade liberalization measures, which 
reduced the rate of  price rises for  food  items, and 
exchange rate stability. Prices declined steadily 
throughout the year and fell  even more sharply 
in the fourth  quarter. 
c) Employment 
In Barbados,  employment increased in 
several sectors, most notably in commerce, 
manufacturing,  and government services and 
information  services. In manufacturing,  the 
subsectors showing the greatest improvement in 
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Table 3 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Average  annual variations) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Anguilla 4.9 3.0 
Antigua and Barbuda 2.1 1.2 
Bahamas 7.1 5.7 
Barbados 6.3 6.1 
Belize 5.6 2.8 
Dominica 2.0 4.4 
Grenada 1.0 4.6 
Guyana 70.3 14.2 
Jamaica 51.0 77.3 
Montserrat 9.2 1.4 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4.5 1.5 
Saint Lucia 7.3 2.5 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 2.3 3.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.8 6.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
4.1 4.0 1.6 
1.5 7.1 -0.6 
2.7 1.3 2.2 
1.1 0.1 1.9 
1.3 2.6 2.9 
1.7 0.8 1.4 
3.5 1.9 2.1 
7.7 16.1 8.1 
22.1 35.1 19.9 
0.7 2.8 4.4 
1.4 1.3 2.6 
0.7 5.8 4.7 
4.5 0.4 3.1 
8.7 9.4 5.4 
employment were the food,  beverage and 
tobacco industries. In Belize,  the rate of 
unemployment declined by just over two 
percentage points of  GDP; the female 
unemployment rate was down to 19.2%, while 
male unemployment fell  to 13.7%. 
In Jamaica,  job creation was not sufficient  to 
absorb the 28,500 new entrants to the labour 
market. Accordingly, the unemployment rate 
rose by almost one percentage point. The 
majority of  the unemployed were in the under-25 
age group, and the rate was particularly high 
among the women in this category, although the 
imbalance affecting  women in general was 
reduced slightly. Nevertheless, unemployment 
among young males also increased, from  18.5% 
in 1994 to 25.1% in 1995. Among youngfemales, 
the rate climbed from  37.7% to 44.6% while for 
older women, it descended from  16.9% to 14.5%. 
The services sector contributed the most new 
jobs, a majority of  which were taken by women. 
Unemployment in Trinidad  and Tobago  fell 
for  the second consecutive year despite a 2.3% 
expansion in the labour force.  The majority of 
new jobs were created in the services sector, 
which already accounted for  56% of  the total. 
Slight increases in employment, were registered 
in all the other sectors except agriculture, which 
lost over 5,000 jobs. Unemployment in the 15-24 
age group remained above the average, although 
it fell  from  32.5% to 30.9% in 1995, which was 
a sharper decline than for  other age groups. 
Female unemployment (20.6%) remained higher 
than male unemployment (15.1%). 
d) The external sector 
i) Foreign  trade  and the balance of  payments. 
The trade balance deteriorated throughout the 
subregion, although less markedly in the smaller 
OECS countries. Exports rose by almost 18% but 
imports grew more (26%). For the OECS, both 
imports and exports recorded more modest 
increases. The services account, which usually 
serves to offset  the substantial merchandise trade 
deficits  incurred by most of  the Caribbean 
countries, was sluggish, mainly because the 
percentage increase in tourism earnings was 
lower than in previous years. Moreover, in 
several countries burgeoning domestic demand, 
which inflated  the merchandise import bill, also 
reduced the travel surplus, since nationals used 
some of  the readily available credit to take 
vacations abroad. 
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The external accounts of  the OECS countries 
strengthened appreciably, chiefly  as a 
consequence of  inflows  related to 
indemnification  for  and repairs of  the damage 
done by hurricanes. Merchandise exports 
climbed by 8%; this was mainly attributable to a 
10% increase in the export earnings of  banana 
producers in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
and Saint Lucia, and to a lesser degree, to larger 
inflows  from  the sale of  cocoa by Grenada (12%), 
sugar by Saint Kitts and Nevis (12%), and soap 
by Dominica (4%). Meanwhile, at 5%, the 
increase in imports was relatively modest. The 
surplus on the services account was, however, 
disappointing, for  while it had grown steadily 
between 1990 and 1994, it contracted by 9% in 
1995 as a result of  the decline in gross tourism 
receipts in Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Grenada, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. On the other 
hand, current transfers  more than trebled owing 
to increased inflows  of  grants and insurance 
payments, so the current account deficit 
narrowed to just over 10% of  GDP, compared with 
11% in 1994. Portfolio  investments and 
long-term private capital inflows  also rose. The 
outcome was an overall surplus and an increase 
in reserves of  close to US$ 50 million. 
The trade deficit  also widened significantly  in 
Jamaica  -by over 44%- even though exports 
grew at a faster  rate than in the two preceding 
years. Both traditional and non-traditional 
exports increased, although the rate of  the latter 
slowed somewhat. Among traditional exports, 
bauxite earnings fell,  while in the non-traditional 
sector, earnings from  manufactures  declined by 
about 12%. Imports grew faster  than exports 
because of  a more accommodating monetary 
policy. All categories of  imports showed an 
increase with the exception of  motor vehicles, 
which slowed for  the second year after  an 
unusually high peak. The positive balance on the 
services account also diminished, for  while 
tourism earnings increased, expenditure by 
Jamaicans travelling abroad was up even more 
sharply, in line with the upturn in total 
expenditure, so that net travel earnings declined. 
The current account moved from  a surplus in 
1994 to a substantia] deficit  in 1995 despite a 
20% increase in transfers.  The capital account 
was again positive, though inflows  (largely made 
up of  private fiinds)  were 13% lower than the 
previous year. Nevertheless, they were sufficient 
to generate a positive balance and to build up 
reserves by a small amount. 
In Barbados,  exports from  all sectors, except 
for  sugar and electrical components, were up 
slightly, but the growth rate of  imports greatly 
outstripped these increases. Consequently, the 
trade deficit  expanded considerably. Imports of 
consumer items grew by over 12%; this was 
especially true of  purchases of  motor vehicles, 
whose domestic price fell  as duties declined. 
Intermediate imports also climbed -by 9%-
owing to the buoyancy of  construction activity, 
while imports of  capital goods swelled by 14%. 
Income from  services increased just 3% 
compared with 19% in 1994. This decline was 
due in part to the reduced contribution of  tourism 
earnings and in part to increased spending by 
Barbadian tourists travelling abroad. Transfers 
were up only slightly and, as a result, the current 
account surplus contracted by over one third. A 
slight deficit  was incurred on the capital account 
but, even to, reserves increased. However, the 
overall balance was less than half  of  what it had 
been in 1994. 
In Trinidad  and Tobago,  the trade surplus 
decreased by 20%. Export earnings from  oil and 
petrochemicals and from  manufactures  increased 
but imports grew more rapidly because of  trade 
liberalization measures and more 
accommodating monetary conditions, which 
encouraged spending on consumer and capital 
goods. Meanwhile, food  imports rose by 33%. 
Net outflows  on the services account diminished 
thanks to a higher level of  income from 
transportation services. Net inflows 
corresponding to investment income declined. 
On the other hand, external transfers  went up. 
The capital account deficit  showed a slight 
overall increase; private-sector inflows  declined 
as a result of  a reduction in direct investment and 
the deficit  in official  transactions widened due to 
a downturn in loan disbursements to the central 
government and higher external debt payments. 
An overall surplus was recorded for  the third 
consecutive year, but it was less than one quarter 
of  the surplus recorded in 1994. 
A slightly larger trade deficit  was recorded for 
the Bahamas, with both imports and exports 
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Table 4 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Anguilla -7.9 -16.7 -12.8 -10.3 -8.3 
Antigua and Barbuda -33.5 -18.9 -0.5 -18.0 -16.7 
Bahamas -183.6 -34.1 -54.5 -214.5 -199.8 
Barbados -23.4 145.5 65.4 123.8 78.8 
Belize -26.2 -29.1 -49.0 -30.5 -21.2 
Dominica -33.6 -25.8 -24.7 -40.0 -42.6 
Grenada -46.4 -32.3 -43.6 -21.4 -29.0 
Guyana -118.0 -146.7 -137.9 -100.8 -94.9 
Jamaica -255.8 10.9 -194.2 18.3 -255.1 
Saint Kitts and Nevis -34.9 -15.8 -30.0 -27.1 -25.9 
Saint Lucia -71.9 -54.8 -49.3 -53.8 -30.2 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines -44.0 -25.5 -46.7 -61.3 -57.9 
Trinidad and Tobago -20.7 122.6 67.3 339.4 193.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures. 
increasing modestly. The surplus on the services 
account rose by about 5% even though net 
earnings from  tourism were down slightly. 
Outlays under the heading of  investment income 
were lower, but earnings from  transportation and 
offshore  services higher. The capital account 
surplus also increased, owing mainly to the fact 
that private long-term investment capital 
doubled. Overall, the balance of  payments 
moved from  a small surplus in 1994 to a 
moderate deficit  in 1995. 
In Belize,  merchandise trade was fairly  brisk, 
and the deficit  narrowed by 22%. The growth in 
export earnings was attributable to increased 
sales of  sugar, citrus fruits  and marine products. 
Imports showed an overall decline; the decrease 
of  manufactures  was particularly sharp despite 
higher imports of  food,  fuel  and lubricants. The 
surplus registered for  services shrank, mainly 
because inflows  linked to military operations 
virtually ceased. Earnings from  tourism, on the 
other hand, increased by almost 6%. The 
capital account once again showed a deficit 
due to a reduction in long-term capital inflows 
as a result of  net official-sector  outflows  and a 
slight increase in private inflows.  International 
reserves climbed slightly to the equivalent of 
1.5 months' worth of  imports by the end of  the 
year. 
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ii)  The  external  debt.  The total external debt 
of  the Caribbean countries increased due to their 
mounting service arrears. Apart from  these 
arrears, the countries' debt has contracted during 
three of  the last four  years, although the reduction 
in 1995 was less than 1%; within the OECS group, 
however, the opposite trend was observed, with 
the debt expanding by 2%. In most of  the 
countries except Guyana, external debt service 
payments remained below 20% of  the value of 
exports of  goods and services. 
Public and publicly-guaranteed debt in the 
OECS countries swelled to just under 33% of  their 
aggregate output. The degree of  concessionality 
of  the debt had also been falling  for  the past three 
years, and the ratio of  concessional debt to total 
debt thus declined from  68% in 1993 to 65% in 
1995. Disbursements fell  in comparison with 
1994, and a net outflow  of  resources was 
registered. 
Despite renewed efforts  to reduce interest 
arrears, disbursements under this heading 
actually increased by 8.5% in 1995 and thus 
come to represent 2.3% of  GDP and 4% of  exports 
of  goods and services. 
The stock of  external debt increased in a few 
countries. In the OECS countries, loan funds  were 
procured primarily for  utilities (25%), industrial 
development (17%) and tourism (17%), while 
Table 5 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: EXTERNAL DEBT3 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total 9 794.2 9 553.4 9 465.9 9 346.8 9 046.5 
Anguilla 8.4 9.2 8.6 8.7 7.8 
Antigua and Barbuda 261.1 250.6 235.8 231.4 234.7 
Bahamas 412.4 440.4 453.3 411.4 392.2 
Barbados 417.2 377.5 352.0 357.2 358.9 
Belize 142.8 141.4 167.4 180.4 183.9 
Dominica 92.8 94.1 90.0 98.7 102.2 
Grenada 84.2 80.9 79.0 88.2 88.3 
Guyana 1 873.3 2 054.0 2 062.0 1 999.5 2 058.3 
Jamaica 3 874.3 3 678.0 3 687.2 3 651.9 3 451.9 
Montserrat 3.4 5.2 10.0 10.2 10.2 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 39.1 39.2 40.1 52.1 52.4 
Saint Lucia 81.0 97.1 100.9 106.0 113.6 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 66.1 70.8 77.5 87.5 86.9 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 438.1 2 215.0 2 102.1 2 063.5 1 905.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official  figures  and information  provided by international financial  institutions. 
a Does not include debt service arrears. 
agriculture accounted for  5% and education, 
training and housing accounted for  a further  3%. 
In Barbados,  external debt increased marginally 
to just under 24% of  GDP, while in Guyana it 
increased by 3% due to the fact  that new debt was 
incurred -mainly with multilateral agencies- so 
that the country could consolidate its bilateral 
arrears. Other countries registered a contraction 
in their external debt. In the Bahamas, it 
decreased by 5%; public debt -equivalent to 40% 
of  the total- remained unchanged, but debt 
contracted with commercial banks and with 
offshore  financial  institutions, together with 
bilateral debt, all decreased; in contrast, debt 
owed to international financial  institutions 
increased by about 4%. Overall debt obligations 
were quite low at 22% of  export earnings, and 
debt servicing represented less than 5% of 
exports (both of  these coefficients  were the 
lowest of  all the countries surveyed). Debt also 
declined slightly in Belize  to 37% of  GDP) or 62% 
of  export income. Net capital flows  were 
negative for  the first  time ever, and this reversal 
thus marked a turning point in the profile  of 
Belizean capital flows.  Bilateral debt, 
commercial bank debt and suppliers' credits all 
contracted but debt contracted with multilateral 
institutions to finance  infrastructure  projects 
increased by 8%. Debt servicing was equivalent 
to 6% of  GDP, or 20% of  export earnings. 
In Jamaica,  the external debt declined for  the 
third consecutive year, falling  by 5% in 1995. All 
categories showed a decrease; bilateral debt, 
accounting for  52% of  the total, diminished 
slightly and multilateral debt recorded an even 
sharper decline (10%). Debt service payments 
swelled by 11% while amortization payments, 
accounting for  68% of  the total, increased by 
15%. On the other hand, the debt service burden 
remained constant because of  the increase in 
export receipts. The Paris Club and the 
Government of  the Netherlands also helped to 
ease the debt burden of  the country, which has 
received over US$ 46 million in debt relief  since 
1990. In Trinidad  and Tobago,  external debt 
declined for  the sixth consecutive year and the 
debt-GDP ratio therefore  descended from  44% in 
1994 to 37% in 1995. The only new flows  to 
be received were provided by international 
financial  institutions for  ongoing projects, but 
these inflows  were exceeded by outgoing 
amortization payments. Debt-reduction 
measures and an improved debt profile 
contributed to a decline in the debt-service ratio 
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